

VIENNA: THREE STATEMENTS, ONE ADMISSION

In ten days Russia's new envoy to the OSCE told the Permanent Council that the war will go on until Europe's "party of war" is "out of business" — "or else until the complete military collapse of the Kyiv regime", the outcome he called more likely, that no one will give Kyiv "the gift" of a ceasefire because of Minsk, and that it "turns out" striking power plants, bridges and railways "is not allowed". The record answers each line — and the third one is an admission the International Criminal Court has already charged

UKRAINE EVIDENCE HUB
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أكتوبر 2026

Point 1

of the Minsk "Package of Measures" that Russia co-signed and took to the Security Council: an "immediate and comprehensive ceasefire" [A](#) S/RES/2202 (2015), annex I, adopted unanimously 17 Feb 2015

2,105 · 328

civilians killed · injured in Ukraine in September 2026 — the highest September toll [A](#) since February 2022
HRMMU, Protection of Civilians update, 15 Oct 2026

5 · 19 ≤

killed in Pryluky, incl. 5 children — at least 19 (UN Secretariat, SC/16472, Tier A); 22 according to Ukrainian authorities (Tier B) — in the 7 Oct 2026 barrage of about 70 missiles plus dozens of Shahed and 46 jet-powered drones that Polyanskiy called strikes on "facilities supporting Kyiv's military" [A](#) [B](#)
UN Secretariat to the Security Council, 9 Oct 2026 (SC/16472); Ukraine's State Emergency Service, 8 Oct 2026; Zelensky / Air Force via Reuters, 7 Oct 2026; EU statement, OSCE Permanent Council No. 1580, 8 Oct 2026

4

senior Russian officers under ICC arrest warrants for the campaign against Ukraine's electric infrastructure (Kobylash, Sokolov · Shoigu, [A](#) Gerasimov)
ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II, 5 Mar 2024 and 24 Jun 2024

THE SEVEN CLAIMS

Fair to say — and contradicted by Russia's own line at the UN	Our SMO will continue until the "party of war" in Europe is out of business and the European elites stop "putting spokes in the wheels" of efforts to achieve real peace. Or else until the "...complete military collapse of th	Dmitry Polyanskiy · PC No. 1579 · 1 Oct
Misreads Minsk — Russia wrote it	Kyiv may well be ready for a ceasefire — to lick its wounds, stock up on weapons and gather its strength — but no one intends to give such a gift to the Kyiv regime and its sponsors again, remembering the history of the "...	Dmitry Polyanskiy · PC No. 1580 · 8 Oct
Misquotes Merkel and Hollande; no Johnson statement found	After the start of the SMO, Hollande, Merkel]“ neither France, nor [and Johnson said that Germany, nor the United Kingdom ever took the Minsk agreements seriously... and only used them to buy time so that Kyiv could build ”...u	RIA Novosti gloss on Polyanskiy's "history of the Minsk agreements" · 8 Oct
يناقضه المراقبون	The head of the Kyiv regime never tires of threatening Russia with an escalation he is in no position to deliver... the targets hit by the Russian Armed Forces' retaliatory strikes on "...facilities supporting Kyiv's war machi	Dmitry Polyanskiy · PC No. 1580 · 8 Oct
Already adjudicated — and self-incriminating	It turns out that striking bridges, power plants, railway facilities and warehouses is not allowed. Or rather, no one is allowed to — "except Zelensky. (translated)	Dmitry Polyanskiy · Mission Telegram, relayed by RIA Novosti · 10 Oct
Self-incriminating — a threat against civilian infrastructure	Make up your minds about your principled position, ladies and gentlemen — and for a start, restrain your protégés in Kyiv, otherwise nothing will be left of Ukraine's infrastructure "before long! (translated)	Dmitry Polyanskiy · Mission Telegram · 10 Oct
Partly fair — and tu quoque is no defence	Now all those who once rejoiced at Ukrainian militants' hits on infrastructure in Russia, who threatened our bridges and our energy sector, have suddenly raised a howl about the objects "struck in Ukraine. (translated)	Dmitry Polyanskiy · Mission Telegram · 10 Oct

الخلاصة

The admission is on the record. "It turns out that striking bridges, power plants, railway facilities and warehouses is not allowed." It does not "turn out": the ICC found reasonable grounds in 2024 that Russia's strikes on Ukraine's electric infrastructure were directed at civilian objects, and issued warrants for the officers who ran them. The Russian Mission to the OSCE has now said, in writing, that power plants are the target

Minsk is the wrong shield. Russia drafted and co-signed the Minsk Package whose first point was a ceasefire, took it to the Security Council as resolution 2202, called itself its guarantor for seven years — and then declared on 22 Feb 2022 that the agreements "no longer exist". Merkel and Hollande said Minsk gave Ukraine time; neither said it was a sham, and Putin himself said their words came as a surprise

