

298

people killed on MH17, 17 Jul 2014 — passengers and crew from 17 countries, 80 of them children [A](#)

Dutch Safety Board, final report, 13 Oct 2015; District Court of The Hague, 17 Nov 2022

3

incompatible Russian versions in four years: Ukrainian Su-25 (Jul 2014) · Ukrainian Buk 9M38M1 then 9M38 from Zaroshchenske (Jun/Oct 2015) · missile no. 8868720 "sent to Ukraine in 1986" (Sep 2018) [RU](#)

Russian MoD briefings 21 Jul 2014 and 17 Sep 2018; Almaz-Antey 2 Jun and 13 Oct 2015

11 - 1 - 3

Security Council vote on an MH17 tribunal, 29 Jul 2015 — Russia the only vote against [A](#)

UN press release SC/11990, draft S/2015/562, 7498th meeting

4

bodies that have held Russia or its agents responsible: JIT (2016–18) · District Court of The Hague (17 Nov 2022) · ICAO Council (12 May 2025) · ECtHR Grand Chamber (9 Jul 2025) [A](#)

JIT 24 May 2018; courtmh17.com; ICAO; HUDOC 001-244292

BOTTOM LINE

Russia's versions cancel each other. If a Ukrainian Su-25 shot MH17 down (MoD, July 2014), there was no Buk; if a Buk 9M38M1 was fired from Zaroshchenske (Almaz-Antey, June 2015), it was not a 9M38 (Almaz-Antey, October 2015); and if the missile was no. 8868720 from a 1986 batch (MoD, September 2018), then Russia accepts that the parts recovered by the JIT are the weapon — the Buk scenario it had first denied.

Every independent body reached the same answer. The Dutch Safety Board: a Buk 9N314M warhead, launched from a 320 km² area in separatist-held territory. The JIT: a Buk TELAR of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade, Kursk. The District Court of The Hague: the TELAR "came from the Russian Federation, complete with a crew", fired near Pervomaiskyi; three men convicted of 298 murders. The ECtHR Grand Chamber: Russia violated Articles 2, 3 and 13. The ICAO Council: Russia failed its obligations under Article 3 bis of the Chicago Convention.

Russia blocked the forums, then dismissed the results. It vetoed the tribunal (2015), left the ICAO proceedings (17 Jun 2024), did not file a memorial or attend the ECtHR hearing (12 Jun 2024), and called the judgments "null and void" (Peskov, 9 Jul 2025) and "illegitimate" (MFA, 14 May 2025). The ECtHR found Russia's non-cooperation a breach of Article 38 of the Convention.

What Russia concedes. That MH17 was shot down by a Buk missile (Almaz-Antey 2015, MoD 2018); that the 9M38-series missile parts recovered by the JIT are the weapon (MoD 2018); that the "DPR" is not part of the Russian armed forces (Russia's own position, used by the court to deny the accused combatant immunity).

Fair to say. Ukraine did not close its airspace above FL320 before 17 July 2014; the Dutch Safety Board found it had sufficient reason to do so. The Dutch court acquitted one of the four accused (Pulatov). The JIT found "strong indications" but not conclusive proof that the decision to supply the Buk was taken by President Putin.

