

NEBENZIA AT THE COUNCIL: SIX CLAIMS

Russia's Permanent Representative spoke for twelve minutes after the strikes of 7–8 October. Six claims carry the statement. Each is set against Russia's own Ministry of Defence statements, UN findings and the weapons identified at the sites. Quotations from the UN verbatim record and Russia's published English text.

UKRAINE EVIDENCE HUB
VERIFIED RECORD
OCT 2026

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incidents of the week addressed by name in the statement C

Pryluky, Kramatorsk, Zaporizhzhia, Kyiv, Kharkiv — none mentioned

2

MoD target lists that contradict "only military facilities" C

7 Oct (plant in Pryluky; residential block hit) · 14 Oct (Kyiv CHP-4/5/6)

0 / 5

sites where an air-defence position has been evidenced B

Three of the five strikes were glide bombs, which air defence does not engage

4

ICC arrest warrants already issued for "energy = military" conduct A

Kobylash, Sokolov (5 Mar 2024); Shoigu, Gerasimov (24 Jun 2024)

CLAIM 1 · DENIAL

"We decisively reject baseless accusations that the Russian Armed Forces have presumably targeted the civilian population of Ukraine on purpose. Our targets have been and remain only military facilities and infrastructure."

CLAIM 2 · UKRAINE DID IT

"Why Ukrainian forces are stationing air defense systems in residential areas, thus endangering the lives of ordinary Ukrainians. The Kiev authorities are ascribing the blame for the tragedies that are occurring due to the inadequate performance of Ukraine's air defense systems to us... violating Article 58 of Additional Protocol I."

CLAIM 3 · STAGED

"They seek to blame Russia for their failures. Various provocations and staged incidents are used to this end. Instead of evidence and facts, once again, we only hear 'highly likely'."

CLAIM 4 · ENERGY = MILITARY

"A predictable response followed from the Russian armed forces against the facilities of Ukraine's military industrial complex, as well as energy infrastructure involved in military production and logistics."

CLAIM 5 · MIRROR

"Terror against civilians and civilian infrastructure has long become one of the tools of Zelensky's state policy. Residential neighborhoods, civilian buses, hospitals, ambulances, and energy and life-support facilities are targeted time and time again."

CLAIM 6 · UN BIAS (ARRIA, 14 OCT)

"The victim of this campaign has also become our Organization, which is doing everything to avoid documenting the crimes of the Kiev regime, while simultaneously making unfounded accusations against Russia."

CONTRADICTED BY RUSSIA'S OWN MOD

The MoD's 7 Oct target list names an industrial plant in Pryluky; the impact site was a residential building and five children died. On 14 Oct the MoD named Kyiv's three heat-and-power plants as targets. Kramatorsk, 8 Oct: a UMPB D-30SN guided bomb on two passenger buses — 33 killed; no military target has been claimed. "Only military facilities" is a statement about intent; the sites are a statement of fact.

WRONG WEAPON, WRONG ARTICLE

Guided (glide) bombs — Kramatorsk 8 Oct, Zaporizhzhia 10 Oct, Kharkiv 2, 5 and 11 Oct — are released from aircraft and are not engaged by Ukrainian air defence at all; there is no interceptor and no debris. Of the 39 ballistic missiles on 14 Oct, 35 were not intercepted: they arrived. Art. 58 obliges the defender to take precautions; it does not suspend arts. 51 and 57 for the attacker. No evidence of an air-defence position at any of the five sites has been offered.

THE EVIDENCE IS ON THE RECORD

OHCHR verifies each casualty from two independent sources or a field visit; the High Commissioner spoke on Kramatorsk within hours; the Security Council was briefed with figures ("more than 100 civilians killed and at least 429 injured" in one week). Police identified the Kramatorsk weapon by fragments. The "staged" line is the Bucha line of April 2022, which Russia itself abandoned in 2026 (see Fact-check 02).