The war aim is stated. "Until the complete military collapse of the Kyiv regime" is not a security concern; it is a demand for the defeat of a UN member state. Set beside the Council statement of 9 Oct that Russia "has never refused" negotiations, the two cannot both be true

The week he described. Polyanskiy's "strikes on facilities supporting Kyiv's military" were the 7 Oct barrage: about 70 missiles plus dozens of Shahed and 46 jet-powered drones; in Pryluky a five-storey apartment block, at least 19 killed including five children (UN Secretariat, SC/16472) — 22 according to Ukrainian authorities; and Russia's own Ministry of Defence naming "Plastmass-Pryluky" as an aim-point

من الإنصاف القول. Ukraine does strike refineries, depots and bridges inside Russia and says so; OHCHR relays Russian-reported casualties (496 killed, Jan-Sep 2026) it cannot verify. The law binds both sides. It does not make one side's violations a licence for the other's — and Ukraine has accepted a full ceasefire since March 2025; Russia, in Vienna, said it will not

Ask the OSCE Secretariat to post the Russian PC.DEL texts of 1 and 8 Oct 2026 promptly, so the record is the Council's, not RIA's · put the 10 Oct "power plants" statement on the record at the next Permanent Council and in the Security Council, next to the ICC warrants of 5 Mar and 24 Jun 2024 · ask Russia to say whether it stands by its own resolution 2202 (2015) and the Minsk ceasefire it co-signed · support the Commission of Inquiry's and HRMMU's work on the autumn energy campaign and the OCHA Winter Response Plan (\$358 m) · restate the ceasefire Ukraine accepted on 11 Mar 2025 and ask Russia, in Vienna, to accept it

ما نطالب به



الصفحة الحية · سجل التصويتات

تدقيق الحقائق
V1 · 21 OCT 2026

المصادر: RIA Novosti, 1, 8 and 10 Oct 2026 · Russian Mission to the OSCE, Telegram 8616, 10 Oct · EU statement, PC No. 1580, 8 Oct · UN Meetings Coverage SC/16472, 9 Oct 2026 · HRMMU, Protection of Civilians, Sept 2026 (15 Oct) · ICC, 5 Mar and 24 Jun 2024 · COI A/HRC/55/66; COI statement 21 Sep 2026 (via SCR) · S/RES/2202 (2015); SC/11785 · Die Zeit, 7 Dec 2022; Kyiv Independent, 28 Dec 2022; TASS, 30 Dec 2022 · Kremlin, 22 Feb 2022 · ECtHR GC, 9 Jul 2025 · Security Council Report, Sep–Oct 2026 · Meduza, 8 Oct 2026 · Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 7 Oct 2026 · full list on page 6

WHO SAID IT, WHERE, AND TO WHOM

UKRAINE EVIDENCE HUB

السجل الموثّق

أكتوبر 2026

Where each claim was made, who made it, how the others in the room answered, and what the .statements left out

THE OCCASION AND THE RECORD		
OSCE Permanent Council — weekly plenary of the 57 participating States, Hofburg, Vienna; sessions closed to the press; delegations' statements are circulated as PC.DEL documents and later posted on osce.org (as of 21 Oct 2026 the latest posted PC.DEL texts date from August 2026 — the October statements are not yet online)		الصيغة
PC No. 1579 (1 Oct 2026) · PC No. 1580 (8 Oct 2026) · Russian Mission Telegram post, 10 Oct 2026 (not a Council statement; relayed by RIA Novosti the same day)		Meetings
Dmitry Polyanskiy, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the OSCE since the presidential decree of 29 Dec 2025 (previously First Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN, New York)		المتحدث
No verbatim OSCE record. Texts carried by RIA Novosti ("the text of his statement is in RIA Novosti's possession") and by the Mission's Telegram channel; quotations below are translated from the Russian — replace with the PC.DEL English text when posted		المصدر
Oct barrage (about 70 missiles plus dozens of Shahed and 46 jet-powered drones; Pryluky: ≥19 killed per SC/16472, 22 per 7 Ukrainian authorities) · 8 Oct glide bomb on two buses in Kramatorsk (≥33 killed) · 9 Oct emergency Security Council briefing (SC/16472) · HRMMU September update published 15 Oct · Russian General Staff announces "massive strikes" on energy, 15–16 Oct		السياق
None. The Permanent Council takes no decision on agenda item "Russia's ongoing aggression against Ukraine"; the EU statement "(PC 1580) and aligned States demanded that Russia "immediately and unconditionally cease its aggression		Outcome

