

MH17: A BUK FROM KURSK, 298 DEAD, THREE COURTS

A Russian Buk-TELAR of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade, driven into occupied Donetsk region and back the same night, fired one missile at a Boeing 777 at 33,000 feet. All 298 on board died, 80 of them children. A Dutch court convicted three men of murder in 2022; in 2025 the ICAO Council and the European Court of Human Rights held Russia responsible. Russia answered with a fighter jet, a retired missile, a withdrawn radar tape and the word 'void'.

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VERIFIED RECORD
OCT 2026

DRAFT — not published. Draft for the editor. Figures checked against the Dutch Safety Board (13 Oct 2015), the JIT (2016–2023), the District Court of The Hague (17 Nov 2022), the ECtHR (9 Jul 2025), ICAO (12 May / 30 Jun 2025), ASIL and the Australian Government (24 Jun 2023). Photos: Wikimedia Commons, official sources, licences checked.

298

people killed: 283 passengers and 15 crew, 80 of them children [A](#)

Dutch Safety Board final report, 13 Oct 2015

53rd

Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade, Kursk — the Russian unit whose Buk-TELAR fired [A](#)

Joint Investigation Team, 24 May 2018; District Court of The Hague, 17 Nov 2022

3 × life


life sentences in absentia for murder: Girkin, Dubinskiy, Kharchenko [A](#)

District Court of The Hague, 17 Nov 2022

2

findings of Russian state responsibility: ICAO Council (12 May 2025), ECtHR Grand Chamber (9 Jul 2025) [A](#)

ICAO; ECtHR



BOTTOM LINE

The weapon and the unit are established. The Dutch Safety Board: a 9N314M warhead on a Buk missile detonated above the cockpit; no other scenario fits. The JIT traced the TELAR to the 53rd Brigade in Kursk and the launch to a field near Pervomaiskyi; the court adopted both.

The state is responsible. The ECtHR Grand Chamber held unanimously that Russia violated Articles 2, 3 and 13 ECHR; the ICAO Council found a breach of Article 3 bis of the Chicago Convention. Russia calls the first void and has appealed the second to the ICJ.

The chain above the trigger is known but unprosecuted. On 8 Feb 2023 the JIT reported 'strong indications' that President Putin decided on supplying the Buk, and suspended the investigation for lack of Russian cooperation.

LEGAL QUALIFICATION IN THREE LAYERS

UNLAWFUL DOWNING OF A CIVIL AIRCRAFT, 298 MURDERS — ESTABLISHED (DISTRICT COURT OF THE HAGUE; ECTHR; ICAO)

DENIAL, COUNTER-NARRATIVES, OBSTRUCTION OF INVESTIGATIONS — PATTERN

ACT OF THE RUSSIAN STATE THROUGH FORCES UNDER ITS OVERALL CONTROL — POSITION (NETHERLANDS, AUSTRALIA, UKRAINE)

Established. District Court of The Hague, 17 Nov 2022: MH17 was shot down by a Buk-TELAR of the Russian 53rd Brigade from a field near Pervomaiskyi; Russia had overall control of the 'DPR'; Girkin, Dubinskiy and Kharchenko guilty of murder. ECtHR Grand Chamber, 9 Jul 2025: Russia responsible under Arts. 2, 3 and 13 ECHR. ICAO Council, 12 May 2025: breach of Art. 3 bis Chicago Convention. **Pattern.** Russian accounts — a Ukrainian Su-25, a Ukrainian Buk, a radar tape showing nothing — each withdrawn by the next, and a veto on a tribunal. **Position.** The Netherlands and Australia hold Russia responsible as a state (25 May 2018); Ukraine qualifies the downing as a war crime in an international armed conflict that Russia has waged since 2014.

WHAT WE ASK

Cite the court, the ECtHR and ICAO together whenever Russia disputes the facts. Support the Netherlands and Australia in Russia's ICJ appeal and the ICAO reparations phase. Designate Col Sergey Muchkaev, Dubinskiy, Kharchenko and the 53rd Brigade where not yet listed — Australia has listed all three men. Quote the JIT's finding on the presidential decision whenever leadership responsibility for 2014 is raised.

