The record Russia cannot deny
One place for the documented record: United Nations findings first, Ukrainian national data second, independent investigations third — always labelled, always dated.
Status · 16 Oct 2026
Civilian casualties in January–September 2026 ran 59% above the same period of 2025 (OHCHR, 16 Oct). In one week, 7–14 October: Pryluky (22 killed, 5 children), Kramatorsk (33 killed on two buses), Zaporizhzhia (23 killed, 4 children), Kyiv (all three heat-and-power plants hit, 600,000 without electricity). At the Security Council on 9 October Russia said its targets "have been and remain only military facilities" — checked claim by claim on the Fact-checks page.
Latest Russian strikes
Full strike logNewest first, from the strike log: Air Force of Ukraine morning counts and regional administrations · preliminary B
New on the site
Update logWhat was added or changed, newest first. Each line opens the page it refers to.
Latest
6 killed, three of them children, incl. an infant · 15 injured, seven of them children. A Geran-3 attack drone hit the central park while families were walking there. No military object has been named.
Kharkiv regional military administration; regional prosecutor's office · Tier B · preliminary
"People can't get out, food can't get in." Russia has held the town and every road into it since 2022; Ukraine drops food by drone, and has an evacuation list of 358 people agreed with the ICRC that Russia has not approved.
UN monitoring mission · Tier A; Ombudsman of Ukraine · Tier B
From "hypocrisy" to "tragedy". Moscow now admits the crisis and blames Kyiv for blockading a town Russia holds. None of eight statements proposes the evacuation the UN, the ICRC and the Pope asked for.
Kremlin, MFA, Russian Mission to the UN · checked against UN, HRW, OSCE records
A city without electricity and water pumping. A damaged substation cut power to Vinnytsia; outages also in Lutsk, Rivne and Zhytomyr. No ballistic missile was reported intercepted.
Air Force; President of Ukraine; Vinnytsia city and regional authorities · Tier B · preliminary
A wholesale market in Lutsk: 6 killed. Almost 360 drones over Kirovohrad region in one night — 3 killed in Kropyvnytskyi. Russia's MoD named only a port in Izmail.
President of Ukraine; Air Force; regional administrations · Tier B · preliminary
600,000 without electricity; 4 killed, 25 injured. Only 4 missiles were intercepted. Russia's MoD listed the heat-and-power plants by name as "military-industrial" — the conduct the ICC qualified as war crimes in 2024.
Air Force; Ukrenergo; SES · Tier B
"Strongly condemns the ongoing attacks on major Ukrainian cities" — the Secretary-General, 7 Oct. Two days later the Council heard: more than 100 civilians killed and 429 injured in one week (OHCHR). On 14 Oct the Deputy Spokesperson confirmed all three Kyiv heat-and-power plants attacked, ~600,000 without power and water.
Noon briefings; S/PV.10237; OHCHR · Tier A
"Only military facilities", "air defence in residential areas", "provocations and staged incidents", energy "involved in military production" — each line set against Russia's own MoD target lists, UN findings and the weapons identified at the sites.
UN verbatim record and russiaun.ru text · UN, OHCHR, Air Force, police
16 killed in five strikes (derived). Guided bombs on 2 Oct (2 killed), 5 Oct (6 killed, 59 injured) and 11 Oct; a missile on a grocery store in Pisochyn (3 killed, incl. a 16-year-old); ~10 Banderol missiles on 12 Oct (4 killed, 41 injured, entrance section collapsed).
State Emergency Service; regional administration · Tier B
23 killed, incl. 4 children · 32 injured incl. 3 children. An entrance section of a three-storey block collapsed with residents inside; rescue work ran through 11 October (320 t of debris removed), declared a day of mourning. Final SES figures of 11 Oct replace the 10 Oct count of 20.
State Emergency Service; regional administration · Tier B
Pressure on Russia
16,431 people and companies are listed by Ukraine but not by the European Union. Search the registers, see which makers of the weapons in our case files are still off some lists, and what has been lifted.
Official lists via OpenSanctions · · Tier A
Ukraine's General Staff counts 1,567,160 personnel losses; Oryx has photographed 24,192 pieces of lost equipment. Russia's budget deficit for January–September 2026: 5.2 trillion roubles.
General Staff of Ukraine; Mediazona/BBC; Oryx; Ministry of Finance of Russia · Tier B / C
Front & occupation
Open the mapNew: the front line and the occupation on one map — 117,102 km² occupied (19.4% of Ukraine, Tier C, derived), 0 of 15 Russian capture claims since 1 October confirmed, and every strike measured by its distance from the front. Open the map →
Coming up
Calendar- New York · Security Council briefing on children and armed conflict A
- New York · High-level open debate on maritime security and freedom of navigation (UNCLOS) A
- London · IMO Council, 138th session A
- Doha · ITU Plenipotentiary Conference (PP-26) A
- Ireland · European Political Community summit (Ireland) A
9 entries in the next 30 days · ICS · full calendar with what to bring
Patterns, not incidents
Five files that run across the whole war. Each opens with its UN-verified figure, then the national figure, then the accountability step already taken. These are the pages for the question "what is the bigger picture".
Established. ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II found reasonable grounds that strikes on electricity infrastructure, Oct 2022 – Mar 2023, were war crimes and crimes against humanity (warrants for Kobylash, Sokolov, 5 Mar 2024; Shoigu, Gerasimov, 24 Jun 2024). The Commission of Inquiry reached the same conclusion on the winter 2022–23 campaign (A/HRC/52/62).
Now. Every major thermal and hydro plant has been hit at least once (Ministry of Energy, 2025). Fourth winter campaign opened 29–30 Sep 2026; Kyiv dark on 8 Oct.
Ask. Air-defence and transformer deliveries before December; name the energy campaign as a pattern in national statements.
ICC, 5 Mar and 24 Jun 2024; COI A/HRC/52/62; Ministry of Energy of Ukraine; KSE damage assessment (energy sector, 2025) · Tier A / B / C
Established. ICC warrants for Putin and Lvova-Belova (17 Mar 2023) for unlawful deportation and transfer of children. The Commission of Inquiry found that transfers violated IHL and amounted to a war crime (A/HRC/52/62, 2023; reiterated 2024–25).
Now. Returns run through third-country mediation (Qatar, Vatican, UAE); identification of children relocated inside Russia remains the bottleneck. Russian "re-education" and adoption decrees documented by Yale HRL.
Ask. Join the International Coalition for the Return of Ukrainian Children; raise the ICC warrants whenever Russia speaks of "evacuation".
Ombudsman of Ukraine / childrenofwar.gov.ua, 7 Oct 2026; Bring Kids Back UA; ICC; COI; Yale HRL · Tier A / B / C
Established. OHCHR interviews with released POWs: 95% report torture or ill-treatment; 48 died in custody. The Commission of Inquiry found torture of POWs and civilians to be systematic and a crime against humanity (A/79/549, Oct 2024).
Now. Over 16,000 civilians recorded as detained by Russia; more than 1,000 held since 2022. Olenivka (29 Jul 2022) still without an international investigation on site.
Ask. Demand ICRC access to all places of detention; support the all-for-all exchange and the return of civilian detainees as a separate track.
OHCHR briefing, 10 Aug 2026; COI A/79/549; Coordination HQ for the Treatment of POWs, Oct 2026 · Tier A / B
Established. OHCHR report of 18 Sep 2026: most victims are men in detention (electric shocks to the genitals, beatings, threats); women and children mainly under occupation. The Commission of Inquiry found rape by Russian forces to be a war crime (A/77/533).
Now. In May 2026 the Secretary-General listed Russian armed and security forces for the first time in the annex of his report on conflict-related sexual violence.
Ask. Keep the listing until perpetrators are held to account; demand OHCHR and ICRC access to all places of detention; no amnesty for sexual violence.
OHCHR, 18 Sep 2026; Secretary-General, May 2026; COI A/77/533, A/79/549; Prosecutor General, 19 Jun 2026 · Tier A / B
Established. Seized under fire on 4 Mar 2022; the latest blackout kept the plant on diesel for 18 days (20 Aug – 7 Sep 2026). A drone breached the Chornobyl New Safe Confinement on 14 Feb 2025; the IAEA found it lost its confinement function.
Now. Russia has issued "licences" for units 1 and 2 to Rosatom; strikes on substations cut power to nuclear sites in every winter campaign.
Ask. Demilitarisation and return of the plant to Ukraine (78/316); no recognition of Russian "licences"; no strikes on the grid that nuclear sites depend on.
IAEA Updates 362–364 (Aug–Sep 2026); A/RES/78/316 (11 Jul 2024); World Nuclear Association · Tier A / C
Brief · what to cite this week
Press Add to my brief under any card, UN entry or key figure as you read. The yellow My brief button at the bottom left opens your list: print it or save it as a PDF with every source and link, or copy it as text into a statement. The list stays in this browser only; nothing is sent to us.
Assembled automatically from the newest items on the site: the three most recent facts with sources, one legal line, one ask. Copy it into a statement, a talking-points note or an e-mail. Replaced every time the site is updated; the date in the header is the date of the data.
Attacks on residential buildings far from the front, with no military objective identified, engage Rome Statute art. 8(2)(b)(i) and (ii); the Commission of Inquiry has already found this pattern to constitute war crimes (A/77/533, A/HRC/52/62).
Name Kramatorsk (8 Oct), Pryluky (7 Oct), Zaporizhzhia (10 Oct) and the Kyiv energy strike (14 Oct) in national statements; cite the ICC energy warrants whenever Russia says "military-industrial"; confirm ballistic-capable air defence and transformer deliveries before the December cold.
7 Oct · Secretary-General: "strongly condemns the ongoing attacks on major Ukrainian cities" — "a record number of civilian casualties".
9 Oct · ASG Khiari, Security Council: more than 100 civilians killed and at least 429 injured in one week (OHCHR).
14 Oct · Spokesperson: all three Kyiv heat-and-power plants attacked; ~600,000 without power and water.
Next update
OHCHR September update published 16 Oct (328 killed, 2,105 injured) — pulse and home indicators already refreshed; this brief is renewed on Monday.
Case files
One incident, one page, one fixed structure: what happened, what is verified and by whom, the legal qualification in three honest layers, who is responsible, what Russia said, and what we ask. Each card opens a printable one-pager. Ten files from the last month; earlier files are in the Archive.
At about 16:30 on Monday a Geran-3 attack drone hit the central park of Nova Vodolaha, about 27 km from Kharkiv, while families with children were walking there. Six people were killed, three of them children, among them an infant in a stroller; 15 injured, seven of them children, were taken to hospitals in Kharkiv. A café in the park was damaged. Figures as of 18:20, preliminary; OHCHR verification pending.
War crimes — pattern (CoI A/80/497, drone attacks on civilians) This strike — position
Russia said. No statement on Nova Vodolaha found as of the evening of 19 October. At the Security Council on 9 October Russia said it strikes "only military facilities"; no military object has been named in the park.
Evidence held: Kharkiv regional military administration (O. Syniehubov, 18:20); Kharkiv regional prosecutor's office (time, weapon); Minister of Internal Affairs I. Vyhivskyi; Kharkiv regional emergency medical centre.
Occupied since 24 Feb 2022 and flooded when the Kakhovka dam was destroyed in 2023, Oleshky has been cut off since May 2026: no food by road, no organised evacuation, no electricity. The UN monitoring mission: "People can't get out, food can't get in." Ukraine agreed an evacuation list of 358 people with the ICRC; Russia has given no security guarantees. Since late September Ukraine has dropped about 8 t of food and medicine by drone; Ukrainian officials say Russian soldiers took food from residents (not independently verified).
Update, 19 Oct. Ukraine's Ombudsman says talks with Russia on a ceasefire regime and evacuation directly to Ukrainian-controlled territory have reached "the final details", with "difficult issues" still open; no agreement has been announced (Tier B).
Occupier's duty to feed — established (GC IV) Blocking relief and evacuation — pattern Starvation as a method of warfare — position
Russia said. Kremlin, 21 Sep: the situation is "critical" and Kyiv is to blame; Nebenzia, 14 Oct: "the tragedy in Alyoshki". Russia has occupied the town and every road into it since February 2022. The Kremlin readout of the 16 Oct call with Pope Leo XIV supports "supplies" — not the ceasefire or evacuation the Pope asked for.
Evidence held: HRMMU statement of 25 Jun 2026; HRW, 9 Jul 2026; OSCE/ODIHR; Ombudsman of Ukraine; Kherson regional and Oleshky city military administrations; six published testimonies of people who left; Russian official statements, Sep–Oct 2026.
From 18:00 on 16 Oct: 332 drones, Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles, Kh-22/32 and 4 Kalibr cruise missiles; 289 drones and the 4 Kalibr downed, no ballistic missile reported intercepted; hits at 22 locations. Vinnytsia: a damaged substation left the city without electricity, the main water station lost power, critical facilities on back-up supply, electric transport stopped; 6 injured in the region. Severe disruptions also in Lutsk, Rivne, Zhytomyr, Shepetivka, Slavuta and Netishyn.
War crimes — established (ICC, energy campaign 2022–23) This strike — pattern CAH — position
Russia said. The Ministry of Defence (17 Oct) reported a "massive strike on Ukraine's metallurgical plants and energy facilities", naming Kryvyi Rih, Zaporizhzhia and a substation in Zhytomyr. It did not mention Vinnytsia, where a damaged substation cut power to the whole city and its water station.
Evidence held: Air Force summary (08:00, 17 Oct); President of Ukraine; Vinnytsia mayor; Vinnytsia Regional Military Administration; Vinnytsiaoblenergo; Vinnytsiaoblvodokanal; Vinnytsia regional council; regional administrations; Russian MoD statement of 17 Oct.
Lutsk, 14 Oct: a jet-powered Shahed hit the "Yevrohurt" wholesale market on Koniakina Street — 6 killed, 12 injured. Overnight 580 drones and 2 Kh-59 missiles; almost 360 drones over Kirovohrad region alone, the largest attack on it since 2022 — 3 killed in Kropyvnytskyi. Further deaths in Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv and Kherson regions; injured in Rivne, Kyiv, Zaporizhzhia and Ternopil regions.
War crimes — pattern CAH — position
Russia said. The MoD reported strikes on Izmail port "used for unloading and storing military and dual-use cargo". It said nothing about a market in Lutsk or homes in Kropyvnytskyi.
Evidence held: Air Force summaries (14–15 Oct); Volyn, Kirovohrad, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv and Kherson regional administrations; Lutsk City Council; SES; National Police photographs of the Lutsk site.
Only 4 of 39 ballistic missiles were intercepted. All three combined heat-and-power plants that warm a city of three million were hit at the start of the heating season; three women were killed in a nine-storey block in Desnianskyi district. Fourth winter campaign: 29–30 Sep, 7 Oct, 8 Oct, 13–14 Oct.
War crimes — established CAH — pattern Continuing CAH — position
Russia said. MoD, 14 Oct: "five energy facilities used for the needs of the military-industrial complex", naming CHP-4, 5 and 6. The ICC qualified exactly this conduct as war crimes and crimes against humanity in 2024.
Official media. SES Kyiv, 10 Oct: Desnianskyi block — 2 found dead, 16 rescued, 21 injured incl. 1 child; photo gallery ↗
Evidence held: Air Force radar track and launch count; Ukrenergo damage reports; MoD target list (Interfax, 14 Oct, archived); SES site documentation, Desnianskyi block. Satellite imagery requested (Maxar News Bureau).
Guided bombs on 2 Oct (2 killed), 5 Oct (6 killed, 59 injured) and 11 Oct; a missile on a grocery store in Pisochyn (3 killed, incl. a 16-year-old); ~10 Banderol missiles on 12 Oct (4 killed, 41 injured, entrance section collapsed). The Commission of Inquiry qualified the Kharkiv glide-bomb campaign as war crimes in 2024.
War crimes — established CAH — pattern
Russia said. OSCE envoy Polyanskiy, 8 Oct: "impossible to hide the scale of the failure of Ukraine's air defence". Glide bombs are not engaged by air defence at all — the argument concedes whose bombs they are.
Official media. SES Kharkiv region, 12 Oct: 41 injured in the massed attack; photo gallery ↗
Evidence held: KAB and Banderol fragments (police); regional administration casualty lists per strike; HRW documentation of the Kryvyi Rih hospital strike (same weapon family); COI 2024 findings on Kharkiv.
An entrance section of a three-storey block collapsed with residents inside; rescue work ran through 11 October (320 t of debris removed), declared a day of mourning. Final SES figures of 11 Oct replace the 10 Oct count of 20. 160 drones were launched nationwide the same night, 110 of them jet-powered. OHCHR verification pending.
War crimes — established CAH — pattern
Russia said. Nothing — no MoD, MFA or Kremlin statement mentions the block. The same day Russia's OSCE envoy wrote that "nothing will be left of Ukraine's infrastructure".
Evidence held: SES rescue log; regional administration damage survey (26 buildings); bomb fragments recovered by police; witness statements. Satellite imagery requested.
The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights called it "today's horrifying strike hitting two public buses" that "could amount to war crimes"; the Security Council was briefed the next day ("at least 33"). Three more were killed the same day in Bilenke.
Direct attack on civilians — established CAH — pattern
Russia said. Nothing by name. The next day at the Security Council Amb. Nebenzia said Ukraine targets "civilian buses… time and time again" — a mirror claim, one week after the MFA alleged "216 buses" attacked by Ukraine.
Official media. SES Donetsk region, 8 Oct 18:45: 30 killed, 20 injured at that hour, photos and video (final SES figure: 33) ↗
Evidence held: UMPB D-30SN fragments with markings (National Police); CCTV and dash-cam video, geolocated; victim identification list (SES); High Commissioner statement; UN verbatim record of 9 Oct.
Part of a two-wave strike of 48 cruise missiles, ballistic and anti-ship missiles and 130 drones; the UN called Pryluky "the deadliest attack" of the night (32 killed nationwide). Kremenchuk: 2 killed, 47 injured; Oleksandriia: 2 killed.
War crimes — established CAH — pattern
Russia said. MoD, 7 Oct: a "massive strike with high-precision weapons" on "military-industrial facilities", listing a plant in Pryluky. No mention of the residential building or the five children.
Official media. SES Chernihiv region, 8 Oct: final report (22 killed incl. 5 children, 54 injured, 15 rescued, 500+ responders) with photo gallery ↗
Evidence held: missile fragments (prosecutors); Air Force launch/interception log; MoD target list (Telegram 68011, archived); SES identification list; UN ASG briefing. Satellite imagery requested — current photo is a placeholder.
At about 11:20 on a working Monday a jet-powered drone hit an eight-storey office building in Shevchenkivskyi district; floors 5–6 were gutted and windows blown out in six residential buildings nearby. Evening figures of 28 Sep (21 injured) replace interim counts of 12–18; three women remained in hospital on 29 Sep. On 22 Sep a ballistic missile killed four workers at the Interpipe plant and halted production. OHCHR verification pending.
War crimes — established CAH — pattern
Russia said. Nothing about Dnipro. The MoD said its overnight strikes hit logistics, communications, port infrastructure and vessels (RFE/RL summary); the office block was hit in daylight. No statement names the Interpipe plant.
Evidence held: regional administration casualty reports (28–29 Sep); SES rescue record (49 evacuated); police statements taken at an on-site mobile point; Air Force launch and interception data; Interpipe statement on 22 Sep losses. Satellite imagery requested.
Guided bombs hit several locations in the Sumy community; two people were killed in a residential area of Kovpakivskyi district. Three girls aged 14, 8 and 11 months were hospitalised. The deadliest of five glide-bomb attacks on Sumy from 18 Sep to 4 Oct (6 killed in all); on 29 Sep a school was hit during lessons. OHCHR verification pending.
War crimes — established CAH — pattern
Russia said. Nothing on this strike. Gen. Gerasimov announced (RIA, 31 Dec 2025) that Putin ordered the "buffer zone" in Sumy and Kharkiv regions expanded in 2026.
