

WHO SHELLS THE PLANT

Since August 2022 Russia has told the Security Council, the IAEA Board and the press that Ukraine shells and now drones its own nuclear plant. The plant has been under Russian armed control since 4 March 2022; it has been run by a Rosatom entity since a presidential decree of 5 October 2022; IAEA experts have been on site since 1 September 2022. In four years the Agency has observed shelling, drone strikes, military vehicles in the turbine halls and 26 complete losses of off-site power — and has attributed none of the attacks to either side. Seven claims, the record, and what each concedes: that whatever happens at the plant happens on a site Russia controls.

UKRAINE EVIDENCE HUB
VERIFIED RECORD
2022 - 2026

26

complete losses of off-site power at the ZNPP since the invasion, as counted by the IAEA — the 26th on 20 Aug 2026, lasting almost three weeks on diesel generators A

IAEA Updates 362–366, Aug–Sep 2026; EU statement to the IAEA Board, 10 Sep 2026

4 Mar 2022

the day Russian forces took the plant — "under their complete control by that time", in Russia's own words to the Council RU

Nebenzia, S/PV.9109, 11 Aug 2022; occupied since 4 Mar 2022 (Ukraine, same meeting)

26-2 · 24-2

IAEA Board votes calling on Russia to cease all actions at the plant and withdraw — 15 Sep 2022 · 17 Nov 2022 (against: Russia, China) A

IAEA Board of Governors resolutions, Sep and Nov 2022 (via World Nuclear News, Reuters)

0

attacks on the plant attributed by the IAEA to either side — a fact Russia itself has complained about, at the Council and at the Board A

Nebenzia, S/PV.9124, 6 Sep 2022; Ulyanov, IAEA Board, Apr 2024

BOTTOM LINE

The claim and the site. "Ukraine shells its own plant" is said of a plant Russia seized by force on 4 March 2022, garrisons, claims as federal property and staffs through Rosatom. Every incident Russia reports happens inside a perimeter it controls and to which the IAEA must ask Russia's plant management for access.

The IAEA does not attribute — and Russia knows it. The Agency's September 2022 report recorded shelling, damage and Russian military trucks in the turbine halls without naming the source of fire; Nebenzia told the Council he "regret[ted] that the source of the shelling is not directly indicated". In 2024 Russia's governor said the IAEA was "afraid" to blame Ukraine. The Hub follows the Agency: individual incidents are unattributed.

The record is about control, not about who fired last night. Two Board resolutions (Sep and Nov 2022), four General Conference resolutions and the General Assembly's rejection of the annexation of Zaporizhzhia region all point the same way: the plant must return to Ukrainian control and military personnel and equipment must leave. Russia voted against each time.

The danger is measurable. Twenty-six complete losses of off-site power, the longest a month in autumn 2025 and three weeks in August–September 2026, eight IAEA-brokered local ceasefires for line repairs, six of the Seven Pillars compromised (GOV/2025/54). None of this existed before 4 March 2022.

Fair to say. Drones and shells have struck inside the plant perimeter; the IAEA has confirmed hits and at least one death and has urged both sides to show restraint. The Hub does not claim Ukraine has never fired near the plant. It claims only what the record supports: the attribution is unverified, and the occupation is not.

THE SEVEN CLAIMS

Vassily Nebenzia · Security Council, 11 Aug 2022	"...the Ukrainian armed forces repeatedly shelled the largest nuclear power plant in Europe... On 5 August, such a strike damaged a number of facilities... On 6 August, the Ukrainian armed forces struck the Zaporizhzhya plant w..."	Unverified — the IAEA does not attribute
Vassily Nebenzia · Security Council, 11 Aug 2022	"[Russian soldiers] in close coordination with the plant's staff, are ensuring the protection of the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant and are repelling the Kyiv regime's attacks every day... [Russia] is not using civilian i..."	Contradicted by the IAEA
Vassily Nebenzia · Security Council, 23 Aug 2022	"On 14 August, the Armed Forces of Ukraine fired 10 shells at the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant [including] 155-millimetre shells from American-made M777 howitzers... Russia is not placing heavy weapons on the premises o..."	No evidence presented · demilitarisation rejected
Vassily Nebenzia · Security Council, 6 Sep 2022	"[We regret that in your report] the source of the shelling is not directly indicated... [the plant's personnel enjoy] the well-established cooperation... with the Russian armed forces guarding the plant."	Self-incriminating
Vladimir Putin · Presidential decree, 5 Oct 2022	"[Putin] has instructed the government to establish Federal State Unitary Enterprise Zaporozhye Nuclear Power Plant... [the plant's facilities and related property] will become federal property. [Interfax's report of the de..."	Already adjudicated
Mikhail Ulyanov · IAEA Board of Governors, Apr 2024	"[The IAEA is] afraid [to say that Ukraine was behind the drone attacks on the plant]... shooting at nuclear facilities is completely unacceptable."	The IAEA does not attribute — by Russia's own account
ZNPP press service (Rosatom) and Maria Zakharova · 5 Oct 2026	"Laboratory-utility building No. 2 was attacked by two Ukrainian UAVs... The building is located about 200 metres from power units Nos. 4 and 5... No casualties and no threat to nuclear safety. — [Zakharova:] The lack of a pr..."	Unverified — the IAEA does not attribute

