VERIFICACIÓN

DMITRY POLYANSKIY, RUSSIA'S PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE OSCE · PERMANENT COUNCIL, VIENNA · 1, 8 AND 10 OCT 2026

VIENNA: THREE STATEMENTS, ONE ADMISSION

In ten days Russia's new envoy to the OSCE told the Permanent Council that the war will go on until Europe's "party of war" is "out of business" — "or else until the complete military collapse of the Kyiv regime", the outcome he called more likely, that no one will give Kyiv "the gift" of a ceasefire because of Minsk, and that it "turns out" striking power plants, bridges and railways "is not allowed". The record answers each line — and the third one is an admission the International Criminal Court has already charged.

UKRAINE EVIDENCE HUB
REGISTRO VERIFICADO
OCT 2026

4

senior Russian officers under ICC arrest warrants for the campaign against Ukraine's electric infrastructure (Kobylash, Sokolov · Shoigu, Gerasimov) A

ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II, 5 Mar 2024 and 24 Jun 2024

≥ 19 · 5

killed in Pryluky, incl. 5 children — at least 19 (UN Secretariat, SC/16472, Tier A); 22 according to Ukrainian authorities (Tier B) — in the 7 Oct 2026 barrage of about 70 missiles plus dozens of Shahed and 46 jet-powered drones that Polyanskiy called strikes on "facilities supporting Kyiv's military" A B

UN Secretariat to the Security Council, 9 Oct 2026 (SC/16472); Ukraine's State Emergency Service, 8 Oct 2026; Zelensky / Air Force via Reuters, 7 Oct 2026; EU statement, OSCE Permanent Council No. 1580, 8 Oct 2026

328 · 2,105

civilians killed · injured in Ukraine in September 2026 — the highest September toll since February 2022 A

HRMMU, Protection of Civilians update, 15 Oct 2026

Point 1

of the Minsk "Package of Measures" that Russia co-signed and took to the Security Council: an "immediate and comprehensive ceasefire" A

S/RES/2202 (2015), annex I, adopted unanimously 17 Feb 2015

CONCLUSIÓN

The admission is on the record. "It turns out that striking bridges, power plants, railway facilities and warehouses is not allowed." It does not "turn out": the ICC found reasonable grounds in 2024 that Russia's strikes on Ukraine's electric infrastructure were directed at civilian objects, and issued warrants for the officers who ran them. The Russian Mission to the OSCE has now said, in writing, that power plants are the target.

Minsk is the wrong shield. Russia drafted and co-signed the Minsk Package whose first point was a ceasefire, took it to the Security Council as resolution 2202, called itself its guarantor for seven years — and then declared on 22 Feb 2022 that the agreements "no longer exist". Merkel and Hollande said Minsk gave Ukraine time; neither said it was a sham, and Putin himself said their words came as a surprise.

The war aim is stated. "Until the complete military collapse of the Kyiv regime" is not a security concern; it is a demand for the defeat of a UN member state. Set beside the Council statement of 9 Oct that Russia "has never refused" negotiations, the two cannot both be true.

The week he described. Polyanskiy's "strikes on facilities supporting Kyiv's military" were the 7 Oct barrage: about 70 missiles plus dozens of Shahed and 46 jet-powered drones; in Pryluky a five-storey apartment block, at least 19 killed including five children (UN Secretariat, SC/16472) — 22 according to Ukrainian authorities; and Russia's own Ministry of Defence naming "Plastmass-Pryluky" as an aim-point.

Hay que reconocer. Ukraine does strike refineries, depots and bridges inside Russia and says so; OHCHR relays Russian-reported casualties (496 killed, Jan–Sep 2026) it cannot verify. The law binds both sides. It does not make one side's violations a licence for the other's — and Ukraine has accepted a full ceasefire since March 2025; Russia, in Vienna, said it will not.

THE SEVEN CLAIMS

Dmitry Polyanskiy · PC No. 1579 · 1 Oct	“Our SMO will continue until the "party of war" in Europe is out of business and the European elites stop "putting spokes in the wheels" of efforts to achieve real peace. Or else until the complete military collapse of th…”	**Fair to say — and contradicted by Russia's own line at the UN**
Dmitry Polyanskiy · PC No. 1580 · 8 Oct	“Kyiv may well be ready for a ceasefire — to lick its wounds, stock up on weapons and gather its strength — but no one intends to give such a gift to the Kyiv regime and its sponsors again, remembering the history of the …”	**Misreads Minsk — Russia wrote it**
RIA Novosti gloss on Polyanskiy's "history of the Minsk agreements" · 8 Oct	“[After the start of the SMO, Hollande, Merkel and Johnson said that] neither France, nor Germany, nor the United Kingdom ever took the Minsk agreements seriously… and only used them to buy time so that Kyiv could build u…”	**Misquotes Merkel and Hollande; no Johnson statement found**
Dmitry Polyanskiy · PC No. 1580 · 8 Oct	“The head of the Kyiv regime never tires of threatening Russia with an escalation he is in no position to deliver… the targets hit by the Russian Armed Forces' retaliatory strikes on facilities supporting Kyiv's war machi…”	**Desmentido por los observadores**
Dmitry Polyanskiy · Mission Telegram, relayed by RIA Novosti · 10 Oct	“It turns out that striking bridges, power plants, railway facilities and warehouses is not allowed. Or rather, no one is allowed to — except Zelensky. (translated)”	**Already adjudicated — and self-incriminating**
Dmitry Polyanskiy · Mission Telegram · 10 Oct	“Make up your minds about your principled position, ladies and gentlemen — and for a start, restrain your protégés in Kyiv, otherwise nothing will be left of Ukraine's infrastructure before long! (translated)”	**Self-incriminating — a threat against civilian infrastructure**
Dmitry Polyanskiy · Mission Telegram · 10 Oct	“Now all those who once rejoiced at Ukrainian militants' hits on infrastructure in Russia, who threatened our bridges and our energy sector, have suddenly raised a howl about the objects struck in Ukraine. (translated)”	**Partly fair — and tu quoque is no defence**

QUÉ PEDIMOS

Ask the OSCE Secretariat to post the Russian PC.DEL texts of 1 and 8 Oct 2026 promptly, so the record is the Council's, not RIA's · put the 10 Oct "power plants" statement on the record at the next Permanent Council and in the Security Council, next to the ICC warrants of 5 Mar and 24 Jun 2024 · ask Russia to say whether it stands by its own resolution 2202 (2015) and the Minsk ceasefire it co-signed · support the Commission of Inquiry's and HRMMU's work on the autumn energy campaign and the OCHA Winter Response Plan ($358 m) · restate the ceasefire Ukraine accepted on 11 Mar 2025 and ask Russia, in Vienna, to accept it.