Open-source record: regional and city administration statements; Air Force overnight summary; media photo of damaged block. Not located: SES incident report, prosecutor's proceedings, OHCHR incident verification.
A drone hit a 16-storey apartment block in Pecherskyi district at about 08:00, killing a 14-year-old boy; in the afternoon another hit an office building in Solomianskyi district, killing four people in its car park. The High Council of Justice building and a food warehouse were also hit. Mayor's final figures of 25 Sep (21:20) replace interim counts of 46 and 57 injured; early reports of "2 children" referred to the injured, not the dead. OHCHR verification pending.
War crimes — established CAH — pattern
Russia said. The MoD claimed strikes on "defence industry sites, logistics centres and vessels" (Reuters). Kyiv's dead, the apartment block and the court building went unmentioned; Russia denies targeting civilians.
Official media. Kyiv City Military Administration, live log of 25 Sep (21:19): 7 killed, 59 injured, 25 in hospital; a 14-year-old boy among the dead ↗
Evidence held: SES and police scene reports (Pecherskyi, Solomianskyi, Shevchenkivskyi, Podilskyi); Air Force launch and interception data; drone fragments; city damage survey. Prosecutor proceedings under art. 438 CCU to be confirmed.
A Russian FPV drone hit a scheduled minibus on the road in Nikopol district, across the Dnipro from occupied Enerhodar. The district declared a day of mourning. This was the third bus strike in the district in 2026, after 7 April (4 killed) and 8 August (driver killed). The UN COI has found Russia's drone campaign against civilians on the Dnipro right bank, including Dnipropetrovsk oblast, to be a crime against humanity of murder. HRMMU verification of this incident is pending.
CAH of murder — established (COI, drone campaign) This strike — verification pending
Russia said. Nothing. Russia made no comment on the strike (AFP, 16 Sep). Its standing line is that it does not deliberately target civilians, but the UN COI found the drone attacks systematic and under centralised command (A/80/497).
Publicly available: regional administration photos of the minibus and official casualty statements; Prosecutor General's proceedings under art. 438 CCU. HRMMU verification not yet published; the perpetrating unit has not yet been publicly identified.
Earlier. Case file 12 — Sumy, 26 Sep 2026 (glide bombs on residential areas, 2 killed) · Case file 11 — Nikopol district, 16 Sep 2026 (FPV drone on a passenger minibus, 5 killed) · Case file 01 — Bucha, Mar 2022 (A3 one-pager) · Fact-check 02 — the 2026 Bucha denial (6 pp.). In the Archive and on the Fact-checks page.
In preparation. Izium, Yahidne, Olenivka, Hroza, Okhmatdyt (2022–24).
Each card: 24–48 h after verification; UN figures replace national figures when published; every change is logged on the Method page.
Fact-checks
When Russia circulates a denial — as a report, a Security Council statement or a ministry briefing — we check it against the mandated record and publish the result in full. The method is the same each time: every verifiable claim, its source, what it actually establishes, what the document omits, and what it concedes compared with earlier Russian positions. Every fact-check is issued as a multi-page dossier on the model of Fact-check 02: page 1 is the one-page summary; the following pages give the speaker and the venue, each claim against the record, the omissions, the concessions since 2022, and the sources.
Fact-check 04 · Oleshky: a blockade with no author
PDF · 5 pagesEight Russian official statements on occupied Oleshky, 21 September – 16 October 2026: the Kremlin, the Foreign Ministry, the Permanent Representative to the UN and the occupation authorities. Moscow now calls the situation "critical", "a catastrophe", "a tragedy" — and blames Ukraine for blockading a town Russia has held, with every road into it, since 24 February 2022. None of the statements proposes the evacuation, corridor or ceasefire the UN, the ICRC and Pope Leo XIV have asked for. Context: Case file 14 — Oleshky.
Fact-check 04 · five-page dossier (PDF) p.1 one-page summary · p.2 the speakers and how the line moved · p.3–4 the eight claims against the record · p.5 the record, the law, lines to take and Q&A · v1, 18 Oct 2026
Fact-check 03 · Nebenzia at the Security Council, 9 October 2026
The 10237th meeting was called after the strikes of 7–8 October. Russia's Permanent Representative spoke for twelve minutes. Six claims carry the whole statement; each is set against Russia's own Ministry of Defence statements, UN findings and the weapons identified at the sites. Quotations from the UN verbatim record and Russia's published English text (russiaun.ru); both are linked on the Sources page.
Fact-check 03 · six-page dossier (PDF) p.1 one-page summary · p.2 the speaker and the venue · p.3 the six claims against the record · p.4 what the statement omits · p.5 what it concedes since 2022 · p.6 sources and how to use it
The shape of the statement
Four moves, in order: deny intent → shift causation to Ukrainian air defence → call the evidence staged → reframe energy strikes as retaliation. Not one incident of the week was addressed by name. The same four moves appear in the MFA statement of 3 Oct ("strikes of retribution"), the MoD of 4 Oct ("blame only the head of the Kyiv regime") and Zakharova of 7 Oct (foreigners should leave Kyiv so that no "provocative staging" is claimed). The open question: which military objective was at each of the five sites. No answer has been given.
What it concedes. Four years after "not a single civilian suffered" (UNSC, 5 Apr 2022), the report no longer disputes that the deaths occurred under Russian occupation. It argues about who the dead were. That is an acknowledgement.
Our own precision. The Bucha Wall of Remembrance lists residents of the community killed during the occupation, including local defence volunteers whose plaques say so. "509 civilians", used in some speeches, was imprecise. The legal record never depended on it.
Narrative shift tracker
What Russia said on day one, after a week, and later. Each change of line concedes the previous one; the Bucha sequence (hoax → the dead were soldiers) is the template. Verified quotations only, with source and archived copy in the watch log below.
Reading the table: a line that moves from "it did not happen" to "it happened but was lawful" has conceded the fact. The remaining argument is legal, and on energy it has already been decided by the ICC.
Disinformation watch
Fact-checks start with knowing what is being said, where, and by whom. This log tracks Russian claims about crimes in Ukraine across four layers — UN organs, official Russia, propagandists, and foreign channels used as proxies — tagged by narrative and linked to our response. Verified entries only; a claim is logged with its primary source.
| Date · venue | Speaker | Claim (narrative) | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| 3 Apr 2022 · Russian MoD statement | Ministry of Defence | Bucha images are "a hoax"; bodies placed after withdrawal Staged | Refuted FC-02 |
| 5 Apr 2022 · UN Security Council source ↗ · archived | Amb. Nebenzia | "Not a single civilian suffered" in Bucha under Russian control Denial | Refuted FC-02 |
| 18 Apr 2022 · Presidential decree | V. Putin | "Guards" title to the 64th Brigade for "mass heroism" Reward | Documented CF-01 |
| 2023–24 · Russian courts | Basmanny, Ostankinsky courts | Prison terms for citizens who spoke about Bucha (Bazhutova, Gessen, Zygar) Suppression | Documented FC-02 |
| 2026 · "International Public Tribunal" (Civic Chamber) | M. Grigoriev (EU-sanctioned) | The dead were combatants; Ukraine stages killings for the press Reclassify Staged | Refuted FC-02 · letter to SG |
| 17 Sep 2026 · MFA press conference source ↗ · archived | M. Zakharova | The Secretary-General "knowingly played along with the anti-Russian campaign" on Bucha; a "provocation" Staged | Refuted FC-02 |
| 23 Sep 2026 · UN Security Council (10227th) source ↗ · archived | FM S. Lavrov | Ukraine uses "openly terrorist methods"; no mention of civilian casualties, energy or strikes Denial | Documented |
| 1 Oct 2026 · Geneva briefing source ↗ · archived | R. Miroshnik (MFA) | Ukraine has "attacked 216 passenger buses" this year Ukraine did it | Documented — one week before Kramatorsk, FC-03 |
| 3 Oct 2026 · MFA statement source ↗ · archived | Ministry of Foreign Affairs | Russia "will continue to deliver massive strikes of retribution"; foreigners should leave Kyiv Legit. target | Documented CF-03, CF-06 |
| 4 Oct 2026 · MoD statement source ↗ · archived | Ministry of Defence | Strikes "will be intensified"; "the population of Ukraine should blame only the head of the Kyiv regime" Ukraine did it | Documented CF-07 |
| 7 Oct 2026 · MoD, Telegram 06:55 source ↗ · archived | Ministry of Defence | "Massive strike with high-precision weapons" on "military-industrial facilities"; lists a plant in Pryluky; no mention of the residential building Legit. target | Refuted CF-03 |
| 7 Oct 2026 · Sputnik radio source ↗ · archived | M. Zakharova | Foreigners should leave Kyiv so that no "provocative staging and setup" is claimed afterwards — citing Bucha Staged | Documented FC-03 |
| 8 Oct 2026 · OSCE Permanent Council source ↗ · archived | D. Polyanskiy (PR to the OSCE) | "Impossible to hide the scale of the failure of Ukraine's air defence" Ukraine did it | Refuted CF-07 (glide bombs are not engaged by air defence) |
| 8 Oct 2026 · Kremlin source ↗ · archived | D. Peskov | No comment on Kramatorsk (33 killed on two buses) Denial | Documented CF-04 |
| 9 Oct 2026 · UN Security Council (10237th) source ↗ · archived | Amb. V. Nebenzia | "Only military facilities"; casualties due to Ukrainian air defence "in residential areas" (AP I art. 58); "provocations and staged incidents"; energy "involved in military production"; Ukraine targets "civilian buses" Denial Ukraine did it Staged Legit. target | Refuted FC-03 |
| 10 Oct 2026 · OSCE mission statement source ↗ · archived | D. Polyanskiy | Striking "bridges, power plants, railway facilities and warehouses" is "not allowed to anyone except Zelensky"; "nothing will be left of Ukraine's infrastructure" Legit. target | Documented CF-05, PF-01 — stated intent |
| 13 Oct 2026 · TASS source ↗ · archived | M. Zakharova | Strikes "only on facilities linked to the military-industrial complex" became "a painful boomerang for Kyiv" Legit. target | Refuted CF-06 |
| 14 Oct 2026 · MoD via Interfax, 09:13 source ↗ · archived | Ministry of Defence | "Five energy facilities used for the needs of Ukraine's military-industrial complex" — CHP-4, CHP-5, CHP-6, Trypilska TPP, a Kyiv substation Legit. target | Refuted CF-06, PF-01 — conduct already qualified by the ICC |
| 14 Oct 2026 · Arria-formula meeting convened by Russia source ↗ · archived | Amb. V. Nebenzia; R. Miroshnik; L. Johnson | The UN "is doing everything to avoid documenting the crimes of the Kiev regime"; OHCHR methodology flawed; Ukraine runs "secret prisons" Ukraine did it Denial | Refuted FC-03, PF-03 |
| 14 Oct 2026 · OSCE FSC source ↗ · archived | Y. Zhdanova | "9,006 civilians incl. 305 children" killed in Russia by Ukrainian forces since 2022 Ukraine did it | In monitoring — OHCHR figure for Russia: 496 killed Jan–Sep 2026 |
Entry rule: primary source (UN meeting record, official transcript, broadcast with timestamp, archived post) or it is not logged. Every Russian source is snapshotted to the Wayback Machine on logging, because posts are edited and deleted; "archived" opens the snapshot list. Status: Refuted (published fact-check) · Documented (recorded, no rebuttal needed) · In monitoring (claim seen, verification pending).
1 · UN organs. Security Council and General Assembly meeting records and UN Web TV; Human Rights Council statements and side events; Russian letters circulated as A/ and S/ documents; Arria-formula meetings convened by Russia.
2 · Official Russia. MFA weekly briefings and statements; Ministry of Defence daily statements; Presidential Administration; Investigative Committee; Civic Chamber bodies (the "tribunal").
3 · Propagandists. State television prime-time programmes and their hosts; the heads of state media groups; the largest pro-Kremlin Telegram channels. Logged when a claim first appears there before reaching layer 2 — it signals the next official line.
4 · Proxies abroad. RT and Sputnik in Spanish, Arabic, French; affiliated outlets and "initiatives" in Africa, Latin America and South Asia; foreign commentators quoted back by Russian media; "international observers" and "tribunal" members with foreign citizenship.
Staged events are faked for Western cameras · Denial nothing happened · Reclassify the dead were soldiers · Legit. target the object was military · Ukraine did it own air defence, own shelling · Reward decorations and promotions for implicated units · Suppression prosecution of those who speak
The shift from Denial to Reclassify (Bucha, 2022→2026) is itself evidence: each new line concedes the last.
How this runs
Weekly sweep of layers 1–2 (meeting records, MFA, MoD); event-driven sweep of layers 3–4 after each major strike or UN debate. Each new claim gets a narrative tag and a decision within 48 h: log only, short rebuttal, or full fact-check. Can be partly automated as a scheduled search with a human verification step.
UN on the record
What the Secretary-General, his Spokesperson at the noon briefing, OCHA, the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Council briefers have said about Ukraine — newest first, each entry linked to the official record. Figures quoted by UN officials are Tier A. Their assessments are shown as UN position: a layer of its own, kept apart from "established". Where the UN also records harm on the Russian side, the entry says so — whoever quotes the UN must quote all of it.
· Yemen, Gaza & other topics - Daily Press Briefing — UN Transcripts transcript ↗
The initiative is part of MINUSCA's broader efforts to help prevent conflict and protect civilians. And last, from Ukraine, our colleagues at the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs tell us that another wave of large-scale attacks overnight killed and injured several civilians. According to authorities, the capital, Kyiv, was among the hardest hit. Our humanitarian colleagues tell us that the attacks also caused widespread disruption to essential services.
Our humanitarian colleagues tell us that the attacks also caused widespread disruption to essential services. According to authorities, energy facilities in Kyiv and the surrounding region, as well as in the region of Kharkiv, were targeted. All three major heat and power plants in the capital were attacked, leaving 600,000 people without electricity and water in parts of the city. In the Rivne and Volyn regions, previously less impacted by hostilities, drone attacks also killed and injured several people, damaging a university, a shopping center, and residential buildings.
In the Rivne and Volyn regions, previously less impacted by hostilities, drone attacks also killed and injured several people, damaging a university, a shopping center, and residential buildings. Civilian casualties were also reported in the regions of Dnipro, Zaporizhzhia, Kharkiv, Khmelnytskyi, Lviv, Kerson and Sumi. Humanitarian organizations have again been impacted. Yesterday, three aid workers from the Ukrainian Red Cross Society were injured in an attack in the frontline town of Slovyansk in the region of Donetsk.
· COP 17, Indonesia, Sudan & other topics - Daily Press Briefing — UN Transcripts transcript ↗
We reiterate our call on all parties to protect civilians and to allow safe, rapid, and unimpeded humanitarian access to reach people in need. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs tells us that another wave of large-scale attacks overnight in Ukraine killed and injured civilians and disrupted electricity and water supplies, including in areas far from the front line. At least six civilians were killed and 84 injured between yesterday and this morning, according to authorities. Power and water supplies were disrupted in 11 regions.
Scheduled and emergency power cuts continue as falling temperatures increase the risks posed by damage to essential infrastructure. Over the past four days, attacks in the Donetsk and Kharkiv regions killed an aid worker and injured others. A humanitarian office, a food warehouse, and a marked evacuation vehicle were also damaged, further hindering aid operations. Meanwhile, the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission reports that in September, at least 328 civilians were killed and more than 2,100 were injured.
Speaker 4 28:21 Thank you. We have a monthly count of civilian casualties in Ukraine, as you have just told us. Do we have a similar monitoring mission in the Russian-held areas? UN 28:36 We are not able to provide the same resources given the lack of access.
UN 28:36 We are not able to provide the same resources given the lack of access. But we do have a mandate in terms of our human rights monitoring for work inside Ukraine, and so that's where we're carrying it out. Mona. Speaker 6 28:57 Thank you very much, Mr.
Paragraphs that mention Ukraine, copied verbatim from the UN transcript. An editor turns them into entries of the record above, with the speaker named.
OHCHR monthly update detected automatically: September 2026 ukraine.ohchr.org ↗ · checked
Cite the speaker and the date, never "the UN says". The Secretary-General's words carry the Charter; the Spokesperson's noon briefing is on the record and transcribed the same day; an OCHA or OHCHR figure is the one the Secretariat will repeat.
Figures first, assessments second. "More than 100 civilians killed in one week (OHCHR, 9 Oct)" is Tier A. "Could amount to war crimes" (High Commissioner, 8 Oct) is a UN position — strong, but not a finding. We keep the two apart on this page and in every PDF.
Quote all of it. On 7 Oct the Secretary-General condemned the attacks on Ukrainian cities and, in the same statement, voiced concern at civilian casualties in Russia. Leaving out the second sentence invites the reply "selective quotation" and loses the first.
Official record over transcript. Links go to press.un.org and the verbatim records (S/PV.). The automatic transcripts at transcripts.un.org are used only on the day, until the official text is posted; quotes on this page are checked against the official text when it appears.
Case files. "UN said" is a fixed line on each card and one-pager: Pryluky — ASG Khiari, 9 Oct; Kramatorsk — High Commissioner, 8 Oct; Kyiv energy — Spokesperson, 14 Oct.
Fact-checks. Each Russian claim is set against what UN officials said the same week; the Secretary-General's 7 Oct statement answers "only military facilities" (Fact-check 03).
Brief and pulse. The newest UN entry opens the weekly brief; the monthly pulse quotes the OHCHR update it is built on.
Subscribe. "UN statements" is a category of its own: same-day alert with the quote, the link and the figure.
What the UN has not said
No Secretary-General statement in October uses the words "war crime"; the High Commissioner says "could amount to". The UN names "Russian forces" as the attacker in the 7 Oct statement and "Russian long-range drone attacks" in the 2 Oct update, and in both also records casualties in Russia. This page shows the wording as given, so that no one who quotes it is corrected from the Russian side.
Beyond Ukraine
Russia's war is not confined to Ukraine. Killings and poisonings, sabotage and arson, drones and fighter jets in NATO airspace, cyber operations, election interference and the abuses of Russian state-backed forces in Africa and the Middle East — recorded worldwide since 2004, each entry with who established Russia's role and how. Data as of 15 Oct 2026.
Court finding A court, the European Court of Human Rights or a judicial public inquiry has found that Russia or its agents were responsible.
Official attribution A government, a prosecutor, the EU, NATO or a UN body has formally named Russia, its services or its state-backed forces. This is a position of that authority, not a verdict.
Charged Suspects have been charged and Russian involvement is alleged by prosecutors; there is no verdict yet and the presumption of innocence applies.
Suspected Russian involvement is reported or alleged but not established. These cases are kept in a separate block at the end of this page.
Attacks and operations in other countries
On the night of 14–15 August 2026 a fire was set at a Milrem Robotics building in Tallinn's Lasnamäe district; no one was hurt. On 29 September 2026 Estonia's government stated, based on Internal Security Service intelligence, that it was sabotage commissioned by Russian special services.
Established by. Government of Estonia, 29 Sep 2026, based on Internal Security Service intelligence; Russia's chargé d'affaires summoned.
Latest. Three suspects, two of them Latvian citizens, detained on 17–18 Aug 2026 and handed to Estonia on 17–18 Sep 2026; criminal investigation ongoing.
Link to the war against Ukraine. Milrem supplies THeMIS unmanned ground vehicles to Ukraine.
Polish services, working with US authorities, detained a Russian man on 7 August 2026 who, according to Prime Minister Donald Tusk, had been recruited by Russian special services to kill a US citizen of Ukrainian origin in Warsaw. Tusk described it as the first case of someone acting on Russia's orders against an American citizen in another NATO country. Details of charges and the target have not been made public.
Established by. PM Donald Tusk, press conference 13 Aug 2026: suspect recruited by Russian special services and ordered to 'carry out an execution'; target 'uncomfortable for the Putin regime'. Minister-coordinator of special services Tomasz Siemoniak: operation conducted with US services. Charges not detailed publicly in sources reviewed.