THE EIGHT CLAIMS

Lt-Gen Andrei Kartapolov, Russian General Staff · Moscow, 21 Jul 2014	"An altitude gain was detected for a Ukrainian combat jet, supposedly a Su-25... flying at a distance of 3–5 kilometers from the Boeing... We would like Kiev to explain why a combat jet was flying almost at the same altitude ..."	Abandoned by Russia itself
Lt-Gen Andrei Kartapolov · 21 Jul 2014	"[The Boeing] crashed within the operating zone of the Ukrainian army's self-propelled, medium-range surface-to-air Buk... The presence of the Ukrainian combat jet can be confirmed by video shots made by the Rostov monitori..."	No evidence presented
Yan Novikov, Director-General of Almaz-Antey · Moscow, 2 Jun 2015	"[MH17 was hit by a] 9M38M1 [missile]... no longer used in Russia... [fired from south of] Zaroshchenskoye."	Contradicted by Almaz-Antey's own second version
Yan Novikov · Moscow, 13 Oct 2015 (hours before the DSB report)	"We have proved beyond doubt that the missile fired over Ukraine was a 9M38... [launched] from the village of Zaroshchenskoye controlled by Ukrainian troops. The 9M38 missile was withdrawn from Russian army service."	Contradicted by the forensic record
Lt-Gen Nikolai Parshin · Maj-Gen Igor Konashenkov · Moscow, 17 Sep 2018	"[Missile no.] 8868720... manufactured at a military plant in Dolgoprudny... in 1986... [dispatched on 29 December 1986 to] military unit 20152 [in Ukraine]... [the missile] came from the arsenals of the Ukrainian army, not from ..."	Self-incriminating: accepts the JIT's missile, abandons the Su-25
Russian Ministry of Defence, statement 24–25 May 2018 · Vladimir Putin, St Petersburg, 25 May 2018	"Not a single anti-aircraft missile system from the Russian Federation has ever crossed the Russia-Ukraine border. ... [Putin, asked whether the missile was Russian:] Certainly not."	Already adjudicated
Vitaly Churkin, Permanent Representative · UN Security Council, 7498th meeting, 29 Jul 2015	"We have repeatedly stated that we do not support the idea of setting up a tribunal under Chapter VII of the Charter. There are no grounds for it, given that in resolution 2166 (2014) the Security Council did not classify..."	Blocks the court it says it wants
Dmitry Peskov, Presidential press secretary · Moscow, 9 Jul 2025	"[Russia considers the ECtHR rulings] null and void [and will not comply]."	Misstates the law

WHAT WE ASK

Cite the three Russian versions side by side whenever Russia raises MH17 in the Council — they refute each other · call on Russia to implement the ECtHR judgment of 9 Jul 2025 and the ICAO Council decision of 12 May 2025, including reparations to the Netherlands and Australia · support the Netherlands' and Australia's pursuit of the ICAO remedies and the ECtHR just-satisfaction stage · ask Russia to transfer Girkin, Dubinskiy and Kharchenko or to prosecute them itself, as Article 2 ECHR requires · keep MH17 in every accountability text: the pattern of denial began here.

WHO SAID IT, WHERE, AND TO WHOM

Where each claim was made, who made it, how the others in the room answered, and what the statements left out.

UKRAINE EVIDENCE HUB

VERIFIED RECORD

2014 - 2025

THE OCCASION AND THE RECORD	
Occasion	Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 (Boeing 777, Amsterdam–Kuala Lumpur) shot down over Donetsk region at 13:20 UTC on 17 Jul 2014; 298 killed; wreckage in territory held by the "DPR"
Where the claims were made	Russian MoD briefings, Moscow (21 Jul 2014; 17 Sep 2018; statement 24–25 May 2018) · Almaz-Antey press conferences, Moscow (2 Jun 2015; 13 Oct 2015) · UN Security Council, 7498th meeting, New York (29 Jul 2015) · SPIEF, St Petersburg (Putin, 25 May 2018) · Kremlin press pool (Peskov, 9 Jul 2025)
Record	UNSC res. 2166 (21 Jul 2014, unanimous, Russia in favour) · Dutch Safety Board final report (13 Oct 2015) · JIT presentations 28 Sep 2016, 24 May 2018, 8 Feb 2023 · District Court of The Hague judgment (17 Nov 2022) · ICAO Council decision (12 May 2025) · ECtHR Grand Chamber, Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (9 Jul 2025, HUDOC 001-244292)
What happened next	Russia vetoed draft S/2015/562 (tribunal) on 29 Jul 2015 · did not take part in the Dutch trial as a state; MFA called the verdict a "political bid to implicate Russia" (17 Nov 2022) · halted participation in the ICAO proceedings (17 Jun 2024) and called the Council's ruling "illegitimate" (14 May 2025) · did not file a memorial or attend the ECtHR Grand Chamber hearing (12 Jun 2024); Peskov: "null and void" (9 Jul 2025) · JIT investigation suspended 8 Feb 2023, all leads exhausted