Fuentes: RIA Novosti, 1, 8 and 10 Oct 2026 · Russian Mission to the OSCE, Telegram 8616, 10 Oct · EU statement, PC No. 1580, 8 Oct · UN Meetings Coverage SC/16472, 9 Oct 2026 · HRMMU, Protection of Civilians, Sept 2026 (15 Oct) · ICC, 5 Mar and 24 Jun 2024 · COI A/HRC/55/66; COI statement 21 Sep 2026 (via SCR) · S/RES/2202 (2015); SC/11785 · Die Zeit, 7 Dec 2022; Kyiv Independent, 28 Dec 2022; TASS, 30 Dec 2022 · Kremlin, 22 Feb 2022 · ECtHR GC, 9 Jul 2025 · Security Council Report, Sep–Oct 2026 · Meduza, 8 Oct 2026 · Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 7 Oct 2026 · full list on page 6

VERIFICACIÓN
V1 · 21 OCT 2026

página en vivo · registro de correcciones

VERIFICACIÓN EL FORO Y LOS ORADORES

WHO SAID IT, WHERE, AND TO WHOM

Where each claim was made, who made it, how the others in the room answered, and what the statements left out.

UKRAINE EVIDENCE HUB
REGISTRO VERIFICADO
OCT 2026

THE OCCASION AND THE RECORD

Formato	OSCE Permanent Council — weekly plenary of the 57 participating States, Hofburg, Vienna; sessions closed to the press; delegations' statements are circulated as PC.DEL documents and later posted on osce.org (as of 21 Oct 2026 the latest posted PC.DEL texts date from August 2026 — the October statements are not yet online)
Meetings	PC No. 1579 (1 Oct 2026) · PC No. 1580 (8 Oct 2026) · Russian Mission Telegram post, 10 Oct 2026 (not a Council statement; relayed by RIA Novosti the same day)
Orador	Dmitry Polyanskiy, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the OSCE since the presidential decree of 29 Dec 2025 (previously First Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN, New York)
Fuente	No verbatim OSCE record. Texts carried by RIA Novosti ("the text of his statement is in RIA Novosti's possession") and by the Mission's Telegram channel; quotations below are translated from the Russian — replace with the PC.DEL English text when posted
Contexto	7 Oct barrage (about 70 missiles plus dozens of Shahed and 46 jet-powered drones; Pryluky: ≥19 killed per SC/16472, 22 per Ukrainian authorities) · 8 Oct glide bomb on two buses in Kramatorsk (≥33 killed) · 9 Oct emergency Security Council briefing (SC/16472) · HRMMU September update published 15 Oct · Russian General Staff announces "massive strikes" on energy, 15–16 Oct
Outcome	None. The Permanent Council takes no decision on agenda item "Russia's ongoing aggression against Ukraine"; the EU statement (PC 1580) and aligned States demanded that Russia "immediately and unconditionally cease its aggression"

LOS PORTAVOCES

Dmitry Polyanskiy	Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the OSCE (decree of 29 Dec 2025); First Deputy PR to the UN 2018–2025	Delivered the 1 Oct and 8 Oct statements at the Permanent Council; author of the 10 Oct Telegram statement on infrastructure strikes
Russian Mission to the OSCE (press service)	Telegram channel RusMissionOSCE	Published the 10 Oct text (post 8616) that RIA Novosti relayed within the hour
RIA Novosti	State news agency	Sole public carrier of the 1 and 8 Oct statements ("text in RIA Novosti's possession"); added the Merkel/Hollande/Johnson gloss to the 8 Oct piece in its own voice

WHAT OTHERS SAID

European Union (+ Albania, Andorra, Georgia, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Norway, San Marino, Ukraine) · PC No. 1580, 8 Oct	"On October 7, Russia carried out one of the largest attacks against Ukraine in recent weeks… around 70 missiles — many of them ballistic — and drones, killing at least 22 people, including 5 children"; strikes on schools in Sumy and Kyiv; 4,278 schools damaged and 428 destroyed; demanded that Russia "immediately and unconditionally cease its aggression" and agree to "a full, immediate and unconditional ceasefire".
European Union · PC No. 1578, 24 Sep	Called Russia's war an "illegal and unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine" and rejected Russia's agenda proposal as an attempt to justify it.
United Kingdom · Security Council, 9 Oct (same week)	Russia is "seeking to make the unacceptable appear routine"; a Russian MoD post said Ukrainians would "freeze" and the Kremlin called the energy system an "Achilles heel"; "directly targeting civilian infrastructure may constitute a war crime" (SC/16472).
France · Security Council, 9 Oct	Moscow targets "the very conditions of the Ukrainian people's existence on their own land"; demanded an "immediate, comprehensive and unconditional ceasefire" and backed a moratorium on energy and Black Sea attacks (SC/16472).
United States · Security Council, 9 Oct	"The killing must stop"; the conflict will end "only through negotiations"; continued mediation of trilateral talks (SC/16472).
Nordic States (Norway for DK, FI, IS, SE) · Security Council, 9 Oct	Warned of the harshest winter yet; called for safe humanitarian access and an immediate, unconditional ceasefire (SC/16472).
Germany · Security Council, 9 Oct	"Reckless and deliberate disregard for international humanitarian law"; "As Europeans, we stand ready to talk. Ukraine stands ready to talk" (SC/16472).
Poland · Security Council, 9 Oct	"Russia cannot bomb its way to a legitimate peace" (SC/16472).