Latest. Suspect detained (Aug 2026); no public indictment located as of Oct 2026.
Link to the war against Ukraine. The alleged target is a US citizen of Ukrainian origin.
On the evening of 4 August 2026 a drone carrying explosives was found near a Ukrainian cargo aircraft at Leipzig/Halle airport and defused; the airport was closed for hours. On 1 September 2026 the German government formally blamed Russian state entities and closed the Russian consulate general in Bonn and the Russian House in Berlin.
Established by. German Interior Minister Dobrindt and Foreign Minister Wadephul attributed the attempted attack to agents acting on behalf of Russian state entities (1 Sep 2026); the President of the European Council condemned 'Russia's attempted drone attack' the same day.
Latest. Criminal investigation ongoing. Media investigations (Telegraph/Welt, 2 Oct 2026; Spiegel/The Insider, 8 Oct 2026) report GRU involvement and name suspects; no publicly confirmed charges or arrests found as of 15 Oct 2026. Russia denies involvement.
Link to the war against Ukraine. The drone was found next to a Ukrainian cargo aircraft (An-124).
On 15–16 November 2025 an explosive charge damaged tracks near Mika and the overhead catenary was damaged near Gołąb on railway line no. 7 (Warsaw–Dorohusk). Prime Minister Tusk called it an unprecedented act of sabotage; prosecutors say it was committed on behalf of Russian intelligence.
Established by. Polish National Prosecutor's Office charged two Ukrainian citizens (Oleksandr K., Yevhenii I.) on 19 Nov 2025 with sabotage of a terrorist nature on behalf of Russian Federation intelligence; government publicly attributed the attack to Russian services.
Latest. Both direct suspects fled to Belarus; Poland requested extradition. An alleged accomplice (Volodymyr B.) was detained 20 Nov 2025 and charged. No trial reported as of Oct 2026.
Link to the war against Ukraine. Line no. 7 is a key route for supplies to Ukraine via Dorohusk.
Six EU states (Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Sweden) brought evidence of recurring GNSS jamming and spoofing affecting civil aviation to ICAO. In June 2025, the ICAO Council noted 'recurring cases of GNSS interference from the Russian Federation'. On 3 October 2025, the ICAO Assembly condemned the interference as a breach of the Chicago Convention.
Established by. ICAO Council decision (13 June 2025) and ICAO 42nd Assembly (3 Oct 2025), on submissions from six EU member states.
Latest. The Assembly urged Russia to halt the interference, and the European Commission welcomed the condemnation. Interference in the Baltic region continued to be reported in 2026.
International observers of Moldova's 28 September 2025 parliamentary elections reported that the campaign was marred by vote-buying, illicit financing, cyberattacks and disinformation. According to the observers, the authorities identified these hybrid attacks as originating from the Russian Federation. A large-scale cyberattack on election day forced authorities to block a platform.
Established by. Moldovan authorities, as reported in the International Election Observation Mission statement (OSCE/ODIHR, OSCE PA, PACE, EP), 29 Sept 2025.
Latest. The observers judged the elections competitive despite the interference.
On 19 September 2025, three Russian MiG-31 fighter jets entered Estonian airspace over the Gulf of Finland near Vaindloo island and stayed for more than ten minutes. Estonia requested Article 4 consultations, and the North Atlantic Council met on 23 September.
Established by. North Atlantic Council statement, 23 Sept 2025: three Russian aircraft 'violated Estonian airspace for over ten minutes'; 'Russia bears full responsibility for these actions'. Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Latest. The UN Security Council met on 22 Sept 2025 at Estonia's request. NATO members delivered a joint statement on the violation at the OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation in October 2025.
On 13 September 2025, during a Russian attack on Ukraine, a Russian drone entered Romanian airspace and Romanian F-16s were scrambled to track it. Bucharest summoned the Russian ambassador and called the incursion unacceptable and irresponsible.
Established by. Romanian Ministry of National Defence and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (summoning of Russia's ambassador, Sept 2025). The North Atlantic Council statement of 23 Sept 2025 names Romania among Allies that 'have also recently experienced airspace violations by Russia'.
Latest. Drone incursions and debris falls on Romanian territory have recurred since 2022 during Russian strikes on Ukraine's Danube region.
Link to the war against Ukraine. The drone crossed into Romania during Russian strikes on Ukraine near the border.
On the night of 9–10 September 2025, during a Russian strike on Ukraine, 19 Russian drones entered Polish airspace, according to the Polish government. Polish and allied aircraft shot down the drones judged most dangerous. Poland requested Article 4 consultations, and the North Atlantic Council met on 10 September.
Established by. Polish Government (Prime Minister's statement, 10–11 Sept 2025); North Atlantic Council statement of 23 Sept 2025, which refers to a 'large-scale violation of Polish airspace by Russian drones' and says 'Russia bears full responsibility'.
Latest. NATO launched Operation Eastern Sentry on 12 Sept 2025 to reinforce the eastern flank. The UN Security Council held an emergency briefing on 12 Sept 2025. The NAC's attribution stands.
Link to the war against Ukraine. The drones entered Poland during a large Russian drone and missile attack on western Ukraine.
A NATO – NATO launches Eastern Sentry to bolster posture along eastern flank ↗
B Chancellery of the Prime Minister of Poland – Any attack on Poland will be met with response ↗
C Security Council Report – Emergency briefing on drone incursion into Poland ↗
On 29 April 2025, France for the first time formally attributed a series of cyberattacks on French entities to Russia's GRU, acting through APT28. The cases include the 2015 sabotage of broadcaster TV5Monde and attempts to destabilise the 2017 French elections. The statement also notes APT28 targeting of an organisation involved in the Paris 2024 Olympics.
Established by. French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs statement, 29 April 2025, based on ANSSI technical findings.
Latest. Attribution stands.
In March 2025 suspects sent parcels with GPS trackers from Germany via Nova Post to Ukraine to scout routes for later incendiary parcels. Three Ukrainian nationals were arrested in Germany and Switzerland in May 2025 on suspicion of acting for Russian intelligence.
Established by. Federal Prosecutor General ordered arrests on suspicion of agent activity for sabotage purposes (press release 14 May 2025). OLG Stuttgart on 18 Aug 2026 convicted one defendant of espionage for sabotage purposes (1 year 3 months) and acquitted two.
Latest. Verdict of 18 Aug 2026: one conviction, two acquittals; finality not confirmed.
Link to the war against Ukraine. Parcels routed to Ukraine via Nova Post; planned incendiary parcels could ignite in Germany or Ukraine.
On 12 December 2025, the German government stated that Russia had tried to influence the February 2025 federal election and German domestic affairs through the 'Storm-1516' disinformation campaign. It named the Moscow-based Center for Geopolitical Expertise and a further network as involved, both supported by the GRU.
Established by. German Foreign Office spokesperson, government press conference, 12 Dec 2025, citing intelligence analysis. The Russian ambassador was summoned.
Latest. Attribution announced in Dec 2025. Germany said not all of the evidence can be made public.
On the night of 31 January 2025 Moldovan national Ivan Chihaial set fire to the Ukrainian restaurant Slava Ukraini in Tallinn after a trial arson at a store in Osula. The court found he was tasked by Russia's GRU.
Established by. Harju County Court (settlement proceedings) convicted him on 2 July 2025 of arson on behalf of Russian special services (6.5 years); Estonian Prosecutor's Office stated the task came from the GRU.
Latest. Convicted 2 July 2025; accomplice received 2.5 years (mostly suspended).
Link to the war against Ukraine. Targeted a Ukrainian restaurant, a symbol of support for Ukraine.
On 4 December 2024, Romania declassified Supreme Council of National Defence (CSAT) documents. They stated that 'Romania is a target for aggressive Russian hybrid actions' and described a coordinated TikTok campaign for candidate Călin Georgescu, along with cyberattacks on election IT systems by a 'state cyber actor'. On 6 December 2024, the Constitutional Court annulled the entire presidential election.
Established by. Romanian Presidency / CSAT declassified notes from the SRI, SIE, MAI and STS (4 Dec 2024). Constitutional Court decision annulling the election (6 Dec 2024). The ECHR declared Georgescu's challenge inadmissible (6 Mar 2025). The court rulings concern electoral irregularities and do not themselves attribute the interference to Russia.
Latest. The election was rerun in May 2025. The European Commission opened DSA proceedings against TikTok on 17 Dec 2024.
C AGERPRES – Declassified documents from CSAT: Romania target of Russian hybrid actions ↗
C Verfassungsblog – The second round that wasn't ↗
C Euronews – European Commission opens probe against TikTok over Romanian election ↗
Moldovan police said a network linked to fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor had moved about USD 39 million from Russia to pay voters ahead of the October 2024 presidential election and EU-accession referendum. In July 2025, the EU Council sanctioned Shor associates for vote-buying in those votes, citing 'persistent destabilising activities by Russia'.
Established by. Moldovan National Police findings (Oct 2024). EU Council listings under the Moldova destabilisation framework (15 July 2025; Shor listed earlier).
Latest. As of July 2025, the EU framework covers 23 individuals and 5 entities.
In August 2024, a cyberattack hit Deutsche Flugsicherung (DFS), Germany's air navigation service provider. On 12 December 2025, the German Foreign Office attributed the attack to APT28 ('Fancy Bear') and Russia's military intelligence service, the GRU, and summoned the Russian ambassador.
Established by. German Foreign Office spokesperson at the government press conference, 12 Dec 2025, citing analysis by German intelligence services.
Latest. Germany summoned Russia's ambassador on 12 Dec 2025. Berlin said not all of the evidence can be made public.
In July 2024 parcels containing incendiary devices hidden in neck massagers, sent from Lithuania via DHL and DPD, ignited at the DHL hub at Leipzig airport shortly before loading, at a warehouse in the UK and in a truck in Poland. Test parcels were sent to the US and Canada. A Eurojust-supported joint investigation team identified 22 suspects who are suspected of working on behalf of Russia's military intelligence service.
Established by. Eurojust-supported joint investigation team (Germany, Lithuania, Netherlands, Poland, UK) announced on 6 Mar 2026 that suspects are believed to have worked for Russia's military intelligence service; Lithuanian prosecutors allege the operation was organised by GRU-linked individuals.
Latest. Trial of five defendants on terrorism charges opened at Vilnius Regional Court on 17 Apr 2026 and was ongoing in May 2026; a parallel case is before Polish courts; international warrants out for others. No verdict found as of Oct 2026.
A fire on 12 May 2024 destroyed the Marywilska 44 shopping centre in Warsaw, the city's largest. Polish authorities concluded it was arson instructed by Russian secret services and organised by a person residing in Russia.
Established by. Joint statement of Poland's Minister of Justice–Prosecutor General and Minister of Interior–Coordinator of Special Services, 11 May 2025; Poland ordered closure of the Russian consulate in Kraków.
Latest. Direct perpetrators not yet identified per the March 2026 indictment; one defendant (Daniil B.) is accused of filming the fire for a Russian contact. Related trial opened at Warsaw-Praga District Court on 12 Oct 2026.
A timed incendiary device set off a fire at the IKEA store in Vilnius on the night of 8–9 May 2024; no one was injured. Lithuanian and Polish prosecutors say the attack was ordered by Russian intelligence as part of a wider arson campaign that included an OBI store in Warsaw and a planned attack on IKEA in Riga.
Established by. Lithuanian prosecutors attributed the attack to Russian military intelligence (GRU) in March 2025. Vilnius District Court convicted Ukrainian national Daniil Bardadim of an act of terror on 24 Nov 2025 (3 years 4 months). Polish National Prosecutor's indictment (25 Mar 2026) states the attacks were carried out for Russian intelligence.
Latest. Bardadim convicted in Lithuania (Nov 2025). Trial of co-defendants for the IKEA, OBI and planned Riga attacks opened at Warsaw-Praga District Court on 12 Oct 2026; alleged coordinators remain wanted.
C LRT: Man sentenced in Lithuania over attack on behalf of Russian intelligence ↗
C The Defense Post: Lithuania says Russian military intelligence behind IKEA store arson ↗
On 3 May 2024, Germany and Czechia attributed to GRU-linked APT28 a cyber campaign that exploited an Outlook vulnerability. In Germany, the campaign hit the SPD party headquarters from late December 2022, along with defence, logistics, aerospace and IT firms. Czech state institutions were also targeted. The EU and NATO issued supporting statements.
Established by. German Federal Government / Federal Ministry of the Interior (3 May 2024); Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs (3 May 2024); EU High Representative and NATO statements the same day.
Latest. Germany has since attributed further APT28 operations, including the August 2024 attack on air traffic control provider DFS (Dec 2025).
Link to the war against Ukraine. The German government links the timing of the campaign to its support for Ukraine (start of 2023).
German federal prosecutors charged three men (an Armenian, a Ukrainian and a Russian national) with acting for a Russian intelligence service by trying to lure a Ukrainian army veteran living in Germany to a Frankfurt café in 2024 to identify and surveil him. Prosecutors said the operation was presumably preparation for further intelligence operations, 'possibly even leading to killing'. The men were arrested in June 2024; trial began in December 2025.
Established by. German Federal Prosecutor, indictment of 16 May 2025 (announced 28 May 2025): Vardges I. allegedly received the order from a Russian intelligence service in early May 2024 and recruited Robert A. and Arman S. Trial opened 9 Dec 2025.
Latest. Trial under way since December 2025; no verdict located as of Oct 2026.
Link to the war against Ukraine. The target had fought in Ukraine's armed forces after February 2022.
Polish national Paweł K. was arrested in April 2024 for offering Russian military intelligence security information about Rzeszów-Jasionka airport, the main hub for Western aid to Ukraine. Prosecutors said the information could have been used by Russian services in planning a possible attack on President Volodymyr Zelensky; no attack took place.
Established by. On 29 January 2026 the Zamość District Court convicted him of espionage on behalf of Russian intelligence and illegal weapons possession; the assassination-planning link is the prosecution's allegation, not a court finding that a plot existed.
Latest. Sentenced to 3 years 6 months; the verdict was not final as of the National Prosecutor's Office announcement of 3 February 2026.
Link to the war against Ukraine. The alleged target was President Zelensky and the scouted site is the principal logistics hub for military aid to Ukraine.
German-Russian national Dieter S., arrested in Bayreuth in April 2024, scouted US military facilities, a rail loading station and an arms-related manufacturer in Bavaria and discussed explosive and arson attacks for a Russian intelligence service. Two accomplices assisted him.
Established by. Federal Prosecutor General indicted three defendants on 9 Dec 2024 (press release 30 Dec 2024); Munich Higher Regional Court (OLG München) sentenced Dieter S. to six years on 30 Oct 2025; accomplices received suspended sentences.
Latest. First-instance verdict of 30 Oct 2025; finality/appeal status not confirmed in available sources.
Link to the war against Ukraine. Prosecutors said the planned attacks aimed to undermine German military support for Ukraine.
In late April 2024, two Finnair flights had to abort approaches to Tartu after GPS interference. Finnair then suspended the route for a month. On 8 May 2024, Estonia summoned Russia's chargé d'affaires, and its foreign minister called the jamming 'an element of Russia's hybrid activities'.
Established by. Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8 May 2024 (summoning of Russian chargé d'affaires); joint Baltic foreign ministers' warnings (Apr 2024).
Latest. The wider issue was taken to ICAO, which in 2025 found recurring GNSS interference originating from Russia.
Two units of a Ukrainian-owned business in Leyton, east London, holding supplies for Ukraine, were set alight on 20 March 2024, causing about £1 million in damage. Organiser Dylan Earl had been in contact with the Wagner Group, acting on behalf of the Russian state.
Established by. Central Criminal Court (Old Bailey): convictions in 2025 including the first under the National Security Act 2023 (Earl, Reeves); sentencing of six men on 24 Oct 2025 announced by Counter Terrorism Policing.
Latest. Six defendants sentenced on 24 Oct 2025 (Earl 23 years total, 17 in custody).
Link to the war against Ukraine. Targeted a Ukrainian-owned business storing aid and supplies for Ukraine.
In December 2023 the car of Estonia's Minister of the Interior and a journalist's car were vandalised in Tallinn. Prosecutors established that organiser Allan Hantsom acted at the request and under instruction of Russia's GRU, alongside memorial vandalism attacks.
Established by. Harju County Court convicted Hantsom and co-defendants of intelligence activities against Estonia in 2024; Estonian Prosecutor's Office (5 Dec 2024) stated he acted on GRU instructions.
Latest. Seven people convicted; Hantsom sentenced to 6.5 years per ERR; two GRU-linked organisers in Russia declared internationally wanted.
A network of 16 foreign nationals, detained from March 2023, installed cameras to monitor rail and air hubs including Rzeszów and prepared to derail trains carrying aid to Ukraine. Prosecutors indicted them for espionage on behalf of Russian intelligence; on 19 December 2023 a Lublin court convicted 14 of them (1–6 years), with two tried separately.
Established by. Polish Internal Security Agency (ABW) and prosecutors: indictment of 15 Nov 2023 for espionage on behalf of Russian intelligence and preparations to derail aid trains. Lublin District Court convicted 14 defendants on 19 Dec 2023 (1–6 years).
Latest. 14 convicted in Dec 2023 (appealable at the time); two defendants tried separately.
Link to the war against Ukraine. Targeted rail transport of military and humanitarian aid to Ukraine via the Rzeszów hub.
About an hour before Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, a cyberattack disabled terminals on Viasat's KA-SAT satellite network. Outages hit Ukraine and also several EU member states. The EU, UK and US attributed the attack to Russia in May 2022. The map point is a general marker for central Europe.
Established by. Declaration by the EU High Representative on behalf of the EU, 10 May 2022 ('conducted by the Russian Federation'), with parallel UK and US attributions.
Latest. Attribution unchanged. The EU cites the attack as an example of spillover risk from attacks on Ukraine.
Link to the war against Ukraine. The attack was designed to disrupt Ukrainian command and communications at the start of the invasion.
A UK-based ring led by Orlin Roussev carried out surveillance operations for Russian intelligence between 2020 and 2023, tracking investigative journalists Christo Grozev and Roman Dobrokhotov and others across Europe. Prosecutors showed the group discussed kidnapping Dobrokhotov and another target and a 'honeytrap' against Grozev; no attack was carried out.
Established by. Six Bulgarian nationals were convicted at the Old Bailey of spying offences (guilty pleas and 2025 jury verdicts); the CPS stated they acted on instructions relayed from Russian intelligence services via fugitive Wirecard executive Jan Marsalek.
Latest. On 12 May 2025 the six were sentenced to terms ranging from about 5 to 10 years 8 months; Marsalek remains at large.
Zelimkhan (Tornike) Khangoshvili, a Georgian citizen of Chechen ethnicity and former Second Chechen War commander, was shot dead in a Berlin park on 23 August 2019 by a gunman on a bicycle. One person was killed.
Established by. The Berlin Higher Regional Court (Kammergericht) on 15 December 2021 sentenced Russian national Vadim Krasikov (alias 'Vadim Sokolov') to life imprisonment, finding he acted on the orders of Russian central state authorities under a false identity prepared by the Russian state.
Latest. Krasikov was released by Germany in the 1 August 2024 multinational prisoner exchange in Ankara; on 2 August 2024 the Kremlin acknowledged he is an FSB officer.
Dawn Sturgess and Charlie Rowley were exposed in Amesbury in late June 2018 to Novichok concealed in a counterfeit perfume bottle discarded after the Salisbury attack. Sturgess died on 8 July 2018; Rowley survived after serious illness.
Established by. The statutory Dawn Sturgess Inquiry chaired by Lord Hughes (report published 4 December 2025) found a direct causal link between her death and the GRU's attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal, that the Novichok was brought from Russia, and that the operation was authorised by President Putin.
Latest. Inquiry report published 4 December 2025; Counter Terrorism Policing states the investigation into her murder remains ongoing and no one has been charged over her death.