THE SPEAKERS		
Lt-Gen Andrei Kartapolov	Head of the Main Operations Directorate, Russian General Staff (2014); since 2021 chair of the State Duma Defence Committee	Presented the "Ukrainian Su-25" version at the MoD briefing of 21 Jul 2014
Yan Novikov	Director-General of Almaz-Antey, state-owned maker of the Buk system; Almaz-Antey has been on the EU sanctions list since 30 Jul 2014 (Regulation (EU) No 826/2014) — the company said its 2015 presentations were "the basis for a court appeal against EU sanctions"	Presented the Zaroshchenske version twice: 9M38M1 (2 Jun 2015), then 9M38 with a 9N314 warhead (13 Oct 2015)
Maj-Gen Igor Konashenkov · Lt-Gen Nikolai Parshin	MoD spokesman · Head of the Main Missile and Artillery Directorate	Briefing of 17 Sep 2018: missile no. 8868720 "sent to Ukraine" in 1986; JIT videos "fabricated"
Vitaly Churkin · Dmitry Peskov	Permanent Representative to the UN (died 2017) · Presidential press secretary	Cast the veto on the MH17 tribunal (29 Jul 2015) · dismissed the ECtHR judgment as "null and void" (9 Jul 2025)

WHAT OTHERS SAID	
Security Council, 21 Jul 2014	Resolution 2166 adopted unanimously — Russia included — demanding accountability and a full, thorough and independent international investigation.
Netherlands (Koenders), 29 Jul 2015	"I find it incomprehensible that a member of the Security Council obstructs justice in a tragedy that has affected so many."
Australia (Bishop), 29 Jul 2015	"The veto only compounds the atrocity."
Malaysia (Liow Tiong Lai), 29 Jul 2015	Presented the draft as the state of registry: "Doing nothing is not an option."
Belgium (Frankinet), 29 Jul 2015	"An international tribunal would have advanced the cause of justice."
Ukraine (Klimkin), 29 Jul 2015	"There is no reason to oppose such a move unless you are one of the perpetrators."
China, Angola, Venezuela, 29 Jul 2015	Abstained; the other eleven members voted in favour.
France, 13 May 2025	Welcomed the ICAO Council's finding that Russia breached its obligations under the Chicago Convention and called on Russia to implement it.
Council of Europe (PACE President), 9 Jul 2025	Called the Grand Chamber judgment "historic" and asked member states to ensure its execution.

WHAT THE STATEMENTS LEFT OUT
- That Russia voted for Security Council resolution 2166 (21 Jul 2014), which demanded that "those responsible for this incident be held to account" and full cooperation with the investigation — before vetoing the tribunal meant to do that (S/PV.7498, 29 Jul 2015). - That the Dutch Safety Board found no scenario other than a Buk surface-to-air missile could explain the damage, and excluded an air-to-air missile and an internal explosion (DSB, 13 Oct 2015) — the Su-25 version was never repeated by Russia after Almaz-Antey's 2015 presentations. - That the launch field near Pervomaiskyi "was located in separatist-controlled territory" and that from mid-May 2014 the "DPR" "in fact took directions from the Russian Federation" (District Court of The Hague, 17 Nov 2022). - That the JIT's 2018 appeal concerned a 9M38-series missile — and that the MoD's 2018 answer (a 1986 missile from a Ukrainian unit) does not address the TELAR the JIT had traced, vehicle by vehicle, from Kursk to Donetsk and back (JIT, 24 May 2018). - That Russia left the ICAO proceedings before the merits were decided (17 Jun 2024) and did not file a memorial or attend the ECtHR hearing (12 Jun 2024) — the same courts it now calls biased (ECtHR press release, 9 Jul 2025; Russian MFA, 14 May 2025).

HOW IT TRAVELS
Each version was launched at a televised Moscow briefing and carried the same day by RIA Novosti, TASS, RT and Sputnik ("Ukrainian Su-25 warplane detected heading toward Malaysian Boeing", TASS, 21 Jul 2014; "Russian missile maker traces site of missile launch... with 4 km accuracy", TASS, 13 Oct 2015; "Russian Military Reveals Evidence Proving Ukraine's Involvement in MH17 Crash", Sputnik, 17 Sep 2018; "'Certainly not' Russian missile that brought down MH17, Putin says", TASS, 25 May 2018). Earlier versions are never withdrawn; they stay online side by side. EUvsDisinfo has logged the MH17 narratives as a standing cluster ("Mystery of the downing of MH17 remains unsolved"; "Not a single air defence system... has ever crossed the border").