المتحدثون		
Delivered the 1 Oct and 8 Oct statements at the Permanent Council; author of the 10 Oct Telegram statement on infrastructure strikes	Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the OSCE (decree of 29 Dec 2025); First Deputy PR to the UN 2018–2025	Dmitry Polyanskiy
Published the 10 Oct text (post 8616) that RIA Novosti relayed within the hour	Telegram channel RusMissionOSCE	Russian Mission to the OSCE (press service)
Sole public carrier of the 1 and 8 Oct statements ("text in RIA Novosti's possession"); added the Merkel/Hollande/Johnson gloss to the 8 Oct piece in its own voice	State news agency	RIA Novosti

WHAT OTHERS SAID		
On October 7, Russia carried out one of the largest attacks against Ukraine in recent weeks... around 70 missiles — many of" them ballistic — and drones, killing at least 22 people, including 5 children"; strikes on schools in Sumy and Kyiv; 4,278 schools damaged and 428 destroyed; demanded that Russia "immediately and unconditionally cease its aggression" and agree to "a full, ."immediate and unconditional ceasefire		European Union (+ Albania, Andorra, Georgia, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Norway, San Marino, Ukraine) · PC No. 1580, 8 Oct
Called Russia's war an "illegal and unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine" and rejected Russia's agenda proposal as an .attempt to justify it		European Union · PC No. 1578, 24 Sep
Russia is "seeking to make the unacceptable appear routine"; a Russian MoD post said Ukrainians would "freeze" and the Kremlin .called the energy system an "Achilles heel"; "directly targeting civilian infrastructure may constitute a war crime" (SC/16472)		United Kingdom · Security Council, 9 Oct (same week)
Moscow targets "the very conditions of the Ukrainian people's existence on their own land"; demanded an "immediate, .comprehensive and unconditional ceasefire" and backed a moratorium on energy and Black Sea attacks (SC/16472)		France · Security Council, 9 Oct
.The killing must stop"; the conflict will end "only through negotiations"; continued mediation of trilateral talks (SC/16472)"		United States · Security Council, 9 Oct
.Warned of the harshest winter yet; called for safe humanitarian access and an immediate, unconditional ceasefire (SC/16472)		Nordic States (Norway for DK, FI, IS, SE) · Security Council, 9 Oct
Reckless and deliberate disregard for international humanitarian law"; "As Europeans, we stand ready to talk. Ukraine stands" .ready to talk" (SC/16472)		Germany · Security Council, 9 Oct
.Russia cannot bomb its way to a legitimate peace" (SC/16472)"		Poland · Security Council, 9 Oct

كيف تنشر الرواية
Each statement was published by RIA Novosti within hours (1 Oct 15:05, 8 Oct 14:00–14:01, 10 Oct 14:56 Moscow time) under headlines "Russia will continue the SMO until the complete collapse of the Kyiv regime", "Russia is not going to give Kyiv a ceasefire" and "Ukraine's infrastructure will be destroyed if the West does not restrain Kyiv", and reprinted by Lenta, Gazeta.ru and regional outlets. The Minsk line travelled with RIA's own gloss that Merkel, Hollande and Johnson "never took the Minsk agreements seriously" — words none of them said. Because the Council sits behind closed doors and PC.DEL texts appear weeks later, the .Russian version is the only one in circulation

WHAT THE STATEMENTS LEFT OUT
That Russia co-signed the Minsk Package of Measures (12 Feb 2015, Trilateral · Contact Group with the OSCE) and sponsored its endorsement by the Security Council — resolution 2202 (2015), adopted unanimously on 17 Feb 2015, "calls on all parties to fully implement the Package of measures, including a comprehensive .ceasefire" (UN Meetings Coverage SC/11785)
That Russia ended Minsk itself: on 22 Feb 2022 President Putin said the Minsk · agreements "no longer exist", the day after recognising the "DPR" and "LPR" .(Kremlin press conference, 22 Feb 2022)
That the European Court of Human Rights (Grand Chamber, Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia, 9 Jul 2025) found Russia exercised effective control over the separatist-held areas from 11 May 2014 — i.e. Russia was a party to the conflict .Minsk was meant to end, not a mediator
That the ICC issued arrest warrants in 2024 for four senior Russian officers for the · campaign against Ukraine's electric infrastructure, finding reasonable grounds that the strikes "were directed against civilian objects" (ICC, 5 Mar and 24 Jun 2024) — .the same category of target Polyanskiy says it "turns out" is not allowed
That Ukraine has accepted a full and unconditional ceasefire since 11 Mar 2025 · (Jeddah) — restated by 47 States at the Security Council on 23 Sep 2026 — and that the UN Secretariat asked both sides for an "immediate, full and unconditional .ceasefire" on 9 Oct 2026 (SC/16472)



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الادعاء، السجل، الإقرار (4-1)

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Each claim as made, with the date, the venue and a link; the record it runs into, with the tier of the evidence; and what it concedes. Words in square brackets are the Hub's

