Three versions, one Buk

Fair to sayUkraine did not close its airspace above FL320 before 17 July 2014; the Dutch Safety Board found it had sufficient reason to do so. The Dutch court acquitted one of the four accused (Pulatov). The JIT found "strong indications" but not conclusive proof that the decision to supply the Buk was taken by President Putin.

Abandoned by Russia itselfThe Dutch Safety Board examined the air-to-air scenario and excluded it: the damage pattern and the 9N314M fragments fit only a Buk surface-to-air missile; "no scenario other than a Buk surface-to-air missile can explain this combination of facts" (13 Oct 2015). Russia's own next two versions — Almaz-Antey (2015) and the MoD (2018) — argue about which Buk missile, not whether a Buk was used. The JIT, the Dutch court and the ECtHR all found a Buk launched from territory held by the "DPR". Concedes: That a surface-to-air Buk was the alternative Russia was arguing against — and that Russian radar data existed.Evidence tiers: A · C

No evidence presentedNo Ukrainian Buk was ever located by any investigation within range of the launch area. The DSB's 320 km² launch area, derived from the damage pattern, lies south of Snizhne, in territory controlled by the "DPR" on 17 Jul 2014 (DSB, 13 Oct 2015). The Dutch court ruled out alternative launch areas on the basis of smoke-trail photographs, a protected witness, satellite images, intercepted calls, telecom mast data, photographs and videos of the Buk and fragment analysis, and found no evidence of tampering (summary of the judgment, 17 Nov 2022). The "Rostov video" has never been produced to any court. Concedes: That the area was within reach of a Buk — the weapon the DSB, JIT and court identified.Evidence tiers: C

Contradicted by Almaz-Antey's own second versionFour months later the same company said the missile was not a 9M38M1 but an older 9M38 with a 9N314 warhead, and denied the "I-beam" fragments it had earlier said were in the wreckage (press conference, 13 Oct 2015; Defense News, 18 Oct 2015). The DSB found a 9N314M warhead — the type fitted to the 9M38M1 — from the bow-tie fragments recovered from the wreckage and the crew's bodies (13 Oct 2015). Zaroshchenske lies about 16 km from the impact point, outside even the widest launch area modelled by the Dutch NLR (Bellingcat, 17 Oct 2015). The company presented its findings as "the basis for a court appeal against EU sanctions". Concedes: That MH17 was shot down by a Buk missile — the end of the Su-25 version.Evidence tiers: C

Contradicted by the forensic recordThe DSB and the JIT identified a 9M38-series missile with a 9N314M warhead; the JIT recovered the missile's engine casing and venturi and "has no doubt the casing and venturi originate from a 9M38 series BUK missile" (24 May 2018). Who controlled Zaroshchenske on 17 Jul 2014 was examined by the DSB (launch area under separatist control) and by Bellingcat (no Ukrainian troops or Ukrainian Buk in the 9M38M1 area; no Ukrainian Buk in the 9M38 area, launch "highly unlikely", 29 Feb 2016). The Dutch court found the launch site was a farm field near Pervomaiskyi in "separatist-controlled territory" and ruled out other areas (17 Nov 2022). Whether the 9M38 was still in Russian service is beside the point: the court found the TELAR and its missile came from Russia. Concedes: That Almaz-Antey's June 2015 version was wrong. Russia's test used a 9M38M1 — provided, Novikov said, by the Ministry of Defence — which the company had said in June was not in Russian stocks.Evidence tiers: C