ALREADY ADJUDICATED

The ICC examined the same argument for the 2022–23 energy campaign and issued four arrest warrants (war crime of attacking civilian objects; crime against humanity). "Predictable response" is a reprisal, prohibited against civilian objects (AP I art. 51(6)); objects indispensable to survival are protected absolutely (art. 54). The 14 Oct MoD list — CHP-4, CHP-5, CHP-6, Trypilska — is the plants that heat Kyiv.

SAID THE DAY AFTER KRAMATORSK

The list — buses, hospitals, ambulances, energy — is the list of Russian strikes of the preceding week: two buses in Kramatorsk (8 Oct), ambulances in Kramatorsk (5 Oct), a hospital in Kryvyi Rih (6 Oct), Kyiv energy (7–8 Oct). The "216 buses" figure had been seeded by the MFA's Miroshnik on 1 Oct. OHCHR records casualties on both sides: 496 civilians killed in Russia Jan–Sep 2026, against 2,222 in Ukraine Jan–Aug — the asymmetry is in the record, not hidden by it.

ACCESS, NOT BIAS

OHCHR's methodology is public and symmetrical; the difference in volume is access. OHCHR visits Ukrainian detention sites and is refused entry to every Russian one; the UN mission on Olenivka was denied access and disbanded. Russia's remedy — invite HRMMU to occupied territory — has been available since 2022.

THE SHAPE OF THE STATEMENT

Four moves, in order: deny intent → shift causation to Ukrainian air defence → call the evidence staged → reframe energy strikes as retaliation. Not one incident of the week was addressed by name. The same four moves appear in the MFA statement of 3 Oct ("strikes of retribution"), the MoD of 4 Oct ("blame only the head of the Kyiv regime") and Zakharova of 7 Oct (foreigners should leave Kyiv so that no "provocative staging" is claimed). **The open question: which military objective was at each of the five sites. No answer has been given.**

Sources: UN Security Council, 10237th meeting, 9 Oct 2026 — press release SC/16472; UN verbatim transcript (transcripts.un.org/en/sc/10237) · Russian Mission to the UN, statement of 9 Oct 2026 (russiaun.ru/en/news/409102026) · Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation: Telegram, 7 Oct 2026, 06:55 MSK; Interfax, 14 Oct 2026 · Russian MFA statement, 3 Oct 2026 (Vedomosti); MoD statement, 4 Oct 2026 (Interfax); Zakharova, Sputnik radio, 7 Oct 2026 (RIA); TASS, 1 Oct 2026 (Miroshnik) · OHCHR, Comment by the High Commissioner, 8 Oct 2026; Protection of Civilians update, August 2026 · Security Council Report, What's in Blue, 9 and 14 Oct 2026 · National Police of Ukraine (Kramatorsk weapon identification) · ICC warrants of 5 Mar and 24 Jun 2024 · Air Force of Ukraine, 14 Oct 2026.



WHO SAID IT, WHERE, AND HOW IT WAS BUILT

The 10237th meeting of the Security Council was requested by Western members after the strikes of 7–8 October. Russia's Permanent Representative spoke after the UN briefers. His statement is the fullest official Russian position of the autumn on civilian harm — and the model for every ministry statement that followed.

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THE VENUE

9 October 2026, 15:00, Security Council chamber. Meeting requested by France, the United Kingdom and other members after the 7 Oct mass strike (32 killed nationwide, 22 in Pryluky) and the 8 Oct Kramatorsk bus strike (33 killed). Greece presiding.

Briefers. ASG Khaled Khiari (DPPA): "more than 100 civilians killed and at least 429 injured" in the preceding week; Pryluky "the deadliest attack"; Kramatorsk "at least 33... in a Russian glide bomb attack that hit two civilian passenger buses"; "all attacks on energy infrastructure and on population centres must cease immediately." Gemma Connell (OCHA) on the humanitarian response.

The record. Press release SC/16472 ("Russian Strikes against Ukraine Have Reached 'New Horrifying Level'"); UN verbatim transcript (interpretation, "not an official record"; provisional verbatim record S/PV.10237); Russia's own English text on [russiaun.ru](#), archived by this site on 14 Oct 2026 because Russian web texts are edited after the fact.