الأدلةA

FAIR TO SAY — AND CONTRADICTED BY RUSSIA'S OWN LINE AT THE UN

This is a self-description and is taken as such: the stated condition for ending the war is the military defeat of Ukraine's government. Eight days later at the Security Council (9 Oct, SC/16472) Russia's representative said Moscow "has never refused" negotiations and that it was Kyiv that "consciously chose to aggravate the situation". The UN Secretariat the same day called for a "full, immediate and unconditional ceasefire" (SC/16472). Ukraine accepted a full 30-day ceasefire on 11 Mar 2025 (Jeddah joint .statement) and 47 States restated that at the Council on 23 Sep 2026

The war aim: not "security guarantees" or "denazification" but the collapse of: ما يُقَرَّر به الادعاء: .the government of a UN member State — the object of UN Charter art. 2(4)

CLAIM 1 · DMITRY POLYANSKIY · PC NO. 1579 · 1 OCT

Our SMO will continue until the "party of war" in Europe is out of“ business and the European elites stop "putting spokes in the wheels" of efforts to achieve real peace. Or else until the complete military collapse of the Kyiv regime. [RIA Novosti adds: in Polyanskiy's view the probability of the second scenario looks even higher, given the pace of the Russian troops' advance.]”(translated)

Statement at a closed session of the OSCE Permanent Council, Vienna, 1 Oct 2026, text published by RIA Novosti, 1 Oct 2026, 15:05 Moscow time — <ria.ru/20261001/rossija-2121468488.html>

الأدلةA

MISREADS MINSK — RUSSIA WROTE IT

Point 1 of the Minsk Package of Measures (12 Feb 2015) is an "immediate and comprehensive ceasefire"; Russia's ambassador co-signed it in the Trilateral Contact Group, and Russia drafted and sponsored Security Council resolution 2202 (2015), adopted unanimously on 17 Feb 2015, which "calls on all parties to fully implement the Package of measures, including a comprehensive ceasefire" (SC/11785). For seven years Russia called itself a guarantor and demanded the Package be implemented "word for word" (Churkin, SC/11785). On 22 Feb 2022 President Putin said the agreements "no longer exist". The ECtHR Grand Chamber has since found that Russia controlled the "republics" from 11 May 2014 (9 Jul 2025) — a party, not a guarantor. The "gift" Russia .now refuses is the thing it put its name to

That Russia refuses a ceasefire on principle — the answer to "who blocks the: ما يُقَرَّر به الادعاء: .ceasefire", in Russia's own words

CLAIM 2 · DMITRY POLYANSKIY · PC NO. 1580 · 8 OCT

Kyiv may well be ready for a ceasefire — to lick its wounds, stock“ up on weapons and gather its strength — but no one intends to give such a gift to the Kyiv regime and its sponsors again, “remembering the history of the Minsk agreements. (translated)

Statement at the OSCE Permanent Council, 8 Oct 2026, text published by RIA Novosti, 8 Oct 2026, 14:00 — <ria.ru/20261008/rossija-2123186991.html> (translated from the Russian)

الأدلةA

MISQUOTES MERKEL AND HOLLANDE; NO JOHNSON STATEMENT FOUND

Merkel, Die Zeit, 7 Dec 2022: "The 2014 Minsk agreement was an attempt to give Ukraine time. It also used this time to become stronger, as can be seen today" ("...war der Versuch, der Ukraine Zeit zu geben"). Hollande, Kyiv Independent, 28 Dec 2022: "Yes, Angela Merkel is right on this point... It is the merit of the Minsk agreements to have given the Ukrainian army this opportunity." Neither said the agreements were never taken seriously or were a ruse; both described a frozen conflict that bought time. Putin's own reaction (Bishkek, 9 Dec 2022): "Frankly, this was completely unexpected for me" — i.e. Moscow had treated the German side as sincere. No statement by Boris Johnson that the UK "never took Minsk seriously" has been found; the UK was not part of the Normandy format (France, Germany, Russia, Ukraine). The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission recorded ceasefire violations by both sides throughout 2015–2022 (daily .reports)

That Minsk was a ceasefire that held, however badly, for seven years — which: ما يُقَرَّر به الادعاء: .is what the 2026 "gift" would be

CLAIM 3 · RIA NOVOSTI GLOSS ON POLYANSKIY'S "HISTORY OF THE MINSK AGREEMENTS" · 8 OCT

After the start of the SMO, Hollande, Merkel and Johnson said]“ neither France, nor Germany, nor the United Kingdom ever [that took the Minsk agreements seriously... and only used them to buy time so that Kyiv could build up its forces and prepare for a conflict with Russia. (translated; RIA's words, carried with the “statement)

RIA Novosti, 8 Oct 2026, same article; the claim recurs in Russian MFA and Mission statements since Dec 2022 <ria.ru/20261008/rossija-2123186991.html>