WHAT THE STATEMENTS LEFT OUT

- That Russia co-signed the Minsk Package of Measures (12 Feb 2015, Trilateral Contact Group with the OSCE) and sponsored its endorsement by the Security Council — resolution 2202 (2015), adopted unanimously on 17 Feb 2015, "calls on all parties to fully implement the Package of measures, including a comprehensive ceasefire" (UN Meetings Coverage SC/11785).
- That Russia ended Minsk itself: on 22 Feb 2022 President Putin said the Minsk agreements "no longer exist", the day after recognising the "DPR" and "LPR" (Kremlin press conference, 22 Feb 2022).
- That the European Court of Human Rights (Grand Chamber, Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia, 9 Jul 2025) found Russia exercised effective control over the separatist-held areas from 11 May 2014 — i.e. Russia was a party to the conflict Minsk was meant to end, not a mediator.
- That the ICC issued arrest warrants in 2024 for four senior Russian officers for the campaign against Ukraine's electric infrastructure, finding reasonable grounds that the strikes "were directed against civilian objects" (ICC, 5 Mar and 24 Jun 2024) — the same category of target Polyanskiy says it "turns out" is not allowed.
- That Ukraine has accepted a full and unconditional ceasefire since 11 Mar 2025 (Jeddah) — restated by 47 States at the Security Council on 23 Sep 2026 — and that the UN Secretariat asked both sides for an "immediate, full and unconditional ceasefire" on 9 Oct 2026 (SC/16472).

CÓMO SE DIFUNDE

Each statement was published by RIA Novosti within hours (1 Oct 15:05, 8 Oct 14:00–14:01, 10 Oct 14:56 Moscow time) under headlines "Russia will continue the SMO until the complete collapse of the Kyiv regime", "Russia is not going to give Kyiv a ceasefire" and "Ukraine's infrastructure will be destroyed if the West does not restrain Kyiv", and reprinted by Lenta, Gazeta.ru and regional outlets. The Minsk line travelled with RIA's own gloss that Merkel, Hollande and Johnson "never took the Minsk agreements seriously" — words none of them said. Because the Council sits behind closed doors and PC.DEL texts appear weeks later, the Russian version is the only one in circulation.

Fuentes: RIA Novosti, 1, 8 and 10 Oct 2026 · Russian Mission to the OSCE, Telegram 8616, 10 Oct · EU statement, PC No. 1580, 8 Oct · UN Meetings Coverage SC/16472, 9 Oct 2026 · HRMMU, Protection of Civilians, Sept 2026 (15 Oct) · ICC, 5 Mar and 24 Jun 2024 · COI A/HRC/55/66; COI statement 21 Sep 2026 (via SCR) · S/RES/2202 (2015); SC/11785 · Die Zeit, 7 Dec 2022; Kyiv Independent, 28 Dec 2022; TASS, 30 Dec 2022 · Kremlin, 22 Feb 2022 · ECtHR GC, 9 Jul 2025 · Security Council Report, Sep–Oct 2026 · Meduza, 8 Oct 2026 · Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 7 Oct 2026 · full list on page 6

VERIFICACIÓN LAS AFIRMACIONES, UNA POR UNA

AFIRMACIÓN, HECHOS, CONCESIÓN (1–4)

Each claim as made, with the date, the venue and a link; the record it runs into, with the tier of the evidence; and what it concedes. Words in square brackets are the Hub's.

UKRAINE EVIDENCE HUB
REGISTRO VERIFICADO
OCT 2026

CLAIM 1 · DMITRY POLYANSKIY · PC NO. 1579 · 1 OCT

“Our SMO will continue until the "party of war" in Europe is out of business and the European elites stop "putting spokes in the wheels" of efforts to achieve real peace. Or else until the complete military collapse of the Kyiv regime. [RIA Novosti adds: in Polyanskiy's view the probability of the second scenario looks even higher, given the pace of the Russian troops' advance.] (translated)”

Statement at a closed session of the OSCE Permanent Council, Vienna, 1 Oct 2026, text published by RIA Novosti, 1 Oct 2026, 15:05 Moscow time — ria.ru/20261001/rossija-2121468488.html (translated from the Russian)
ria.ru/20261001/rossija-2121468488.html

FAIR TO SAY — AND CONTRADICTED BY RUSSIA'S OWN LINE AT THE UN

Pruebas A

This is a self-description and is taken as such: the stated condition for ending the war is the military defeat of Ukraine's government. Eight days later at the Security Council (9 Oct, SC/16472) Russia's representative said Moscow "has never refused" negotiations and that it was Kyiv that "consciously chose to aggravate the situation". The UN Secretariat the same day called for a "full, immediate and unconditional ceasefire" (SC/16472). Ukraine accepted a full 30-day ceasefire on 11 Mar 2025 (Jeddah joint statement) and 47 States restated that at the Council on 23 Sep 2026.

Lo que concede la afirmación: The war aim: not "security guarantees" or "denazification" but the collapse of the government of a UN member State — the object of UN Charter art. 2(4).

CLAIM 2 · DMITRY POLYANSKIY · PC NO. 1580 · 8 OCT

“Kyiv may well be ready for a ceasefire — to lick its wounds, stock up on weapons and gather its strength — but no one intends to give such a gift to the Kyiv regime and its sponsors again, remembering the history of the Minsk agreements. (translated)”

Statement at the OSCE Permanent Council, 8 Oct 2026, text published by RIA Novosti, 8 Oct 2026, 14:00 — ria.ru/20261008/rossija-2123186991.html (translated from the Russian)
ria.ru/20261008/rossija-2123186991.html

MISREADS MINSK — RUSSIA WROTE IT

Pruebas A

Point 1 of the Minsk Package of Measures (12 Feb 2015) is an "immediate and comprehensive ceasefire"; Russia's ambassador co-signed it in the Trilateral Contact Group, and Russia drafted and sponsored Security Council resolution 2202 (2015), adopted unanimously on 17 Feb 2015, which "calls on all parties to fully implement the Package of measures, including a comprehensive ceasefire" (SC/11785). For seven years Russia called itself a guarantor and demanded the Package be implemented "word for word" (Churkin, SC/11785). On 22 Feb 2022 President Putin said the agreements "no longer exist". The ECtHR Grand Chamber has since found that Russia controlled the "republics" from 11 May 2014 (9 Jul 2025) — a party, not a guarantor. The "gift" Russia now refuses is the thing it put its name to.