THE SPEAKER

Vassily Nebenzia, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations since 2017. The same office delivered the Bucha denial of 5 April 2022 ("not a single civilian suffered") that Russia abandoned in 2026 (Fact-check 02).

The supporting cast of the week. Foreign Minister Lavrov (UNSC, 23 Sep: "openly terrorist methods", silence on civilian harm) · MFA spokesperson Zakharova (17 Sep: the Secretary-General "played along with the anti-Russian campaign"; 7 Oct: foreigners should leave Kyiv to pre-empt "provocative staging"; 13 Oct: "painful boomerang") · MFA statement, 3 Oct ("strikes of retribution") · MoD, 4 Oct ("blame only the head of the Kyiv regime") · Dmitry Polyanskiy, now Permanent Representative to the OSCE (8 Oct: "failure of Ukraine's air defence"; 10 Oct: "nothing will be left of Ukraine's infrastructure") · Rodion Miroshnik, MFA ambassador-at-large (1 Oct: "216 buses"; 14 Oct Arria: "secret prisons").

Note on roles. Polyanskiy is no longer at the UN; statements attributed to "the Russian Mission" after 2025 should be checked against the OSCE channel.

HOW THE STATEMENT IS BUILT — FOUR MOVES IN TWELVE MINUTES

1

DENY INTENT

"Only military facilities and infrastructure."
No incident of the week named.

2

SHIFT CAUSATION

Ukrainian air defence "in residential areas"; Article 58 AP I invoked against the victim.

3

CALL IT STAGED

"Provocations and staged incidents... 'highly likely'." The Bucha line of 2022, reused.

4

REFRAME AS RETALIATION

"A predictable response" against energy "involved in military production and logistics."

The same four moves appear in the MFA statement of 3 Oct, the MoD statement of 4 Oct and Zakharova's remarks of 7 Oct. This is a line, not an improvisation — which is why a claim-by-claim answer can be prepared once and reused.

WHAT RUSSIA DID NOT SAY

Not one of the five strikes of the week — Pryluky (7 Oct), Kramatorsk (8 Oct), Zaporizhzhia (10 Oct), Kharkiv (2–12 Oct), Kyiv energy (7–8 and 13–14 Oct) — was addressed by name. Kramatorsk, the deadliest, drew no Russian comment at all: the Kremlin spokesman commented the same day only on the absence of "a basis for a near-term peace settlement". Silence is a position: it neither denies the strike, nor offers a target, nor alleges staging.

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CLAIM, RECORD, CONCESSION

Each claim as delivered, the record it runs into, and what it concedes. Concessions matter: a statement that argues about intent has stopped arguing about fact.

UKRAINE EVIDENCE HUB

VERIFIED RECORD

OCT 2026

CLAIM 1 · DENIAL

"We decisively reject baseless accusations that the Russian Armed Forces have presumably targeted the civilian population of Ukraine on purpose. Our targets have been and remain only military facilities and infrastructure."

CONTRADICTED BY RUSSIA'S OWN MOD

The MoD's 7 Oct target list names an industrial plant in Pryluky; the impact site was a residential building and five children died. On 14 Oct the MoD named Kyiv's three heat-and-power plants as targets. Kramatorsk, 8 Oct: a UMPB D-30SN guided bomb on two passenger buses — 33 killed; no military target has been claimed. "Only military facilities" is a statement about intent; the sites are a statement of fact.

What the claim concedes: That strikes are being carried out and that civilians are dying; the dispute is moved to intent.

CLAIM 2 · UKRAINE DID IT

"Why Ukrainian forces are stationing air defense systems in residential areas, thus endangering the lives of ordinary Ukrainians. The Kiev authorities are ascribing the blame for the tragedies that are occurring due to the inadequate performance of Ukraine's air defense systems to us... violating Article 58 of Additional Protocol I."