WHAT WE ASK

Keep the two questions apart in every statement — attribution of incidents (unverified) and responsibility for the site (Russia's, since 4 Mar 2022) · cite the IAEA's own words: the 6 Sep 2022 report on Russian military equipment in the turbine halls and Grossi's request for "prompt, unfettered access" (Update 370) · press for implementation of the Board resolutions of Sep and Nov 2022 and the Five Concrete Principles, including removal of all military personnel and equipment · request a consolidated IAEA table of the 26 losses of off-site power with cause as assessed by the Agency · raise the detained Ukrainian ZNPP personnel at every Board and General Conference session · ask Russia, as the party reporting attacks, to grant the Agency immediate access to every reported impact site and to publish the munition evidence it claims to hold.

WHO SAID IT, WHERE, AND TO WHOM

Where each claim was made, who made it, how the others in the room answered, and what the statements left out.

THE OCCASION AND THE RECORD	
Occasion	Shelling at and around the ZNPP from 5 Aug 2022; IAEA mission arrives 1 Sep 2022; drone strikes reported in Apr 2024, May–Oct 2026; 26 complete losses of off-site power by Aug 2026
Where the claims were made	Security Council: S/PV.9109 (11 Aug 2022, Russia's request), S/PV.9114 (23 Aug 2022, Russia's request), S/PV.9124 (6 Sep 2022, Russia's request), 15 Apr 2024 (briefing by the IAEA Director General) · IAEA Board of Governors, Sep 2022, Nov 2022, Apr 2024 · Kremlin decree of 5 Oct 2022 · MFA comment (Zakharova), 5 Oct 2026 · ZNPP press service (Rosatom), 5 Oct 2026
Record	IAEA report "Nuclear Safety, Security and Safeguards in Ukraine" (2nd summary report, 6 Sep 2022) · IAEA Board resolutions of 15 Sep and 17 Nov 2022 · IAEA Director General's Updates 1–371 (2022–Oct 2026) · GOV/2025/54 (1 Sep 2025) · Grossi's Seven Pillars (Mar 2022) and Five Concrete Principles (Security Council, 30 May 2023) · UNGA res. ES-11/4 (12 Oct 2022) · Extraordinary Board meeting, 30 Jan 2026
What happened next	Russia rejected a demilitarised zone (Aug 2022) and the protection zone (Sep 2022); IAEA experts remain on site under Russian-controlled access; eight local ceasefires brokered by the Agency for repairs (Jan 2026 – Oct 2026); Ukrainian ZNPP personnel remain detained by Russia (EU statement, 18 Sep 2026)

THE SPEAKERS		
Vassily Nebenzia	Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the UN	Requested the Council meetings of 11 and 23 Aug and 6 Sep 2022; accused Ukraine of shelling the plant; conceded Russian control since March 2022 and that the IAEA report names no source
Mikhail Ulyanov	Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the international organisations in Vienna	At the April 2024 Board said the IAEA was "afraid" to say Ukraine was behind the drone strikes on Unit 6 — confirming the Agency's non-attribution
Maria Zakharova	Director of the MFA Information and Press Department · under EU sanctions since 23 Feb 2022, UK	5 Oct 2026 comment: Western "lack of a proper reaction" to Ukrainian attacks on the plant shows the "real price" of their talk of nuclear safety "at the IAEA and the UN"
Alexei Likhachev / ZNPP press service (Rosatom)	Director General of Rosatom; the plant's Russian-installed management	Source of every Russian incident report since Oct 2022; on 5 Oct 2026 reported two drones on "laboratory building No. 2... about 200 metres from units 4 and 5"

WHAT OTHERS SAID	
United States (S/PV.9109; S/PV.9114; S/PV.9124)	"Russia alone created the risks"; "Russia created this risk, and only Russia can defuse it"; "Russia is responsible for this crisis, and it can also resolve it now".
United Kingdom (S/PV.9109; S/PV.9114; S/PV.9124)	"It is Russia's continued invasion and military presence that put the plant at risk"; Russia "could resolve it immediately by withdrawing its forces"; "entirely of Russia's making".
France (S/PV.9109; S/PV.9114)	"Russia bears responsibility for this situation"; Russia "must give Ukraine back full control of the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant".
Albania and Ireland (S/PV.9109; S/PV.9114)	"No nuclear power plant had ever been attacked or militarised by an invading army"; the issues "arise solely from the unjust and unprovoked war waged by Russia"; Russia "must... end its illegal occupation of the site".
China and India (S/PV.9109)	Did not assign responsibility: "exercise restraint and act with caution"; "return to the path of diplomacy and dialogue". China voted against both Board resolutions.
Brazil, Ghana, UAE, Norway, Kenya, Mexico (S/PV.9109; S/PV.9114)	"The absence of immediate threat does not mean the absence of threat"; "under no circumstances should nuclear facilities... be subjected to such attacks"; "the Zaporizhzhya plant must be kept out of this conflict".
IAEA Board of Governors (15 Sep and 17 Nov 2022)	Called on Russia to "immediately cease all actions against, and at" the plant and to withdraw so that "the competent Ukrainian authorities" regain full control; 26–2–7 and 24–2–7, Russia and China against; abstentions incl. India, Pakistan, South Africa, Vietnam, Egypt, Senegal, Burundi / Kenya, Namibia, Saudi Arabia.
47 IAEA Member States (6 Mar 2025) and the EU (Sep 2026)	Condemned the seizure of the plant and said Russia's presence had led to its technical degradation; the EU recorded 26 losses of off-site power and the continued detention of Ukrainian ZNPP personnel.