Lo que concede la afirmación: That Russia refuses a ceasefire on principle — the answer to "who blocks the ceasefire", in Russia's own words.

CLAIM 3 · RIA NOVOSTI GLOSS ON POLYANSKIY'S "HISTORY OF THE MINSK AGREEMENTS" · 8 OCT

“[After the start of the SMO, Hollande, Merkel and Johnson said that] neither France, nor Germany, nor the United Kingdom ever took the Minsk agreements seriously… and only used them to buy time so that Kyiv could build up its forces and prepare for a conflict with Russia. (translated; RIA's words, carried with the statement)”

RIA Novosti, 8 Oct 2026, same article; the claim recurs in Russian MFA and Mission statements since Dec 2022
ria.ru/20261008/rossija-2123186991.html

MISQUOTES MERKEL AND HOLLANDE; NO JOHNSON STATEMENT FOUND

Pruebas A C

Merkel, Die Zeit, 7 Dec 2022: "The 2014 Minsk agreement was an attempt to give Ukraine time. It also used this time to become stronger, as can be seen today" ("…war der Versuch, der Ukraine Zeit zu geben"). Hollande, Kyiv Independent, 28 Dec 2022: "Yes, Angela Merkel is right on this point… It is the merit of the Minsk agreements to have given the Ukrainian army this opportunity." Neither said the agreements were never taken seriously or were a ruse; both described a frozen conflict that bought time. Putin's own reaction (Bishkek, 9 Dec 2022): "Frankly, this was completely unexpected for me" — i.e. Moscow had treated the German side as sincere. No statement by Boris Johnson that the UK "never took Minsk seriously" has been found; the UK was not part of the Normandy format (France, Germany, Russia, Ukraine). The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission recorded ceasefire violations by both sides throughout 2015–2022 (daily reports).

Lo que concede la afirmación: That Minsk was a ceasefire that held, however badly, for seven years — which is what the 2026 "gift" would be.

CLAIM 4 · DMITRY POLYANSKIY · PC NO. 1580 · 8 OCT

“The head of the Kyiv regime never tires of threatening Russia with an escalation he is in no position to deliver… the targets hit by the Russian Armed Forces' retaliatory strikes on facilities supporting Kyiv's war machine are so many… (translated)”

Statement at the OSCE Permanent Council, 8 Oct 2026, text published by RIA Novosti, 8 Oct 2026, 14:01 — ria.ru/20261008/zelenskij-2123187188.html (translated from the Russian)
ria.ru/20261008/zelenskij-2123187188.html

DESMENTIDO POR LOS OBSERVADORES

Pruebas A B C

The "targets" of the previous night and day: on 7 Oct Russia launched about 70 missiles plus dozens of Shahed and 46 jet-powered drones (Zelensky / Air Force via Reuters, 7 Oct); the EU statement at the Permanent Council spoke of "around 70 missiles — many of them ballistic — and drones, killing at least 22 people, including 5 children" (EU statement, PC No. 1580, 8 Oct). The UN Secretariat told the Security Council on 9 Oct that a missile "destroyed a residential building" in Pryluky, killing at least 19 including five children, and that in one week more than 100 civilians were killed and at least 429 injured (SC/16472). Russia's Ministry of Defence listed "Plastmass-Pryluky" among the enterprises struck on 7 Oct (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 7 Oct) — the hit was a five-storey apartment block; according to Ukrainian authorities 22 were killed including five children and 54 injured (Ukraine's State Emergency Service, 8 Oct · Tier B, operational). HRMMU's September update: 328 killed, 2,105 injured, 53% by missiles and long-range drones (15 Oct 2026).

Lo que concede la afirmación: The 7 Oct barrage, its scale, and its motive in his own word — "retaliatory": a reprisal, which AP I art. 52(1) forbids against civilian objects.

Fuentes: RIA Novosti, 1, 8 and 10 Oct 2026 · Russian Mission to the OSCE, Telegram 8616, 10 Oct · EU statement, PC No. 1580, 8 Oct · UN Meetings Coverage SC/16472, 9 Oct 2026 · HRMMU, Protection of Civilians, Sept 2026 (15 Oct) · ICC, 5 Mar and 24 Jun 2024 · COI A/HRC/55/66; COI statement 21 Sep 2026 (via SCR) · S/RES/2202 (2015); SC/11785 · Die Zeit, 7 Dec 2022; Kyiv Independent, 28 Dec 2022; TASS, 30 Dec 2022 · Kremlin, 22 Feb 2022 · ECtHR GC, 9 Jul 2025 · Security Council Report, Sep–Oct 2026 · Meduza, 8 Oct 2026 · Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 7 Oct 2026 · full list on page 6

CLAIM, RECORD, CONCESSION (5–7)

Each claim as made, with the date, the venue and a link; the record it runs into, with the tier of the evidence; and what it concedes. Words in square brackets are the Hub's.