In April 2018, Dutch security services, working with the UK, disrupted a GRU (Unit 26165) operation to hack the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons' Wi-Fi network in The Hague. At the time, the OPCW was examining the Salisbury Novichok poisoning. The officers were expelled from the Netherlands.
Established by. Dutch government and UK government joint disclosure, 4 Oct 2018. The UK statement in The Hague named GRU Unit 26165. The four officers were later listed in EU cyber sanctions (Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/1125). The US indictment of 4 Oct 2018 charged related GRU officers.
Latest. EU sanctions remain in force.
Former GRU officer Sergei Skripal and his daughter Yulia were poisoned with a Novichok nerve agent applied to the door handle of his Salisbury home on 4 March 2018. Both survived after critical illness; police officer Nick Bailey was also seriously poisoned.
Established by. UK prosecutors charged GRU officers 'Alexander Petrov' (Alexander Mishkin) and 'Ruslan Boshirov' (Anatoliy Chepiga) in September 2018 and 'Sergey Fedotov' (Denis Sergeev) in September 2021; the Dawn Sturgess Inquiry report (4 December 2025) found the attack was a GRU operation authorised by President Putin.
Latest. The three charged GRU officers remain in Russia and have not been tried; on 4 December 2025 the UK sanctioned the GRU in its entirety and summoned the Russian ambassador.
B UK Government press release 'UK cracks down on Russian intelligence agency authorised by Putin to target Skripals' (mirror) ↗
A Dawn Sturgess Inquiry (official website, final report) ↗
On 9 February 2018, the Olympic Destroyer malware attacked IT systems of the PyeongChang Winter Olympics during the opening ceremony. A US indictment charges officers of GRU Unit 74455 (Sandworm) with the attack. The same indictment covers hack-and-leak operations against the 2017 French election and attacks in Georgia.
Established by. US federal grand jury indictment of six GRU Unit 74455 officers (returned 15 Oct 2020, announced 19 Oct 2020). The UK NCSC issued a parallel attribution the same day.
Latest. The indictment is outstanding, and no defendants are in custody.
Link to the war against Ukraine. The same GRU unit is charged with attacks on Ukraine's power grid and with NotPetya.
NotPetya wiper malware was launched on 27 June 2017 through Ukrainian accounting software and spread worldwide. Companies across Europe, the US and elsewhere suffered heavy losses. The map point marks Copenhagen, home of Maersk, one of the most affected firms, and is illustrative only.
Established by. UK Foreign Office attribution to the Russian military (15 Feb 2018), with US and allied statements. EU Council sanctions of 30 July 2020 (Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/1125) listed GRU's Main Centre for Special Technologies (GTsST, 'Sandworm'). US indictment of six GRU Unit 74455 officers (15 Oct 2020).
Latest. EU cyber sanctions listings remain in force. The US indictment is outstanding, and no defendant is in custody.
Link to the war against Ukraine. The attack started in Ukraine and was aimed mainly at Ukraine before spreading worldwide.
B US Department of Justice – Six Russian GRU officers charged in connection with worldwide deployment of destructive malware ↗
C MIT Technology Review – The UK says Russia was behind the huge NotPetya ransomware attack ↗
Bulgarian arms manufacturer Emilian Gebrev, his son Hristo and a company executive fell seriously ill after being poisoned in Sofia in April 2015; all three survived. Bulgarian prosecutors also cite earlier attempts on Gebrev, two of them outside Bulgaria.
Established by. The Sofia City Prosecutor's Office charged three Russian citizens in absentia with attempted murder (announced 23 January 2020; further details 21 February 2020), including 'Sergey Fedotov', identified by UK police as GRU officer Denis Sergeev, also charged over the Salisbury attack.
Latest. No trial has taken place; the accused are believed to be in Russia, which does not extradite its nationals, and Bulgarian authorities have not formally attributed the operation to the Russian state as such.
In April–May 2015, hackers broke into the German Bundestag's IT network and stole data, including from MPs' offices. The EU sanctioned GRU officer Dmitry Badin, GRU head Igor Kostyukov and GRU Unit 26165 (APT28) for the attack.
Established by. EU Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/1537 of 22 Oct 2020, adopting cyber sanctions over the Bundestag attack. Germany's Federal Prosecutor obtained an arrest warrant for Dmitry Badin (May 2020).
Latest. EU sanctions remain in force. Badin is subject to a German arrest warrant and is not in custody.
Two explosions at ammunition storage depots near Vrbětice (16 October and 3 December 2014) killed two employees and caused major material damage. Czech authorities attributed the blasts to officers of Russian military intelligence (GRU); the munitions were reportedly intended for onward sale abroad.
Established by. Czech government publicly attributed the blasts to GRU operatives on 17 April 2021 and expelled 18 Russian officials; NATO's North Atlantic Council expressed solidarity on 22 April 2021. On 29 April 2024 Czech police closed the case, calling GRU involvement a proven fact but unable to prosecute because Russia refused cooperation.
Latest. Case closed by Czech police in April 2024 without indictment because of Russian non-cooperation; no trial possible. Two named suspects (Chepiga and Mishkin, also wanted by the UK over Salisbury) remain in Russia.
Link to the war against Ukraine. Czech officials and media have said the stored munitions were probably destined for buyers abroad, possibly including Ukraine; this destination is not officially confirmed.
Flight MH17 (Amsterdam–Kuala Lumpur) was shot down by a Russian Buk missile over occupied eastern Ukraine, killing all 298 people on board. A Dutch court, the ICAO Council and the European Court of Human Rights have each found Russia or persons under its control responsible. Included as an international aviation case although the crash site is in Ukraine.
Established by. District Court of The Hague (17 Nov 2022) convicted Girkin, Dubinskiy and Kharchenko of murder in absentia (life sentences), acquitted Pulatov, and found Russia had overall control of the 'DPR' at the time. ICAO Council (12 May 2025) held the Russian Federation responsible under the Chicago Convention. ECtHR Grand Chamber (9 July 2025, Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia) found violations of Articles 2, 3 and 13 over MH17.
Latest. Dutch verdict final (prosecution did not appeal, Dec 2022). ICAO Council ordered reparations negotiations on 30 June 2025; Russia filed an appeal against that decision at the ICJ (Russian Federation v. Australia and Netherlands, announced 19 Sept 2025), pending. ECtHR reserved just satisfaction for MH17 for later decision.
Link to the war against Ukraine. Occurred during Russia's armed aggression in eastern Ukraine; the Buk system belonged to Russia's 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade per the JIT findings relied upon by the courts.
B Netherlands Public Prosecution Service does not appeal MH17 judgment ↗
B Government of the Netherlands: Russia responsible for downing of Flight MH17 (ICAO Council decision) ↗
A Council of Europe: ECHR holds Russia accountable, including for downing of MH17 ↗
A ICJ: Russia files appeal against ICAO Council decision of 30 June 2025 ↗
Four explosions between 2011 and 2020 hit Bulgarian arms and ammunition facilities, including Lovnidol (2011), two blasts at VMZ-Sopot's Iganovo depot (2015) and the Arsenal plant near Maglizh. Bulgarian prosecutors charged six Russian nationals, who entered under false identities, with terrorism and issued European Arrest Warrants. Prosecutors said in 2021 the six were believed to be GRU agents and the case may be linked to the 2015 poisoning of arms dealer Emilian Gebrev.
Established by. Bulgarian Prosecutor's Office, 28 Apr 2021: at least six Russians believed to be GRU agents were in Bulgaria around the blasts; prosecutors cited a 'reasonable assumption' of a link to the Gebrev poisoning and the 2014 Vrbětice blast. The six were charged in 2021 with terrorism (Art. 108a(1) Criminal Code); the Sofia City Prosecutor's Office reissued European Arrest Warrants on 30 Jan 2024.
Latest. Suspects at large, not tried; EAWs reissued January 2024.
Sulim Yamadayev, a former Chechen battalion commander and rival of Ramzan Kadyrov, was shot dead in Dubai. Dubai's police chief publicly named Russian State Duma deputy Adam Delimkhanov, a Kadyrov relative, as the alleged organiser and said he was on Interpol's wanted list. Two accomplices were convicted in Dubai in 2010; Delimkhanov denied involvement and was never tried.
Established by. Dubai Police chief Lt Gen Dahi Khalfan Tamim, April 2009: said Delimkhanov masterminded the killing and that he was 'officially wanted by Interpol'. Dubai court, April 2010: convicted Mehdi Taqi Dahuria (Iran) and Makhsood Jan Asmatov (Tajikistan) of aiding the killing (life, reduced to 3 years on appeal in Dec 2010).
Latest. Moscow Times reported in 2012 that Delimkhanov was removed from the Interpol list and that Dubai halted the search; he was never tried.
C Dubai appeals court ruling, as reported by The Moscow Times ('Dubai cuts sentences in Yamadayev slaying') ↗
C The Moscow Times: Deputy off Interpol list ↗
C The Moscow Times: Dubai halts search for Delimkhanov ↗
Umar Israilov, a former Kadyrov bodyguard who had filed a complaint against Ramzan Kadyrov at the ECtHR, was shot dead in Vienna in a failed kidnapping. In June 2011 a Vienna court convicted three men, including the group's leader, who received life imprisonment. Austrian investigators believed, largely on circumstantial evidence, that Kadyrov, head of the Russian Federation's Chechen Republic, ordered the kidnapping; he denied it and was not charged.
Established by. Vienna court verdict, June 2011: Otto Kaltenbrunner (life), Suleiman Dadayev (19 yrs), Turpal Ali Yeshurkayev (16 yrs) convicted. Link to Kadyrov rests on Austrian investigators' assessment; the court's attempt to hear Kadyrov by video link failed.
Latest. Convictions stand; no charges against Kadyrov or other Russian officials.
From late April to mid-May 2007, during the dispute over relocating the Soviet war memorial in Tallinn, Estonian government, media and banking websites were hit by large-scale distributed denial-of-service attacks. Estonia's foreign minister said part of the traffic came from Russian state IP addresses; Russia denied involvement and refused investigative cooperation. The only conviction was of an Estonian resident; no Russian state actor has been charged.
Established by. Estonian Foreign Minister Urmas Paet, press conference 1 May 2007: Estonia had proof attacks came from 'IP addresses of governmental authorities of Russia' (reported speech); later accused the Kremlin of direct involvement. Defence Minister Jaak Aaviksoo later said he could not state for certain the attacks were managed by the Kremlin.
Latest. Single conviction: Tallinn student Dmitri Galushkevich fined 17,500 kroons on 24 Jan 2008 for attacking the Reform Party website. A Nashi activist claimed involvement in 2009. The attacks led to the NATO CCDCOE being established in Tallinn (May 2008).
Former FSB officer Alexander Litvinenko, a British citizen, was poisoned with radioactive polonium-210 at a London hotel on 1 November 2006 and died on 23 November 2006. One victim died; polonium contamination was found at multiple sites in London.
Established by. The UK statutory Litvinenko Inquiry (report of 21 January 2016) found Andrei Lugovoy and Dmitry Kovtun killed him in an FSB operation probably approved by Nikolai Patrushev and President Putin; the ECtHR (Carter v. Russia, no. 20914/07, 21 September 2021) held Russia responsible for the killing under Article 2.
Latest. Russia has not surrendered the suspects or complied with the ECtHR judgment; no criminal trial has been possible.
Former Chechen separatist leader Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev was killed by a car bomb in Doha; his 14-year-old son was wounded. In June 2004 a Qatari court convicted two Russian intelligence officers of the murder, attempted murder and arms smuggling. Qatar handed them over to Russia in December 2004 to serve their sentences there.
Established by. Doha criminal court, 30 June 2004: convicted two Russian intelligence agents (Anatoly Belashkov/Bilashkov and Vasily Bogachev/Pokchov, spellings vary); Judge Ibrahim al-Nisf said the evidence showed the killing was directed from Moscow. Russia denied involvement.
Latest. Convicts transferred to Russia in December 2004 under a bilateral accord; Al Jazeera reported in February 2005 they were no longer in prison in Russia.
C Arab News: Qatari Court Jails Russian Agents Over Yandarbiyev Murder ↗
B Qatari foreign ministry announcement, as reported by Al Jazeera ('Qatar to hand over two jailed Russians') ↗
C Al Jazeera: Chechen leader's killers free in Russia ↗
Wagner Group and Africa Corps: Russia's state-backed forces abroad
The Wagner Group fought in Ukraine and, at the same time, in Africa and the Middle East. In June 2023 President Putin acknowledged that the Russian state had fully funded it; in Mali its operations passed in 2025 to the Africa Corps of the Russian Ministry of Defence. Below: what UN bodies found, what governments sanctioned, and how the link to the Russian state was established.
Wagner announced its withdrawal from Mali in June 2025, while Russia's Defence Ministry-controlled 'Africa Corps' remained. On 4 September 2025 OHCHR stated that Malian troops are backed by foreign military personnel from the 'Africa Corps' (formerly 'Wagner Group'), that Malian troops and their foreign backers have committed serious violations against civilians, and that since April 2025 the UN had received credible information of hundreds of extrajudicial executions and other abuses by all parties.
Established by. OHCHR / UN High Commissioner Volker Türk statement, Geneva, 4 September 2025 (general finding; not incident-specific attribution).
Latest. Human Rights Watch (20 Aug 2026) documented the killing of nine civilians, including four children, by Africa Corps-led forces in Bombori (Mopti region) on 10 July 2026 — a C-tier, not yet UN-verified, allegation. No accountability process known.
Link to the war against Ukraine. Africa Corps is a Russian MoD-controlled structure that absorbed Wagner's Africa operations; the same state apparatus is waging the war against Ukraine.
Wagner was proscribed as a terrorist organisation in the UK with effect from 15 September 2023; the Home Office cited its operations in Ukraine, Syria, CAR, Sudan, Libya, Mozambique and Mali and involvement in 'looting, torture and barbarous murders'. On 7 November 2024 the UK became the first G7 country to sanction Africa Corps, stating it has direct links to the Kremlin, threatens peace in Libya, Mali and CAR and has committed widespread human rights abuses; it also sanctioned Wagner-linked Officers Union for International Security.
Established by. UK Home Office proscription order (in force 15 September 2023); FCDO sanctions designations under the Libya (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 and CAR regime (7 November 2024).
Latest. In force. In 2024 a UK court sentenced Piotr Kucharski to two years and six months' custody for professing membership of the proscribed Wagner Group (CPS, 1 November 2024).
Link to the war against Ukraine. The Home Office cited Wagner's operations in Ukraine as a threat to global security.
US Treasury designated Midas Ressources (Ndassima gold mine), Diamville, Dubai-based Industrial Resources General Trading and Russia's OOO DM on 27 June 2023, stating the gold dealings funded Wagner 'to sustain and expand its armed forces, including in Ukraine and Africa'. Treasury added timber company Bois Rouge (March 2024) and Mining Industries SARLU (May 2024). The EU listed Lobaye Invest and Diamville on 25 February 2023 for illegal trade in gold and diamonds looted from local traders.
Established by. US Treasury OFAC designations (27 June 2023; 8 March 2024; 30 May 2024); EU Council listing under the Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime (25 February 2023).
Latest. No delisting found as of October 2026.
Link to the war against Ukraine. Treasury found CAR gold revenues helped fund Wagner forces including in Ukraine.
B US Treasury: Treasury Sanctions Companies and Individuals Advancing Russian Malign Activities in Africa ↗
B US Treasury: Treasury Sanctions Wagner Group-linked Companies in the Central African Republic ↗
A Council of the EU press release, 25 February 2023 ↗
On 27 June 2023, days after Wagner's mutiny, Vladimir Putin told Defence Ministry servicemen that the maintenance of the entire Wagner Group was fully provided for by the state, stating that from May 2022 to May 2023 it received over 86 billion rubles (about USD 1 billion). The statement contradicts Russia's earlier position that Wagner was a private entity unconnected to the state.
Established by. Public statement by the Russian head of state at a meeting with Defence Ministry servicemen, Kremlin transcript, 27 June 2023.
Latest. After Prigozhin's death (23 August 2023), Wagner's Africa operations were brought under Defence Ministry control as 'Africa Corps', which the UK describes as having direct links to the Kremlin.
Link to the war against Ukraine. State funding covered the period of Wagner's assault on Bakhmut and other Ukrainian cities.
US Treasury designated Ivan Maslov, head of Wagner in Mali, on 25 May 2023, stating Wagner may route purchases of military equipment for use in Ukraine (mines, UAVs, radars, counter-battery systems) through Mali using false paperwork. On 24 July 2023 Treasury designated Mali's Defence Minister Col. Sadio Camara and two air-force officers for materially assisting Wagner, citing a reported 278% rise in civilian casualties after Wagner's arrival in December 2021. The EU listed the head of Wagner in Mali under its Mali regime on 25 February 2023 for violence and human rights abuses including extrajudicial killings.
Established by. US Treasury OFAC designations under E.O. 14024 (25 May and 24 July 2023); EU Council listing under the Mali autonomous sanctions framework (25 February 2023).
Latest. No delisting found as of October 2026.
Link to the war against Ukraine. Treasury stated Wagner sought to acquire weapons via Mali for use in Russia's war against Ukraine.
On 26 January 2023 US Treasury designated PMC Wagner as a significant transnational criminal organization under E.O. 13581, citing an ongoing pattern of serious criminal activity including mass executions, rape, child abductions and physical abuse in CAR and Mali, and redesignated it under E.O. 13667 for conduct in CAR. The same action targeted Wagner-linked entities including Sewa Security Services, Kratol Aviation (aircraft moving personnel between CAR, Libya and Mali) and Valery Zakharov.
Established by. US Treasury OFAC, 26 January 2023 (earlier designations: June 2017 under E.O. 13660; State Dept., November 2022 under E.O. 14024).
Latest. No revocation found as of October 2026.
Link to the war against Ukraine. Wagner was first sanctioned by the US in 2017 for actions in Ukraine and fought there through 2023.
During a five-day operation beginning 27 March 2022 in Moura (central Mali), OHCHR found strong indications that more than 500 people were killed, the vast majority summarily executed, and that at least 58 women and girls were raped or subjected to other sexual violence; it obtained names of at least 238 victims. Witnesses described 'armed white men' speaking an unknown language who operated alongside Malian forces, stayed for the whole operation and at times appeared to supervise; OHCHR did not name their nationality or unit. In January 2023 UN Special Procedures experts, including the Working Group on mercenaries, cited credible reports that Malian forces accompanied by personnel believed to belong to the Wagner Group executed several hundred people at Moura.
Established by. OHCHR fact-finding report on Moura, published 12 May 2023 (Malian authorities denied investigators access to the site); UN Special Procedures joint statement of 31 January 2023 calling for an independent investigation into possible international crimes by Government forces and 'Wagner group'.
Latest. No independent or Malian judicial accountability process known as of 2026; Mali expelled MINUSMA (mandate ended 30 June 2023) and the UN Mali sanctions regime and Panel of Experts ended after Russia's veto on 30 August 2023.
Link to the war against Ukraine. The Wagner Group deployed in Mali from December 2021 was the same organisation fighting in Ukraine at the time (incl. Bakhmut/Soledar).
A OHCHR: Mali – UN experts call for independent investigation into possible international crimes committed by Government forces and 'Wagner group' ↗
A UN News: Moura – Over 500 killed by Malian troops, foreign military personnel ↗
On 13 December 2021 the EU listed the Wagner Group, eight individuals and three entities, finding Wagner responsible for serious human rights abuses including torture and extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings in Ukraine, Syria, Libya, the Central African Republic, Sudan and Mozambique. On 25 February 2023 it added 11 individuals and 7 entities linked to Wagner in CAR, Sudan, Mali and Ukraine.
Established by. Council of the EU, Decision (CFSP) 2021/2197 and Regulation (EU) 2021/2194 (13 December 2021) under the Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime; further acts of 25 February 2023.
Latest. Listings renewed; no delisting of Wagner found as of October 2026.
Link to the war against Ukraine. The EU listing explicitly covers Wagner abuses in Ukraine alongside Africa and Syria.