WHAT THE STATEMENTS LEFT OUT
- Who controls the site: Russian forces seized the plant on 4 March 2022 after a night assault that set a training building on fire; Nebenzia told the Council it was "under their complete control" by early March (S/PV.9109). - What the IAEA saw: "Russian military personnel, vehicles and equipment at various places at the ZNPP, including several military trucks on the ground floor of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 turbine halls" (2nd summary report, 6 Sep 2022); Grossi asked the Council that "the military vehicles and equipment that are currently present inside nuclear plant buildings on the site be removed" (S/PV.9124). - The Board's answer: resolutions of 15 Sep 2022 (26–2–7) and 17 Nov 2022 (24–2–7) calling on Russia to "immediately cease all actions against, and at" the plant and to withdraw so that "the competent Ukrainian authorities" regain full control; Russia and China voted against both. - The staff: Ukrainian plant personnel work under Russian armed guard; the EU told the General Conference on 18 Sep 2026 of its "deep concern at the continued detention of Ukrainian ZNPP personnel by Russia". - The grid: the plant lost all off-site power for the 10th time on 23 Sep 2025 (about a month, the longest), the 25th on 8 Aug 2026 and the 26th on 20 Aug – 7 Sep 2026; it relies on one of its ten pre-war lines; the 750 kV Dniprovsk line has been out since 2025 (IAEA Updates 317, 362–366; GOV/2025/54).

HOW IT TRAVELS
Each Russian incident report follows one path: the ZNPP press service (Rosatom) posts on Telegram; RIA Novosti, TASS and Izvestia carry it within the hour ("Ukrainian forces struck 200 metres from the reactor units", RIA, 5 Oct 2026); the MFA or Zakharova adds a comment on Western "silence" the same evening; the Mission raises it at the next Council meeting. When the IAEA's own update then reports "a reported drone attack" and asks for access, Russian media quote the Agency's confirmation of the hit and omit its silence on the source. In August 2024 Zakharova asked "Where is Rafael Grossi and all the IAEA?" — about an incident at a plant whose access Russia controls.



CLAIM, RECORD, CONCESSION (1-4)

Each claim as made, with the date, the venue and a link; the record it runs into, with the tier of the evidence; and what it concedes. Words in square brackets are the Hub's.

UKRAINE EVIDENCE HUB

VERIFIED RECORD

2022 - 2026

CLAIM 1 · VASSILY NEBENZIA · SECURITY COUNCIL, 11 AUG 2022

“...the Ukrainian armed forces repeatedly shelled the largest nuclear power plant in Europe... On 5 August, such a strike damaged a number of facilities... On 6 August, the Ukrainian armed forces struck the Zaporizhzhya plant with cluster munitions... [actions] in line with classic methods in the arsenal of terrorist groups.”

S/PV.9109, 9109th meeting, 11 Aug 2022 (meeting requested by Russia)
www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s

CLAIM 2 · VASSILY NEBENZIA · SECURITY COUNCIL, 11 AUG 2022

“[Russian soldiers] in close coordination with the plant's staff, are ensuring the protection of the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant and are repelling the Kyiv regime's attacks every day... [Russia] is not using civilian infrastructure, not to mention nuclear facilities, [for military purposes].”

S/PV.9109, 11 Aug 2022
www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s

CLAIM 3 · VASSILY NEBENZIA · SECURITY COUNCIL, 23 AUG 2022

“On 14 August, the Armed Forces of Ukraine fired 10 shells at the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant [including] 155-millimetre shells from American-made M777 howitzers... Russia is not placing heavy weapons on the premises of the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant... [A demilitarised zone] is an irresponsible proposal, as it completely ignores the need to maintain the conditions [for safe operation].”

S/PV.9114, 9114th meeting, 23 Aug 2022 (meeting requested by Russia)
un-project.org/meeting/S-PV-9114

CLAIM 4 · VASSILY NEBENZIA · SECURITY COUNCIL, 6 SEP 2022

“[We regret that in your report] the source of the shelling is not directly indicated... [the plant's personnel enjoy] the well-established cooperation... with the Russian armed forces guarding the plant.”