Sources: A — Dutch Safety Board, final report (13 Oct 2015); JIT / Netherlands Public Prosecution Service (28 Sep 2016, 24 May 2018, 19 Jun 2019, 8 Feb 2023); District Court of The Hague, judgment of 17 Nov 2022; ECtHR Grand Chamber, *Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia* (9 Jul 2025); ICAO Council decision (12 May / 30 Jun 2025); S/RES/2166 (2014); S/2015/562; Dutch Government (25 May 2018, 2025); Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs (24 Jun 2023); ASIL (Sep 2025). B — Prosecutor General of Ukraine; SBU. C — Bellingcat (2014–2016); StopFake (Jul 2014); Just Security (Nov 2022); TASS (13 Oct 2015); Kommersant, Ukrainska Pravda (9 Jul 2025); Russian MFA via GlobalSecurity (18 Sep 2025). All accessed 21 Oct 2026.



A MISSILE SYSTEM THAT CROSSED A BORDER TWICE IN A DAY

MH17 was one of about 160 airliners that crossed eastern Ukraine on 17 July 2014. It was hit at cruising altitude by a weapon designed to engage aircraft at that height, operated by a crew trained for it, brought in for the purpose from a Russian brigade garrison 100 km from the border.

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16-17 Jul 2014	A Buk-TELAR of the 53rd Brigade crosses from Russia into occupied Donetsk region in a convoy; after the shoot-down it is driven back across the border during the night. A — JIT, 28 Sep 2016 and 24 May 2018
17 Jul 2014, 13:20 UTC	A 9N314M warhead detonates above the left of the cockpit of MH17 (Amsterdam–Kuala Lumpur, 283 passengers, 15 crew); the aircraft breaks up over a 50 km² area near Hrabove. 298 dead. A — Dutch Safety Board, 13 Oct 2015
21 Jul 2014	Security Council resolution 2166 (unanimous): an independent international investigation and access to the site. Same day the Russian MoD claims a Ukrainian Su-25 was 3–5 km from MH17. A — S/RES/2166 (2014); Russian MoD briefing (Lt-Gen Kartapolov)
29 Jul 2015	Russia vetoes a draft resolution to establish an international tribunal for MH17 (11 in favour, 1 against, 3 abstentions). A — UN S/2015/562; Security Council press
13 Oct 2015	Dutch Safety Board final report: a Buk missile with a 9N314M warhead; launch area of 320 km² in eastern Ukraine; Ukraine had sufficient reason to close its airspace; no other scenario fits. The same day Almaz-Antey presents its 'Zaroshchenske' alternative. A — Dutch Safety Board; TASS, 13 Oct 2015
24 May 2018	JIT: the TELAR belonged to the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade of the Russian Armed Forces, Kursk. The next day the Netherlands and Australia formally hold Russia responsible as a state. A — JIT; Dutch Government, 25 May 2018
17 Nov 2022	Verdict: Girkin, Dubinskiy and Kharchenko guilty of murder — life imprisonment and €16 million in damages; Pulatov acquitted. The court finds Russia had overall control of the 'DPR' and assumes the TELAR crew were Russian servicemen. A — District Court of The Hague; Just Security; DutchNews
8 Feb 2023	JIT: 'strong indications' that President Putin decided on supplying the Buk to the separatists; investigation suspended — the bar of conclusive evidence for new suspects cannot be reached without Russian cooperation. A — JIT press conference, The Hague; Arab News/AFP
12 May 2025	ICAO Council: Russia responsible, in breach of the Chicago Convention; written decision 30 Jun 2025. On 18 Sep 2025 Russia appeals to the ICJ under Art. 84. A — Dutch Government; ASIL
9 Jul 2025	ECtHR Grand Chamber, Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia: violations of Arts. 2, 3 and 13 ECHR over MH17. Peskov: the judgments are void and will not be complied with. A — ECtHR; Kommersant / Ukrainska Pravda

WHAT THE INVESTIGATIONS ESTABLISHED

Dutch Safety Board (13 Oct 2015): a 9N314M warhead on a 9M38-series Buk missile detonated at 13:20 UTC above the left side of the cockpit; the airframe broke up in flight. An internal explosion and an air-to-air missile were examined and excluded.