CLAIM, RECORD, CONCESSION (1-4)

Each claim as made, with the date, the venue and a link; the record it runs into, with the tier of the evidence; and what it concedes. Words in square brackets are the Hub's.

UKRAINE EVIDENCE HUB

VERIFIED RECORD

2014 - 2025

CLAIM 1 · LT-GEN ANDREI KARTAPOLOV, RUSSIAN GENERAL STAFF · MOSCOW, 21 JUL 2014

“An altitude gain was detected for a Ukrainian combat jet, supposedly a Su-25... flying at a distance of 3–5 kilometers from the Boeing... We would like Kiev to explain why a combat jet was flying almost at the same altitude and the same time.”

MoD briefing, Moscow, 21 Jul 2014, as published by RIA Novosti (English)
www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/ukraine/2014/ukraine-140721-rianovosti06.h

CLAIM 2 · LT-GEN ANDREI KARTAPOLOV · 21 JUL 2014

“[The Boeing] crashed within the operating zone of the Ukrainian army's self-propelled, medium-range surface-to-air Buk... The presence of the Ukrainian combat jet can be confirmed by video shots made by the Rostov monitoring center.”

Same briefing, 21 Jul 2014 (RIA Novosti English text)
www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/ukraine/2014/ukraine-140721-rianovosti06.h

CLAIM 3 · YAN NOVIKOV, DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF ALMAZ-ANTEY · MOSCOW, 2 JUN 2015

“[MH17 was hit by a] 9M38M1 [missile]... no longer used in Russia... [fired from south of] Zaroshchenskoye.”

Almaz-Antey press conference, 2 Jun 2015 (as reported by The Moscow Times)
www.themoscowtimes.com/2015/06/02/mh17-was-not-shot-down-by-russian-missile-russia

CLAIM 4 · YAN NOVIKOV · MOSCOW, 13 OCT 2015 (HOURS BEFORE THE DSB REPORT)

“We have proved beyond doubt that the missile fired over Ukraine was a 9M38... [launched] from the village of Zaroshchenskoye controlled by Ukrainian troops. The 9M38 missile was withdrawn from Russian army service.”

Almaz-Antey press conference, 13 Oct 2015 (TASS, Defense News)
tass.com/world/828312

ABANDONED BY RUSSIA ITSELF

Evidence

A

C

The Dutch Safety Board examined the air-to-air scenario and excluded it: the damage pattern and the 9N314M fragments fit only a Buk surface-to-air missile; "no scenario other than a Buk surface-to-air missile can explain this combination of facts" (13 Oct 2015). Russia's own next two versions — Almaz-Antey (2015) and the MoD (2018) — argue about which Buk missile, not whether a Buk was used. The JIT, the Dutch court and the ECtHR all found a Buk launched from territory held by the "DPR".

What the claim concedes: That a surface-to-air Buk was the alternative Russia was arguing against — and that Russian radar data existed.

NO EVIDENCE PRESENTED

Evidence

C

No Ukrainian Buk was ever located by any investigation within range of the launch area. The DSB's 320 km² launch area, derived from the damage pattern, lies south of Snizhne, in territory controlled by the "DPR" on 17 Jul 2014 (DSB, 13 Oct 2015). The Dutch court ruled out alternative launch areas on the basis of smoke-trail photographs, a protected witness, satellite images, intercepted calls, telecom mast data, photographs and videos of the Buk and fragment analysis, and found no evidence of tampering (summary of the judgment, 17 Nov 2022). The "Rostov video" has never been produced to any court.

What the claim concedes: That the area was within reach of a Buk — the weapon the DSB, JIT and court identified.

CONTRADICTED BY ALMAZ-ANTEY'S OWN SECOND VERSION

Evidence

C

Four months later the same company said the missile was not a 9M38M1 but an older 9M38 with a 9N314 warhead, and denied the "I-beam" fragments it had earlier said were in the wreckage (press conference, 13 Oct 2015; Defense News, 18 Oct 2015). The DSB found a 9N314M warhead — the type fitted to the 9M38M1 — from the bow-tie fragments recovered from the wreckage and the crew's bodies (13 Oct 2015). Zaroshchenske lies about 16 km from the impact point, outside even the widest launch area modelled by the Dutch NLR (Bellingcat, 17 Oct 2015). The company presented its findings as "the basis for a court appeal against EU sanctions".