S/PV.9124, 9124th meeting, 6 Sep 2022 (meeting requested by Russia; Grossi briefing on the 2nd summary report)
www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s

UNVERIFIED — THE IAEA DOES NOT ATTRIBUTE

Evidence

A

Grossi, same meeting: "without a physical presence, the IAEA cannot corroborate some very important facts"; the statements from Russia and Ukraine "are frequently contradictory"; "all seven pillars have been compromised, if not entirely violated, at one point or another". The Agency's 2nd summary report (6 Sep 2022), written after its experts reached the site, records shelling at and around the plant and damage to several buildings and calls for shelling to "stop immediately" — without naming the source. No Russian submission to the Council or the Agency has since identified a firing position, a unit or a munition recovered on site. The one physical finding the Agency did report was Russian: military trucks inside the turbine halls.

What the claim concedes: That "the Zaporizhzhya plant is controlled by the Russian armed forces" and was "under their complete control" by early March 2022 — his words in the same statement.

CONTRADICTED BY THE IAEA

Evidence

A

IAEA 2nd summary report, 6 Sep 2022: "the presence of Russian military personnel, vehicles, and equipment at various places at the ZNPP, including several military trucks on the ground floor of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 turbine halls". Grossi to the Council, 6 Sep: the vehicles and equipment "currently present inside nuclear plant buildings on the site" should be removed. IAEA Board, 15 Sep 2022: deplored Russia's "persistent violent actions against nuclear facilities in Ukraine" and called on it to "immediately cease all actions against, and at" the plant. A nuclear plant with an armed garrison and military vehicles inside its buildings is a nuclear facility used for military purposes by any ordinary reading.

What the claim concedes: That Russian troops are at the plant and engage in combat from it ("repelling... attacks every day").

NO EVIDENCE PRESENTED · DEMILITARISATION REJECTED

Evidence

A

No shell fragments, calibre analysis or crater survey was tabled, then or since; the Agency's experts arrived nine days later and reported what they saw (claim 2), not M777 fragments. DiCarlo, same meeting: "All military personnel and equipment must be withdrawn from the plant"; "the electricity produced at the Zaporizhzhya plant belongs to Ukraine". The UK: Russia "could resolve it immediately by withdrawing its forces from the nuclear power plant"; the US: "Russia created this risk, and only Russia can defuse it"; France: Russia "must give Ukraine back full control". The Board's resolution of 15 Sep 2022 followed. Russia's refusal of a demilitarised zone, repeated for the Agency's protection-zone proposal of 6 Sep 2022, is a matter of record.

What the claim concedes: That Russia intends to keep military forces at a nuclear power plant — the condition every mandated body has asked it to end.

SELF-INCRIMINATING

Evidence

A

Russia's Permanent Representative confirms, on the record, that the IAEA — present on site since 1 Sep 2022 — does not say who shells the plant. Every later Russian "Ukraine shells its own plant" statement runs against that admission. Grossi, same meeting: "Wittingly or unwittingly, the physical attacks and the hits that the facility has taken" are unacceptable; "we propose the establishment of a nuclear safety and security protection zone". The US: "Russia is responsible for this crisis, and it can also resolve it now"; the UK: "the situation at Zaporizhzhya is entirely of Russia's making".

What the claim concedes: Non-attribution by the IAEA, and Russian armed guards at the plant.



CLAIM, RECORD, CONCESSION (5-7)

Each claim as made, with the date, the venue and a link; the record it runs into, with the tier of the evidence; and what it concedes. Words in square brackets are the Hub's.

UKRAINE EVIDENCE HUB
VERIFIED RECORD
2022 - 2026

CLAIM 5 · VLADIMIR PUTIN · PRESIDENTIAL DECREE, 5 OCT 2022

"[Putin] has instructed the government to establish Federal State Unitary Enterprise Zaporozhye Nuclear Power Plant... [the plant's facilities and related property] will become federal property. [Interfax's report of the decree]"

Decree of 5 Oct 2022 as reported by Interfax (interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/83581) and RFE/RL

interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/83581

ALREADY ADJUDICATED

Evidence A

UNGA res. ES-11/4 (12 Oct 2022; 143 in favour, 5 against, 35 abstentions) declared the attempted annexation of Zaporizhzhia and three other regions "unlawful" and without validity. The IAEA Board's resolution of 17 Nov 2022 expressed "grave concern that the Russian Federation has not heeded the calls of the Board" and called on it to "immediately withdraw"; Grossi has repeated that the plant is a Ukrainian facility and that its licence holder is Energoatom. The decree is Russia's statement that it owns, operates and staffs the site through Rosatom's Rosenergoatom.

What the claim concedes: Responsibility: a state that declares a nuclear plant its federal property and installs its operator answers for what happens on the site — including every incident it reports as Ukrainian.

CLAIM 6 · MIKHAIL ULYANOV · IAEA BOARD OF GOVERNORS, APR 2024

"[The IAEA is] afraid [to say that Ukraine was behind the drone attacks on the plant]... shooting at nuclear facilities is completely unacceptable."