JIT (2016, 2018) and the court (2022): the TELAR entered Ukraine from Russia on 17 July in a convoy filmed along the route, fired from a field near Pervomaiskyi, and was driven back to Russia that night. A Buk cannot be fired by accident; the court assumed the crew were Russian servicemen.



Dutch and Australian police investigators at the MH17 crash site in eastern Ukraine. Photo: Ministerie van Defensie · CC BY-SA 4.0 · via Wikimedia Commons

WHO THE DEAD WERE

298 people: 283 passengers and 15 crew — 196 Dutch nationals on the Dutch Government's count (193 on the Safety Board's single-nationality count), 43 Malaysians, 27 Australians, 12 Indonesians, 10 Britons and others. 80 were children.

The ECtHR found that the next of kin suffered inhuman treatment through Russia's years of denial and obstruction.

Sources: A — Dutch Safety Board, final report (13 Oct 2015); JIT / Netherlands Public Prosecution Service (28 Sep 2016, 24 May 2018, 19 Jun 2019, 8 Feb 2023); District Court of The Hague, judgment of 17 Nov 2022; ECtHR Grand Chamber, *Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia* (9 Jul 2025); ICAO Council decision (12 May / 30 Jun 2025); S/RES/2166 (2014); S/2015/562; Dutch Government (25 May 2018, 2025); Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs (24 Jun 2023); ASIL (Sep 2025). B — Prosecutor General of Ukraine; SBU. C — Bellingcat (2014–2016); StopFake (Jul 2014); Just Security (Nov 2022); TASS (13 Oct 2015); Kommersant, Ukrainska Pravda (9 Jul 2025); Russian MFA via GlobalSecurity (18 Sep 2025). All accessed 21 Oct 2026.

THREE JURISDICTIONS, ONE CHAIN OF CUSTODY

No other case in this war has been examined by a national criminal court, a regional human rights court and a UN specialised agency. Their findings rest on the same evidence and converge.

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ESTABLISHED BY BODIES WITH A MANDATE

Dutch Safety Board, 13 Oct 2015: Buk missile with 9N314M warhead; 'no scenario other than a Buk surface-to-air missile' explains the facts; Ukraine had sufficient reason to close its airspace. A

JIT, 24 May 2018: TELAR of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade; charges of 19 Jun 2019 against four suspects. A

District Court of The Hague, 17 Nov 2022: three convictions for murder, life sentences, €16 million damages; Russia had overall control of the 'DPR'; verdict final. A

ICAO Council, 12 May 2025, and ECtHR Grand Chamber, 9 Jul 2025: Russia breached Art. 3 bis Chicago Convention and Arts. 2, 3 and 13 ECHR. A

UKRAINIAN INVESTIGATION

Ukraine's Prosecutor General and SBU: parallel proceedings since 2014; Ukrainian intercepts formed part of the JIT file; Ukraine is co-applicant at the ECtHR. B

Ukraine restricted only lower altitudes; the Safety Board found it had sufficient reason to close its eastern airspace entirely. B

INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATIONS


Bellingcat, 2014–2016: open-source tracking of the Buk convoy from Kursk to Snizhne and back. C

Bellingcat, 26 Sep 2016: the MoD's 'rediscovered' radar data contradicts its own 2014 Su-25 claim. C