The UN Panel of Experts on CAR reported that international humanitarian law violations by FACA soldiers and Russian instructors included excessive use of force, indiscriminate killings, occupation of schools and large-scale looting. It documented excessive force in Grimari on 28 December 2020 (3 civilians killed, 15 wounded) and unarmed civilians shot in Ippy, Bodol, Grimari and Kradé, and rejected Russia's claim that its instructors did not take part in operations. The Panel used the term 'Russian instructors' rather than Wagner; their coordinator said they were recruited by the Russian MoD via the Officers Union for International Security.
Established by. Final report of the UN Security Council Panel of Experts on CAR, S/2021/569 (transmitted 25 June 2021).
Latest. Later Panel report S/2024/444 described an attack near Sam Ouandja carried out by Russian instructors alone. The Officers Union for International Security was sanctioned by the UK in November 2024.
UN independent experts, including the Working Group on mercenaries, reported in March 2021 mass executions without trial, arbitrary detention, torture during interrogations, enforced disappearances and attacks on humanitarian workers by private military personnel operating alongside CAR forces, naming Sewa Security Services, Lobaye Invest SARLU and the Wagner Group. In October 2021 they said Wagner-linked 'Russian instructors' were violently harassing and intimidating civilians, peacekeepers, journalists and aid workers, with reported rape and sexual violence by Wagner officers, and noted a CAR Special Commission of Inquiry had found violations including by 'Russian instructors'.
Established by. UN Special Procedures (Working Group on mercenaries and others) joint statements of 31 March 2021 and 27 October 2021, after communications to the CAR Government.
Latest. Russian personnel remain in CAR in 2026; the UN CAR arms embargo on the Government was lifted in 2024 (res. 2745). No accountability for these abuses reported.
The UN Panel of Experts on Libya's final report S/2021/229 set out in detail the role of ChVK Wagner in support of Haftar-affiliated forces, including its command structure and MiG-29 and Su-24 aircraft operated under Wagner control, in a context it described as non-compliance with the UN arms embargo. Earlier Panel reporting (cited by HRW) estimated 800–1,200 Wagner operatives in Libya and dated their presence to October 2018.
Established by. UN Security Council Panel of Experts on Libya, final report S/2021/229 (8 March 2021).
Latest. Panel report S/2024/914 found 'no substantial changes' in Wagner's activities after Prigozhin's death (Jufrah airbase, Brak al-Shati). No Wagner-linked person has been added to the UN Libya sanctions list; the UK sanctioned Africa Corps under its Libya regime in November 2024.
US Treasury designated M Invest and its subsidiary Meroe Gold on 15 July 2020, stating M Invest served as a cover for Wagner forces in Sudan, held gold concessions since 2017 and developed plans for Omar al-Bashir to suppress protesters, including disinformation and staged public executions. The EU listed M Invest and Meroe Gold in February 2023. In May 2023 Treasury stated that Wagner has supplied surface-to-air missiles to Sudan's Rapid Support Forces.
Established by. US Treasury OFAC designations (15 July 2020); Treasury statement in Maslov designation (25 May 2023); EU Council listing (25 February 2023).
Latest. Sanctions remain in force (no delisting found).
Link to the war against Ukraine. Sudanese gold revenue is assessed by Treasury and the EU as a Wagner financing stream during the war against Ukraine.
The EU found that Wagner commander Dmitriy Utkin personally ordered the torture and killing of a Syrian deserter in Homs in June 2017 and ordered it filmed, and listed Wagner member Stanislav Dychko as one of four participants. Separately, US Treasury designated Prigozhin-controlled Evro Polis in January 2018 for contracting with the Syrian Government to protect oil fields in exchange for 25% of production.
Established by. Council of the EU Decision (CFSP) 2021/2197 of 13 December 2021 (statements of reasons); US Treasury designation of Evro Polis, 26 January 2018 (without naming Wagner).
Latest. Utkin died in the August 2023 plane crash with Prigozhin; no prosecution known. After the fall of the Assad government (December 2024) Russian presence in Syria was reduced.
Link to the war against Ukraine. Wagner's Syria veterans and command (Utkin) led its operations in Ukraine.
Suspected — not established
Cases where Russian involvement is reported or alleged — by officials speaking without a formal attribution, by unnamed sources or by investigative media — but not established. Shown for completeness, apart from the record above. Do not cite these as proven.
On the night of 2–3 September 2026 incendiary devices were thrown from a passing car at a construction site near the Munich offices of defence firms Rohde & Schwarz and Helsing, causing minor damage and no injuries. Police detained two Bulgarian citizens. According to the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, German investigators suspect Russian military intelligence (GRU) recruited them.
Established by. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (late Sep 2026), citing unnamed German security sources: suspects may belong to a GRU-linked group operating from Slovakia. No official German attribution or public charges reported.
Latest. Two suspects detained; investigation ongoing as of late Sep 2026.
Link to the war against Ukraine. Helsing supplies strike drones to Ukraine.
On 25 December 2024, the anchor of the tanker Eagle S damaged the Estlink 2 power cable and several telecom cables in the Gulf of Finland. Finnish prosecutors charged the captain and two chief officers with aggravated criminal mischief and aggravated interference with telecommunications. Russian state responsibility for the damage has not been established; the link to Russia is the vessel's listing by the EU as part of Russia's 'shadow fleet'.
Established by. Finnish police and prosecutors (charges, Aug 2025). The Helsinki District Court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction (Oct 2025). The EU Council listed Eagle S under the 17th sanctions package (May 2025) as a shadow-fleet vessel, without attributing the cable damage.
Latest. On 27 Aug 2026, the Helsinki Court of Appeal overturned the dismissal, ruled that Finland has jurisdiction, and returned the case to the District Court. A Supreme Court appeal is possible, but only with leave.
Link to the war against Ukraine. The EU lists Eagle S as part of the shadow fleet that carries Russian oil and funds the war against Ukraine.
CNN reported in July 2024 that US intelligence had uncovered a Russian government plan to assassinate Armin Papperger, CEO of Rheinmetall, a major arms supplier to Ukraine, and had alerted Germany, which provided him protection. German authorities declined to comment on the specific report. No charges have been made public.
Established by. CNN, 11 Jul 2024, citing five unnamed US and Western officials. German interior ministry declined to comment directly, saying the government 'takes the threats from the Russian regime very seriously'. NATO official James Appathurai later told the European Parliament that Russia's campaign included 'threats to assassinate industry leaders, such as Rheinmetall's CEO'.
Latest. No public indictment or official German attribution as of Oct 2026.
Link to the war against Ukraine. Rheinmetall is a leading supplier of ammunition and armour to Ukraine.
A Colombian man attempted to set fire to public buses at the Klíčov depot in Prague and was arrested. In June 2025 a Prague court sentenced him to eight years after he pleaded guilty; he had received orders via Telegram with a promise of payment. Prime Minister Petr Fiala said the attack was likely organised and financed by Russia; the court did not rule on a Russian link.
Established by. Czech PM Petr Fiala, June 2024: attack likely organised and financed by Russia as part of 'hybrid war'. Prague court, 9 Jun 2025: Andrés Alfonso de la Hoz de la Cruz convicted and sentenced to 8 years (guilty plea); verdict did not attribute the commission to Russia. Kremlin denied involvement.
Latest. Perpetrator convicted (June 2025); Russian sponsorship remains a government assessment, not a court finding.
Maksim Kuzminov, a Russian military helicopter pilot who defected to Ukraine in 2023, was shot several times and killed in a residential complex in Villajoyosa (Alicante) on 13 February 2024.
Established by. No court or government has formally attributed the killing; Russian state involvement has been alleged by unnamed Spanish intelligence sources (El País) and Western intelligence sources (Wall Street Journal, June 2024).
Latest. A Villajoyosa investigating judge provisionally closed the case for lack of an identified perpetrator (order of September 2025, made public 9 December 2025); the case can be reopened if new evidence emerges.
Link to the war against Ukraine. Kuzminov flew a Mi-8 helicopter to Ukraine in August 2023 in a defection operation organised by Ukrainian military intelligence (HUR).
Human Rights Watch found that MON-50, MON-200 and OZM-72 mines, not previously recorded in Libya, were laid at 35 locations in Ain Zara (southern Tripoli) mapped on a tablet attributed to a Wagner operative, in areas where Wagner was present before its June 2020 withdrawal. The Libyan Mine Action Centre recorded 130 killed and 196 injured by mines and other explosive ordnance from May 2020 to March 2022, mostly civilians in Tripoli's southern suburbs. The UN Fact-Finding Mission on Libya (October 2021) said Haftar's forces and Wagner 'may have violated' the principle of proportionality.
Established by. Human Rights Watch investigation (31 May 2022) based on BBC-obtained tablet and field verification; UN Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Libya report A/HRC/48/83 (October 2021) on related IHL concerns.
Latest. HRW urged the ICC to investigate; no charges known as of 2026.
Link to the war against Ukraine. Russia's use of anti-personnel mines and booby traps in Ukrainian territories mirrors this pattern.
The ask
Attribute together and say it at the UN. Joint public attribution carries further than national statements; raise it in the General Assembly, the Security Council and the UN Open-ended Working Group on ICT security.
Sanction those who order, not only those who act. List the GRU units and officers behind the operations; expel intelligence officers under diplomatic cover.
Share evidence across borders. Support Eurojust and joint investigation teams; many of these cases cross three or four jurisdictions.
Hold Wagner and Africa Corps to account. Support UN investigations in Mali, the Central African Republic and Libya, and restore independent UN monitoring where it was shut down.
See the link. The same services that strike Ukrainian cities sabotage warehouses, railways and airports that supply Ukraine. Support for Ukraine is part of every partner's own security.
Sanctions
Who is sanctioned for Russia's war against Ukraine, by whom and why — and where the lists do not match. The registers below combine the official lists of the United States, the European Union, the United Kingdom, Ukraine, Canada, Switzerland, Japan, Australia and New Zealand, with the same person or company counted once; they are refreshed every day. A sanctions listing is a decision of the government that adopted it: it is shown here as that government's position, not as a court finding.
Documents: the legal acts
The main acts that impose sanctions in response to Russia's aggression, newest first, each linked to the official text. Packages, executive orders and decrees add names to the registers below.
- — Iran-related Designations; Issuance of Iran-related General License; Issuance of Amended Russia-related General License ofac.treasury.gov ↗
3 individuals and 9 entities in Russia, Türkiye, the UAE, India and Seychelles: cargo, customs and payment intermediaries for sanctioned goods; three companies in the shadow-fleet ecosystem; a supplier of Russian-origin crude oil to India. Asset freeze, ban on making funds available, travel ban.
77 persons: 74 candidates in the September 2026 State Duma elections organised in occupied Ukrainian territory and 3 members of Russia's Central Election Commission.
826 Russian companies and 743 individuals who head them, focused on mid-level suppliers of components for advanced weapons. Asset freeze, ban on making funds available, travel ban. Listings under the regime now close to 4,600.
38 designations: oil producers Zarubezhneft and INK Capital (UK: over 90% of Russia's oil production capacity now covered); 12 shadow-fleet tankers (over 600 in total); three crypto exchanges and two payment platforms; 17 suppliers of goods vital to the war effort.
31 measures incl. 23 individuals/entities; 8 vessels (3 LNG shadow-fleet tankers, 2 bunkering vessels, 3 Russian ice-class vessels); UK total ~600 shadow-fleet tankers.
Individual listings extended until 22 Sep 2029 (shift from six-monthly to three-year renewal).
Directs tariffs up to 500% on Russian goods/energy; authorises up to 100% secondary tariffs on top-five buyers/evasion facilitators of Russian oil/gas; 'mandatory' sanctions subject to presidential determination and national-interest waiver; congressional review of terminations.
216 listings (48 individuals, 168 entities); 41 more shadow-fleet vessels (total 673); 33 more Russian banks under transaction ban; MOEX asset freeze; price-cap auto-adjustment paused at USD 44.10 until 15 Jul 2027; refinery transaction ban tool (Kulevi, Georgia); 51 Annex IV entities.
46 persons and 80 entities listed, 46 shadow-fleet vessels; bank transaction bans (20 Russian + 4 third-country banks); crypto (A7A5, RUBx, digital rouble) bans; LNG terminal services ban; port bans (Murmansk, Tuapse, Karimun).
New listings of individuals and entities; also removes position 2 from annex of NSDC decision of 2 May 2026 (Decree 358/2026).
Sanctions on individuals (annex 1) and legal entities (annex 2); counts not stated on page.
~70 new sanctions targeting shadow fleet, military supply chains and finance networks; OFSI general licence supporting interdiction of shadow-fleet vessels (UK authorised boarding).
Energy, military-industrial, trade and financial/crypto measures; introduced LNG terminal-services ban (per Steptoe summary of 21st package).
Nearly 300 designations: Transneft; 175 companies of the 2Rivers shadow-fleet/oil-trading network; 48 tankers; 6 LNG targets (Portovaya, Vysotsk terminals); 49 military-supply-chain targets; 9 banks; civil nuclear entities.
Oil price cap lowered from USD 47.60 to 44.10; further 2026 rounds: 100 vessels (25 Mar), 23+5 (8 May), 7+34 and 121 vessels (12 Jun, SOR/2026-122), 8 individuals over deportation of Ukrainian children (4 Sep, SOR/2026-188).
Extended sanctions on Dmytro Firtash and his circle (synchronised with UK); extended sanctions on Taras Kozak and 8 related propaganda companies.
Phased ban on Russian LNG imports (full by 1 Jan 2027); Rosneft/Gazprom Neft transaction ban; 117 more vessels (total 557); third-country banks and crypto providers.
First major Russia designations under the second Trump administration: Rosneft and Lukoil plus 34 subsidiaries (28 Rosneft, 6 Lukoil); called on Moscow to agree to a ceasefire.
39 designations and 51 ship specifications (44 shadow-fleet tankers); Rosneft and Lukoil designated; also Chinese/Indian refineries and terminals per news.
Price cap cut from USD 60 to 47.60; 95 additional shadow-fleet vessels (>150 since Jun 2025); >1,600 Russia-related sanctions in total since Feb 2022.
39 individuals and 55 companies (43 Russian, 10 Chinese, 2 Belarusian) incl. Zala Aero, KB Vostok, AI-for-drones centres; Register regulation amended after 16 Jul 2025 law extending sanctions to vessels and aircraft.
Crude price cap lowered from USD 60 to 47.6 with automatic six-monthly adjustment (15% below market); Nord Stream 1/2 transaction ban; refined-products-from-Russian-crude import ban; 105 more vessels.
5 China-registered companies (e.g. Ningbo BLIN Machinery, Suzhou ECOD Precision Manufacturing) supplying components for Russian/Iranian-design drones.
403 individuals and 188 entities sanctioned in line with EU 9th–14th packages, EU Belarus and Iran human-rights/military-support listings; part of synchronisation with EU/G7.
Open database of foreign components in Russian weapons, sanctions-evasion routes, persons/companies/vessels proposed for sanctions.
116 designations (45 Kremlin enablers/oligarchs, 35 war beneficiaries, 15 shadow-fleet enablers, 3 banks); 201 vessels; new export/import bans.
189 further shadow-fleet vessels (total 342); ~75 listings; also hybrid, human-rights and chemical-weapons listings same day.
Specified ~100 oil tankers of Russia's shadow fleet (101 ships per Kyiv Independent) plus suppliers of military goods.
Further export bans on military-relevant items, software and technology transfers to Russia.
71 individuals and 18 legal entities (Russian propaganda outlets and figures e.g. Sladkov, Karasov, Sharapova; 'Insha Ukraina' project of Medvedchuk).
59 individuals incl. Russian and Chinese nationals connected to the shadow fleet.
Primary aluminium import ban; 74 further shadow-fleet vessels; SWIFT/transaction bans on 13 more banks; 48 individuals and 35 entities listed.
Asset freezes on 11 individuals, 29 organisations, 3 Russian banks (incl. DPRK and Georgian-bank links); export bans on 22 Russian and 31 third-country companies; 335 additional goods categories banned.
Designated Gazprom Neft and Surgutneftegas, 183 vessels (largely shadow fleet), traders, oilfield service providers, insurers; determination opening the energy sector to designations.
54 individuals and 30 entities listed; 52 further shadow-fleet vessels (total 79).
Blocked Gazprombank and its foreign subsidiaries, plus >50 Russian banks and 40+ registrars and officials.
New regime to list those responsible for Russian hybrid/destabilising activities against EU and Member States; first listings 16 Dec 2024 (16 individuals, 3 entities); renewed 8 Oct 2026 to 9 Oct 2027.
Ban on reloading Russian LNG in EU ports for third-country transshipment; SPFS ban; 116 listings; first vessel-specific port/service bans (27 vessels).
Designated Moscow Exchange, NCC, NSD and >300 persons incl. third-country suppliers; widened 'military-industrial base' definition to all EO 14024-blocked persons.
106 individuals and 88 entities listed incl. third-country suppliers of military goods (China, India, Türkiye, DPRK etc.).
Largest single US tranche: >500 Treasury designations (plus State) targeting financial sector, military-industrial base and third-country evasion networks.
Created the public State Register of Sanctions (drs.nsdc.gov.ua) recording all persons sanctioned by Ukraine with grounds and terms.
Authorised secondary sanctions on foreign financial institutions facilitating Russia's military-industrial base; broadened import bans (Russian-origin seafood/diamonds processed in third countries).
Ban on Russian diamonds; 'no Russia clause' for exports; tighter price-cap compliance; over 140 listings.
New trade measures incl. ban on Russian diamonds/processed in third countries (phased), LPG, copper, aluminium, nickel imports; legal services ban.
New anti-circumvention tool to restrict exports to third countries; transit bans; ~100 additional listings; ban on ship-to-ship transfers suspected of breaching price cap.
Export bans on critical tech/industrial goods worth over EUR 11bn; listings incl. Iranian drone producers; media suspensions.
Caps of USD 100/bbl (premium-to-crude products) and USD 45/bbl (discount-to-crude) effective 5 Feb 2023.
Nearly 200 individuals and entities listed; further export bans (drone engines), media suspensions, transaction ban with Russian Regional Development Bank.
Ban on import of Russian crude oil and oil products into the UK.
Prohibits US maritime-transport services for Russian crude sold above USD 60/bbl (products: USD 100/45 from 2023-02-05).
Crude oil price cap set at USD 60/barrel effective 5 Dec 2022 (with G7/Australia coalition).
Additional trade restrictions; UK maritime services ban on Russian oil with G7 price-cap exception from 5 Dec 2022.
Legal basis for G7 oil price cap on maritime transport; further import/export bans; listings of persons involved in sham 'referenda'.
Agreed comprehensive prohibition of services for maritime transport of Russian-origin crude and products unless bought at or below a price cap; implemented 5 Dec 2022 (crude, USD 60) / 5 Feb 2023 (products).
Ban on Russian gold imports; reinforced export controls; clarifications; additional listings incl. Sberbank asset freeze.
Bans on services (management consulting, accounting, PR) and further export/import restrictions.
Phased ban on seaborne Russian crude (Dec 2022) and petroleum products (Feb 2023); Sberbank and two others removed from SWIFT; three more broadcasters suspended; 65 individuals and 18 entities listed.
Further trade measures (luxury goods, oil refining goods, quantum/advanced materials) and import bans (iron & steel).
Ban on imports of Russian coal; closure of EU ports to Russian-flagged vessels; road transport ban; further export/import bans; 217 individuals and 18 entities listed (Council release: 'additional 218 individuals' headline? see link).
Ban on all new US investment in Russia and on specified services (basis for price-cap determinations); full blocking of Sberbank and Alfa-Bank, Putin's adult daughters, Lavrov's family.
Ban on transactions with certain state-owned enterprises, new investment ban in energy sector, luxury goods export ban, steel import ban; 15 individuals and 9 entities listed.
Bans on imports of Russian seafood, alcohol, non-industrial diamonds (later gold, metals) and exports of luxury goods/banknotes.