IAEA Board session of 11 Apr 2024, as reported by Arms Control Today (May 2024)

www.armscontrol.org/act/2024-05/news/drones-hit-zaporizhzhia-reactor-building

THE IAEA DOES NOT ATTRIBUTE — BY RUSSIA'S OWN ACCOUNT

Evidence A

On 7 Apr 2024 drones struck several buildings including "a direct hit on the reactor dome of Unit 6"; the damage "did not compromise nuclear safety in a serious way" but set "a very dangerous precedent of the successful targeting of the reactor containment" (Grossi, Board 11 Apr; Security Council 15 Apr 2024). The Agency did not name the operator of the drones; Russia and Ukraine "traded accusations"; the United States condemned "all such actions regardless of who the culprit is". Russia's complaint that the IAEA is "afraid" is the clearest statement that the Agency has not endorsed the Russian attribution.

What the claim concedes: That the only mandated body on the site has declined to adopt Russia's version.

CLAIM 7 · ZNPP PRESS SERVICE (ROSATOM) AND MARIA ZAKHAROVA · 5 OCT 2026

"Laboratory-utility building No. 2 was attacked by two Ukrainian UAVs... The building is located about 200 metres from power units Nos. 4 and 5... No casualties and no threat to nuclear safety. — [Zakharova:] The lack of a proper reaction by the West to the attacks of the Ukrainian armed forces on the Zaporizhzhia NPP shows the real price of the statements of representatives of these countries about nuclear safety... at the IAEA and the UN... [they] are ready to support any terrorist methods used by their hangers-on. [translated]"

RIA Novosti, 5 Oct 2026 (plant press service); MFA comment published on mid.ru, 5 Oct 2026, as carried by RIA Novosti

ria.ru/20261005/mid-2122446610.html

UNVERIFIED — THE IAEA DOES NOT ATTRIBUTE

Evidence A B

IAEA Update 370 (9 Oct 2026): the team "was informed of a reported drone attack on a laboratory and utility building and a radioactive waste processing building inside the protected area"; no casualties or radiation release; "it is essential that IAEA staff are provided with prompt, unfettered access to the sites of reported attacks in order to enable independent assessment of the nature and impact of any incident". The Agency's 3 Oct statement had already spoken of "a series of drone attacks in recent weeks" (19, 20, 27 Sep) without attribution. Ukraine's armed forces denied involvement and called the reports nuclear blackmail (Tier B, noted). In the same week the plant's sole external line, Ferosplavna-1, was being repaired under the eighth IAEA-brokered local ceasefire (Update 371, 16 Oct 2026). The Hub records the incident as reported and unattributed.

What the claim concedes: That access for independent assessment runs through Russia's plant management — the IAEA must be "provided" access by the party making the accusation.

Sources: S/PV.9109 (11 Aug 2022), S/PV.9114 (23 Aug 2022), S/PV.9124 (6 Sep 2022) · IAEA 2nd summary report, 6 Sep 2022 · IAEA Board resolutions 15 Sep and 17 Nov 2022 (WNN, Cyprus Mail/Reuters) · IAEA Updates 317, 362–366, 369–371 · GOV/2025/54 · EU statements to the Board (10 Sep 2026) and General Conference (18 Sep 2026) · UNGA ES-11/4 · Interfax on the 5 Oct 2022 decree · Arms Control Today, May 2024 · RIA Novosti, 5 Oct 2026 · 360.ru, Aug 2024 · full list on page 6

FACT-CHECK · HISTORICAL
V1 · 21 OCT 2026



live page · corrections
log

THE RECORD			
QUESTION	WHAT RUSSIA SAYS	WHAT THE RECORD SHOWS	SOURCE
Who controls the plant	Russian "protection"; federal property since 5 Oct 2022	Seized by force 4 Mar 2022; Russia's own words: "under their complete control" by early March; annexation declared unlawful by 143 states	S/PV.9109; UNGA ES-11/4, 12 Oct 2022
Who shells / drones the plant	"the Ukrainian armed forces" — 2022, 2024, 2026	Not attributed by the IAEA in any update, report or Board document; Russia has complained of this itself	IAEA 2nd summary report, 6 Sep 2022; S/PV.9124; Arms Control Today, May 2024
Military equipment on the site	"not placing heavy weapons"; "not using... nuclear facilities" militarily	Russian military personnel, vehicles and equipment observed, incl. trucks in Units 1–2 turbine halls; Grossi asked for their removal	IAEA report, 6 Sep 2022; S/PV.9124
What the IAEA Board asked	Rejects demilitarised / protection zone	Cease all actions at the plant; withdraw; Ukrainian authorities to regain full control — 26–2–7 (15 Sep 2022) and 24–2–7 (17 Nov 2022)	IAEA Board resolutions (via WNN, Reuters)
Complete losses of off-site power since Mar 2022	—	8th: 2 Dec 2023 · 9th: 4 Jul 2025 · 10th: 23 Sep 2025 (about a month) · 25th: 8 Aug 2026 · 26th: 20 Aug – 7 Sep 2026; 10 of them in Jun–Aug 2026 alone	IAEA Updates (RFE/RL, 2 Dec 2023); GOV/2025/54; Update 317; Updates 362–366; EU Board statement, 10 Sep 2026
Seven Pillars	—	Six of seven fully or partially compromised; situation "precarious"	GOV/2025/54, 1 Sep 2025
Local ceasefires needed to repair power lines	—	Eight brokered by the IAEA, Jan–Oct 2026, the latest from 15 Oct 2026	IAEA Update 371, 16 Oct 2026