Just Security, Nov 2022: analysis of the court's 'overall control' finding. C

THE NUMBERS — EVERY SOURCE, AS PUBLISHED

Figure	What it counts	Source · date · tier
298 (283 + 15)	killed — passengers + crew; no survivors	Dutch Safety Board, 13 Oct 2015 · A
193 · 196	Dutch victims — Safety Board (single nationality) / Dutch Government (including dual nationals); the hub shows both	Dutch Safety Board; Dutch Government, 9 Jul 2025 · A
80	children among the dead	Dutch Government; JIT · A
320 km²	launch area computed by the Safety Board; the JIT narrowed it to one field near Pervomaiskyi	Dutch Safety Board; JIT 28 Sep 2016 · A
4 · 3 · 1	accused · convicted (life) · acquitted (Pulatov)	District Court of The Hague, 17 Nov 2022 · A
11 – 1 – 3	Security Council vote on the MH17 tribunal draft; Russia's veto	S/2015/562, 29 Jul 2015 · A



Flight data of MH17 on 17 July 2014, 13:17–13:20 UTC, from the Dutch Safety Board preliminary report. Photo: Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid · Public domain · via Wikimedia Commons

Safety Board, court, ECtHR and ICAO findings are Tier A; Ukrainian statements are Tier B; open-source work is support (Tier C). The two Dutch counts differ only in how dual nationals are counted.

Sources: A — Dutch Safety Board, final report (13 Oct 2015); JIT / Netherlands Public Prosecution Service (28 Sep 2016, 24 May 2018, 19 Jun 2019, 8 Feb 2023); District Court of The Hague, judgment of 17 Nov 2022; ECtHR Grand Chamber, *Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia* (9 Jul 2025); ICAO Council decision (12 May / 30 Jun 2025); S/RES/2166 (2014); S/2015/562; Dutch Government (25 May 2018, 2025); Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs (24 Jun 2023); ASIL (Sep 2025). B — Prosecutor General of Ukraine; SBU. C — Bellingcat (2014–2016); StopFake (Jul 2014); Just Security (Nov 2022); TASS (13 Oct 2015); Kommersant, Ukrainska Pravda (9 Jul 2025); Russian MFA via GlobalSecurity (18 Sep 2025). All accessed 21 Oct 2026.

MH17

DRAFT V0.1 · 21 OCT 2026 · NOT PUBLISHED · LIVE VERSION AND CORRECTIONS LOG ON THE UKRAINE EVIDENCE HUB



live page · corrections log

FROM THE KREMLIN DECISION TO THE FIELD NEAR PERVOMAIISKYI

Three men who requested, escorted and guarded the Buk are convicted. The brigade that supplied it is identified; the crew is not. The JIT's last finding points to the top.

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Who	Role in the case	Proceedings	Sanctions · courts
Igor Girkin ('Strelkov') former FSB colonel; 'DPR' defence minister and army commander, Jul 2014	Decided on the deployment of the Buk; 'functional perpetrator' (court)	Life imprisonment in absentia, District Court of The Hague, 17 Nov 2022; final	Australia (2014) and the EU (Apr 2014), for the 2014 aggression
Sergey Dubinskiy former GRU officer; head of 'DPR' intelligence, Girkin's deputy	Requested the Buk; organised its transport and return to Russia; co-perpetrator	Life imprisonment in absentia, 17 Nov 2022; final	Australia, 24 Jun 2023, for MH17
Leonid Kharchenko Ukrainian national; commander of a 'DPR' combat unit, Donetsk region	Commanded the escort; secured the Buk at the launch site; co-perpetrator	Life imprisonment in absentia, 17 Nov 2022; final	Australia, 24 Jun 2023, for MH17
Oleg Pulatov former GRU Spetsnaz officer; deputy head of 'DPR' intelligence	Involved as area commander; insufficient evidence of co-perpetration	Acquitted, 17 Nov 2022	—
Col Sergey Muchkaev commander, 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade, Kursk, Jul 2014	Brigade supplied the Buk-TELAR that fired the missile (JIT, 24 May 2018)	Not charged; JIT investigation suspended 8 Feb 2023	Australia, 24 Jun 2023, for MH17
53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade Russian Armed Forces, Kursk	Source of the TELAR and, on the court's assumption, of the crew	Identified by the JIT; crew not identified	—
Vladimir Putin President of the Russian Federation	'Strong indications' that he decided on supplying the Buk to the separatists (JIT); an intercepted call was played at the briefing	Not charged — head-of-state immunity in the Netherlands; evidence below the prosecution threshold (JIT, 8 Feb 2023)	Listed by the EU, US, UK and others since Feb 2022 for the 2022 aggression; not for MH17

