Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant, 2022 – 2026
Who shells the plant
7 claims checked against the record · PDF in six languages
Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant, 2022 – 2026
Who shells the plant7 claims checked against the record · PDF in six languagesRussian Mission to the UN, MoD, MFA · Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant · August 2022 – October 2026. Since August 2022 Russia has told the Security Council, the IAEA Board and the press that Ukraine shells and now drones its own nuclear plant. The plant has been under Russian armed control since 4 March 2022; it has been run by a Rosatom entity since a presidential decree of 5 October 2022; IAEA experts have been on site since 1 September 2022. In four years the Agency has observed shelling, drone strikes, military vehicles in the turbine halls and 26 complete losses of off-site power — and has attributed none of the attacks to either side. Seven claims, the record, and what each concedes: that whatever happens at the plant happens on a site Russia controls.
7-page dossier · six languagesPDF
The recordThe claim and the site. "Ukraine shells its own plant" is said of a plant Russia seized by force on 4 March 2022, garrisons, claims as federal property and staffs through Rosatom. Every incident Russia reports happens inside a perimeter it controls and to which the IAEA must ask Russia's plant management for access.
Fair to sayDrones and shells have struck inside the plant perimeter; the IAEA has confirmed hits and at least one death and has urged both sides to show restraint. The Hub does not claim Ukraine has never fired near the plant. It claims only what the record supports: the attribution is unverified, and the occupation is not.
Claim 1 · Vassily Nebenzia · Security Council, 11 Aug 2022“…the Ukrainian armed forces repeatedly shelled the largest nuclear power plant in Europe… On 5 August, such a strike damaged a number of facilities… On 6 August, the Ukrainian armed forces struck the Zaporizhzhya plant with cluster munitions… [actions] in line with classic methods in the arsenal of terrorist groups.”S/PV.9109, 9109th meeting, 11 Aug 2022 (meeting requested by Russia) · source ↗
Unverified — the IAEA does not attributeGrossi, same meeting: "without a physical presence, the IAEA cannot corroborate some very important facts"; the statements from Russia and Ukraine "are frequently contradictory"; "all seven pillars have been compromised, if not entirely violated, at one point or another". The Agency's 2nd summary report (6 Sep 2022), written after its experts reached the site, records shelling at and around the plant and damage to several buildings and calls for shelling to "stop immediately" — without naming the source. No Russian submission to the Council or the Agency has since identified a firing position, a unit or a munition recovered on site. The one physical finding the Agency did report was Russian: military trucks inside the turbine halls. Concedes: That "the Zaporizhzhya plant is controlled by the Russian armed forces" and was "under their complete control" by early March 2022 — his words in the same statement.Evidence tiers: A
Claim 2 · Vassily Nebenzia · Security Council, 11 Aug 2022“[Russian soldiers] in close coordination with the plant's staff, are ensuring the protection of the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant and are repelling the Kyiv regime's attacks every day… [Russia] is not using civilian infrastructure, not to mention nuclear facilities, [for military purposes].”S/PV.9109, 11 Aug 2022 · source ↗
Contradicted by the IAEAIAEA 2nd summary report, 6 Sep 2022: "the presence of Russian military personnel, vehicles, and equipment at various places at the ZNPP, including several military trucks on the ground floor of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 turbine halls". Grossi to the Council, 6 Sep: the vehicles and equipment "currently present inside nuclear plant buildings on the site" should be removed. IAEA Board, 15 Sep 2022: deplored Russia's "persistent violent actions against nuclear facilities in Ukraine" and called on it to "immediately cease all actions against, and at" the plant. A nuclear plant with an armed garrison and military vehicles inside its buildings is a nuclear facility used for military purposes by any ordinary reading. Concedes: That Russian troops are at the plant and engage in combat from it ("repelling… attacks every day").Evidence tiers: A