CLAIM 5 · DMITRY POLYANSKIY · MISSION TELEGRAM, RELAYED BY RIA NOVOSTI · 10 OCT

"It turns out that striking bridges, power plants, railway facilities and warehouses is not allowed. Or rather, no one is allowed to — except Zelensky. (translated)"

Russian Mission to the OSCE, Telegram post 8616, 10 Oct 2026 — t.me/RusMissionOSCE/8616; relayed by RIA Novosti, 10 Oct 2026, 14:56 — ria.ru/20261010/polyanskiy-2123675265.html (translated from the Russian)
t.me/RusMissionOSCE/8616

ALREADY ADJUDICATED — AND SELF-INCRIMINATING

Pruebas A C

ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II, 5 Mar 2024: arrest warrants for Lt-Gen Sergei Kobylash (Long-Range Aviation) and Adm. Viktor Sokolov (Black Sea Fleet) for "missile strikes carried out by the Russian armed forces against the Ukrainian electric infrastructure from at least 10 October 2022 until at least 9 March 2023" — the war crimes of directing attacks at civilian objects (art. 8(2)(b)(ii)) and causing excessive incidental harm (art. 8(2)(b)(iv)), and the crime against humanity of inhumane acts (art. 7(1)(k)). 24 Jun 2024: the same charges against Sergei Shoigu and Valery Gerasimov; the Chamber found reasonable grounds that "the alleged strikes were directed against civilian objects" and, for any installation that might have been a military objective, that the expected civilian harm "would have been clearly excessive to the anticipated military advantage". The Commission of Inquiry found the waves of attacks on energy infrastructure from 10 Oct 2022 may amount to crimes against humanity (A/HRC/55/66, Mar 2024) and on 21 Sep 2026 warned that continued attacks were "increasing civilians' vulnerability" before winter. Power plants are not "allowed" when the foreseeable effect is to cut heat, water and light to millions (AP I arts. 51(5)(b), 52, 54).

Lo que concede la afirmación: In writing, from the Mission's own channel: that power plants, railways and bridges are the targets — the element the ICC had to prove.

CLAIM 6 · DMITRY POLYANSKIY · MISSION TELEGRAM · 10 OCT

"Make up your minds about your principled position, ladies and gentlemen — and for a start, restrain your protégés in Kyiv, otherwise nothing will be left of Ukraine's infrastructure before long! (translated)"

t.me/RusMissionOSCE/8616; RIA Novosti, 10 Oct 2026
t.me/RusMissionOSCE/8616

SELF-INCRIMINATING — A THREAT AGAINST CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE

Pruebas A C

AP I art. 51(2) prohibits "acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population"; art. 54(2) prohibits attacking, destroying or rendering useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population. On 15–16 Oct the Chief of the General Staff reported to the President that Russian forces "have begun massive strikes on Ukraine's energy facilities" and that a "list of these objects" had been drawn up (Interfax/TASS, 16 Oct); on 15 Oct President Putin said "they are already squealing about energy… and other objects, including data centres" (RIA Novosti). The UN Secretariat: "repeated attacks on energy infrastructure risk leaving large numbers of civilians without heating, electricity and water" as winter approaches (SC/16472, 9 Oct). OCHA has a $358 million winter plan for 2 million people, and "no amount of preparedness can substitute for protecting the infrastructure civilians depend on" (SC/16472).

Lo que concede la afirmación: Intent: the destruction of a country's infrastructure as leverage on third States — reprisal logic, which AP I art. 52(1) forbids.

CLAIM 7 · DMITRY POLYANSKIY · MISSION TELEGRAM · 10 OCT

"Now all those who once rejoiced at Ukrainian militants' hits on infrastructure in Russia, who threatened our bridges and our energy sector, have suddenly raised a howl about the objects struck in Ukraine. (translated)"

t.me/RusMissionOSCE/8616; RIA Novosti, 10 Oct 2026
t.me/RusMissionOSCE/8616

PARTLY FAIR — AND TU QUOQUE IS NO DEFENCE

Pruebas A C

Ukraine strikes refineries, fuel depots, airfields and bridges in Russia and says so; Russia's representative listed them at the Security Council on 9 Oct (SC/16472). OHCHR records reports of 496 civilians killed and 3,394 injured in Russia by Ukrainian attacks, Jan–Sep 2026 — figures "reported by Russian authorities" that OHCHR cannot verify, since Russia gives it no access (SC/16472; DiCarlo, 23 Sep 2026). The Secretariat's rule covers both: "All attacks targeting civilians and civilian infrastructure, wherever they occur, are a violation of international humanitarian law and must end immediately" (SC/16472). A refinery is not a power plant serving a city: the distinction is between a military objective (AP I art. 52(2)) and an object indispensable to civilian survival (art. 54). And a violation by one party never licenses the other — reprisals against civilian objects are prohibited (art. 52(1)).

Lo que concede la afirmación: That Russian strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure are a response to Ukrainian strikes — a reprisal motive, stated.

Fuentes: RIA Novosti, 1, 8 and 10 Oct 2026 · Russian Mission to the OSCE, Telegram 8616, 10 Oct · EU statement, PC No. 1580, 8 Oct · UN Meetings Coverage SC/16472, 9 Oct 2026 · HRMMU, Protection of Civilians, Sept 2026 (15 Oct) · ICC, 5 Mar and 24 Jun 2024 · COI A/HRC/55/66; COI statement 21 Sep 2026 (via SCR) · S/RES/2202 (2015); SC/11785 · Die Zeit, 7 Dec 2022; Kyiv Independent, 28 Dec 2022; TASS, 30 Dec 2022 · Kremlin, 22 Feb 2022 · ECtHR GC, 9 Jul 2025 · Security Council Report, Sep–Oct 2026 · Meduza, 8 Oct 2026 · Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 7 Oct 2026 · full list on page 6

VERIFICACIÓN THE RECORD SIDE BY SIDE

WHAT RUSSIA SAYS, WHAT THE RECORD SHOWS

Each line sets a Russian statement against the finding of a mandated body or, where none exists, an independent investigation. Tiers are marked on every source.

