Those are local self-defence forces

Fair to sayLocal people did take part on the separatist side in 2014; the OSCE SMM reported what it saw and did not draw conclusions; and the Russian regular-army presence in Donbas between 2015 and 2021 was intermittent and partly covert. None of this is "no Russian troops".

Contradicted by Russia's own PresidentPutin, Direct Line, 17 Apr 2014: "our military personnel was behind the backs of Crimea's self-defence" (RIA English); Putin in "Crimea. The Way Home", Rossiya 1, 15 Mar 2015: at the end of an all-night Kremlin meeting on 22–23 Feb 2014 he told the heads of the security services, "We are obliged to start working to return Crimea to Russia". The ECtHR found that Russia exercised effective control over Crimea in the period from 27 Feb 2014, before the "referendum" (admissibility decision, 16 Dec 2020; judgment, 25 Jun 2024), and that courts applying Russian law in Crimea are not "established by law" because an occupying power may not replace local law with its own. Concedes: That armed men in Russian-pattern uniforms without insignia had taken control of Crimea's institutions — the fact Russia was explaining away.Evidence tiers: A

Self-incriminatingThe statement reverses claim 1 six weeks later and is the basis on which the ECtHR and the General Assembly's position rest: a change of territory brought about by the armed forces of another state is not an exercise of self-determination (res. 68/262; Art. 2(4) UN Charter). Putin's same answer denied any presence in the east: the article records only that Russia wanted to avoid "events like those in southeastern Ukraine" — the claim examined in claims 3–6. Concedes: Everything claim 1 denied: that Russian servicemen were deployed in Crimea, under orders, during the "referendum".Evidence tiers: A

Already adjudicatedECtHR admissibility decision, 25 Jan 2023: the Court relied on evidence of Russian military personnel in eastern Ukraine from April 2014, the extensive provision of Russian weapons, and "the large-scale deployment of Russian troops from August 2014 at the very latest"; Russia exercised effective control over the areas held by the "DPR/LPR" from 11 May 2014 (confirmed in the judgment of 9 Jul 2025). The man who took Sloviansk on 12 Apr 2014 — one day after Lavrov's statement — was Igor Girkin, a serving FSB colonel until 2013 who had come from Crimea; he said in Zavtra (Nov 2014): "I was the one who pulled the trigger of this war… If our unit had not crossed the border, it would have all fizzled out." The Dutch court convicted Girkin for MH17 as a "functional perpetrator" and found the "DPR" took directions from Russia from mid-May 2014. Concedes: The standard Russia set for itself: that the presence of Russian "troops or agents" would be wrongful. Girkin's own account answers it.Evidence tiers: A · C

Contradicted by the ECtHR recordTen servicemen of military unit 71211 (331st Regiment, 98th Airborne Division, Kostroma) were detained near Dzerkalne, Donetsk region, on 25 Aug 2014 — about 20 km inside Ukraine. The MoD confirmed they were Russian. Within days Ukrainian forces were encircled at Ilovaisk; the ECtHR placed "the large-scale deployment of Russian troops from August 2014 at the very latest" (25 Jan 2023). On 8 Nov 2014 the OSCE SMM recorded a convoy of more than 40 unmarked military trucks — 19 towing 122 mm howitzers, crews in dark-green uniforms without insignia — moving west at Makiivka, and nine unmarked tanks in Donetsk (spot report, 8 Nov 2014). Graves of paratroopers of the 76th Division appeared near Pskov in the same week as the capture; their markings were removed (Moscow Times, 27 Aug 2014; Tier C). Concedes: That the ten men were serving Russian soldiers, armed and in Ukraine — the fact in dispute. The Chizhov figure ("nine") is itself an admission of presence.Evidence tiers: A · C

Contradicted by Russia's own decreeTen days later, on 28 May 2015, Putin signed a decree adding to the list of state secrets information on losses of personnel "in peacetime during special operations"; until then only wartime losses were secret (Meduza, 28 May 2015). The two captured men, Yevgeny Yerofeyev and Aleksandr Aleksandrov, said they were serving in the 3rd GRU Spetsnaz Brigade (Tolyatti); they were convicted in Kyiv in April 2016 and exchanged for Nadiya Savchenko in May 2016. On 2 Aug 2015 an armed man guarding a heavy-weapons holding site told the SMM his unit was "the 16th airborne brigade from Orenburg, Russian Federation" (SMM daily report, 3 Aug 2015). The ECtHR's finding of effective control covers the whole period from 11 May 2014 to at least 26 Jan 2022. Concedes: That the question had been asked "repeatedly" — because Russian soldiers kept being captured, buried and photographed.Evidence tiers: A · C

Concedes presence; the distinction has no legal weight"People… in the military sphere" is an admission that claims 3 and 5 were untrue. International law attributes conduct to a state that directs or controls it, whatever the formal status of the persons (ILC Articles on State Responsibility, art. 8). The ECtHR did not require proof of regular units: effective control through "military, political and economic support" to the separatist entities sufficed for Russian jurisdiction from 11 May 2014 (25 Jan 2023; 9 Jul 2025). The Dutch court applied the same logic: because the "DPR" took Russia's directions, the conflict was international from mid-May 2014; because Russia denied the "DPR" was part of its forces, its fighters could not claim combatant immunity (17 Nov 2022). Concedes: That Russians "in the military sphere" were in Donbas with the Kremlin's knowledge — twenty months after "there are no Russian troops there".Evidence tiers: A · C

Rejected by 100 statesResolution 68/262 "Territorial integrity of Ukraine": 100 in favour, 11 against, 58 abstentions. It underscores "the invalidity of the 16 March referendum" and calls on states not to recognise any change in the status of Crimea or Sevastopol. The "voluntary choice" was made with Russian servicemen "behind the backs" of the self-defence forces, as Putin confirmed three weeks later (claim 2). Every General Assembly resolution on Crimea since (73/263, 74/17, 75/192 and others) has restated the position; the ECtHR treats Crimea as occupied territory under international humanitarian law (25 Jun 2024). Concedes: That the lawfulness of the referendum depended on its being free of foreign armed force — the condition Russia's own President later said was not met.Evidence tiers: A

SourcesPutin, 4 Mar, 17 Apr 2014, 17 Dec 2015 via RIA/RFE/RL · Lavrov, Rossiya 1, 11 Apr 2014 · Peskov 15 Apr 2014, 18 May 2015 · RIA/Moscow Times 26–28 Aug 2014 · VOA on "Crimea. The Way Home", Mar 2015 · GA/11493 · OSCE SMM 8 Nov 2014, 3 Aug 2015; Hug 25 Mar 2016 · ECtHR 25 Jan 2023, 25 Jun 2024, 9 Jul 2025 · District Court of The Hague 17 Nov 2022 · Meduza 28 May 2015 · Zavtra/Girkin Nov 2014 · EUvsDisinfo · full list on page 6