WRONG WEAPON, WRONG ARTICLE

Guided (glide) bombs — Kramatorsk 8 Oct, Zaporizhzhia 10 Oct, Kharkiv 2, 5 and 11 Oct — are released from aircraft and are not engaged by Ukrainian air defence at all; there is no interceptor and no debris. Of the 39 ballistic missiles on 14 Oct, 35 were not intercepted: they arrived. Art. 58 obliges the defender to take precautions; it does not suspend arts. 51 and 57 for the attacker. No evidence of an air-defence position at any of the five sites has been offered.

What the claim concedes: That the weapons are Russian; the argument is about why they land where they land.

CLAIM 3 · STAGED

"They seek to blame Russia for their failures. Various provocations and staged incidents are used to this end. Instead of evidence and facts, once again, we only hear 'highly likely'."

THE EVIDENCE IS ON THE RECORD

OHCHR verifies each casualty from two independent sources or a field visit; the High Commissioner spoke on Kramatorsk within hours; the Security Council was briefed with figures ("more than 100 civilians killed and at least 429 injured" in one week). Police identified the Kramatorsk weapon by fragments. The "staged" line is the Bucha line of April 2022, which Russia itself abandoned in 2026 (see Fact-check 02).

What the claim concedes: Nothing — but it is the line Russia itself abandoned on Bucha in 2026, which makes it the weakest point to press.

CLAIM 4 · ENERGY = MILITARY

"A predictable response followed from the Russian armed forces against the facilities of Ukraine's military industrial complex, as well as energy infrastructure involved in military production and logistics."

ALREADY ADJUDICATED

The ICC examined the same argument for the 2022–23 energy campaign and issued four arrest warrants (war crime of attacking civilian objects; crime against humanity). "Predictable response" is a reprisal, prohibited against civilian objects (AP I art. 51(6)); objects indispensable to survival are protected absolutely (art. 54). The 14 Oct MoD list — CHP-4, CHP-5, CHP-6, Trypilska — is the plants that heat Kyiv.

What the claim concedes: That energy infrastructure is the target and that the motive is retaliation — the two elements the ICC warrants rest on.

CLAIM 5 · MIRROR

"Terror against civilians and civilian infrastructure has long become one of the tools of Zelensky's state policy. Residential neighborhoods, civilian buses, hospitals, ambulances, and energy and life-support facilities are targeted time and time again."

SAID THE DAY AFTER KRAMATORSK

The list — buses, hospitals, ambulances, energy — is the list of Russian strikes of the preceding week: two buses in Kramatorsk (8 Oct), ambulances in Kramatorsk (5 Oct), a hospital in Kryvyi Rih (6 Oct), Kyiv energy (7–8 Oct). The "216 buses" figure had been seeded by the MFA's Miroshnik on 1 Oct. OHCHR records casualties on both sides: 496 civilians killed in Russia Jan–Sep 2026, against 2,222 in Ukraine Jan–Aug — the asymmetry is in the record, not hidden by it.

What the claim concedes: That attacks on buses, hospitals and ambulances are crimes — the standard Russia asks to be applied to Ukraine applies to Kramatorsk.

CLAIM 6 · UN BIAS (ARRIA, 14 OCT)

"The victim of this campaign has also become our Organization, which is doing everything to avoid documenting the crimes of the Kiev regime, while simultaneously making unfounded accusations against Russia."

ACCESS, NOT BIAS

OHCHR's methodology is public and symmetrical; the difference in volume is access. OHCHR visits Ukrainian detention sites and is refused entry to every Russian one; the UN mission on Olenivka was denied access and disbanded. Russia's remedy — invite HRMMU to occupied territory — has been available since 2022.

What the claim concedes: That OHCHR documents the war; the complaint is about volume, which is a function of access Russia denies.