What the claim concedes: That MH17 was shot down by a Buk missile — the end of the Su-25 version.

CONTRADICTED BY THE FORENSIC RECORD

Evidence

C

The DSB and the JIT identified a 9M38-series missile with a 9N314M warhead; the JIT recovered the missile's engine casing and venturi and "has no doubt the casing and venturi originate from a 9M38 series BUK missile" (24 May 2018). Who controlled Zaroshchenske on 17 Jul 2014 was examined by the DSB (launch area under separatist control) and by Bellingcat (no Ukrainian troops or Ukrainian Buk in the 9M38M1 area; no Ukrainian Buk in the 9M38 area, launch "highly unlikely", 29 Feb 2016). The Dutch court found the launch site was a farm field near Pervomaiskyi in "separatist-controlled territory" and ruled out other areas (17 Nov 2022). Whether the 9M38 was still in Russian service is beside the point: the court found the TELAR and its missile came from Russia.

What the claim concedes: That Almaz-Antey's June 2015 version was wrong. Russia's test used a 9M38M1 — provided, Novikov said, by the Ministry of Defence — which the company had said in June was not in Russian stocks.



CLAIM, RECORD, CONCESSION (5–8)

Each claim as made, with the date, the venue and a link; the record it runs into, with the tier of the evidence; and what it concedes. Words in square brackets are the Hub's.

UKRAINE EVIDENCE HUB

VERIFIED RECORD

2014 - 2025

CLAIM 5 · LT-GEN NIKOLAI PARSHIN · MAJ-GEN IGOR KONASHENKOV · MOSCOW, 17 SEP 2018

“[Missile no.] 8868720... manufactured at a military plant in Dolgoprudny... in 1986... [dispatched on 29 December 1986 to] military unit 20152 [in Ukraine]... [the missile] came from the arsenals of the Ukrainian army, not from Russia.”

MoD briefing, 17 Sep 2018 (Sputnik English; Mediazona Russian text)
www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/ukraine/2018/ukraine-180917-sputnik01.htm

CLAIM 6 · RUSSIAN MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, STATEMENT 24-25 MAY 2018 · VLADIMIR PUTIN, ST PETERSBURG, 25 MAY 2018

“Not a single anti-aircraft missile system from the Russian Federation has ever crossed the Russia-Ukraine border. ... [Putin, asked whether the missile was Russian:] Certainly not.”

MoD statement, 24–25 May 2018 (TASS, Jakarta Post/AFP); Putin at SPIEF, 25 May 2018 (TASS)
tass.com/world/1006378

CLAIM 7 · VITALY CHURKIN, PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE · UN SECURITY COUNCIL, 7498TH MEETING, 29 JUL 2015

“We have repeatedly stated that we do not support the idea of setting up a tribunal under Chapter VII of the Charter. There are no grounds for it, given that in resolution 2166 (2014) the Security Council did not classify [the crash] as a threat to international peace and security... The position that we have adopted today has nothing in common with promoting impunity.”

S/PV.7498, 7498th meeting, 29 Jul 2015 (UN verbatim record, via un-project.org/meeting/S-PV-7498); summary SC/11990
un-project.org/meeting/S-PV-7498

CLAIM 8 · DMITRY PESKOV, PRESIDENTIAL PRESS SECRETARY · MOSCOW, 9 JUL 2025

“[Russia considers the ECtHR rulings] null and void [and will not comply].”