NZ's first autonomous sanctions law; regulations designated Putin and elites; extended in 2025 to 17 Mar 2028; price cap from 29 Feb 2024 (USD 60 -> 47.60 on 12 Sep 2025 -> 44.10 on 20 Feb 2026); 100 shadow-fleet vessels on 20 Feb 2026.
Ban on US imports of Russian crude oil, LNG and coal; ban on new US investment in Russian energy sector.
Export bans on military and certain dual-use items; financial prohibitions on VTB, VEB, Promsvyazbank, Bank Rossiya; ban on crypto transactions circumventing measures.
Seven Russian banks barred from SWIFT; broadcasting suspension of RT/Russia Today and Sputnik in the EU.
Export bans on dual-use, military and critical-industry goods/technology to Russia following full-scale invasion.
Prohibition of transactions with Central Bank of Russia; closure of EU airspace to Russian aircraft; 26 individuals and 1 entity listed.
Ban on exports of strategic items to Russia; participation in SWIFT removal of Russian banks; non-strategic items (57 US-controlled items) to follow.
Neutral Switzerland adopted EU listings and financial sanctions, departing from past practice; subsequently tracks EU packages through annex amendments by the DEFR/SECO.
Prohibition on transactions involving the Central Bank of Russia, National Wealth Fund and Ministry of Finance (immobilisation of sovereign assets in US).
Asset freezes on Putin and Lavrov; financial, energy (refining tech), transport (aviation), dual-use and export-finance restrictions.
Visa suspension and asset freezes for designated Russian individuals/entities; asset freezes on VEB.RF, Promsvyazbank, Bank Rossiya; export bans on military-related entities and dual-use goods incl. semiconductors.
351 Duma members plus 31 individuals and 19 entities listed (largest early expansion); 2022-03-23 all 160 Federation Council members added.
Cut Sberbank from US correspondent banking (Dir. 2) and banned new debt/equity of 13 major Russian state-owned enterprises (Dir. 3).
Listed 351 State Duma members and 27 persons/entities; trade ban with non-government-controlled Donetsk/Luhansk; restrictions on Russian state access to EU capital markets.
Embargo on the so-called DNR/LNR regions (later extended by OFAC to occupied Zaporizhzhia/Kherson areas).
Expanded criteria to designate persons 'involved in obtaining a benefit from or supporting the Government of Russia', enabling post-invasion mass designations.
Authority to sanction persons involved in Nord Stream 2 and similar pipelines; Nord Stream 2 AG designated under it on 2022-02-23.
Principal authority for post-2021 Russia designations, sector determinations (financial, technology, defence, energy etc.) and secondary sanctions on foreign financial institutions (amended by EO 14114).
Blocked three pro-Kremlin TV channels linked to Medvedchuk's circle.
UK autonomous Russia regime replacing EU measures post-Brexit (in force 31 Dec 2020); amended >20 times since Feb 2022 to add financial, trade, transport, oil and services measures.
Codified Ukraine-related EOs, mandatory sanctions on Russian cyber, defence/intelligence sector transactions, energy pipelines; congressional review of any easing.
Sanctions on Russian entities incl. VKontakte, Odnoklassniki, Yandex, Mail.ru, Kaspersky and Dr.Web, blocking access in Ukraine.
First large Ukrainian sanctions list against Russian individuals and entities (annexes 1 and 2; ~388 persons and ~105 entities per contemporary reports), for one year.
Comprehensive embargo on occupied Crimea (new investment, imports, exports).
Sectoral debt/equity restrictions on Russian banks and energy companies; Directive 4 bans support for deepwater/Arctic/shale oil projects (amended 31 Oct 2017).
Legal basis for Ukrainian personal and sectoral sanctions proposed by Cabinet/NBU/SBU, adopted by NSDC and enacted by presidential decree; amended 2025 to cover vessels and aircraft.
Base sectoral (economic) sanctions regime: capital-market, arms, dual-use, oil technology; vehicle for all 2022–2026 economic packages. Renewed 25 Jun 2026 until 31 Jul 2027 (first 12-month renewal).
Import ban and later investment/trade/tourism restrictions on illegally annexed Crimea and Sevastopol; renewed annually (latest to 2026-06-23 per Council timeline, further renewal 2026 not verified).
Sectoral authority (financial services, energy, metals and mining, defence); basis for Sectoral Sanctions Identifications (SSI) directives.
Canada's Russia regime: asset freezes/dealings bans (Sch. 1), vessels (Sch. 1.1), trade bans; amended continually.
Base asset-freeze/travel-ban regime for persons responsible for actions against Ukraine's territorial integrity; vehicle for nearly all individual listings since 2014.
Expanded emergency; authorised blocking of Russian government officials and arms-sector persons.
Declared national emergency over Russia's actions in Ukraine (Crimea); authorised blocking of persons undermining Ukraine's sovereignty.
Registers: companies, individuals, vessels
Search by name in any spelling, then filter by who imposed the sanctions, by type and by reason. Open a line for aliases, programmes and the stated reason. Reasons are grouped into indicative categories from the wording of the listings.
Registers compiled from the official lists by OpenSanctions (opensanctions.org, licence CC BY-NC 4.0); each listing names the list it comes from. Updated . A name on a list is not a finding of guilt; check the official list before relying on an entry.
From strike to sanction
The weapons that hit the places in our case files, and whether their makers are on each list. The marks are read from the registers each time the page opens. A missing mark is a gap — or a listing under a different spelling: open the listings to check.
- Special Economic Zone Alabuga (Tatarstan) and its operating companies
- Izhevsk Electromechanical Plant Kupol
- MKB Raduga (Dubna)
- Smolensk Aviation Plant
- Votkinsk Plant
- Tactical Missiles Corporation (KTRV)
- MKB Raduga
- Tactical Missiles Corporation (KTRV)
- NPO Bazalt
- Tactical Missiles Corporation (KTRV)
Gaps between the lists
Each jurisdiction lists different people and companies. These counts show where one list goes further than another — the practical starting point for a request to align.
| Jurisdiction | Individuals | Companies and organisations | Vessels | All | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| US United States | 2,389 | 5,160 | 514 | 8,157 | |
| EU European Union | 3,691 | 2,729 | 679 | 7,134 | |
| UK United Kingdom | 2,432 | 1,167 | 645 | 4,244 | |
| UA Ukraine | 12,717 | 8,454 | 0 | 21,171 | |
| CA Canada | 2,559 | 1,005 | 731 | 4,295 | |
| CH Switzerland | 2,330 | 1,754 | 630 | 4,714 | |
| JP Japan | 1,152 | 919 | 0 | 2,071 | |
| AU Australia | 1,548 | 544 | 298 | 2,390 | |
| NZ New Zealand | 1,383 | 519 | 0 | 1,902 |
Lifted and eased
Delistings, court annulments, licences and waivers that reduced the pressure, newest first. Each is a documented decision; the reason given by the authority is quoted where it was published. Removals found in the daily comparison of the lists appear at the end.
Executive Order 'Implementing the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026' waives, before they took effect, the Act's duties (incl. the increased rates on Russian goods and on the main importers of Russian oil and gas and sanctions-evasion facilitators) and the secondary sanctions under sections 102(a), (d) and (e), 103–111 and 117, on a national-interest certification to Congress. Waivers stay until the President or the Secretary of State decides otherwise; sanctions under the existing Russia national-emergency orders are not affected.
GL 135 authorises sale, delivery, offloading and importation (incl. into US) of Russian-origin diesel until 7 Apr 2027 (excl. debits to CBR/NWF/MinFin accounts). Issued same day as President's post announcing deal with Russia to 'release 300,000 tons of diesel'; backdrop of rising diesel prices.
Existing licences extended (targeted, time-limited) so Japan and South Korea can maintain energy security while reducing reliance on Russian energy.
GL 131J authorises contingent contracts for sale of Lukoil International GmbH (forced divestment of foreign assets); related GLs 128D (Lukoil retail stations abroad) and 130B (Lukoil entities in Bulgaria) amended 15 Oct 2026.
Removed automatic capture of relatives and associates of designated persons; removed export prohibitions on certain medical equipment (effective 3 Sep 2026).
21st package removed an Azerbaijan bank from transaction-ban list; extended Sakhalin-2 oil exemption to 31 Mar 2028; temporary exemption for certain pre-2022 long-term LNG contracts to 25 Jul 2027; price-cap auto-adjustment frozen at USD 44.10.
Decree 587/2026 removed one position from the 2 May 2026 sanctions annex (Decree 358/2026); identity not stated on page.
OFAC Russia-related removals of 7 individuals, Turkish entities and 2 vessels; no reasons stated.
Removed a goods item from Russia regs Schedule 7 to avoid adversely affecting the global food supply; review subsections 8(3)-(4) repealed.
OFAC recent actions list 'Russia-related Designation Removal' on 8 May 2026; details not retrieved.
OFAC removed Zadornov from SDN list.
OFAC Russia-related removals; no reason stated.
At March 2026 renewal of individual listings (to 15 Sep 2026) 7 names removed: 5 deceased, 2 unidentified. Slovakia/Hungary had sought removal of 7 incl. Usmanov and Fridman - not granted per AFP source.
GL 134 authorised sale, delivery, offloading of Russian oil loaded as of 12 Mar 2026, until 11 Apr 2026; renewed ~17-18 Apr 2026 for a month; expired 16 May 2026 without renewal. Context: global supply disruption linked to Iran conflict.
OFAC removed entity from SDN list (EO 14024).
GL 132 authorises transactions related to Paks II project.
GL 124B authorises transactions related to these Kazakh projects despite Rosneft/Lukoil blocking (energy security of Kazakhstan/partners).
UK revoked her designation under Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019; no reason stated (OFSI ID 15880, RUS1822).
Removed at Sep 2025 renewal after General Court ruling in his favour (25 Jun 2025); other removals described as technical. Hungary/Slovakia had sought six removals.
Removed from Russia Sanctions Regulations Schedule 2; designation notice for Abramov relatives revoked.
OFAC removed her from SDN list without explanation; reportedly a US citizen since at least 2013; Boris Rotenberg remains sanctioned.
Removed via Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/527 at March 2025 renewal; understood to follow Hungarian pressure (Rashevsky after court annulment). No public reasons for others.
Removed at September 2024 six-month renewal as compromise after Hungary demanded removals; both had won EU court cases.
General Court (T-309/22, T-739/22) annulled listing acts of 2022–2023; Council had not shown listing was justified. Delisted March 2025.
General Court (T-301/22, T-304/22) annulled their listings for 28 Feb 2022–15 Mar 2023: grounds insufficiently substantiated; proximity to Putin not enough. Both remained listed under subsequent acts.
At March 2024 renewal EU removed 12 names: 9 deceased; Volozh (Yandex co-founder, had condemned the war), Mndoiants (AFK Sistema), Hambalek (Night Wolves Europe). No public reasons for living persons.
General Court (T-212/22) annulled her listing (Feb–Jun 2022 acts): Council failed to prove she was associated with her son's activities after she ceased owning Concord. She remained listed under later acts until delisted Sep 2024.
State Department found sanctionable conduct under PEESA but waived sanctions on Nord Stream 2 AG, its CEO and corporate officers as in the US national interest (relations with Germany).
OFAC removed the three companies after restructuring reduced Oleg Deripaska's ownership/control below 50%; Deripaska himself remained designated (designated 2018-04-06).
The ask
Close the gaps. Align national and EU lists with the designations already made by partners — above all the makers of the missiles and drones used against Ukrainian cities and their third-country suppliers.
Do not ease without change on the ground. Every delisting and licence is read in Moscow as a reward; tie any relief to the end of strikes on civilians and the return of deported children.
Enforce. Shadow-fleet vessels, re-export hubs and front companies change names faster than lists change; share the data and act on it.
The cost of the war for Russia
What the war costs Russia: soldiers, equipment, military assets, violence brought home and the economy. Every figure is given as its source states it, with the date. Three kinds of source are kept apart: statements of Ukraine as a party to the conflict, government estimates of other states, and independent counts that verify each loss by name or by photograph — the last are a floor, not a total. Military losses are not war crimes; they are recorded here because they show what Russia is prepared to pay, and why pressure works.
B Statement of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, a party to the conflict, published every morning; not independently verified. Personnel = killed, wounded, missing and captured, approximate. Bulletin ↗
C Independent floors: Oryx lists only losses documented by a photo or video; Mediazona and BBC News Russian count only deaths confirmed by name. They are minimums, not totals, and are never added to the General Staff figure. Grey bars: share of the General Staff figure confirmed by photo.
Latest: · Ryazan
Latest: · St Petersburg
Latest: · near Prosvet
Latest: · Surgut district
Latest: · Rostov-on-Don
Latest: · Lenina
Latest: · Hrintal and Ternove
Latest: · Sukhodilsk
Latest: · Donetsk
Latest: · Novorossiysk
Latest: · Trubchevsk
Latest: · Olenivka
Latest: · Leningrad oblast
C B Each entry is one site on one date, kept with who claimed the result and what confirms it. These are entries in this record, not a count of every strike. C = independently confirmed (satellite imagery, statements of Russian officials or companies, allied intelligence, verified media); B = claim of Ukrainian authorities only.
Recorded because these facilities fuel Russia's war and its export revenue. The record states what was reported and by whom; it does not assess the lawfulness of individual strikes.
The record was started in October 2026 and is filled backwards from sources; recent months are fuller than earlier ones, so it does not show a trend.
Latest additions
Military assets and facilities added most recently, newest first. The section is updated with every site update; the figures of the General Staff of Ukraine — every morning.
People
Ukraine's figure counts all personnel losses (killed, wounded, missing, captured) and is a statement of a party to the conflict. The name-by-name count includes only deaths confirmed in open sources such as obituaries and is a minimum. Estimates of other governments sit in between.
Personnel losses Jan-Sep 2026 (sum of monthly figures): 326,900; Personnel losses in 2022 (24 Feb-31 Dec): 106,720; Personnel losses in 2023: 253,290; Personnel losses in 2024 (record year): 430,790; Personnel losses in 2025 (MoD: 'over 418,000', ~1,145/day): 418,170 · B
| Figure | What it counts | Date | Source | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| C | 258,989 | Named confirmed deaths (exact), previous update | Mediazona/BBC Russian via Kyiv Independent (pub. 28 Sep 2026) kyivindependent.com ↗ | |
| C | 276,000 | Russian military deaths confirmed by name (Mediazona + BBC News Russian + volunteers) | Mediazona en.zona.media ↗ | |
| C | 352,000 | Estimated Russian military deaths (men 18-59) from Feb 2022 to end-2025, probate/inheritance-registry method | Mediazona + Meduza en.zona.media ↗ | |
| B | 150,000 | Russian killed (of 500,000 total losses) - French estimate | French Foreign Minister Stephane Sejourne (Novaya Gazeta Europe interview) via Malay Mail/AFP malaymail.com ↗ | |
| B | 100 | Russian casualties (killed+wounded) per km2 captured; 1,000-1,500 casualties/day (Jan 2025) | Estonian Defence Forces Intelligence Centre (Janek Kesselmann) via Europeiska Pravda eurointegration.com.ua ↗ | |
| C | 950,000 | Russian casualties (killed+wounded) incl. up to 250,000 killed - CSIS 'Russia's Battlefield Woes in Ukraine' | CSIS via Kyiv Independent kyivindependent.com ↗ | |
| B | 415,000 | Russian casualties (killed+wounded) in 2025; cumulative ~1,213,000 since Feb 2022; 2024 ~430,000 | UK Ministry of Defence (Defence Intelligence) via Euromaidan Press euromaidanpress.com ↗ | |
| C | 1,200,000 | Russian casualties (killed, wounded, missing) Feb 2022-Dec 2025, incl. up to 325,000 killed (Jones: range 275,000-325,000) | CSIS (US think tank, not government) via AP/WTOP and RFE/RL rferl.org ↗ | |
| B | 500,000 | Russian troops killed (estimate), UK; total killed+wounded+missing ~1.5 million | UK Chief of the Defence Staff Sir Rich Knighton (prepared statement) via Kyiv Independent kyivindependent.com ↗ |
Recruitment: prisoners, foreigners, mobilisation
- 50,000 — Prisoners recruited by Wagner (~50,000); ~20,000 Wagner killed at Bakhmut, half of them convicts B Yevgeny Prigozhin via Novaya Gazeta Europe, novayagazeta.eu ↗
- 300,000 — Reservists mobilised in 'partial mobilisation' (82,000 deployed, 218,000 in training at that time) B Russian Defence Minister Shoigu to Putin, via Meduza, meduza.io ↗
- 450,000 — Contracts signed with Russian Armed Forces in 2025 (~450,000); 127,000 (+10,000 volunteer formations) in 2026 as of ~29 Apr 2026 B Dmitry Medvedev via TASS, tass.com ↗
- 2,000 — North Korean troops killed in Russia's war (est.); earlier NIS (30 Apr 2025): ~600 killed, ~4,700 casualties of ~15,000 deployed B South Korea NIS via lawmaker Lee Seong-kweun, The Defense Post, thedefensepost.com ↗
- 28,000 — Foreign nationals recruited into Russian army (>28,000, from 40+ countries); incl. >=2,982 Africans from 37 countries, ~486 Africans killed (Ukrainian MFA) B HUR chief Oleh Ivashchenko (The Times interview) and Ukrainian MFA via United24 Media, united24media.com ↗
Equipment
Two counts side by side. The General Staff of Ukraine reports cumulative claims every morning. Oryx lists only losses documented by a photograph or video, with each image linked; its total is therefore lower and is a floor.
| General Staff of Ukraine · B | Total | Last day |
|---|---|---|
| Tanks | 12,416 | |
| Armoured fighting vehicles | 25,565 | +4 |
| Artillery systems | 51,317 | +24 |
| MLRS | 2,224 | |
| Air defence assets | 1,714 | +3 |
| Aircraft | 449 | |
| Helicopters | 356 | |
| UAVs (operational-tactical) | 569,994 | +1,636 |
| Cruise missiles | 5,134 | |
| Warships and boats | 35 | |
| Submarines | 2 | |
| Vehicles and fuel tanks | 164,578 | +332 |
| Special equipment | 4,838 | +3 |
| Unmanned ground vehicles | 2,974 | +6 |
| Oryx, visually confirmed C | Total | Destroyed | Damaged | Abandoned | Captured |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tanks | 4,453 | 3,358 | 165 | 392 | 538 |
| Armoured Fighting Vehicles | 2,430 | 1,989 | 38 | 124 | 279 |
| Infantry Fighting Vehicles | 6,492 | 5,222 | 158 | 478 | 634 |
| Armoured Personnel Carriers | 754 | 595 | 18 | 44 | 97 |
| Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicles | 64 | 48 | 4 | 1 | 11 |
| Infantry Mobility Vehicles | 438 | 357 | 18 | 12 | 51 |
| Command Posts And Communications Stations | 323 | 227 | 5 | 4 | 87 |
| Engineering Vehicles And Equipment | 737 | 464 | 51 | 62 | 160 |
| Self-Propelled Anti-Tank Missile Systems | 47 | 22 | 1 | 4 | 20 |
| Artillery and Missile Support Vehicles And Equipment | 181 | 117 | 3 | 1 | 60 |
| Towed Artillery | 613 | 401 | 108 | 5 | 99 |
| Self-Propelled Artillery | 1,060 | 891 | 54 | 7 | 108 |
| Rocket and Missile Artillery | 640 | 536 | 48 | 2 | 54 |
| Anti-Aircraft Guns | 71 | 51 | 1 | 0 | 19 |
| Self-Propelled Anti-Aircraft Guns | 30 | 18 | 3 | 2 | 7 |
| Surface-To-Air Missile Systems | 445 | 341 | 76 | 4 | 24 |
| Radars | 142 | 88 | 44 | 0 | 10 |
| Jammers And Deception Systems | 107 | 82 | 15 | 0 | 10 |
| Aircraft | 200 | 169 | 31 | 0 | 0 |
| Helicopters | 185 | 145 | 38 | 0 | 2 |
| Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles | 25 | 21 | 1 | 0 | 3 |
| Naval Ships and Submarines | 40 | 27 | 13 | 0 | 0 |
| Trucks and similar vehicles | 4,715 | 3,984 | 111 | 52 | 568 |
| All | 24,192 | 19,155 | 1,002 | 1,194 | 2,841 |
Oryx ↗ · accessed
Military assets destroyed or damaged
Warships, aircraft, air defence, headquarters, arsenals and military production — military objectives only. Each entry says who claimed the result and what independent evidence exists: C independently confirmed (satellite imagery, Russian admission, allied intelligence, verified media), B claim only.