Sources: UN Security Council, 10237th meeting, 9 Oct 2026 — press release SC/16472; UN verbatim transcript (transcripts.un.org/en/sc/10237) · Russian Mission to the UN, statement of 9 Oct 2026 (russiaun.ru/en/news/409102026; archived 14 Oct 2026) · Security Council Report, What's in Blue, 9 and 14 Oct 2026 · Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation: Telegram, 7 Oct 2026; Interfax, 14 Oct 2026 · Russian MFA, 3 Oct 2026; MoD, 4 Oct 2026; Zakharova, 7 and 13 Oct 2026; Polyanskiy (OSCE), 8 and 10 Oct 2026; Miroshnik, 1 and 14 Oct 2026 · OHCHR, 8 Oct 2026; Protection of Civilians, August 2026 · State Emergency Service of Ukraine (regional directorates, CC BY 4.0) · Air Force of Ukraine · National Police of Ukraine · ICC warrants of 5 Mar and 24 Jun 2024 · COI A/77/533, A/HRC/52/62, A/79/549.



ARTICLE 58 DOES NOT RESCUE ARTICLE 51

Russia's statement makes one legal argument — that Ukraine violates Article 58 of Additional Protocol I by placing air defence near civilians — and one legal claim — that energy infrastructure is a military objective. Both have answers in the text of the Protocol and in decisions already taken.

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ARTICLE 58 — PRECAUTIONS BY THE DEFENDER

What it says. Parties "shall, to the maximum extent feasible", remove civilians from the vicinity of military objectives and avoid locating military objectives within densely populated areas.

What it does not say. Nothing in art. 58 relieves the attacker of arts. 51 (protection of the civilian population) and 57 (precautions in attack). Art. 51(8) is explicit: a violation by the defender "shall not release the Parties to the conflict from their legal obligations with respect to the civilian population". A breach of art. 58, even if proven, is not a defence to an attack on civilians.

What would be needed. Evidence of a military objective at the site. None has been offered for Pryluky, Kramatorsk, Zaporizhzhia, Kharkiv or the Desnianskyi block in Kyiv. The MoD's own 7 Oct list names an industrial plant in Pryluky, not the residential building that was hit.

ENERGY: A QUESTION ALREADY DECIDED

ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II, warrants of 5 Mar 2024 (Kobylash, Sokolov) and 24 Jun 2024 (Shoigu, Gerasimov): reasonable grounds that strikes on Ukrainian electricity infrastructure, Oct 2022 – Mar 2023, were directed at civilian objects (art. 8(2)(b) (ii)), caused excessive incidental harm (8(2)(b)(iv)), and constituted the crime against humanity of inhumane acts (7(1)(k)). The "military logistics" argument was before the Chamber and did not prevail.

Reprisals. "A predictable response" is a reprisal. AP I art. 51(6) prohibits attacks against the civilian population by way of reprisals; art. 54(4) prohibits reprisals against objects indispensable to survival. Announcing reprisals in advance (MFA, 3 Oct; MoD, 4 Oct) is evidence of intent.

Art. 52(3). In case of doubt whether an object normally dedicated to civilian purposes — a heat-and-power plant serving three million people — is being used for military action, it shall be presumed not to be.

THE WEAPONS DECIDE THE "AIR DEFENCE" QUESTION

Guided (glide) bombs — Kramatorsk 8 Oct (UMPB D-30SN, fragments identified by police), Zaporizhzhia 10 Oct (five KABs), Kharkiv 2, 5 and 11 Oct — are released from aircraft 40–70 km away and glide to target. Ukrainian air defence does not engage them; there is no interceptor and no debris to blame.

Ballistic missiles — Kyiv 13–14 Oct: 39 launched, 4 intercepted. Thirty-five arrived. A missile that reaches a nine-storey block has not been "shot down over a residential area"; it has hit it.

Cruise missiles — Pryluky 7 Oct: the Air Force logged 48 launched and 39 intercepted; the one that hit Pryluky was not among the 39. The air-defence argument requires debris; the site shows a direct hit.