FAIR TO SAY

Attacks have hit the plant. The IAEA has confirmed shelling damage in 2022, a drone hit on the Unit 6 containment in April 2024 with at least one casualty, a drone hit on the Unit 6 machine hall reported in May 2026, and drone strikes in September–October 2026; a plant employee was reported killed on a supply vehicle in October 2026 (Russian report, unverified). The Agency has repeatedly urged "both sides" to show restraint and has said "neither side would benefit from a nuclear accident" (Update 317). The Hub does not assert that Ukrainian forces have never fired near the plant; it asserts that no mandated body has attributed any incident, and that Russia's own representatives have said so.

The IAEA is deliberately neutral on attribution because it works on both sides of the line and needs Russian consent to stay on site; that neutrality is a limitation of the record as well as its strength. The loss-of-power count mixes causes: some outages were due to damage to lines far from the plant on either side, and the Agency has sometimes reported an "external grid fault" rather than an attack (2 Dec 2023, the 8th loss).

Counting: the EU's General Conference statement of 18 Sep 2026 called the 20 Aug 2026 event the 27th complete loss, while the IAEA updates and the EU's own Board statement a week earlier give 26; the Hub follows the Agency's numbering and shows both. The earlier dates in the series (losses 2–7) are to be reconciled against the IAEA update list before publication.

ESTABLISHED, PATTERN, POSITION

What mandated bodies have established, what the record shows as a pattern, and what is a position — kept apart. Then the lines to take and the questions to expect.

UKRAINE EVIDENCE HUB
VERIFIED RECORD
2022 - 2026

THE LAW

Additional Protocol I, art. 56: nuclear electrical generating stations "shall not be made the object of attack... if such attack may cause the release of dangerous forces"; parties "shall endeavour to avoid locating any military objectives in the vicinity" of such works (art. 56(5)). An armed garrison and military vehicles inside the plant are what the article tells parties not to create.

Hague Regulations art. 43 and Fourth Geneva Convention arts. 53 and 55: an occupying power must ensure public order and safety and may not appropriate or destroy property except where imperatively demanded by military necessity; a decree converting a nuclear plant into "federal property" is not an act of occupation law but of annexation, which UNGA res. ES-11/4 and the UN Charter art. 2(4) exclude.

IAEA General Conference decision GC(53)/DEC/13 (2009) and the Seven Pillars / Five Concrete Principles (30 May 2023): armed attacks on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes are a violation of the UN Charter, international law and the IAEA Statute; no attack from or against the plant, no use as a base for heavy weapons, off-site power available at all times. **Rome Statute art. 8(2)(b)(iv):** launching an attack in the knowledge that it will cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment clearly excessive to the military advantage.

Three layers. *Established:* Russian armed control of the site since 4 Mar 2022; Russian military personnel and vehicles inside the plant (IAEA, Sep 2022); 26 complete losses of off-site power (IAEA). *Pattern:* repeated unattributed shelling and drone strikes inside a perimeter Russia controls; repeated Russian refusal of demilitarisation. *Position:* that Russia stages or tolerates incidents at the plant is Ukraine's qualification and is not a finding of the IAEA; the Hub does not adopt it.

LINES TO TAKE

- "The plant Russia says Ukraine shells is a plant Russia seized by force, garrisons and claims as federal property. Every incident it reports happens inside its own perimeter."
- "The IAEA has been on site since September 2022. It has never attributed an attack to either side. Russia's ambassador complained about exactly that."
- "The Agency found Russian military trucks in the turbine halls. It has never found a Ukrainian firing position."
- "Two Board resolutions, 26 to 2 and 24 to 2, asked Russia to leave. Russia and China voted no."
- "Twenty-six times the plant has lost all off-site power. Before 4 March 2022 the count was zero."
- "We say what the IAEA says: the hits are real, the source is unverified, the occupation is not."

Q&A

"The IAEA confirmed the drone strikes — so Ukraine attacked the plant."

The IAEA confirmed that buildings were hit and asked for access to assess them. It did not say by whom, and it never has. Russia's own representatives have complained that the Agency does not name Ukraine. The Hub follows the Agency: unattributed.

"Why would Russia attack a plant it holds?"

The Hub does not say it did; no mandated body has found that either. The question of who fired is open on the record. What is not open is who controls the site, who put military vehicles in the turbine halls, and who has rejected every proposal to demilitarise it.

"Russia protects the plant; without its troops it would be a target."

The IAEA Board asked Russia to withdraw so that Ukraine regains control; Additional Protocol I art. 56(5) tells parties to keep military objectives away from such works. The losses of off-site power began with the occupation and have reached 26.

"The IAEA is biased against Russia."