UKRAINE EVIDENCE HUB
REGISTRO VERIFICADO
OCT 2026

EL REGISTRO

QUESTION	WHAT RUSSIA SAYS	LO QUE MUESTRAN LOS HECHOS	FUENTE
Who refuses a ceasefire	"No one intends to give such a gift to the Kyiv regime" (8 Oct)	Ukraine accepted a full 30-day ceasefire on 11 Mar 2025; 47 States restated it at the UNSC on 23 Sep 2026; UN called for a "full, immediate and unconditional ceasefire" on 9 Oct	RIA 8 Oct · Jeddah statement · SC/16472
What Minsk II was	A "gift" that Kyiv used to rearm; the West "never took it seriously"	Point 1: immediate and comprehensive ceasefire; co-signed by Russia; endorsed unanimously by UNSC res. 2202; declared non-existent by Putin on 22 Feb 2022	S/RES/2202 (2015) annex I · SC/11785 · Kremlin, 22 Feb 2022
What Merkel said	"Never took the Minsk agreements seriously" (RIA gloss)	"An attempt to give Ukraine time. It also used this time to become stronger"	Die Zeit, 7 Dec 2022
The 7 Oct strikes	"Facilities supporting Kyiv's military"	about 70 missiles plus dozens of Shahed and 46 jet-powered drones; Pryluky: ≥19 killed incl. 5 children (SC/16472, A), 22 per Ukrainian authorities (B); residential building destroyed; MoD's own list names "Plastmass-Pryluky"	EU PC 1580 · SC/16472 · Reuters 7 Oct · Rossiyskaya Gazeta 7 Oct
Power plants as targets	"It turns out… not allowed" — treated as absurd	ICC warrants for four officers: attacks on electric infrastructure "directed against civilian objects"; COI: may amount to crimes against humanity	ICC 5 Mar & 24 Jun 2024 · A/HRC/55/66
Civilian toll, Sept 2026	Not mentioned	328 killed, 2,105 injured; +85% on Sept 2025; civilian casualties recorded in Kyiv on 22 of 30 days	HRMMU, 15 Oct 2026
Civilians in Russia, Jan–Sep 2026	"8,000 affected" (Nebenzia, 9 Oct)	496 killed, 3,394 injured — reported by Russian authorities, not verifiable by OHCHR (no access)	SC/16472

HAY QUE RECONOCER

Russia's refusal of a ceasefire is stated openly and consistently (Lavrov 23 Sep, Polyanskiy 1 and 8 Oct, Peskov 12 Oct). That is honest, and the Hub treats it as such: the point is not that Russia hides its position but that the position contradicts the "never refused negotiations" line used at the UN.

Merkel's and Hollande's 2022 remarks were careless and have been read by many — not only in Moscow — as saying Minsk was never meant to be implemented. The Hub's reading (an attempt to buy time; a frozen conflict; no sham) is the text of the interviews; the reader should check them.

Ukraine does strike energy and transport targets inside Russia; OHCHR relays Russian-reported casualties it cannot verify. The IHL rules cited here bind Ukraine too.

The 1 and 8 Oct quotations rest on texts carried by RIA Novosti; the OSCE's PC.DEL documents for October are not yet posted. If the English PC.DEL text differs, it governs.

Fuentes: RIA Novosti, 1, 8 and 10 Oct 2026 · Russian Mission to the OSCE, Telegram 8616, 10 Oct · EU statement, PC No. 1580, 8 Oct · UN Meetings Coverage SC/16472, 9 Oct 2026 · HRMMU, Protection of Civilians, Sept 2026 (15 Oct) · ICC, 5 Mar and 24 Jun 2024 · COI A/HRC/55/66; COI statement 21 Sep 2026 (via SCR) · S/RES/2202 (2015); SC/11785 · Die Zeit, 7 Dec 2022; Kyiv Independent, 28 Dec 2022; TASS, 30 Dec 2022 · Kremlin, 22 Feb 2022 · ECtHR GC, 9 Jul 2025 · Security Council Report, Sep–Oct 2026 · Meduza, 8 Oct 2026 · Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 7 Oct 2026 · full list on page 6

VERIFICACIÓN
V1 · 21 OCT 2026

página en vivo · registro de correcciones

VERIFICACIÓN THE LAW, WHAT TO SAY

ESTABLISHED, PATTERN, POSITION

What mandated bodies have established, what the record shows as a pattern, and what is a position — kept apart. Then the lines to take and the questions to expect.

UKRAINE EVIDENCE HUB
REGISTRO VERIFICADO
OCT 2026

EL DERECHO

UN Charter art. 2(4); GA res. ES-11/1 (2 Mar 2022): the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of a State is prohibited; "until the complete military collapse of the Kyiv regime" states the prohibited object.

AP I arts. 48, 51(2), 52(1)–(2): distinction; no threats of violence to terrorise civilians; civilian objects are not to be attacked or made the object of reprisals; a military objective must make an effective contribution to military action and its destruction offer a definite military advantage — a power plant serving a city in winter fails the test when the foreseeable harm is to the population (**art. 51(5)(b)**, **art. 54(2)** on objects indispensable to civilian survival; **art. 56** on dams, dykes and nuclear electrical generating stations).

Rome Statute arts. 8(2)(b)(ii), 8(2)(b)(iv), 7(1)(k): the charges in the ICC warrants of 5 Mar and 24 Jun 2024 for the energy campaign; "it turns out… not allowed" is the Chamber's finding, not a discovery.

S/RES/2202 (2015), annex I, point 1: "immediate and comprehensive ceasefire" — the Minsk ceasefire Russia co-signed. **Tres capas.** *Establecido:* ICC warrants; ECtHR finding of Russian control from 11 May 2014. *Patrón:* HRMMU monthly tolls; COI warnings on energy. *Posición:* Minsk as a Western "ruse" — no body has found it.

LINES TO TAKE

1. "Russia's envoy in Vienna says striking power plants, bridges and railways 'turns out' not to be allowed. The International Criminal Court said so in 2024 — and issued four warrants."
2. "The Minsk ceasefire that Russia now calls a 'gift' was drafted by Russia and endorsed by Russia's own resolution 2202. Russia declared it dead on 22 February 2022."
3. "Merkel said Minsk 'gave Ukraine time'. She did not say it was a sham — and Putin said her words surprised him."
4. "'Until the complete military collapse of the Kyiv regime' is the war aim, stated in Vienna. 'We never refused negotiations' was said in New York eight days later. Both cannot be true."
5. "The 'facilities supporting Kyiv's military' of 7 October included an apartment block in Pryluky. Russia's Defence Ministry listed Pryluky itself."
6. "Ukraine accepted a full ceasefire in March 2025. Russia, in Vienna, said it will not give one. That is the whole answer to 'who blocks peace'."

