

RUSSIA-LINKED VOTE-BUYING IN MOLDOVA'S 2024 ELECTION AND EU REFERENDUM

Moldovan police said a network linked to fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor had moved about USD 39 million from Russia to pay voters ahead of the October 2024 presidential election and EU-accession referendum. In July 2025, the EU Council sanctioned Shor associates for vote-buying in those votes, citing 'persistent destabilising activities by Russia'.

UKRAINE EVIDENCE HUB
BEYOND UKRAINE
AS OF 15 OCT 2026

DEGREE OF PROOF

OFFICIAL ATTRIBUTION

A government, a prosecutor, the EU, NATO or a UN body has formally named Russia, its services or its state-backed forces. This is a position of that authority, not a verdict.

WHO ESTABLISHED IT

Moldovan National Police findings (Oct 2024). EU Council listings under the Moldova destabilisation framework (15 July 2025; Shor listed earlier).

LATEST

As of July 2025, the EU framework covers 23 individuals and 5 entities.

SOURCES

A Council of the EU – Republic of Moldova: Council lists seven individuals and three entities for actions destabilising the country · 2025-07-15

<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/ro/press/press-releases/2025/07/15/republic-of-moldova-council-lists-seven-individuals-and-three-entities-for-actions-destabilising-the-country/pdf/>

C RFE/RL – Moldovan police accuse pro-Russian oligarch of \$39M vote-buying scheme · 2024-10-25

<https://www.rferl.org/a/moldova-police-accuse-shor-russia-oligarch-39m-vote-buying/33172951.html>

WHAT WE ASK OF MEMBER STATES

- Expose interference networks publicly and early.
- Sanction those who finance vote-buying and disinformation.
- Support the electoral resilience of targeted states.

Status follows four degrees of proof: court finding · official attribution · charged · suspected (suspected cases are listed only on the live page). Tier A = courts, UN bodies, international organisations · B = governments, prosecutors · C = media and investigators. Corrections: evidence@ukraine-evidence.org



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