The Agency has refused to attribute incidents to Ukraine, which Russia wants, and has not attributed them to Russia, which Ukraine wants. It reports what its experts see. In September 2022 what they saw was Russian military equipment inside the plant.

"Ukraine cut the power lines itself."

Some outages were caused by damage far from the plant, on either side of the line, and the Agency has said so case by case (e.g., an "external grid fault" in Dec 2023). The pattern — 26 losses, a month-long outage in 2025, three weeks in 2026, eight local ceasefires to repair lines — is the consequence of fighting around a plant that was never a front line before the invasion.

"Zaporizhzhia region is Russian now, so the plant is Russian."

143 states in the General Assembly said the annexation is unlawful; the IAEA treats the plant as a Ukrainian facility whose licence holder is Energoatom. A decree cannot change that, and it does fix responsibility: the state that declares the plant its property answers for its safety.

WHAT WE ASK

Keep the two questions apart in every statement — attribution of incidents (unverified) and responsibility for the site (Russia's, since 4 Mar 2022) · cite the IAEA's own words: the 6 Sep 2022 report on Russian military equipment in the turbine halls and Grossi's request for "prompt, unfettered access" (Update 370) · press for implementation of the Board resolutions of Sep and Nov 2022 and the Five Concrete Principles, including removal of all military personnel and equipment · request a consolidated IAEA table of the 26 losses of off-site power with cause as assessed by the Agency · raise the detained Ukrainian ZNPP personnel at every Board and General Conference session · ask Russia, as the party reporting attacks, to grant the Agency immediate access to every reported impact site and to publish the munition evidence it claims to hold.