PREGUNTAS Y RESPUESTAS

"Ukraine strikes Russian energy too — why the double standard?"	No double standard: the UN says all attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure, wherever they occur, violate IHL. The difference is in the objects — refineries and depots feeding an invading army are military objectives; power plants that heat cities in winter are not, which is why the ICC charged the officers who ran Russia's 2022–23 energy campaign. And one side's violation never licenses the other's: reprisals against civilian objects are prohibited.
"Didn't Merkel and Hollande admit Minsk was a trick?"	No. Merkel said Minsk was "an attempt to give Ukraine time" and that Ukraine used that time; Hollande agreed. Neither said the agreements were never meant to be implemented. Russia co-signed Minsk, took it to the Security Council, and ended it on 22 February 2022.
"Russia says Kyiv wants a ceasefire only to rearm."	Russia says it will give no ceasefire — that is the admission. Ukraine accepted a full, unconditional 30-day ceasefire in March 2025 and has repeated it since; the UN Secretariat asked both sides for one on 9 October. Rearming during a ceasefire is a risk for both sides; refusing a ceasefire is a choice by one.
"These are only RIA Novosti texts — can you trust them?"	They are the Russian delegation's own words as the delegation released them; the Mission's Telegram channel carries the 10 October text itself. The Hub marks them as translated and will replace them with the OSCE PC.DEL documents when posted.
"Polyanskiy says the targets are facilities supporting Kyiv's military."	On 7 October Russia launched about 70 missiles plus dozens of Shahed and 46 jet-powered drones; the UN told the Security Council a missile destroyed a residential building in Pryluky, killing at least 19 including five children (22 according to Ukrainian authorities). Russia's own Ministry of Defence listed a Pryluky plant as the target. The outcome was an apartment block.
"Is 'complete military collapse of the Kyiv regime' really a war aim or just rhetoric?"	It is the stated condition for ending the war, from the Permanent Representative, in a formal statement. Take it at its word — it tells you what a ceasefire refusal is for.

QUÉ PEDIMOS

Ask the OSCE Secretariat to post the Russian PC.DEL texts of 1 and 8 Oct 2026 promptly, so the record is the Council's, not RIA's · put the 10 Oct "power plants" statement on the record at the next Permanent Council and in the Security Council, next to the ICC warrants of 5 Mar and 24 Jun 2024 · ask Russia to say whether it stands by its own resolution 2202 (2015) and the Minsk ceasefire it co-signed · support the Commission of Inquiry's and HRMMU's work on the autumn energy campaign and the OCHA Winter Response Plan ($358 m) · restate the ceasefire Ukraine accepted on 11 Mar 2025 and ask Russia, in Vienna, to accept it.

Fuentes: RIA Novosti, 1, 8 and 10 Oct 2026 · Russian Mission to the OSCE, Telegram 8616, 10 Oct · EU statement, PC No. 1580, 8 Oct · UN Meetings Coverage SC/16472, 9 Oct 2026 · HRMMU, Protection of Civilians, Sept 2026 (15 Oct) · ICC, 5 Mar and 24 Jun 2024 · COI A/HRC/55/66; COI statement 21 Sep 2026 (via SCR) · S/RES/2202 (2015); SC/11785 · Die Zeit, 7 Dec 2022; Kyiv Independent, 28 Dec 2022; TASS, 30 Dec 2022 · Kremlin, 22 Feb 2022 · ECtHR GC, 9 Jul 2025 · Security Council Report, Sep–Oct 2026 · Meduza, 8 Oct 2026 · Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 7 Oct 2026 · full list on page 6

VERIFICACIÓN
V1 · 21 OCT 2026

página en vivo · registro de correcciones

VERIFICACIÓN FUENTES Y MÉTODO

DE DÓNDE PROCEDE CADA LÍNEA

All sources were checked on 21 October 2026. Russian statements are listed as the position under review, not as evidence.