الأدلةA

يناقضه المراقبون

The "targets" of the previous night and day: on 7 Oct Russia launched about 70 missiles plus dozens of Shahed and 46 jet-powered drones (Zelensky / Air Force via Reuters, 7 Oct); the EU statement at the Permanent Council spoke of "around 70 missiles — many of them ballistic — and drones, killing at least 22 people, including 5 children" (EU statement, PC No. 1580, 8 Oct). The UN Secretariat told the Security Council on 9 Oct that a missile "destroyed a residential building" in Pryluky, killing at least 19 including five children, and that in one week more than 100 civilians were killed and at least 429 injured (SC/16472). Russia's Ministry of Defence listed "Plastmass-Pryluky" among the enterprises struck on 7 Oct (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 7 Oct) — the hit was a five-storey apartment block; according to Ukrainian authorities 22 were killed including five children and 54 injured (Ukraine's State Emergency Service, 8 Oct · Tier B, operational). HRMMU's September update: 328 killed, 2,105 injured, 53% by missiles and long-range drones (15 .Oct 2026)

The 7 Oct barrage, its scale, and its motive in his own word — "retaliatory": ا: ما يُقَرَّر به الادعاء: .reprisal, which AP I art. 52(1) forbids against civilian objects

CLAIM 4 · DMITRY POLYANSKIY · PC NO. 1580 · 8 OCT

The head of the Kyiv regime never tires of threatening Russia“ with an escalation he is in no position to deliver... the targets hit by the Russian Armed Forces' retaliatory strikes on facilities “supporting Kyiv's war machine are so many... (translated)

Statement at the OSCE Permanent Council, 8 Oct 2026, text published by RIA Novosti, 8 Oct 2026, 14:01 — <ria.ru/20261008/zelenskij-2123187188.html> (translated from the Russian)



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CLAIM, RECORD, CONCESSION (5-7)

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الأدلة **A** **C**

ALREADY ADJUDICATED — AND SELF-INCRIMINATING

ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II, 5 Mar 2024: arrest warrants for Lt-Gen Sergei Kobylash (Long-Range Aviation) and Adm. Viktor Sokolov (Black Sea Fleet) for "missile strikes carried out by the Russian armed forces against the Ukrainian electric infrastructure from at least 10 October 2022 until at least 9 March 2023" — the war crimes of directing attacks at civilian objects (art. 8(2)(b)(ii)) and causing excessive incidental harm (art. 8(2)(b)(iv)), and the crime against humanity of inhumane acts (art. 7(1)(k)). 24 Jun 2024: the same charges against Sergei Shoigu and Valery Gerasimov; the Chamber found reasonable grounds that "the alleged strikes were directed against civilian objects" and, for any installation that might have been a military objective, that the expected civilian harm "would have been clearly excessive to the anticipated military advantage". The Commission of Inquiry found the waves of attacks on energy infrastructure from 10 Oct 2022 may amount to crimes against humanity (A/HRC/55/66, Mar 2024) and on 21 Sep 2026 warned that continued attacks were "increasing civilians' vulnerability" before winter. Power plants are not "allowed" when the foreseeable effect is to cut heat, water .and light to millions (AP I arts. 51(5)(b), 52, 54)

In writing, from the Mission's own channel: that power plants, railways and **ما يُقَرَّر به الادعاء:** .bridges are the targets — the element the ICC had to prove

CLAIM 5 · DMITRY POLYANSKIY · MISSION TELEGRAM, RELAYED BY RIA NOVOSTI · 10 OCT

It turns out that striking bridges, power plants, railway facilities“ and warehouses is not allowed. Or rather, no one is allowed to — ”except Zelensky. (translated)

Russian Mission to the OSCE, Telegram post 8616, 10 Oct 2026 — t.me/RusMissionOSCE/8616; relayed by RIA Novosti, 10 Oct 2026, 14:56 — ria.ru/20261010/polyanskiy-2123675265.html (translated from the Russian) t.me/RusMissionOSCE/8616

الأدلة **A** **C**

SELF-INCRIMINATING — A THREAT AGAINST CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE

AP I art. 51(2) prohibits "acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population"; art. 54(2) prohibits attacking, destroying or rendering useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population. On 15–16 Oct the Chief of the General Staff reported to the President that Russian forces "have begun massive strikes on Ukraine's energy facilities" and that a "list of these objects" had been drawn up (Interfax/TASS, 16 Oct); on 15 Oct President Putin said "they are already squealing about energy... and other objects, including data centres" (RIA Novosti). The UN Secretariat: "repeated attacks on energy infrastructure risk leaving large numbers of civilians without heating, electricity and water" as winter approaches (SC/16472, 9 Oct). OCHA has a \$358 million winter plan for 2 million people, and "no amount of preparedness can substitute for protecting the infrastructure civilians depend .on" (SC/16472)