Claim 3 · Vassily Nebenzia · Security Council, 23 Aug 2022“On 14 August, the Armed Forces of Ukraine fired 10 shells at the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant [including] 155-millimetre shells from American-made M777 howitzers… Russia is not placing heavy weapons on the premises of the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant… [A demilitarised zone] is an irresponsible proposal, as it completely ignores the need to maintain the conditions [for safe operation].”S/PV.9114, 9114th meeting, 23 Aug 2022 (meeting requested by Russia) · source ↗
No evidence presented · demilitarisation rejectedNo shell fragments, calibre analysis or crater survey was tabled, then or since; the Agency's experts arrived nine days later and reported what they saw (claim 2), not M777 fragments. DiCarlo, same meeting: "All military personnel and equipment must be withdrawn from the plant"; "the electricity produced at the Zaporizhzhya plant belongs to Ukraine". The UK: Russia "could resolve it immediately by withdrawing its forces from the nuclear power plant"; the US: "Russia created this risk, and only Russia can defuse it"; France: Russia "must give Ukraine back full control". The Board's resolution of 15 Sep 2022 followed. Russia's refusal of a demilitarised zone, repeated for the Agency's protection-zone proposal of 6 Sep 2022, is a matter of record. Concedes: That Russia intends to keep military forces at a nuclear power plant — the condition every mandated body has asked it to end.Evidence tiers: A
Claim 4 · Vassily Nebenzia · Security Council, 6 Sep 2022“[We regret that in your report] the source of the shelling is not directly indicated… [the plant's personnel enjoy] the well-established cooperation… with the Russian armed forces guarding the plant.”S/PV.9124, 9124th meeting, 6 Sep 2022 (meeting requested by Russia; Grossi briefing on the 2nd summary report) · source ↗
Self-incriminatingRussia's Permanent Representative confirms, on the record, that the IAEA — present on site since 1 Sep 2022 — does not say who shells the plant. Every later Russian "Ukraine shells its own plant" statement runs against that admission. Grossi, same meeting: "Wittingly or unwittingly, the physical attacks and the hits that the facility has taken" are unacceptable; "we propose the establishment of a nuclear safety and security protection zone". The US: "Russia is responsible for this crisis, and it can also resolve it now"; the UK: "the situation at Zaporizhzhya is entirely of Russia's making". Concedes: Non-attribution by the IAEA, and Russian armed guards at the plant.Evidence tiers: A
Claim 5 · Vladimir Putin · Presidential decree, 5 Oct 2022“[Putin] has instructed the government to establish Federal State Unitary Enterprise Zaporozhye Nuclear Power Plant… [the plant's facilities and related property] will become federal property. [Interfax's report of the decree]”Decree of 5 Oct 2022 as reported by Interfax (interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/83581) and RFE/RL · source ↗
Already adjudicatedUNGA res. ES-11/4 (12 Oct 2022; 143 in favour, 5 against, 35 abstentions) declared the attempted annexation of Zaporizhzhia and three other regions "unlawful" and without validity. The IAEA Board's resolution of 17 Nov 2022 expressed "grave concern that the Russian Federation has not heeded the calls of the Board" and called on it to "immediately withdraw"; Grossi has repeated that the plant is a Ukrainian facility and that its licence holder is Energoatom. The decree is Russia's statement that it owns, operates and staffs the site through Rosatom's Rosenergoatom. Concedes: Responsibility: a state that declares a nuclear plant its federal property and installs its operator answers for what happens on the site — including every incident it reports as Ukrainian.Evidence tiers: A
Claim 6 · Mikhail Ulyanov · IAEA Board of Governors, Apr 2024“[The IAEA is] afraid [to say that Ukraine was behind the drone attacks on the plant]… shooting at nuclear facilities is completely unacceptable.”IAEA Board session of 11 Apr 2024, as reported by Arms Control Today (May 2024) · source ↗
The IAEA does not attribute — by Russia's own accountOn 7 Apr 2024 drones struck several buildings including "a direct hit on the reactor dome of Unit 6"; the damage "did not compromise nuclear safety in a serious way" but set "a very dangerous precedent of the successful targeting of the reactor containment" (Grossi, Board 11 Apr; Security Council 15 Apr 2024). The Agency did not name the operator of the drones; Russia and Ukraine "traded accusations"; the United States condemned "all such actions regardless of who the culprit is". Russia's complaint that the IAEA is "afraid" is the clearest statement that the Agency has not endorsed the Russian attribution. Concedes: That the only mandated body on the site has declined to adopt Russia's version.Evidence tiers: A