Kremlin briefing, 9 Jul 2025, as reported by Ukrainska Pravda (citing Kommersant), pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2025/07/09/7520988
pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2025/07/09/7520988

SELF-INCRIMINATING: ACCEPTS THE JIT'S MISSILE, ABANDONS THE SU-25

Evidence

C

The serial number came from the venturi and engine casing recovered by the JIT, which on 24 May 2018 had asked the public for help identifying the unit to which the missile was delivered. By answering, the MoD accepted that these parts are the weapon that destroyed MH17. The JIT had already traced the launcher — not the missile — by its unique features (“a fingerprint, as it were”) to the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade in Kursk, from its journey on 23–25 Jun 2014 to its appearance in Donetsk on 17–18 Jul 2014 (24 May 2018). The court found the Buk TELAR “came from the Russian Federation, complete with a crew” (JIT transcript, 8 Feb 2023). Where a 1986 missile was stored for 28 years does not say who fired it in 2014. Konashenkov's claim that JIT videos were “fabricated” was not accepted by the court, which found no evidence of tampering.

What the claim concedes: The weapon: a 9M38-series Buk missile. And that Russia keeps 32-year-old delivery records for a single missile — but has produced no record of the 53rd Brigade's movements in June–July 2014.

ALREADY ADJUDICATED

Evidence

A

C

District Court of The Hague, 17 Nov 2022: MH17 was destroyed by a Buk missile fired by a Buk TELAR near Pervomaiskyi; the TELAR was brought into Ukraine at Dubinskiy's request and came from the Russian Federation with a crew; Girkin, Dubinskiy and Kharchenko sentenced to life for 298 murders; compensation of more than €16 million awarded to 306 relatives. ECtHR Grand Chamber, 9 Jul 2025: the missile “was intentionally fired” from occupied territory, by a member of the Russian Buk-TELAR crew or of the “DPR” — Russia responsible either way; violations of Articles 2, 3 and 13. ICAO Council, 12 May 2025: the claims of Australia and the Netherlands “well founded in fact and in law”; Russia failed its obligations under Article 3 bis of the Chicago Convention.

What the claim concedes: Putin's own admission the same day: “We take no part in it” — Russia's absence from the investigation was its choice; the JIT invited Russian participation from 2014.

BLOCKS THE COURT IT SAYS IT WANTS

Evidence

A

Draft S/2015/562 (Malaysia, Australia, Belgium, the Netherlands, Ukraine) received 11 votes in favour, 3 abstentions (Angola, China, Venezuela) and one against — Russia's veto. Russia had voted for resolution 2166 a year earlier, which demanded accountability and full cooperation with the investigation. The consequence of the veto was a national prosecution in the Netherlands, where Russia then refused to appear. The Netherlands: “I find it incomprehensible that a member of the Security Council obstructs justice in a tragedy that has affected so many” (Koenders). Ukraine: “There is no reason to oppose such a move unless you are one of the perpetrators” (Klimkin).

What the claim concedes: That a court would decide — and that Russia preferred it not to.

MISSTATES THE LAW

Evidence

A

Russia ceased to be a party to the European Convention on 16 Sep 2022, but the Court “is still competent to deal with cases concerning facts from before 16 September 2022” (ECtHR Q&A, 9 Jul 2025). Russia took part in the admissibility stage of the Ukrainian applications, answered the Court on interim measures in March 2022, then chose not to file a memorial or attend the Grand Chamber hearing of 12 Jun 2024; the Court found “insufficient cause” for this and held the “deplorable failure” to cooperate a breach of Article 38. The judgment stands on the Convention Russia ratified in 1998 and binds it for the period examined. The same week Russia called the ICAO Council's decision “illegitimate” (MFA, 14 May 2025) and had earlier called the Dutch verdict “a political bid to implicate Russia” (MFA, 17 Nov 2022).

What the claim concedes: That the judgment exists and that Russia will not implement it — non-compliance, not invalidity.