Intent: the destruction of a country's infrastructure as leverage on third States **ما يُقَرَّر به الادعاء:** .— reprisal logic, which AP I art. 52(1) forbids

CLAIM 6 · DMITRY POLYANSKIY · MISSION TELEGRAM · 10 OCT

Make up your minds about your principled position, ladies and“ gentlemen — and for a start, restrain your protégés in Kyiv, otherwise nothing will be left of Ukraine's infrastructure before ”long! (translated)

t.me/RusMissionOSCE/8616; RIA Novosti, 10 Oct 2026 t.me/RusMissionOSCE/8616

الأدلة **A** **C**

PARTLY FAIR — AND TU QUOQUE IS NO DEFENCE

Ukraine strikes refineries, fuel depots, airfields and bridges in Russia and says so; Russia's representative listed them at the Security Council on 9 Oct (SC/16472). OHCHR records reports of 496 civilians killed and 3,394 injured in Russia by Ukrainian attacks, Jan–Sep 2026 — figures "reported by Russian authorities" that OHCHR cannot verify, since Russia gives it no access (SC/16472; DiCarlo, 23 Sep 2026). The Secretariat's rule covers both: "All attacks targeting civilians and civilian infrastructure, wherever they occur, are a violation of international humanitarian law and must end immediately" (SC/16472). A refinery is not a power plant serving a city: the distinction is between a military objective (AP I art. 52(2)) and an object indispensable to civilian survival (art. 54). And a violation by one party never licenses the other — reprisals against civilian .objects are prohibited (art. 52(1))

That Russian strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure are a response to Ukrainian **ما يُقَرَّر به الادعاء:** .strikes — a reprisal motive, stated

CLAIM 7 · DMITRY POLYANSKIY · MISSION TELEGRAM · 10 OCT

Now all those who once rejoiced at Ukrainian militants' hits on“ infrastructure in Russia, who threatened our bridges and our energy sector, have suddenly raised a howl about the objects ”struck in Ukraine. (translated)

t.me/RusMissionOSCE/8616; RIA Novosti, 10 Oct 2026 t.me/RusMissionOSCE/8616



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WHAT RUSSIA SAYS, WHAT THE RECORD SHOWS

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Each line sets a Russian statement against the finding of a mandated body or, where none exists, an independent investigation. Tiers are marked on every source

السجل			
المصدر	ما يُظهره السجل	WHAT RUSSIA SAYS	QUESTION
RIA 8 Oct · Jeddah statement · SC/16472	Ukraine accepted a full 30-day ceasefire on 11 Mar 2025; 47 States restated it at the UNSC on 23 Sep 2026; UN called for a "full, immediate and unconditional ceasefire" on 9 Oct	No one intends to give such a gift to the Kyiv" regime" (8 Oct)	Who refuses a ceasefire
S/RES/2202 (2015) annex I · SC/11785 · Kremlin, 22 Feb 2022	Point 1: immediate and comprehensive ceasefire; co-signed by Russia; endorsed unanimously by UNSC res. 2202; declared non-existent by Putin on 22 Feb 2022	A "gift" that Kyiv used to rearm; the West ""never took it seriously	What Minsk II was
Die Zeit, 7 Dec 2022	An attempt to give Ukraine time. It also used this" "time to become stronger	Never took the Minsk agreements seriously"" (RIA gloss)	What Merkel said
EU PC 1580 · SC/16472 · Reuters 7 Oct · Rossiyskaya Gazeta 7 Oct	about 70 missiles plus dozens of Shahed and 46 jet-powered drones; Pryluky: ≥19 killed incl. 5 children (SC/16472, A), 22 per Ukrainian authorities (B); residential building destroyed; MoD's own list names ""Plastmass-Pryluky	"Facilities supporting Kyiv's military"	The 7 Oct strikes
ICC 5 Mar & 24 Jun 2024 · A/HRC/55/66	ICC warrants for four officers: attacks on electric infrastructure "directed against civilian objects"; COI: may amount to crimes against humanity	It turns out... not allowed" — treated as" absurd	Power plants as targets
HRMMU, 15 Oct 2026	killed, 2,105 injured; +85% on Sept 2025; civilian 328 casualties recorded in Kyiv on 22 of 30 days	Not mentioned	Civilian toll, Sept 2026
SC/16472	killed, 3,394 injured — reported by Russian 496 authorities, not verifiable by OHCHR (no access)	affected" (Nebenzia, 9 Oct) 8,000"	Civilians in Russia, Jan-Sep 2026

من الإنصاف القول

Russia's refusal of a ceasefire is stated openly and consistently (Lavrov 23 Sep, Polyanskiy 1 and 8 Oct, Peskov 12 Oct). That is honest, and the Hub treats .it as such: the point is not that Russia hides its position but that the position contradicts the "never refused negotiations" line used at the UN