Claim 7 · ZNPP press service (Rosatom) and Maria Zakharova · 5 Oct 2026“Laboratory-utility building No. 2 was attacked by two Ukrainian UAVs… The building is located about 200 metres from power units Nos. 4 and 5… No casualties and no threat to nuclear safety. — [Zakharova:] The lack of a proper reaction by the West to the attacks of the Ukrainian armed forces on the Zaporizhzhia NPP shows the real price of the statements of representatives of these countries about nuclear safety… at the IAEA and the UN… [they] are ready to support any terrorist methods used by their hangers-on. [translated]”RIA Novosti, 5 Oct 2026 (plant press service); MFA comment published on mid.ru, 5 Oct 2026, as carried by RIA Novosti · source ↗
Unverified — the IAEA does not attributeIAEA Update 370 (9 Oct 2026): the team "was informed of a reported drone attack on a laboratory and utility building and a radioactive waste processing building inside the protected area"; no casualties or radiation release; "it is essential that IAEA staff are provided with prompt, unfettered access to the sites of reported attacks in order to enable independent assessment of the nature and impact of any incident". The Agency's 3 Oct statement had already spoken of "a series of drone attacks in recent weeks" (19, 20, 27 Sep) without attribution. Ukraine's armed forces denied involvement and called the reports nuclear blackmail (Tier B, noted). In the same week the plant's sole external line, Ferosplavna-1, was being repaired under the eighth IAEA-brokered local ceasefire (Update 371, 16 Oct 2026). The Hub records the incident as reported and unattributed. Concedes: That access for independent assessment runs through Russia's plant management — the IAEA must be "provided" access by the party making the accusation.Evidence tiers: A · B
What we askKeep the two questions apart in every statement — attribution of incidents (unverified) and responsibility for the site (Russia's, since 4 Mar 2022) · cite the IAEA's own words: the 6 Sep 2022 report on Russian military equipment in the turbine halls and Grossi's request for "prompt, unfettered access" (Update 370) · press for implementation of the Board resolutions of Sep and Nov 2022 and the Five Concrete Principles, including removal of all military personnel and equipment · request a consolidated IAEA table of the 26 losses of off-site power with cause as assessed by the Agency · raise the detained Ukrainian ZNPP personnel at every Board and General Conference session · ask Russia, as the party reporting attacks, to grant the Agency immediate access to every reported impact site and to publish the munition evidence it claims to hold.
SourcesS/PV.9109 (11 Aug 2022), S/PV.9114 (23 Aug 2022), S/PV.9124 (6 Sep 2022) · IAEA 2nd summary report, 6 Sep 2022 · IAEA Board resolutions 15 Sep and 17 Nov 2022 (WNN, Cyprus Mail/Reuters) · IAEA Updates 317, 362–366, 369–371 · GOV/2025/54 · EU statements to the Board (10 Sep 2026) and General Conference (18 Sep 2026) · UNGA ES-11/4 · Interfax on the 5 Oct 2022 decree · Arms Control Today, May 2024 · RIA Novosti, 5 Oct 2026 · 360.ru, Aug 2024 · full list on page 6
Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant, 2022 – 2026 · Who shells the plant
PDF · 7 pagesRussian Mission to the UN, MoD, MFA · Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant · August 2022 – October 2026. Since August 2022 Russia has told the Security Council, the IAEA Board and the press that Ukraine shells and now drones its own nuclear plant. The plant has been under Russian armed control since 4 March 2022; it has been run by a Rosatom entity since a presidential decree of 5 October 2022; IAEA experts have been on site since 1 September 2022. In four years the Agency has observed shelling, drone strikes, military vehicles in the turbine halls and 26 complete losses of off-site power — and has attributed none of the attacks to either side. Seven claims, the record, and what each concedes: that whatever happens at the plant happens on a site Russia controls.
Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant, 2022 – 2026 · 7-page dossier (PDF) p.1 one-page summary · p.2 the occasion, the speakers, what others said and what was left out · p.3–4 the seven claims against the record · p.5 the record side by side · p.6 the law, lines to take and Q&A · p.7 sources and method · v1 · 21 Oct 2026
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