MIRROR CLAIMS AND COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY

Tu quoque is not a defence. Whatever Russia alleges about Ukrainian strikes, it has no bearing on the lawfulness of Russian strikes; international criminal law has rejected the argument since Nuremberg. OHCHR records casualties on both sides (496 civilians killed in Russia, Jan–Sep 2026) and the record can be cited without accepting the equivalence.

Command responsibility (Rome Statute art. 28). A statement by the Permanent Representative that strikes on energy are policy ("a predictable response") is relevant to the knowledge element for commanders already under warrant — Gerasimov (General Staff), and for the Supreme Commander.

Established / pattern / position. Established: attacks on residential buildings without a military objective are war crimes (COI, A/77/533); the 2022–23 energy campaign was a war crime and CAH (ICC). Pattern: the 2026 strikes repeat the conduct. Position: Ukraine qualifies the 2026 campaign as a continuing crime against humanity — pending international findings.

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FACT-CHECK 03 · 4 OF 6
V1 · 14 OCT 2026 · LIVE VERSION AND
CORRECTIONS LOG ON THE UKRAINE
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log

STRIKE	WEAPON AND TARGET	CASUALTIES (UKRAINIAN AUTHORITIES, TIER B)	VERIFICATION	RUSSIAN COMMENT
Pryluky, 7 Oct	Cruise missile, residential five-storey block, 150 km from the front	22 killed incl. 5 children; 54 injured (SES, 8 Oct)	UN ASG, 9 Oct: "the deadliest attack"; SES photo record	MoD 7 Oct: "military-industrial facilities", plant in Pryluky listed; residential block not mentioned
Kramatorsk, 8 Oct	UMPB D-30SN guided bomb, two passenger buses, ~10:00	33 killed; 18 injured (SES); +3 in Bilenke	High Commissioner, 8 Oct: "could amount to war crimes"; UN ASG: "at least 33"; police weapon ID	None by name. Nebenzia, 9 Oct: Ukraine targets "civilian buses"
Zaporizhzhia, 10 Oct	Five guided bombs; entrance of a three-storey block collapsed	23 killed incl. 4 children; 32 injured incl. 3 children (SES, 11 Oct)	SES search-and-rescue record; 320 t of debris removed	None. Polyanskiy, 10 Oct: "nothing will be left of Ukraine's infrastructure"
Kharkiv, 2–12 Oct	Guided bombs (2, 5, 11 Oct); missiles on Pischyn (11 Oct); ~10 Banderol missiles (12 Oct)	16 killed, 160+ injured over 11 days; 12 Oct: 4 killed, 41 injured, entrance of a four-storey block destroyed	SES Kharkiv: fire and rescue record; COI 2024 findings on the glide-bomb campaign	Polyanskiy, 8 Oct: "failure of Ukraine's air defence"
Kyiv energy, 13–14 Oct	39 ballistic missiles + 128 drones; all three CHP plants	4 killed, 25 injured; ~600,000 without electricity; outages in 9 regions	Air Force; Ukrenergo; SES Kyiv; ICC warrants for the same conduct (2024)	MoD 14 Oct: "five energy facilities used for the needs of the military-industrial complex" — CHP-4, 5, 6 named

NARRATIVE SHIFT — DAY ONE, WITHIN A WEEK, LATER			
EVENT	DAY ONE	WITHIN A WEEK	LATER
Bucha, 2022 → 2026	"A hoax"; "not a single civilian suffered" (UNSC, 5 Apr 2022)	"Staged provocation... like Gleiwitz"	2026: the dead "were combatants" — deaths under occupation no longer disputed
Pryluky, 7 Oct	MoD: plant in Pryluky among "military-industrial" targets	Nebenzia: Ukrainian air defence to blame (art. 58)	— residential impact never addressed
Kramatorsk, 8 Oct	Silence	Nebenzia: Ukraine targets "civilian buses" (mirror)	— weapon identified; no Russian comment by name
Energy, 2022 → 2026	2022: "demilitarisation of energy"	2024 ICC warrants → "involved in military logistics"	14 Oct 2026: MoD names Kyiv's three CHPs; "nothing will be left of Ukraine's infrastructure"
The UN	"Ukrainian numbers"	Zakharova: SG "played along"	Arria 14 Oct: UN "avoids documenting" Ukrainian crimes — the figures themselves no longer disputed
A line that moves from "it did not happen" to "it happened but was lawful" has conceded the fact. The remaining argument is legal; on energy it has already been decided.			