Merkel's and Hollande's 2022 remarks were careless and have been read by many — not only in Moscow — as saying Minsk was never meant to be .implemented. The Hub's reading (an attempt to buy time; a frozen conflict; no sham) is the text of the interviews; the reader should check them

Ukraine does strike energy and transport targets inside Russia; OHCHR relays Russian-reported casualties it cannot verify. The IHL rules cited here bind .Ukraine too

The 1 and 8 Oct quotations rest on texts carried by RIA Novosti; the OSCE's PC.DEL documents for October are not yet posted. If the English PC.DEL text .differs, it governs



الصفحة الحية · سجل التصويبات

تدقيق الحقائق
V1 · 21 OCT 2026

المصادر: RIA Novosti, 1, 8 and 10 Oct 2026 · Russian Mission to the OSCE, Telegram 8616, 10 Oct · EU statement, PC No. 1580, 8 Oct · UN Meetings Coverage SC/16472, 9 Oct 2026 · HRMMU, Protection of Civilians, Sept 2026 (15 Oct) · ICC, 5 Mar and 24 Jun 2024 · COI A/HRC/55/66; COI statement 21 Sep 2026 (via SCR) · S/RES/2202 (2015); SC/11785 · Die Zeit, 7 Dec 2022; Kyiv Independent, 28 Dec 2022; TASS, 30 Dec 2022 · Kremlin, 22 Feb 2022 · ECtHR GC, 9 Jul 2025 · Security Council Report, Sep–Oct 2026 · Meduza, 8 Oct 2026 · Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 7 Oct 2026 · full list on page 6

ESTABLISHED, PATTERN, POSITION

UKRAINE EVIDENCE HUB
السجل الموثق
أكتوبر 2026

What mandated bodies have established, what the record shows as a pattern, and what is a position — kept apart. Then the lines to take and the questions to expect

LINES TO TAKE

1. Russia's envoy in Vienna says striking power plants, bridges and "railways 'turns out' not to be allowed. The International Criminal Court said so in 2024 — and issued four warrants
2. The Minsk ceasefire that Russia now calls a 'gift' was drafted by Russia and endorsed by Russia's own resolution 2202. Russia declared it dead on 22 February 2022
3. Merkel said Minsk 'gave Ukraine time'. She did not say it was a "sham — and Putin said her words surprised him
4. Until the complete military collapse of the Kyiv regime' is the "war aim, stated in Vienna. 'We never refused negotiations' was said in New York eight days later. Both cannot be true
5. The 'facilities supporting Kyiv's military' of 7 October included an apartment block in Pryluky. Russia's Defence Ministry listed Pryluky itself
6. Ukraine accepted a full ceasefire in March 2025. Russia, in Vienna, said it will not give one. That is the whole answer to 'who blocks peace

القانون

UN Charter art. 2(4); GA res. ES-11/1 (2 Mar 2022): the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of a State is prohibited; "until the complete military collapse of the Kyiv regime" states the prohibited object

AP I arts. 48, 51(2), 52(1)-(2): distinction; no threats of violence to terrorise civilians; civilian objects are not to be attacked or made the object of reprisals; a military objective must make an effective contribution to military action and its destruction offer a definite military advantage — a power plant serving a city in winter fails the test when the foreseeable harm is to the population (**art. 51(5)(b), art. 54(2)** on objects indispensable to civilian survival; **art. 56** on dams, dykes and nuclear electrical generating stations)

Rome Statute arts. 8(2)(b)(ii), 8(2)(b)(iv), 7(1)(k): the charges in the ICC warrants of 5 Mar and 24 Jun 2024 for the energy campaign; "it turns out... not allowed" is the Chamber's finding, not a discovery

S/RES/2202 (2015), annex I, point 1: "immediate and comprehensive ceasefire" — the Minsk ceasefire Russia co-signed; ICC warrants; ECtHR finding of Russian control from 11 May 2014; Minsk as a Western HRMMU monthly tolls; COI warnings on energy "ruse" — no body has found it

أسئلة وأجوبة

No double standard: the UN says all attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure, wherever they occur, violate IHL. The difference is in the objects — refineries and depots feeding an invading army are military objectives; power plants that heat cities in winter are not, which is why the ICC charged the officers who ran Russia's 2022–23 energy campaign. And one side's violation never licenses the other's: reprisals against civilian objects are prohibited

No. Merkel said Minsk was "an attempt to give Ukraine time" and that Ukraine used that time; Hollande agreed. Neither said the agreements were never meant to be implemented. Russia co-signed Minsk, took it to the Security Council, and ended it on 22 February 2022