UKRAINE EVIDENCE HUB
REGISTRO VERIFICADO
OCT 2026

FUENTES

RIA Novosti (state)	Polyanskiy: Russia will continue the SMO until the complete collapse of the Kyiv regime, 1 Oct 2026 https://ria.ru/20261001/rossija-2121468488.html	RU
RIA Novosti (state)	Russia is not going to give Kyiv a ceasefire, Polyanskiy said, 8 Oct 2026 https://ria.ru/20261008/rossija-2123186991.html	RU
RIA Novosti (state)	Polyanskiy: Zelensky threatens escalation he cannot deliver, 8 Oct 2026 https://ria.ru/20261008/zelenskij-2123187188.html	RU
RIA Novosti (state)	Polyanskiy called on the West to restrain the Kyiv authorities, 10 Oct 2026 https://ria.ru/20261010/polyanskiy-2123675265.html	RU
Russian Mission to the OSCE	Telegram post 8616 — statement on infrastructure strikes, 10 Oct 2026 https://t.me/RusMissionOSCE/8616	RU
360.ru / Izvestia	Putin appoints Polyanskiy Permanent Representative to the OSCE, decree of 29 Dec 2025 https://360.ru/news/vlast/putin-naznachil-novogo-postpreda-pri-obse/	C
European External Action Service	EU statement on the Russian Federation's ongoing aggression against Ukraine, OSCE Permanent Council No. 1580, 8 Oct 2026 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/vienna-international-organisations/eu-statement-russian-federations-ongoing-aggression-against-ukraine-osce-permanent-council-no-1580_en	A
European External Action Service	EU opening remarks, OSCE Permanent Council No. 1578, 24 Sep 2026 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/vienna-international-organisations/eu-opening-remarks-osce-permanent-council-no-1578-vienna-24-september-2026_en	A
UN Meetings Coverage	SC/16472 — Security Council 10237th meeting, 9 Oct 2026: Russian strikes have reached a "new horrifying level" https://press.un.org/en/2026/sc16472.doc.htm	A
HRMMU / ACNUDH	Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict — September 2026 (15 Oct 2026) https://ukraine.ohchr.org/uk/Protection-of-Civilians-in-Armed-Conflict-September-2026	A
Corte Penal Internacional	Situation in Ukraine: ICC judges issue arrest warrants against Sergei Kobylash and Viktor Sokolov, 5 Mar 2024 https://icc-cpi.int/news/situation-ukraine-icc-judges-issue-arrest-warrants-against-sergei-ivanovich-kobylash-and	A
International Criminal Court (text via GlobalSecurity mirror)	Situation in Ukraine: arrest warrants against Sergei Shoigu and Valery Gerasimov, 24 Jun 2024 https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/ukraine/2024/06/ukraine-240625-icc01.htm	A
UN News / Commission of Inquiry	Russia's energy grid attacks, torture in Ukraine, could be crimes against humanity (A/HRC/55/66, Mar 2024) https://news.un.org/en/node/1134652	A
Security Council Report	What's in Blue: Ukraine high-level briefing, 23 Sep 2026 (COI statement of 21 Sep; HRMMU August figures; energy-truce chronology) https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2026/09/ukraine-high-level-briefing-9.php	C
Security Council Report	What's in Blue: Arria-formula meeting on Ukraine, 13 Oct 2026 (summary of the 9 Oct briefing) https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2026/10/arria-formula-meeting-on-ukraine-11.php	C
Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU	Resolution 2202 (2015), annex I: Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements, 17 Feb 2015 https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/787968	A
UN Meetings Coverage	SC/11785 — Security Council unanimously adopts resolution 2202 (2015), 17 Feb 2015 (Churkin: implement "word for word") https://press.un.org/en/2015/sc11785.doc.htm	A
Kremlin (via Ukrainska Pravda)	Putin: the Minsk agreements no longer exist, 22 Feb 2022 https://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2022/02/22/7325005/	RU
Die Zeit (via swissinfo/dpa)	Merkel: "Das Minsker Abkommen 2014 war der Versuch, der Ukraine Zeit zu geben", 7 Dec 2022; Putin's reaction, 9 Dec 2022 https://www.swissinfo.ch/ger/putin-zeigt-sich-enttaeuscht-von-merkel-wegen-aeusserungen-zur-ukraine/48123336	C
TASS (quoting the Kyiv Independent)	Hollande: "Yes, Angela Merkel is right on this point", 30 Dec 2022 https://tass.com/world/1558075/amp	RU
EUvsDisinfo	Disinfo case: Hollande "stated that Paris was never interested in Minsk agreements" https://www.euvsdisinfo.eu/report/former-french-president-francois-hollande-stated-that-paris-was-never-interested-in-minsk-agreements/	C
ECtHR Grand Chamber	Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia, judgment of 9 Jul 2025 (effective control from 11 May 2014) https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-244292	A
Russian Mission to the UN	Statement by V. Nebenzia at the Security Council, 9 Oct 2026 https://russiaun.ru/en/news/409102026	RU
Rossiyskaya Gazeta (state)	"Otvet Tsirkona i Iskandera": list of enterprises struck on 7 Oct 2026 incl. "Plastmass-Pryluky" https://rg.ru/2026/10/07/otvet-cirkona-i-iskandera.html	RU
Meduza	Russian missile strike on apartment building in Pryluky kills 22 people, including five children, 8 Oct 2026 https://meduza.io/en/feature/2026/10/08/russian-missile-strike-on-apartment-building-in-pryluky-northern-ukraine-kills-22-people-including-five-children	C
Novaya Gazeta Europe	Gerasimov reports to Putin on strikes on Ukraine's energy infrastructure, 16 Oct 2026 https://novayagazeta.eu/articles/2026/10/16/gerasimov-dolozhil-putinu-ob-udarakh-po-energoinfrastrukture-ukrainy-news	C
OSCE	Permanent Council documents (PC.DEL) — October 2026 texts not yet posted as of 21 Oct 2026; latest indexed: PC.DEL/804/26 (Canada, PC 1575, Aug 2026) https://www.osce.org/permanent-council	A
Reuters (via TimesLIVE)	Putin's birthday is marked by deadly Ukraine missile barrage — about 70 missiles, dozens of Shaheds and 46 jet-powered drones, 7 Oct 2026 https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/world/2026-10-07-putins-birthday-is-marked-by-deadly-ukraine-missile-barrage/	C

MÉTODO

Polyanskiy's words are quoted from the texts released by the Russian delegation to RIA Novosti (1 and 8 Oct) and from the Mission's own Telegram post (10 Oct); all are translated from the Russian by the Hub and marked so. The OSCE's PC.DEL documents for October 2026 were not posted as of 21 Oct; when they are, the English PC.DEL text replaces the translation. Words in square brackets are the Hub's. The Merkel/Hollande/Johnson line (claim 3) is RIA Novosti's gloss carried with the statement, not a sentence attributed to Polyanskiy, and is labelled as such.

Each claim is checked against documents of mandated bodies (Tier A: ICC, Commission of Inquiry, HRMMU/OHCHR, UN Meetings Coverage, Security Council resolutions, ECtHR, the EU statement at the Permanent Council) first; independent sources (Tier C) only where no Tier A exists. Ukrainian official data (Tier B) are not used to rebut Russian claims; the one Tier B figure (22 killed in Pryluky, State Emergency Service) is an operational toll and is marked.

Other delegations' positions are summarised from the EU statement at PC No. 1580 and, for the same week, from the Security Council meeting record SC/16472; statements by other delegations at the Permanent Council in October 2026 were not online as of 21 Oct and are not used.

Tiers: **A** — UN-mandated bodies, international courts and organisations (OHCHR/HRMMU, Commission of Inquiry, ICC, ECtHR, IAEA, OSCE, OPCW, Security Council record); **B** — Ukrainian official bodies, marked "according to Ukraine"; **C** — independent investigators and media; **RU** — Russian official statements, the position under review. Tiers are never combined in one figure.