THE RECORD			
QUESTION	WHAT RUSSIA SAYS	WHAT THE RECORD SHOWS	SOURCE
Weapon	Jul 2014: Ukrainian Su-25 air-to-air · Jun 2015: Buk 9M38M1 · Oct 2015: Buk 9M38 with 9N314 warhead · Sep 2018: 9M38-series missile no. 8868720	Buk 9M38-series missile, 9N314M warhead	DSB 13 Oct 2015; JIT 24 May 2018; District Court 17 Nov 2022
Launch site	Zaroshchenske ("controlled by Ukrainian troops")	Farm field near Pervomaiskyi, south of Snizhne, "in separatist-controlled territory"; Zaroshchenske lies outside the 320 km² launch area	DSB; Bellingcat 17 Oct 2015, 29 Feb 2016; Court 17 Nov 2022
Origin of the launcher	"Not a single anti-aircraft missile system... has ever crossed the border"	Buk TELAR of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade, Kursk; "came from the Russian Federation, complete with a crew"	JIT 24 May 2018; JIT 8 Feb 2023 citing the judgment
Responsibility of the state	None; "certainly not" (Putin, 25 May 2018)	Russia responsible; violations of ECHR Arts. 2, 3, 13; breach of Chicago Convention Art. 3 bis	ECtHR GC 9 Jul 2025; ICAO Council 12 May 2025
Individual responsibility	Not addressed; MFA: trial "based on a political bid to implicate Russia"	Girkin, Dubinskiy, Kharchenko: life imprisonment; Pulatov acquitted; €16m+ compensation to 306 relatives	District Court of The Hague, 17 Nov 2022
Security Council	Veto of the tribunal; "did not promote impunity"	11 in favour, 1 against (Russia), 3 abstentions; res. 2166 (2014) adopted unanimously with Russia's vote	SC/11990, 29 Jul 2015; S/RES/2166, 21 Jul 2014

FAIR TO SAY

The Dutch Safety Board found that Ukraine "had sufficient reason to close the entire eastern airspace as a precaution" and instead restricted only lower altitudes; the DSB recommended changes to how states manage airspace over conflict zones (13 Oct 2015). That finding concerns risk management, not the cause of the crash, and the DSB did not assign blame.

The Dutch court acquitted Oleg Pulatov for lack of conclusive proof, and the JIT, in suspending its work on 8 Feb 2023, said that "strong indications" that the decision to supply the Buk was taken by President Putin did not reach "the high bar of complete and conclusive evidence". The ECtHR did not decide whether the crew who fired was Russian or "DPR", because it did not need to.

Russia is right that it was not a party to the Dutch criminal trial; the trial was held in absentia under Dutch law, and the accused could be and were represented (Pulatov). Russia's absence from the JIT and the ICAO proceedings was its own decision.

ESTABLISHED, PATTERN, POSITION

What mandated bodies have established, what the record shows as a pattern, and what is a position — kept apart. Then the lines to take and the questions to expect.

UKRAINE EVIDENCE HUB

VERIFIED RECORD

2014 - 2025

THE LAW	LINES TO TAKE
Chicago Convention, Art. 3 bis: states "must refrain from resorting to the use of weapons against civil aircraft in flight". The ICAO Council found on 12 May 2025 that Russia failed this obligation — the first merits decision between states in ICAO's history. European Convention on Human Rights, Art. 2 (right to life), Art. 3 (inhuman treatment — of the relatives), Art. 13 (effective remedy): violated, Grand Chamber, 9 Jul 2025; Art. 38 breached by Russia's refusal to cooperate. The Court remains competent for facts before 16 Sep 2022. Geneva Conventions, common Art. 2 / Dutch Criminal Code: the court found the conflict international from mid-May 2014 because the "DPR" took directions from Russia; because Russia denies that the "DPR" is part of its forces, the accused could not claim combatant immunity — Russia's denial removed their only defence. Three layers. <i>Established:</i> a Russian Buk from the 53rd Brigade, fired from "DPR"-held territory; state responsibility (ECtHR, ICAO); three convictions. <i>Pattern:</i> Russia's serial, incompatible explanations and refusal of every forum. <i>Position:</i> that the order to supply the Buk came from the President — "strong indications" (JIT), not proven.	"Russia has given three explanations for MH17 — a Ukrainian jet, a Ukrainian Buk, a 1986 missile. They cannot all be true, and no court has found any of them true." "When Russia produced the delivery record for missile 8868720, it accepted that the parts found in the wreckage are the weapon. It has never produced the record of where its 53rd Brigade was in July 2014." "A Dutch court, the ICAO Council and the European Court of Human Rights reached the same conclusion; Russia boycotted all three and then called them biased." "Russia voted for resolution 2166 demanding accountability for MH17, then vetoed the tribunal that would deliver it." "Ask the Russian delegation: which of your three versions do you still hold — and why did you not put it to the court?"