Russia says it will give no ceasefire — that is the admission. Ukraine accepted a full, unconditional 30-day ceasefire in March 2025 and has repeated it since; the UN Secretariat asked both sides for one on 9 October. Rearming during a ceasefire is a risk for both sides; refusing a ceasefire is a choice by one

They are the Russian delegation's own words as the delegation released them; the Mission's Telegram channel carries the 10 October text itself. The Hub marks them as translated and will replace them with the OSCE PC.DEL documents when posted

On 7 October Russia launched about 70 missiles plus dozens of Shahed and 46 jet-powered drones; the UN told the Security Council a missile destroyed a residential building in Pryluky, killing at least 19 including five children (22 according to Ukrainian authorities). Russia's own Ministry of Defence listed a Pryluky plant as the target. The outcome was an apartment block

It is the stated condition for ending the war, from the Permanent Representative, in a formal statement. Take it at its word — it tells you what a ceasefire refusal is for

Ukraine strikes Russian energy too — why the "double standard"

Didn't Merkel and Hollande admit Minsk was a "trick"

"Russia says Kyiv wants a ceasefire only to rearm"

These are only RIA Novosti texts — can you trust "them"

Polyanskiy says the targets are facilities "supporting Kyiv's military"

Is 'complete military collapse of the Kyiv regime' "really a war aim or just rhetoric"

Ask the OSCE Secretariat to post the Russian PC.DEL texts of 1 and 8 Oct 2026 promptly, so the record is the Council's, not RIA's · put the 10 Oct "power plants" statement on the record at the next Permanent Council and in the Security Council, next to the ICC warrants of 5 Mar and 24 Jun 2024 · ask Russia to say whether it stands by its own resolution 2202 (2015) and the Minsk ceasefire it co-signed · support the Commission of Inquiry's and HRMMU's work on the autumn energy campaign and the OCHA Winter Response Plan (\$358 m) · restate the ceasefire Ukraine accepted on 11 Mar 2025 and ask Russia, in Vienna, to accept it

ما نطالب به



الصفحة الحية · سجل التصويبات

تدقيق الحقائق
V1 · 21 OCT 2026

المصادر: RIA Novosti, 1, 8 and 10 Oct 2026 · Russian Mission to the OSCE, Telegram 8616, 10 Oct · EU statement, PC No. 1580, 8 Oct · UN Meetings Coverage SC/16472, 9 Oct 2026 · HRMMU, Protection of Civilians, Sept 2026 (15 Oct) · ICC, 5 Mar and 24 Jun 2024 · COI A/HRC/55/66; COI statement 21 Sep 2026 (via SCR) · S/RES/2202 (2015); SC/11785 · Die Zeit, 7 Dec 2022; Kyiv Independent, 28 Dec 2022; TASS, 30 Dec 2022 · Kremlin, 22 Feb 2022 · ECtHR GC, 9 Jul 2025 · Security Council Report, Sep–Oct 2026 · Meduza, 8 Oct 2026 · Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 7 Oct 2026 · full list on page 6

من أين يأتي كل سطر

UKRAINE EVIDENCE HUB
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أكتوبر 2026

All sources were checked on 21 October 2026. Russian statements are listed as the position under review, not as evidence.

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المنهجية

Polyanskiy's words are quoted from the texts released by the Russian delegation to RIA Novosti (1 and 8 Oct) and from the Mission's own Telegram post (10 Oct); all are translated from the Russian by the Hub and marked so. The OSCE's PC.DEL documents for October 2026 were not posted as of 21 Oct; when they are, the English PC.DEL text replaces the translation. Words in square brackets are the Hub's. The Merkel/Hollande/Johnson line (claim 3) is RIA Novosti's gloss carried with the statement, not a sentence attributed to Polyanskiy, and is labelled as such.

Each claim is checked against documents of mandated bodies (Tier A: ICC, Commission of Inquiry, HRMMU/OHCHR, UN Meetings Coverage, Security Council resolutions, ECtHR, the EU statement at the Permanent Council) first; independent sources (Tier C) only where no Tier A exists. Ukrainian official .data (Tier B) are not used to rebut Russian claims; the one Tier B figure (22 killed in Pryluky, State Emergency Service) is an operational toll and is marked.

Other delegations' positions are summarised from the EU statement at PC No. 1580 and, for the same week, from the Security Council meeting record .SC/16472; statements by other delegations at the Permanent Council in October 2026 were not online as of 21 Oct and are not used.

Tiers: **A** — UN-mandated bodies, international courts and organisations (OHCHR/HRMMU, Commission of Inquiry, ICC, ECtHR, IAEA, OSCE, OPCW, Security Council record); **B** — Ukrainian official bodies, marked "according to Ukraine"; **C** — independent investigators and media; **RU** — Russian official statements, the position under review. Tiers are never combined in one figure.