CHAIN OF RESPONSIBILITY

The court's sequence: Dubinskiy requested a Buk → the TELAR crossed from Russia on the night of 16–17 July → Kharchenko's unit escorted it to the field near Pervomaiskyi → it fired at 13:20 UTC → it was driven back to Russia that night.

Above the brigade, the JIT found that the request was passed to Moscow and the decision taken at presidential level — 'strong indications', not proof to the criminal standard. The ECtHR held that Russia exercised overall control of the separatist forces from 11 May 2014.

THE RUSSIAN STATE'S OWN ACTS

Russia's account changed: a Ukrainian Su-25 (MoD, 21 Jul 2014); a Ukrainian Buk from Zaroshchenske (Almaz-Antey, 2015); radar data showing no missile from the east (MoD, 26 Sep 2016).

Russia vetoed the tribunal (29 Jul 2015), left talks with the Netherlands and Australia (2020), called the ECtHR judgment void (9 Jul 2025) and appealed the ICAO decision to the ICJ (18 Sep 2025).

Sanctions column: only designations confirmed in the designating government's own release (Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 24 Jun 2023). A dash means none was identified for this case.

EACH EXPLANATION CANCELLED THE ONE BEFORE

Russia's statements on MH17 do not form a single account. The fighter jet of 2014 was abandoned by the radar tape of 2016; the retired 9M38 missile of 2015 by the court's findings. Only the conclusion stayed the same.

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LT-GEN ANDREI KARTAPOLOV · HEAD OF THE MAIN OPERATIONS
DIRECTORATE, GENERAL STAFF · RUSSIAN MOD BRIEFING,
MOSCOW, 21 JUL 2014

“A Ukraine Air Force military jet was detected gaining height, its distance from the Malaysian Boeing was 3 to 5 km. The SU-25 fighter jet can gain an altitude of 10 km, according to its specification.”

Russian MoD briefing, 21 Jul 2014; transcript via StopFake; Bellingcat, 26 Sep 2016

YAN NOVIKOV · CEO, ALMAZ-ANTEY (STATE-OWNED BUK
MANUFACTURER) · MOSCOW, 13 OCT 2015

“The 9M38 missile was withdrawn from Russian army service. If a Buk system downed the plane, it was hit by a 9M38 missile from Zaroshchenskoye.”

TASS, 13 Oct 2015; Almaz-Antey presentations of 2 Jun and 13 Oct 2015

DMITRY PESKOV · KREMLIN SPOKESMAN · PRESS CALL, 9 JUL
2025

“We do not intend to comply with them. We consider them null and void. (translations vary: 'worthless')”

Kommersant; Ukrainska Pravda, 9 Jul 2025; Censor.net

RUSSIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS · STATEMENT ON THE
ICJ APPEAL · 18 SEP 2025

“The council accepted the position of one side and disregarded or distorted the arguments of the other side ... The ICAO Council's decision has been appealed and consequently has not come into effect.”

Russian MFA statement, 18 Sep 2025 (via GlobalSecurity); ASIL, Sep 2025

WITHDRAWN BY RUSSIA'S OWN RADAR DATA

The Safety Board excluded an air-to-air missile: the damage pattern and the bow-tie fragments fit only a Buk warhead. On 26 Sep 2016 the Russian MoD released radar data showing no second aircraft near MH17 — the Su-25 disappeared from Russia's own account.

What the claim concedes: That MH17 was shot down over territory under separatist control and that Russia tracked the airspace in real time.

