

ROMANIA ANNULS PRESIDENTIAL VOTE AFTER RUSSIAN HYBRID-ATTACK FINDINGS

On 4 December 2024, Romania declassified Supreme Council of National Defence (CSAT) documents. They stated that 'Romania is a target for aggressive Russian hybrid actions' and described a coordinated TikTok campaign for candidate Călin Georgescu, along with cyberattacks on election IT systems by a 'state cyber actor'. On 6 December 2024, the Constitutional Court annulled the entire presidential election.

UKRAINE EVIDENCE HUB
BEYOND UKRAINE
AS OF 15 OCT 2026

DEGREE OF PROOF

OFFICIAL ATTRIBUTION

A government, a prosecutor, the EU, NATO or a UN body has formally named Russia, its services or its state-backed forces. This is a position of that authority, not a verdict.

WHO ESTABLISHED IT

Romanian Presidency / CSAT declassified notes from the SRI, SIE, MAI and STS (4 Dec 2024). Constitutional Court decision annulling the election (6 Dec 2024). The ECHR declared Georgescu's challenge inadmissible (6 Mar 2025). The court rulings concern electoral irregularities and do not themselves attribute the interference to Russia.

LATEST

The election was rerun in May 2025. The European Commission opened DSA proceedings against TikTok on 17 Dec 2024.

SOURCES

- A** European Court of Human Rights – Inadmissibility decision, Georgescu v. Romania · 2025-03-06
<https://www.echr.coe.int/w/inadmissibility-decision-concerning-romania-1>
- C** AGERPRES – Declassified documents from CSAT: Romania target of Russian hybrid actions · 2024-12-04
<https://agerpres.ro/2024/12/04/declassified-documents-from-csat-romania---target-of-russian-hybrid-actions-georgescu-s-campaign---f--1398576>
- C** Verfassungsblog – The second round that wasn't · 2024-12-07
<https://verfassungsblog.de/the-second-round-that-wasnt/>
- C** Euronews – European Commission opens probe against TikTok over Romanian election · 2024-12-17
<https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2024/12/17/european-commission-opens-probe-against-tiktok-over-romanian-election>

WHAT WE ASK OF MEMBER STATES

- Expose interference networks publicly and early.
- Sanction those who finance vote-buying and disinformation.
- Support the electoral resilience of targeted states.