Self-incriminating: accepts the JIT's missile, abandons the Su-25The serial number came from the venturi and engine casing recovered by the JIT, which on 24 May 2018 had asked the public for help identifying the unit to which the missile was delivered. By answering, the MoD accepted that these parts are the weapon that destroyed MH17. The JIT had already traced the launcher — not the missile — by its unique features ("a fingerprint, as it were") to the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade in Kursk, from its journey on 23–25 Jun 2014 to its appearance in Donetsk on 17–18 Jul 2014 (24 May 2018). The court found the Buk TELAR "came from the Russian Federation, complete with a crew" (JIT transcript, 8 Feb 2023). Where a 1986 missile was stored for 28 years does not say who fired it in 2014. Konashenkov's claim that JIT videos were "fabricated" was not accepted by the court, which found no evidence of tampering. Concedes: The weapon: a 9M38-series Buk missile. And that Russia keeps 32-year-old delivery records for a single missile — but has produced no record of the 53rd Brigade's movements in June–July 2014.Evidence tiers: C

Already adjudicatedDistrict Court of The Hague, 17 Nov 2022: MH17 was destroyed by a Buk missile fired by a Buk TELAR near Pervomaiskyi; the TELAR was brought into Ukraine at Dubinskiy's request and came from the Russian Federation with a crew; Girkin, Dubinskiy and Kharchenko sentenced to life for 298 murders; compensation of more than €16 million awarded to 306 relatives. ECtHR Grand Chamber, 9 Jul 2025: the missile "was intentionally fired" from occupied territory, by a member of the Russian Buk-TELAR crew or of the "DPR" — Russia responsible either way; violations of Articles 2, 3 and 13. ICAO Council, 12 May 2025: the claims of Australia and the Netherlands "well founded in fact and in law"; Russia failed its obligations under Article 3 bis of the Chicago Convention. Concedes: Putin's own admission the same day: "We take no part in it" — Russia's absence from the investigation was its choice; the JIT invited Russian participation from 2014.Evidence tiers: A · C

Blocks the court it says it wantsDraft S/2015/562 (Malaysia, Australia, Belgium, the Netherlands, Ukraine) received 11 votes in favour, 3 abstentions (Angola, China, Venezuela) and one against — Russia's veto. Russia had voted for resolution 2166 a year earlier, which demanded accountability and full cooperation with the investigation. The consequence of the veto was a national prosecution in the Netherlands, where Russia then refused to appear. The Netherlands: "I find it incomprehensible that a member of the Security Council obstructs justice in a tragedy that has affected so many" (Koenders). Ukraine: "There is no reason to oppose such a move unless you are one of the perpetrators" (Klimkin). Concedes: That a court would decide — and that Russia preferred it not to.Evidence tiers: A

Misstates the lawRussia ceased to be a party to the European Convention on 16 Sep 2022, but the Court "is still competent to deal with cases concerning facts from before 16 September 2022" (ECtHR Q&A, 9 Jul 2025). Russia took part in the admissibility stage of the Ukrainian applications, answered the Court on interim measures in March 2022, then chose not to file a memorial or attend the Grand Chamber hearing of 12 Jun 2024; the Court found "insufficient cause" for this and held the "deplorable failure" to cooperate a breach of Article 38. The judgment stands on the Convention Russia ratified in 1998 and binds it for the period examined. The same week Russia called the ICAO Council's decision "illegitimate" (MFA, 14 May 2025) and had earlier called the Dutch verdict "a political bid to implicate Russia" (MFA, 17 Nov 2022). Concedes: That the judgment exists and that Russia will not implement it — non-compliance, not invalidity.Evidence tiers: A

SourcesRussian MoD briefings 21 Jul 2014 (RIA/TASS) and 17 Sep 2018 (Sputnik/Mediazona); MoD statement 24–25 May 2018 (TASS) · Almaz-Antey 2 Jun and 13 Oct 2015 (Moscow Times, TASS, Defense News) · Putin, SPIEF 25 May 2018 (TASS) · SC/11990, 29 Jul 2015 · DSB 13 Oct 2015 · JIT 24 May 2018, 8 Feb 2023 · District Court of The Hague 17 Nov 2022 · ICAO 12 May 2025; Russian MFA 14 May 2025 · ECtHR GC 9 Jul 2025 (press release, Q&A; HUDOC 001-244292); Peskov 9 Jul 2025 · Bellingcat 2015–16 · EUvsDisinfo · full list on page 6