CONTRADICTED BY THE LAUNCH SITE AND THE VEHICLE'S IDENTITY

The JIT placed the launch in a field near Pervomaiskyi, not Zaroshchenske, and identified the TELAR by its markings as a 53rd Brigade vehicle from Kursk. The court adopted both findings. The 9N314M warhead is carried by 9M38-series missiles.

What the claim concedes: That a Buk missile destroyed MH17 — abandoning the Su-25 account of the MoD.

A REFUSAL, NOT A REBUTTAL

The Grand Chamber found unanimously that Russia was responsible for the downing, conducted no effective investigation, obstructed the JIT and inflicted inhuman treatment on the relatives. The events fall within Russia's membership of the Convention.

What the claim concedes: Nothing on the facts; Russia did not contest the evidence in the proceedings, having ceased to participate.

A PROCEDURAL OBJECTION, NOT A REBUTTAL

Russia's application argues that the Chicago Convention does not apply during armed conflict (Art. 89) and challenges the Council's jurisdiction and standard of proof (ASIL). It does not contest the JIT's identification of the TELAR. The court and the ECtHR reached the same facts independently.

What the claim concedes: The armed-conflict argument presupposes an armed conflict in eastern Ukraine in July 2014 — the premise Russia denied for eight years.

FAIR TO SAY

The Dutch Safety Board found Ukraine had sufficient reason to close its eastern airspace and did not. This concerns the risk to overflights, not the identity of the shooter.

The judgment establishes the acts of three men; it does not name the crew or the officer who gave the order. The JIT's presidential finding is below the criminal standard and is shown as such. Russia's ICJ appeal is pending.

Sources: A — Dutch Safety Board, final report (13 Oct 2015); JIT / Netherlands Public Prosecution Service (28 Sep 2016, 24 May 2018, 19 Jun 2019, 8 Feb 2023); District Court of The Hague, judgment of 17 Nov 2022; ECtHR Grand Chamber, *Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia* (9 Jul 2025); ICAO Council decision (12 May / 30 Jun 2025); S/RES/2166 (2014); S/2015/562; Dutch Government (25 May 2018, 2025); Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs (24 Jun 2023); ASIL (Sep 2025). B — Prosecutor General of Ukraine; SBU. C — Bellingcat (2014–2016); StopFake (Jul 2014); Just Security (Nov 2022); TASS (13 Oct 2015); Kommersant, Ukrainska Pravda (9 Jul 2025); Russian MFA via GlobalSecurity (18 Sep 2025). All accessed 21 Oct 2026.

CIVIL AVIATION, THE RIGHT TO LIFE, AND OVERALL CONTROL

MH17 is the only case where the question of Russian responsibility for its proxies in Donbas has been answered by courts with binding force: a national criminal court on the men, a human rights court on the state, a treaty body on the obligation never to use weapons against civil aircraft.

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ESTABLISHED — BY BODIES WITH A MANDATE

District Court of The Hague (17 Nov 2022): murder of 298 persons and causing an aircraft to crash; Russia had overall control of the 'DPR', so no combatant immunity; verdict final.

ECtHR Grand Chamber (9 Jul 2025): violations of Arts. 2, 3 and 13 ECHR; Russian jurisdiction over the separatist-held areas from 11 May 2014.

ICAO Council (12 May 2025): breach of Art. 3 bis Chicago Convention; under appeal to the ICJ.

PATTERN — WHAT THE RECORD SHOWS

Weapons moved from Russia into Ukraine with their crews under a 'volunteer' cover, from 2014 on.

The response sequence — a Ukrainian aircraft, a Ukrainian missile, a staged event, a procedural objection — recurs at Kramatorsk, Kremenchuk and Hroza.

Obstruction as policy: the veto (2015), withdrawal from talks (2020), judgments declared void (2025).

POSITION — UKRAINE'S QUALIFICATION

Ukraine qualifies the downing as a terrorist act and a war crime in the international armed conflict that began in 2014, and is co-applicant at the ECtHR.

The Netherlands and Australia hold Russia responsible under international law (25 May 2018) and seek reparation.