SOURCES		
UN Security Council	S/PV.9109, 9109th meeting, 11 Aug 2022 — Grossi briefing; Nebenzia on Ukrainian shelling and Russian control https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_9109.pdf	A
UN Security Council	S/PV.9114, 9114th meeting, 23 Aug 2022 — DiCarlo briefing; Nebenzia on M777 shells, heavy weapons, demilitarised zone https://un-project.org/meeting/S-PV-9114/	A
UN Security Council	S/PV.9124, 9124th meeting, 6 Sep 2022 — Grossi on the 2nd summary report; Nebenzia regrets the source of shelling is not indicated https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv.9124.pdf	A
UN Security Council	S/PV.9115, 9115th meeting, 24 Aug 2022 — Zelenskyy by video: "Russia should... completely withdraw from the plant"; Nebenzia on "Kyiv's ongoing bombardment" https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_9115.pdf	A
IAEA	Nuclear Safety, Security and Safeguards in Ukraine — 2nd summary report by the Director General, 6 Sep 2022 https://iaea.org/sites/default/files/documents/ukraine-2ndsummaryreport_sept2022.pdf	A
RFE/RL via GlobalSecurity	Nuclear watchdog's report on Zaporizhzhya says current situation is "untenable", calls for security zone, 6 Sep 2022 https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/ukraine/2022/09/ukraine-220906-rferl01.htm	C
European Pravda	IAEA confirmed presence of Russia's military personnel, vehicles and equipment at ZNPP (turbine halls quote), 6 Sep 2022 https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/eng/news/2022/09/6/7146276/	C
World Nuclear News	IAEA board calls for Russia to hand over control of Zaporizhzhia — resolution of 15 Sep 2022, vote 26–2–7 https://world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/IAEA-board-calls-for-Russia-to-hand-over-control-o	C
Cyprus Mail / Reuters	UN nuclear watchdog board again urges Russia to end actions at Ukrainian plants — resolution of 17 Nov 2022, vote 24–2–7 https://www.cyprus-mail.com/2022/11/17/un-nuclear-watchdog-board-again-urges-russia-to-end-actions-at-ukrainian-plants	C
Interfax	Putin instructs government to establish Federal State Unitary Enterprise Zaporozhye NPP — decree of 5 Oct 2022 https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/83581/	RU
RFE/RL via GlobalSecurity	Putin decree on the Zaporizhzhia plant, 5 Oct 2022 https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/ukraine/2022/10/ukraine-221005-rferl02.htm	C
Arms Control Today	Drones hit Zaporizhzhia reactor building — Grossi at the Board (11 Apr 2024) and the Security Council (15 Apr 2024); Ulyanov: IAEA "afraid" https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2024-05/news/drones-hit-zaporizhzhia-reactor-building	C
IAEA via GlobalSecurity	Update 317 — tenth complete loss of off-site power, 23 Sep 2025; "neither side would benefit from a nuclear accident", 30 Sep 2025 https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/ukraine/2025/09/ukraine-250930-iaea01.htm	A
RFE/RL	Eighth complete loss of off-site power — "external grid fault", 2 Dec 2023 https://www.rferl.org/a/zaporizhzhya-nuclear-power-plant-safety-ukraine/32711212.html	C
IAEA	GOV/2025/54 — Director General's report, 1 Sep 2025: six of seven pillars compromised; ninth loss of off-site power on 4 Jul 2025 https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/documents/gov2025-54_0.pdf	A
IAEA	Update 370 — drone incidents at the ZNPP, 5 Oct 2026; "prompt, unfettered access", 9 Oct 2026 (21 Oct 2026) https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/update-370-iaea-director-general-statement-on-situation-in-ukraine	A
IAEA	Update 371 — eighth IAEA-facilitated local ceasefire, Ferosplavna-1 repairs, 16 Oct 2026 (21 Oct 2026) https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/update-371-iaea-director-general-statement-on-situation-in-ukraine	A
European Union (EEAS)	EU statement to the IAEA Board of Governors, agenda item 7, 10 Sep 2026 — 26 losses of off-site power, ten in the reporting period https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/vienna-international-organisations/board-governors-international-atomic-energy-agency-eu-statement-agenda-item-7-nuclear-safety_en	A
European Union (EEAS)	EU statement to the 70th IAEA General Conference, agenda item 21, 18 Sep 2026 — detained Ukrainian ZNPP personnel https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/vienna-international-organisations/70th-session-general-conference-international-atomic-energy-agency-eu-statement-agenda-item-21_en	A
BASE (German Federal Office for the Safety of Nuclear Waste Management)	Chronology of the situation at Ukrainian nuclear sites citing IAEA Updates 361–366 (26th loss, 20 Aug – 7 Sep 2026) https://www.base.bund.de/en/nuclear-safety/nuclear-accidents/information-current-situation.html	C
World Nuclear News	Zaporizhzhia reconnected to external power after 18 days, 8 Sep 2026 https://world-nuclear-news.org/articles/zaporizhzhia-reconnected-to-external-power-after-18-days	C
RIA Novosti	Ukrainian forces struck 200 metres from the ZNPP power units — plant press service, 5 Oct 2026 https://ria.ru/20261005/zaes--2122259971.html	RU
RIA Novosti	MFA: no proper Western reaction to Ukrainian attacks on the ZNPP — Zakharova comment, 5 Oct 2026 https://ria.ru/20261005/mid-2122446610.html	RU
360.ru	Zakharova: Ukrainian strike on the ZNPP is "nuclear terror of the continent"; "Where is Rafael Grossi and all the IAEA?", 11 Aug 2024 https://360.ru/news/vlast/zaharova-nazvala-ukrainskij-udar-po-zaes-jadernym-terrorom-kontinenta/	RU
bluewin / dpa	IAEA investigates accusation of drone attack on the Unit 6 machine hall, 31 May 2026 https://www.bluewin.ch/en/news/international/iaea-investigates-accusation-of-drone-attack-on-zaporizhzhya-nuclear-power-plant-3256612.html	C
Government of Ukraine	Joint statement of 47 IAEA Member States on the third anniversary of the occupation of the ZNPP, 6 Mar 2025 https://www.kmu.gov.ua/en/news/47-derzhav-chleniv-mahate-vystupyly-zi-spilnoiu-zaiavoju-na-pidtrymku-ukrainy-u-zviazku-z-nezakonnoui-okupatsiiei-rosiiei-u-zaporizkoi-aes	B
World Nuclear News	In quotes: UN Security Council discusses Zaporizhzhia (11 Aug 2022) — Albania, Ireland, Brazil, Ghana, UAE, Norway, Kenya, India, China https://world-nuclear.org/ukraine-information/wnn-ukraine/wnn-in-quotes--un-security-council-discusses-zapor	C
Security Council Report	What's In Blue: Ukraine briefing on Zaporizhzhia, 11 Aug 2022 https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2022/08/ukraine-briefing-on-zaporizhzhia.php	C

METHOD

Russian claims are quoted from the Security Council verbatim records S/PV.9109, S/PV.9114 and S/PV.9124 (English as issued by the UN); from Interfax's report of the 5 Oct 2022 decree (kremlin.ru could not be opened); from Arms Control Today's report of the April 2024 Board session; and from RIA Novosti's publication of the ZNPP press service and MFA texts of 5 Oct 2026 (translated by the Hub). Words in square brackets are the Hub's.

The record is the IAEA's: its 2nd summary report of 6 Sep 2022, the Board resolutions of 15 Sep and 17 Nov 2022, the Director General's numbered Updates and report GOV/2025/54. Where an individual Update is cited, it is cited through the UN record (Grossi's Council briefings), the EU's statements to the Board and General Conference, or the secondary carriers named in the source table (WNN, RFE/RL). The Hub adopts the Agency's practice and attributes no individual incident.

Ukrainian statements (Energoatom, the armed forces' denials) are noted as Tier B context and are not used to rebut Russian attribution claims. The count of losses of off-site power follows the IAEA's own numbering; where the EU's count differs (27 vs 26), both are shown.

Tiers: **A** — UN-mandated bodies, international courts and organisations (OHCHR/HRMMU, Commission of Inquiry, ICC, ECtHR, IAEA, OSCE, OPCW, Security Council record); **B** — Ukrainian official bodies, marked "according to Ukraine"; **C** — independent investigators and media; **RU** — Russian official statements, the position under review. Tiers are never combined in one figure.