FOR THE CHAMBER, FOR PARTNERS, FOR THE PRESS

Five sentences that survive interpretation; six answers to the questions partners will ask; and what not to do. Figures as of 14 Oct 2026; OHCHR verification of the week's casualties pending.

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FIVE LINES

1. "Russia says only military facilities. Its own Ministry of Defence lists the targets — and the sites are a bus stop, a five-storey block, a heat-and-power plant."
2. "Three of the five strikes this week were guided bombs. Air defence does not engage them. There is no debris to blame."
3. "On energy the legal question is closed: four ICC arrest warrants for exactly this conduct. 'Military logistics' was argued before the Chamber and lost."
4. "'Staged' is the Bucha line of April 2022. Russia itself dropped it in 2026 — the dead are now 'combatants'. Each new line concedes the last."
5. "Ask one question of the Russian delegation: which military objective was at each of the five sites? The question has been open since 9 October."

WHAT NOT TO DO

- Do not argue totals.** Russia wants a debate about 19 vs 22 in Pryluky, or 30 vs 33 in Kramatorsk. Give both figures with their dates and move to the weapon and the site.
- Do not engage "216 buses" without the OHCHR figure.** Cite 496 (OHCHR, Jan–Sep 2026) and the asymmetry of access; never a number we cannot source.
- Do not say "terror".** Say what the ICC said: war crimes and crimes against humanity. The legal words are stronger because they are findings.
- Do not let "staged" pass.** It is the Bucha line; Russia has abandoned it. Say so once, with the date.
- Do not debate Article 58 in the abstract.** Ask for the military objective at the site. There is none on record.

Q&A

"Russia cites Article 58 — doesn't Ukraine have obligations too?"

Yes, and nothing in art. 58 cancels arts. 51 and 57 for the attacker; art. 51(8) says so in terms. Russia has offered no evidence of a military objective at any of the five sites. The burden is on the party that chose the target.

"Isn't a power plant a legitimate target if it feeds factories?"

The ICC examined that argument for 2022–23 and issued warrants. Art. 52(3) presumes civilian use in case of doubt; art. 54 protects objects indispensable to survival absolutely. A plant that heats three million people is not converted by a factory on the same grid.

"Russia says Ukraine attacks buses and hospitals too."

OHCHR records casualties on both sides — 496 civilians killed in Russia Jan–Sep 2026 — and we cite that figure. It does not change the law for Kramatorsk, where 33 bus passengers died on 8 October and Russia has not commented by name.

"Why do UN figures differ from Ukrainian figures?"

OHCHR counts what it verifies from two independent sources or a field visit; Ukrainian bodies count what they record. Both are right. We show the UN figure first and never merge the two.

"Russia says the UN is biased."

OHCHR's methodology is public and symmetrical. The difference is access: OHCHR visits Ukrainian detention sites and is refused every Russian one; the Olenivka mission was disbanded for lack of access. The remedy is in Moscow's hands.

"What do you want the Council to do?"

Name the five strikes; renew the Commission of Inquiry mandate; fund HRMMU; treat the energy campaign as the continuing crime the ICC has already qualified; and keep asking the question Russia has not answered.

WHAT WE ASK

Name Pryluky, Kramatorsk, Zaporizhzhia, Kharkiv and the Kyiv energy strike in national statements · put the question of the military objective to the Russian delegation on the record · renew the Commission of Inquiry mandate and fund HRMMU so that Tier B figures become Tier A · cite the ICC energy warrants whenever "military-industrial" is said · support air defence against ballistic missiles and counter-aviation capability before December.

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