THE RULES THAT APPLY

Chicago Convention Art. 3 bis: states must refrain from using weapons against civil aircraft in flight; Art. 84: appeal to the ICJ.

ECHR Art. 2 (life, including the duty to investigate) and Art. 3 (relatives); Additional Protocol I Arts. 48, 57; Rome Statute Art. 8(2)(b)(i).

WHAT WE DO NOT KNOW

The names of the TELAR crew and of the officer who gave the firing order.

The outcome of Russia's ICJ appeal and of the ICAO reparations phase.

The ECtHR just-satisfaction ruling and any way to enforce it.

WHAT WE ASK

- Cite all three findings together.** In statements on MH17 use the court (17 Nov 2022), the ECtHR (9 Jul 2025) and the ICAO Council (12 May 2025) as one record: the unit, the state and the treaty breach are each established by a different body.
- Back the Netherlands and Australia at the ICJ and ICAO.** Intervene or file written observations in support of ICAO's jurisdiction in Russia's Art. 84 appeal, and support the reparations phase at the Council.
- Close the sanctions gap.** Designate Col Sergey Muchkaev and the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade, and list Dubinskiy and Kharchenko for MH17 where not yet listed — Australia has listed all three men (24 Jun 2023).
- Keep the leadership finding on the record.** Quote the JIT's 8 Feb 2023 conclusion on the presidential decision to supply the Buk whenever leadership responsibility for 2014 is discussed, and press for the investigation to be reopened when cooperation becomes possible.

Sources: A — Dutch Safety Board, final report (13 Oct 2015); JIT / Netherlands Public Prosecution Service (28 Sep 2016, 24 May 2018, 19 Jun 2019, 8 Feb 2023); District Court of The Hague, judgment of 17 Nov 2022; ECtHR Grand Chamber, *Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia* (9 Jul 2025); ICAO Council decision (12 May / 30 Jun 2025); S/RES/2166 (2014); S/2015/562; Dutch Government (25 May 2018, 2025); Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs (24 Jun 2023); ASIL (Sep 2025). B — Prosecutor General of Ukraine; SBU. C — Bellingcat (2014–2016); StopFake (Jul 2014); Just Security (Nov 2022); TASS (13 Oct 2015); Kommersant, Ukrainska Pravda (9 Jul 2025); Russian MFA via GlobalSecurity (18 Sep 2025). All accessed 21 Oct 2026.



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5 photographs from official sources, as shown on the live page. Each image is credited and openly licensed; videos are linked to the official post (scan the code). No image shows the dead; graphic aftermath is blurred in print. The downloadable pack on the live page holds the full-size files and their SHA-256.


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Dutch and Australian police investigators at the MH17 crash site in eastern Ukraine

Ministerie van Defensie · 2014-08-03 · CC BY-SA 4.0

https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Investigation_of_the_crash_site_of_MH-17.jpg



Flight data of MH17 on 17 July 2014, 13:17–13:20 UTC, from the Dutch Safety Board preliminary report

Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid · 2014-09-09 · Public domain


https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:MH17_Flight_Data.png



Coffins of MH17 victims arrive at Eindhoven air base from Kharkiv, July 2014

Hille Hillenga · 2014-07-25 · CC BY-SA 4.0

https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Aankomst_slachtoffers_MH17_foto_4.png



Union and Dutch flags at half-mast in Downing Street, July 2014

Foreign and Commonwealth Office · 2014-07-23 · CC BY 2.0

[https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:For_those_lost_on_Flight_MH_17_\(14724657094\).jpg](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:For_those_lost_on_Flight_MH_17_(14724657094).jpg)



The National Monument MH17 at Vijfhuizen near Schiphol

Erikt · 2018-07-29 · CC BY-SA 4.0

https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Nationaal_Monument_MH17.jpg



Live page and evidence pack (ZIP): ukraine-evidence.org/#cases/hist-mh17/media. This appendix is not an evidence repository: original material is held by the Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine (warcrimes.gov.ua) and the ICC Office of the Prosecutor.