Outcome. General Staff: a radar station hit (18 Oct and the night of 19 Oct).
Claimed by. General Staff of the AFU
Independent confirmation. None independent yet
Outcome. General Staff: Russian army ammunition depots hit (18 Oct and the night of 19 Oct).
Claimed by. General Staff of the AFU
Independent confirmation. None independent yet
Outcome. General Staff: a storage, preparation and launch site of Russian attack drones hit (17 Oct and the night of 18 Oct); said to reduce Russia's capacity to strike Ukraine and its civilian infrastructure.
Claimed by. General Staff of the AFU
Independent confirmation. None independent yet
Outcome. General Staff: repair base for motor vehicles and armoured combat vehicles hit (17 Oct and the night of 18 Oct); said to complicate the repair of damaged equipment.
Claimed by. General Staff of the AFU
Independent confirmation. None independent yet
Outcome. General Staff: damage to the bridge recorded after strikes on 16 Oct and the night of 17 Oct; expected to complicate Russian rail logistics.
Claimed by. General Staff of the AFU
Independent confirmation. None independent yet
Outcome. General Staff: strikes on supply depots recorded on 16 Oct and the night of 17 Oct (outcome not specified); a drone control point near Malynivka also hit.
Claimed by. General Staff of the AFU
Independent confirmation. None independent yet
Outcome. General Staff: building used to produce and store drones for the Russian army struck on 16 Oct (outcome not specified).
Claimed by. General Staff of the AFU
Independent confirmation. None independent yet
Outcome. Two telecommunications towers with antenna equipment struck on 15 Oct or the night of 16 Oct (outcome not specified).
Claimed by. General Staff of the AFU
Independent confirmation. None independent yet
Outcome. General Staff: 55Zh6U Nebo-U long-range radar hit on the night of 16 Oct; fire in the area of the site. General Staff estimate of its value: about USD 100 million.
Claimed by. General Staff of the AFU
Independent confirmation. None independent yet
Outcome. Struck (outcome not specified).
Claimed by. General Staff of the AFU
Independent confirmation. None independent yet
Outcome. Ukrainian Navy: six Su-34M bombers destroyed by Neptune missiles, with fire, secondary explosions and damage to flight-support equipment (night of 14-15 Oct). Zelensky: four Su-34 destroyed and two more hit.
Claimed by. Ukrainian Navy; President Zelensky (X)
Independent confirmation. Satellite imagery published by Ukrainian monitoring channels (AviVector) reportedly shows four Su-34s burned out and two damaged (ISW cites imagery showing damage to four). Moscow Times: toll 'could not be independently verified'. Russia has not acknowledged damage (Voronezh governor Gusev: 33 drones and 'several jet-powered aerial targets' intercepted; debris damaged outbuildings and a car in Voronezh).
Outcome. Struck (outcome not specified).
Claimed by. President Zelensky
Independent confirmation. None independent yet
Outcome. General Staff: material and technical supply depot of a missile brigade unit struck on 12 Oct (outcome not specified).
Claimed by. General Staff of the AFU
Independent confirmation. None independent yet
Outcome. Struck (outcome not specified).
Claimed by. General Staff of the AFU
Independent confirmation. None independent yet
Outcome. Struck (outcome not specified).
Claimed by. General Staff of the AFU
Independent confirmation. None independent yet
Outcome. Struck (outcome not specified).
Claimed by. General Staff of the AFU
Independent confirmation. None independent yet
Outcome. destroyed (per General Staff)
Claimed by. General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (Telegram, 9 Oct 2026)
Independent confirmation. None independent; General Staff claim relayed by Censor.NET
Outcome. damage being assessed (per General Staff); fire in aircraft parking area recorded
Claimed by. General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
Independent confirmation. NASA FIRMS thermal anomaly in aircraft parking area (per Militarnyi); no post-strike imagery of aircraft
Outcome. destroyed (per General Staff)
Claimed by. General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
Independent confirmation. None independent
Outcome. fire detected near plant; extent unknown
Claimed by. Not claimed by Ukraine; reported by residents via Exilenova+
Independent confirmation. NASA FIRMS fire near the plant; Rostov governor Yuri Slyusar confirmed an attack on Azov and mentioned damage to 'industrial facilities' (plant not named)
Outcome. destroyed (per OSINT)
Claimed by. Not officially detailed; attributed to Ukrainian strike
Independent confirmation. OSINT project CyberBoroshno; unspecified satellite imagery and scene photos showing significant damage
Outcome. damaged (claimed hit)
Claimed by. General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
Independent confirmation. None independent at time of reporting
Outcome. destroyed/hit; 20 Russian officers killed (named)
Claimed by. No formal Ukrainian claim reported; occupation head Pushilin said Storm Shadow missiles used
Independent confirmation. Mediazona (with BBC Russian Service) identified all 20 officers by name and rank - largest known officer loss in a single strike
Outcome. damaged (significantly, per OSINT)
Claimed by. Part of Ukrainian long-range attack; no specific official claim cited
Independent confirmation. Exilenova+ satellite image showing fire site near aircraft; thermal signature detected
Outcome. damaged (varying degrees, preliminary)
Claimed by. General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (joint Defence Forces operation)
Independent confirmation. None independent at time of reporting
Outcome. damaged (set on fire)
Claimed by. HUR (Defence Intelligence) Unmanned Systems Department
Independent confirmation. HUR video only
Outcome. damaged (extent being assessed)
Claimed by. General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
Independent confirmation. None independent
Outcome. damaged (fire >400 sq m)
Claimed by. General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
Independent confirmation. None independent
Outcome. damaged (fire on board, preliminary)
Claimed by. General Staff; Unmanned Systems Forces (cmdr. Robert 'Madyar' Brovdi) video
Independent confirmation. Satellite imagery reportedly showing a smoking warship; no Russian MoD statement
Outcome. hit; damage being assessed
Claimed by. General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
Independent confirmation. None independent
Outcome. damaged
Claimed by. General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
Independent confirmation. None independent
Outcome. damaged ('significant damage to production facilities' per UA)
Claimed by. General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (Storm Shadow)
Independent confirmation. Bryansk governor confirmed an attack with 6 killed, 37 injured, but did not mention the plant; OSINT (CyberBoroshno) counted 7 missile impacts; no satellite imagery
Outcome. damaged (probable)
Claimed by. General Staff; SBU and Defence Forces
Independent confirmation. Satellite analysis by CyberBoroshno and Exilenova+ reports 'probable damage'; Russian authorities reported 3 sailors killed, 14-16 wounded
Outcome. damaged (claimed roof breach of workshop No.19)
Claimed by. Attributed to Ukraine (FP-5 Flamingo cruise missiles) per OSINT; later Ukrainian confirmation reported
Independent confirmation. CyberBoroshno estimated 30x24 m hole in workshop roof; no satellite imagery; effect unclear
Outcome. damaged (claimed)
Claimed by. HUR special unit 'Prymary' (Ghosts)
Independent confirmation. None independent
Outcome. damaged - at least 3 storage buildings destroyed
Claimed by. SBU drones
Independent confirmation. Planet 0.5 m satellite image of 26 Jan 2026 analysed by Radio Liberty (Mark Krutov); governor acknowledged damage to 'several facilities'
Outcome. hit; at least one Su-27 destroyed per SBU
Claimed by. SBU
Independent confirmation. SBU drone video only
Outcome. damaged (claimed 'critically'); Russia denies damage
Claimed by. SBU ('Sub Sea Baby' underwater drone) with Navy
Independent confirmation. Russian Black Sea Fleet denied damage; no independent imagery confirmed
Outcome. destroyed (2 Il-76-type aircraft)
Claimed by. General Staff; Unmanned Systems Forces (cruise missiles + drones)
Independent confirmation. Satellite imagery showing destruction of two Il-76-type aircraft; type ID via historical imagery
Outcome. hit; explosions and large fire
Claimed by. General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
Independent confirmation. None independent
Outcome. An-26 destroyed; Be-12 damaged
Claimed by. HUR (Defence Intelligence)
Independent confirmation. Satellite images of 25 Sep 2025 analysed by AviVector: one An-26 completely destroyed, one Be-12 damaged; others removed or undamaged
Outcome. damaged
Claimed by. HUR (attributed; FPV/long-range drones)
Independent confirmation. Defense Express report; no independent confirmation
Outcome. 5 hit, 1 destroyed (claimed)
Claimed by. SBU
Independent confirmation. None independent cited
Outcome. damaged (fire marks)
Claimed by. SBU
Independent confirmation. Satellite imagery published by Radio Liberty showing fire damage
Outcome. glide-bomb warehouse destroyed; at least one aircraft damaged (claimed)
Claimed by. General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
Independent confirmation. NASA fire detection at the airfield only
Outcome. damaged; 3 killed, dozens injured per Russian officials
Claimed by. General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
Independent confirmation. Russian regional authorities confirmed the strike on a defence enterprise and casualties; independent media (Meduza, Novaya Gazeta Europe)
Outcome. damaged (pier supports, claimed)
Claimed by. SBU (~1,100 kg TNT-equivalent underwater)
Independent confirmation. Bridge traffic suspended for hours; Russia did not confirm structural damage
Outcome. several Tu-95 and Tu-22M3 destroyed or damaged
Claimed by. SBU (FPV drones launched from trucks)
Independent confirmation. Capella SAR image analysed for Reuters: 2 Tu-22 remnants destroyed, 4 Tu-95 destroyed or severely damaged; Planet imagery (Radio Liberty 'Schemes'): 7 aircraft damaged
Outcome. at least 4 Tu-95MS and 1 An-12 destroyed
Claimed by. SBU
Independent confirmation. Satellite images (Arctic Today) show at least 4 Tu-95MS and 1 An-12 destroyed; Reuters verified drone video of burning Tu-95s
Outcome. attacked; no aircraft losses independently confirmed
Claimed by. SBU
Independent confirmation. Russian MoD listed Ivanovo among attacked regions; Reuters found no confirmed aircraft damage
Outcome. extensive damage; explosions and fire
Claimed by. No official Ukrainian claim; Russian MoD blamed 'safety violations'
Independent confirmation. SAR imagery (Brady Africk), NASA FIRMS; UK MoD published satellite images
Outcome. hit; officers killed incl. reportedly a North Korean general wounded
Claimed by. General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (Storm Shadow)
Independent confirmation. Financial Times reporting on casualties (cited by LIGA); no official Russian admission
Outcome. damaged warehouses (claimed ~400 drones stored)
Claimed by. Ukrainian Navy with SBU (per General Staff)
Independent confirmation. Planet Labs image of 11 Oct 2024 (Radio Liberty 'Schemes') shows damaged warehouses and fire traces
Outcome. attacked; satellite image indicates arsenal largely intact
Claimed by. General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
Independent confirmation. Satellite image shows site intact (Ukrainska Pravda)
Outcome. destroyed/badly damaged - scores of storage facilities
Claimed by. General Staff; SBU, HUR, SSO
Independent confirmation. Maxar before/after imagery (TWZ, 22 Sep 2024); scorch marks over much of ~2.6 km2 site
Outcome. damaged - most storage buildings extensively damaged
Claimed by. SBU (per General Staff)
Independent confirmation. Maxar imagery (TWZ)
Outcome. destroyed - vast majority of structures destroyed or seriously damaged
Claimed by. SBU, HUR, SSO
Independent confirmation. Maxar imagery 22 Sep 2024 (TWZ); 2.8-magnitude seismic event; Estonian intelligence estimate ~30,000 t destroyed
Outcome. at least 1 Su-34 destroyed, others damaged
Claimed by. Ukrainian forces (drone strike)
Independent confirmation. Satellite images (M.T. Anderson) of destroyed hangars/depot; CyberBoroshno analysis of scene photos
Outcome. hit; fire recorded; aircraft losses unconfirmed
Claimed by. Ukrainian forces (drones)
Independent confirmation. Satellite fire detection
Outcome. ammunition depot destroyed
Claimed by. General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
Independent confirmation. Satellite images showing destroyed depot
Outcome. sunk (claimed)
Claimed by. General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
Independent confirmation. UK Defence Intelligence assessed sinking raises risks to fleet; previously damaged 13 Sep 2023
Outcome. damaged
Claimed by. HUR (Defence Intelligence)
Independent confirmation. Before/after satellite images published by HUR itself; no independent verification
Outcome. damaged - both radar buildings
Claimed by. No official claim (attributed to HUR drones by sources)
Independent confirmation. Satellite images (RFE/RL) show serious damage to both Voronezh-DM radar buildings
Outcome. sunk/destroyed
Claimed by. Ukrainian Navy / General Staff
Independent confirmation. UK Defence Intelligence assessed successful strike removing Kalibr threat
Outcome. destroyed (satellite shows at least 3 aircraft destroyed)
Claimed by. Ukrainian Armed Forces (ATACMS)
Independent confirmation. Satellite images published 17 May 2024
Outcome. destroyed (crashed)
Claimed by. HUR / Air Force (S-200 missile, per Budanov)
Independent confirmation. Russian MoD acknowledged the crash (attributing it to technical fault)
Outcome. destroyed (S-400 elements)
Claimed by. Ukrainian Armed Forces (ATACMS)
Independent confirmation. Satellite images of aftermath
Outcome. 6 aircraft destroyed, 8 damaged (claimed by media/SBU sources)
Claimed by. SBU / Defence Forces (sources)
Independent confirmation. Russian MoD claimed drones shot down; independent loss figures not established
Outcome. damaged
Claimed by. Ukrainian Armed Forces (Strategic Communications) / Navy
Independent confirmation. Naval News reporting; no Russian admission
Outcome. sunk
Claimed by. HUR (Magura V5 sea drones)
Independent confirmation. UK Defence Secretary and UK Defence Intelligence acknowledged destruction
Outcome. destroyed (shot down)
Claimed by. Ukrainian Air Force and HUR
Independent confirmation. Aviation Safety Network record; Russia later indirectly acknowledged loss
Outcome. sunk
Claimed by. HUR (Magura V5 sea drones); confirmed by General Staff
Independent confirmation. Janes reporting; video of sinking
Outcome. sunk
Claimed by. HUR (six Magura V5 sea drones)
Independent confirmation. TWZ analysis of strike footage; no Russian admission
Outcome. A-50 destroyed; Il-22 damaged
Claimed by. Commander-in-Chief Zaluzhnyi / Ukrainian Air Force
Independent confirmation. UK Defence Intelligence subsequently reported Russia deploying replacement A-50 further from coast; Russian independent media
Outcome. destroyed
Claimed by. Ukrainian Air Force (cruise missiles)
Independent confirmation. Russian Defence Minister Shoigu reported the ship damaged/destroyed to Putin; Kremlin confirmed hit
Outcome. damaged (badly)
Claimed by. Ukrainian Air Force (cruise missiles)
Independent confirmation. Russian MoD admitted ship hit; satellite images; UK Defence Intelligence assessment
Outcome. 9 helicopters destroyed, 15 damaged (Oryx)
Claimed by. SSO / Ukrainian Armed Forces (ATACMS)
Independent confirmation. Oryx visual confirmation
Outcome. damaged (direct hit)
Claimed by. Ukrainian Armed Forces / SSO (Storm Shadow per media)
Independent confirmation. Russian MoD acknowledged missile attack on HQ; TWZ imagery analysis
Outcome. Minsk destroyed; Rostov-on-Don damaged
Claimed by. Ukrainian Air Force (Storm Shadow/SCALP)
Independent confirmation. Russian MoD admitted two ships damaged; Oryx assessed Minsk destroyed; satellite images
Outcome. destroyed (claimed)
Claimed by. HUR (Defence Intelligence)
Independent confirmation. None; a journalist geolocated site as former S-300 position - system type disputed
Outcome. destroyed
Claimed by. HUR sources
Independent confirmation. Russian MoD admitted aircraft damaged; later imagery showed destroyed Tu-22M3 (TWZ)
Outcome. damaged (listing, towed)
Claimed by. SBU and Ukrainian Navy (sea drone)
Independent confirmation. Footage of listing ship being towed; international media (Al Jazeera, gCaptain)
Outcome. damaged (road span collapsed/displaced)
Claimed by. SBU and Ukrainian Navy (sea drones)
Independent confirmation. Russian authorities acknowledged attack and damage
Outcome. damaged (2 Tu-95 reported damaged)
Claimed by. Ukraine (not formally claimed at the time)
Independent confirmation. Russian MoD acknowledged 'aircraft slightly damaged' and servicemen killed in Engels and Dyagilevo attacks
Outcome. damaged (road spans collapsed, rail fuel train fire)
Claimed by. SBU (acknowledged later)
Independent confirmation. Russian authorities acknowledged explosion and damage
Outcome. destroyed (at least 7-9 aircraft)
Claimed by. Ukrainian Armed Forces (acknowledged later)
Independent confirmation. Planet Labs satellite imagery (DFRLab analysis)
Outcome. sunk
Claimed by. Ukrainian Navy (two R-360 Neptune missiles)
Independent confirmation. Pentagon confirmed Neptune hits; Russian MoD admitted ship sank (citing fire)
Outcome. destroyed (sank in port)
Claimed by. Ukrainian Navy / Armed Forces (Tochka-U)
Independent confirmation. Russian Navy acknowledged loss a year later (2023)
Outcome. multiple helicopters destroyed
Claimed by. Ukrainian Armed Forces (repeated strikes, March 2022)
Independent confirmation. Maxar satellite images showing destroyed helicopters
Industrial and energy facilities reported damaged
Refineries, oil terminals, pumping stations and other facilities in Russia reported damaged or out of service, with the consequence for output and exports. The cause is quoted as the sources state it — including the accounts of Russian officials.
- ~20% (of ~6.6m bpd capacity) — Share of Russian refining capacity offline at peak of Aug-Oct 2025 strike wave (attacks + planned maintenance) Reuters calculations based on industry sources, bdnews24.com ↗
- 3.1m t (~17% of capacity, ~1.2m bpd); total idle 6.4m t record — Drone-related idle primary refining capacity, August 2025 Reuters calculations (via Hydrocarbon Processing), hydrocarbonprocessing.com ↗
- ~700,000 bpd; 16 refineries struck; >=35 primary units; damaged capacity peaked near 1m bpd in March and exceeded it in April 2026 — Refining capacity taken out of service by drone strikes Jan-May 2026 Reuters calculations (via Ukranews), ukranews.com ↗
- ~40% — Share of Russia's oil export capacity shut at some point in March 2026 (drone attacks on ports + Druzhba closure + tanker seizures) Reuters, finance.yahoo.com ↗
- ~900,000 bpd (124,580 t/day) = ~14% of total — Russian primary refining capacity idled by drone attacks, end of March 2024 Reuters calculations (via Hydrocarbon Processing), hydrocarbonprocessing.com ↗
Fire at one of the largest oil-product storage and export terminals on Russia's Baltic coast after an overnight drone attack on St Petersburg and Leningrad region. The same night, fires were reported at the Ruchyi oil depot and an Ozon warehouse, and a VK data centre and a 330 kV substation near Novosergievka (Vsevolozhsk district) were reported hit.
Consequence. Fires at the oil terminal, the Ruchyi oil depot and industrial warehouses in Kolpino district; 12 apartment buildings and 2 private houses damaged; 1 person killed and 5 injured in hospital (city governor); about 20,000 people without power in Leningrad region; flights restricted at the city's main airport. Leningrad region: 10 injured, including 5 children; 7 in hospital (regional health committee).