Q&A	
"The investigation was biased — Russia was excluded."	Putin said on 25 May 2018: "We take no part in it." Russia was invited to cooperate from 2014, supplied one radar recording in 2016, left the ICAO proceedings in June 2024 and did not attend the ECtHR hearing. Absence by choice is not exclusion.
"Ukraine had Buk systems too and did not close its airspace."	Both true, and both in the record. The DSB said Ukraine had reason to close the airspace. But the launch area was in territory held by the "DPR", the launcher came from Kursk and returned to Russia, and three men were convicted. Airspace management does not fire a missile.
"Almaz-Antey's experiment showed the missile was an old 9M38 that Russia no longer uses."	Almaz-Antey's June 2015 presentation said 9M38M1; its October presentation said 9M38; the MoD's 2018 record is for a 9M38-series missile. The court did not decide the case on the missile's age but on where the TELAR came from — Russia, with a crew.
"The Hague court was a political trial in absentia."	The accused had counsel; one was acquitted. Russia's MFA said Russia "is not a party to this process" — Russia had vetoed the international tribunal that would have made it one. The ECtHR and the ICAO Council, where Russia was a party, reached the same conclusion.
"The ECtHR has no jurisdiction; Russia left the Council of Europe."	The Court is competent for facts before 16 Sep 2022, and MH17 was 2014. Russia took part in the admissibility stage, then stopped answering. Its non-cooperation was itself found a breach of Article 38.

WHAT WE ASK	Cite the three Russian versions side by side whenever Russia raises MH17 in the Council — they refute each other · call on Russia to implement the ECtHR judgment of 9 Jul 2025 and the ICAO Council decision of 12 May 2025, including reparations to the Netherlands and Australia · support the Netherlands' and Australia's pursuit of the ICAO remedies and the ECtHR just-satisfaction stage · ask Russia to transfer Girkin, Dubinskiy and Kharchenko or to prosecute them itself, as Article 2 ECHR requires · keep MH17 in every accountability text: the pattern of denial began here.
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Sources: Russian MoD briefings 21 Jul 2014 (RIA/TASS) and 17 Sep 2018 (Sputnik/Mediazona); MoD statement 24–25 May 2018 (TASS) · Almaz-Antey 2 Jun and 13 Oct 2015 (Moscow Times, TASS, Defense News) · Putin, SPIEF 25 May 2018 (TASS) · SC/11990, 29 Jul 2015 · DSB 13 Oct 2015 · JIT 24 May 2018, 8 Feb 2023 · District Court of The Hague 17 Nov 2022 · ICAO 12 May 2025; Russian MFA 14 May 2025 · ECtHR GC 9 Jul 2025 (press release, Q&A; HUDOC 001-244292); Peskov 9 Jul 2025 · Bellingcat 2015–16 · EUvsDisinfo · full list on page 6



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METHOD

Russian claims are quoted from the English texts published by Russian state agencies (RIA Novosti, TASS, Sputnik) and, for the 2018 briefing, checked against the Russian report by Mediazona; mil.ru and kremlin.ru could not be opened from outside Russia, so Russian statements are quoted as carried by Russian state agencies and checked against independent reports. The Security Council quote is from the verbatim record S/PV.7498. Words in square brackets are the Hub's.

Each claim is checked first against documents of mandated bodies (Tier A): the Dutch Safety Board, the JIT and the Netherlands Public Prosecution Service, the District Court of The Hague, the ICAO Council, the ECtHR. Bellingcat (Tier C) is used only for the control of Zaroshchenske and the DSB launch-area geometry, where no Tier A document goes into the same detail. No Ukrainian official source is used.

State reactions are taken from the UN press summary of the veto meeting and from government statements on the ICAO and ECtHR decisions; they are summarised, not quoted in full.

Tiers: **A** — UN-mandated bodies, international courts and organisations (OHCHR/HRMMU, Commission of Inquiry, ICC, ECtHR, IAEA, OSCE, OPCW, Security Council record); **B** — Ukrainian official bodies, marked "according to Ukraine"; **C** — independent investigators and media; **RU** — Russian official statements, the position under review. Tiers are never combined in one figure.