Cause as reported. St Petersburg governor Alexander Beglov, morning of 18 Oct: a massive drone attack; 'one person was killed, five were injured and are in hospital'; fires at the St Petersburg oil terminal, the Ruchyi oil depot and industrial warehouses in Kolpino district; 12 apartment buildings and 2 private houses damaged. Leningrad region governor Alexander Drozdenko: 145 drones shot down over the region; a drone attack caused an emergency power outage for about 20,000 people. Russian Ministry of Defence: 1,015 Ukrainian drones downed overnight. Ukrainian manufacturer Fire Point said an FP-1 drone hit the terminal. No Ukrainian General Staff claim found yet. Leningrad region health committee (via TASS, 18 Oct): the number of injured in the region 'rose to 10'; 7 in hospital, including 5 children and 2 women. Drozdenko: a woman and three children in Vsevolozhsk district were hospitalised with carbon-monoxide poisoning after a fire caused by falling drone debris.
Data centre of VK (VKontakte) attacked by drones during the overnight attack on St Petersburg and Leningrad oblast.
Consequence. VK: services available to users as normal; extent of damage not stated. Governor Drozdenko: debris fell on residential buildings and power lines.
Cause as reported. VK confirmed the attack in its own statement (Interfax, Izvestia).
Fire after a suspected Ukrainian drone attack on Russia's largest gas-condensate processing plant (design capacity 12 mt/yr), ~2,500 km from Ukraine; reportedly the first strike on energy infrastructure in Yugra.
Consequence. Large fire; damage being assessed; no casualties reported. Flight restrictions at Surgut and Kogalym airports.
Cause as reported. Governor Ruslan Kukharuk: fire at an 'industrial facility in the Surgut district', damage being assessed. Residents and Supernova+ identified the plant. Ukraine said it was resuming strikes on Russian energy infrastructure; no specific General Staff claim found yet.
Fire at the refinery after an overnight drone attack (first refinery strike after Ukraine's three-day pause under the US-announced 'energy ceasefire').
Consequence. Fire; material damage being assessed (governor). No casualties reported. Refinery accounts for ~5% of Russia's refining capacity and had suspended operations after attacks in May, July and September 2026. Reuters (16 Oct, two industry sources): primary unit AVT-6 shut down after the attack.
Cause as reported. Governor Pavel Malkov: a major Ukrainian drone attack sparked a fire at an oil refinery, material damage being assessed. Russian MoD: 166 drones intercepted overnight. Peskov: strike 'nothing new'. Zelensky (FT): 'The block [on attacking refineries] is out.' ISW: Ukrainian forces 'likely struck' the refinery.
Sberbank's large data centre under construction (first phase launched; ~55,000 sq m, 122.2bn roubles, planned site of Russia's largest supercomputer) attacked by drones overnight; NASA FIRMS fires in the industrial zone.
Consequence. Sberbank: systems and services operating normally, no staff injured; extent of damage not established. Governor Busargin: one woman killed and houses damaged in the city.
Cause as reported. Sberbank (First Deputy CEO Vedyakhin; press service via RBC): 'we confirm the attack'. Claimed by Ukrainian manufacturer Fire Point; presidential adviser Lytvyn: a data centre was struck.
Data centre (IT infrastructure) hit in a drone attack.
Consequence. Yandex: 'Operations at the data centre have been completely suspended'; several Yandex services unavailable; no injuries.
Cause as reported. Yandex: facility hit in a drone attack and shut down. No Ukrainian claim found for this site; Zelensky (8 Oct) said Ukraine responds 'in mirror-like fashion' to Russian strikes on Ukrainian data centres.
Drones hit the oil-loading terminal of the Novoshakhtinsk Petroleum Products Plant (design capacity ~2.5 mt/yr); large fire. Railway bridge in the city also damaged.
Consequence. Fire burned for at least four days; by 14 Oct it had engulfed 8 of 12 storage tanks (Astra), with another tank exploding late on 13 Oct. Train traffic over a damaged railway bridge halted in both directions (governor). No casualties reported.
Cause as reported. Governor Yury Slyusar: confirmed UAV attack, fire in the city and damage to a railway bridge. Astra: drones struck the terminal. No official Ukrainian claim found.
Repeat strike overnight on 10 Oct on Russia's largest oil storage/blending hub (Urals blend) - third attack on the station in October.
Consequence. Damage being clarified (General Staff). Earlier strike on 7 Oct destroyed four RVS-50000 tanks per General Staff.
Cause as reported. General Staff of the AFU (Telegram): struck the Samara LPDS again; extent of damage being clarified. No Russian official statement found.
Data centre (IT infrastructure) hit by drones overnight.
Consequence. Yandex: 'Several modules of the data center were completely disabled'; service disruptions; no injuries at site.
Cause as reported. Yandex: drone attack disabled modules. Governor Shapsha: drones struck other parts of the oblast overnight, 9 injured, houses damaged; Russian authorities: 26 drones shot down over the region. Zelensky confirmed the Kaluga attack (per The Next Web).
Fire at the plant after overnight drone strike
Consequence. Fire extinguished; no employee injuries reported (governor)
Cause as reported. Tver governor Vitaly Korolev said a drone strike caused 'a fire' at a plant in Redkino; plant named by Ukrainian monitoring projects and Astra
Fire and thick black smoke plume at refinery shown in monitoring footage (Exilenova+); capacity ~4.2m t/yr
Consequence. Not reported
Cause as reported. Media (Dialog.UA via Charter97) report attack by Ukrainian defence forces; no official claim quoted
Fire and black smoke reported (Astra OSINT); capacity 22.23m t/yr (largest in Russia), ~2,500 km from border
Consequence. Not reported
Cause as reported. Fire Point said upgraded FP-1 drones hit facility; Governor Khotsenko acknowledged a drone reached city's northern industrial hub, did not confirm refinery damage
Suspected fire
Consequence. Not reported
Cause as reported. Ukrainian General Staff later confirmed strike
Data centre (IT infrastructure) hit in a drone attack; large fire.
Consequence. Yandex: operations completely halted; Reuters: Yandex said it was unclear whether the centre could be restored. Airbus imagery of 12 Oct: about a third of the roof of the western part burned out, holes in the roof, debris.
Cause as reported. Yandex: drone attack. Zelensky (8 Oct): Ukraine responds 'in mirror-like fashion' to Russian strikes on Ukrainian data centres.
Large fire near refinery after massive drone attack; capacity ~14m t/yr (~5% of Russian refining)
Consequence. All crude processing halted (Reuters sources, 6 Oct 2026)
Cause as reported. Governor Bocharov: 'massive drone attack on industrial infrastructure' (facilities not specified); Reuters/Meduza: Ukrainian drones
Large fire on refinery grounds; capacity ~6.6m t/yr
Consequence. Not reported (no confirmed halt); Reuters cited by United24 as saying it was the 4th refinery to suspend operations in under a week, but the halt is not specifically confirmed for Ilsky
Cause as reported. Ukraine's General Staff claimed the strike (1st Separate SBS Centre, 414th 'Madyar's Birds' brigade). Krasnodar governor Veniamin Kondratyev said drones targeted Seversky district and fires broke out at two enterprises, attributing them to falling 'debris'; facilities not named
Fire at the plant after overnight drone attack; Russia's 7th-largest refinery (12.6m t processed in 2024)
Consequence. Refinery halted operations (Reuters, citing industry sources)
Cause as reported. Perm governor Dmitry Makhonin said Ukraine attacked an 'industrial site' in the region (not named); NASA FIRMS heat anomalies at Lukoil refinery (Bloomberg)
Overnight drone attack damaged refinery; capacity 5m t/yr (~100k bpd), mainly export
Consequence. Operations temporarily halted
Cause as reported. Rostov governor Slyusar: drone attack damaged refinery, ~50 drones destroyed overnight
Fire overnight 19-20 Sep; Mayor Sobyanin said a facility at the refinery was damaged, no casualties at the plant. Capacity ~11m t/yr
Consequence. Not reported
Cause as reported. Moscow Mayor Sobyanin reported massive drone attack (1,600+ UAVs downed); Zelensky confirmed strikes on an oil facility in Moscow region
Fire at a primary refining unit (General Staff); capacity ~15m t/yr
Consequence. Not reported
Cause as reported. Ukrainian General Staff claimed; Zelensky: joint SBU/USF/HUR/SZRU operation; Governor Evraev acknowledged damage and fires
Fire and damaged transformer substation
Consequence. Power disrupted in four districts of Rostov-on-Don
Cause as reported. Rostov governor Slyusar reported fire and damaged substation during drone attack
Drone attacks in September 2026
Consequence. Refinery halted (Tuesday ~15 Sep per Reuters sources)
Cause as reported. Reuters: Ukrainian drone attacks this month
Drone attacks in September 2026
Consequence. Operations suspended (Friday ~11 Sep per Reuters sources)
Cause as reported. Reuters: Ukrainian drone attacks this month
Refinery on fire after drone attack; debris at Afipsky railway station killed two, injured two. Processed 7.2m t (~144k bpd) in 2024, export-focused
Consequence. Operating status not reported
Cause as reported. Governor Kondratyev: refinery 'was on fire following a drone attack' (attacker not named)
Fire at production facilities; refinery capacity ~8.8m t/yr
Consequence. Damage under assessment; not independently confirmed
Cause as reported. Ukrainian General Staff claimed strike; Fire Point said FP-1 drones used
Fire and damage to technological units
Consequence. Refinery (Russia's 7th-largest by volume) stopped operations (two industry sources, Reuters)
Cause as reported. Ukrainian General Staff claimed strike causing fire
Attempted drone attack; no physical damage reported
Consequence. Crude loadings suspended and intake stopped as tanks filled; terminal handles ~700k bpd
Cause as reported. Reuters sources: drone attack
Drone fragments struck 'key infrastructure that cannot currently be restored' (governor)
Consequence. Complete shutdown; repairs up to six months (imported equipment, sanctions); region reliant on imported fuel, 80% of 287 filling stations operating
Cause as reported. Orenburg governor Solntsev: drones knocked out the refinery
Fire forced production suspension; refinery ~5% of Russian refining (13.1m t processed 2024)
Consequence. Oil processing halted (Reuters industry sources)
Cause as reported. Ukrainian forces confirmed strike; Governor Malkov: falling debris caused fires at unnamed industrial sites, six hospitalised
Strikes on two refineries; several people wounded in Nizhnekamsk. TANECO processed 17.0m t in 2024; TAIF-NK 6.6m t (~132k bpd)
Consequence. Degree of damage not immediately clear
Cause as reported. Ukrainian General Staff and Special Operations Forces claimed; Tatarstan officials confirmed strikes in region without naming targets
Strike; one killed, several wounded
Consequence. Not reported
Cause as reported. Ukraine claimed strike on refinery; Saratov governor described strike on 'civilian industrial sites'
Strike claimed; unverified social media footage
Consequence. Not reported
Cause as reported. Ukraine claimed; no Russian official mention
Drone attack on gas pumping station
Consequence. Gazprom: Blue Stream exports to Turkey not affected
Cause as reported. Gazprom said drones attacked the station
Strike on Russia's largest refinery, ~2,700 km from Ukrainian-held territory
Consequence. Not reported in source
Cause as reported. Reported by Reuters as hit by Kyiv
Fire at refinery; one killed, one injured in nearby village. Capacity ~100k bpd
Consequence. Not reported
Cause as reported. Zelensky said Ukraine hit two refineries; Krasnodar governor Kondratiev reported fire at refinery
Further attack (after 16, 20, 28 Apr and 2 May waves) damaged port infrastructure, oil storage and civilian buildings; at least one dead
Consequence. Refinery operations suspended indefinitely
Cause as reported. Ukrainian drone attack (per reports compiled on Wikipedia; Ukrainska Pravda)
Explosions overnight; ASTRA video analysis suggests fire at industrial site. Plant produces ammonia and ammonium nitrate
Consequence. Not verified
Cause as reported. Governor Vladimirov said air defences repelled drone attack near Nevinnomyssk, 'no casualties or damage on the ground'
Large fire after overnight attack
Consequence. Not reported
Cause as reported. Ukrainian drones (per Reuters-cited report)
Drone attack
Consequence. Had not resumed operations as of 15 May 2026 (Reuters)
Cause as reported. Drone attack (Reuters)
Drone attack put both primary units AVT-11 and AVT-9 out of commission; AVT-11 most damaged, repair >1 month; capacity 8.3m t/yr
Consequence. Refinery shut since 18 Apr 2026
Cause as reported. Drone attack (Reuters industry sources)
16 Apr strike set fuel storage and port infrastructure ablaze for three days; repeat waves 20 Apr (one killed), 28 Apr (evacuations, 160+ firefighters), 2 May (SBU claimed seaport and refinery). Oil slick in Black Sea; 'black rain'; 13,000+ m3 fuel oil and contaminated soil removed by late April
Consequence. Refinery halted after 16 Apr (Reuters, 21 Apr) as products could not be shipped; state of emergency declared; tanker traffic diverted to Novorossiysk
Cause as reported. Ukrainian drone attacks (Reuters); SBU claimed 2 May strike; Russian Emergencies Minister Kurenkov said burning oil spill contained (29 Apr)
Large-scale fire at Sheskharis (Ukrainian military); Russian MoD said CPC facilities attacked - damage to pipeline, transshipment berth and fires at four oil storage tanks; 10 injured, 25 buildings damaged in city
Consequence. Not quantified; Novorossiysk loaded 2.27m b/d crude in March
Cause as reported. Russian Defence Ministry said Novorossiysk transshipment complex and CPC attacked by drones; Ukrainian military said it hit Sheskharis
Large fire with thick smoke over city, night of 1-2 April 2026
Consequence. Not reported
Cause as reported. Bashkortostan head Khabirov: several drones downed approaching refineries, debris fell on industrial site
Fire at fuel reservoirs; burned for 2+ days. Over March attacks at least eight 50,000 m3 reservoirs damaged = at least 40% of storage (Vantor satellite imagery)
Consequence. Primorsk and Ust-Luga suspended loadings (industry sources); crude loading resumed 24 Mar
Cause as reported. Ukrainian General Staff claimed strike on Transneft terminal; Governor Drozdenko said fire caused by falling drone debris
Attacked 22, 25, 27, 29, 31 March per local authorities; eight 30,000 m3 product reservoirs damaged by fire (~quarter of storage); some berth facilities hit
Consequence. Loadings suspended during attacks
Cause as reported. Local authorities reported drone attacks
Fire at terminal reported overnight 1-2 March
Consequence. Not specified; Bloomberg reported loading resumed by 7-8 March weekend
Cause as reported. Local sources/Militarnyi: Ukrainian drones; Mayor Kravchenko confirmed an attack on the city
Energy infrastructure 'significantly damaged' (governor)
Consequence. No large-scale blackout per early reports
Cause as reported. Governor Gladkov: 'large-scale attack by Ukrainian forces'; Telegram (Pepel Belgorod) reported missile strike on TPP
Four oil storage tanks on fire (Russian authorities); berth pipelines damaged (SBU source); fire ~7,000 m2; preliminary losses ~$50m
Consequence. 3 dead, 8 injured (Interfax); fires out by 22 Jan
Cause as reported. Governor Kondratyev confirmed massive drone attack 21 Jan; Ukrainian General Staff said terminal hit 22 Jan, citing fuel supply to Russian forces; SBU source: Alpha unit
Fire ignited by drone fragments
Consequence. Local emergencies centre: 'nobody was hurt, there was no damage, and the fire is now out'
Cause as reported. Russian officials: Ukrainian drone attack
TPP on fire after drone attack (Exilenova+)
Consequence. Not reported
Cause as reported. Governor Klychkov reported explosions and air defence activity; damage reported by Exilenova+
Missile strike; 'significant damage' to civilian infrastructure
Consequence. Parts of Belgorod lost heat and electricity
Cause as reported. Governor Gladkov confirmed strike; Astrapress first reported missile strike
Naval drone attack significantly damaged Single-Point Mooring 2; CPC said it can no longer be operated
Consequence. Loading fully stopped; tankers withdrawn. CPC handles >1% of global oil supply, ~80% of Kazakh exports
Cause as reported. CPC: attack 'targeted the interests of all member countries'; Ukraine MFA said actions not aimed at Kazakhstan; Kazakhstan MFA protested 'third attack this year on an exclusively civilian installation'
Fire at oil depot of Sheskharis (extinguished); oil berths 1 and 1A hit; tanker Arlan hit, 3 crew injured; apartment buildings damaged
Consequence. Novorossiysk oil exports (~2.2m bpd, ~2% of global supply) suspended; Transneft halted supplies to port; loadings resumed after ~2 days; oil prices +2%
Cause as reported. Ukrainian General Staff said it used Neptune cruise missiles and strike drones; Krasnodar governor Kondratyev said Novorossiysk 'suffered the most'
Port infrastructure and oil terminal hit; tanker hit; vessels moved from berths
Consequence. Refinery (240k bpd) stopped the day after; fuel exports through Tuapse suspended (Reuters, industry sources + LSEG)
Cause as reported. Source to Ukrainska Pravda: SBU Alpha with defence forces; Russian authorities reported tanker fire after drone attack
AVT-4 caught fire (4m t/yr, ~80k bpd, ~quarter of plant capacity); adjacent reformer, VGO hydrotreater and cat cracker also shut
Consequence. Plant running at reduced volume
Cause as reported. Ukrainian General Staff confirmed strike (23 Oct); Reuters: drone-induced fire
Drone strike on gas plant (capacity 37.5 bcm/yr); first reported strike on the plant
Consequence. Intake of Kazakh gas (Karachaganak) suspended; Karachaganak output cut 25-30% (Reuters sources)
Cause as reported. Ukrainian officials confirmed; Zelensky cited increased range of 'long-range sanctions'; Kazakh Energy Ministry reported intake suspended after attack
Drone strike set large sections of facility ablaze; smoke visible 25 km away; second day of fire on 14 Oct
Consequence. ~830 people evacuated by occupation authorities (Krymskyi Veter)
Cause as reported. Media attribute to SBU and Special Operations Forces (no official claim cited in article)
Fire after drone attack halted CDU-6 (8m t/yr, 160k bpd, ~40% of plant capacity)
Consequence. Repair ~1 month; plant to run at ~70% capacity
Cause as reported. Drone attack (Reuters sources)
Strike on TPP; Telegram reported missile strike on Luch substation
Consequence. 'Quite significant disruptions' to electricity; outages in Belgorod, Stary Oskol, Shebekino; water supply problems
Cause as reported. Governor Gladkov: Ukrainian forces struck infrastructure
Fire engulfed condensate unit (3m t/yr) producing gasoline and diesel
Consequence. Motor fuel output halted; restart could take weeks or months; exchange sales from plant halted
Cause as reported. Governor Babushkin: industrial enterprise targeted by drones (not named)
Explosions and fire; ~1,500 km from Ukrainian border
Consequence. Damage being evaluated (official)
Cause as reported. Bashkortostan head Khabirov: 'Two fixed-wing drones hit the plant. There are no casualties.'
Fire from falling debris, extinguished
Consequence. Primary unit damaged per later Reuters reporting (returning to operation by early Oct)
Cause as reported. Ukraine's drone command claimed successful strike; Governor Drozdenko: three drones destroyed, debris fire extinguished, no injuries
Fire; Khabirov: production site slightly damaged. DIU-linked sources claimed vacuum distillation tower damaged (unconfirmed)
Consequence. Not reported
Cause as reported. Anonymous Ukrainian DIU sources (Ukrainska Pravda); Khabirov: downed drone fell on plant territory
Fire on a ship in port; tankers Kusto and Cai Yun damaged; pumping station attacked (damage unknown)
Consequence. Port reportedly suspended operations (Reuters)
Cause as reported. Governor Drozdenko: ship on fire due to drone attack; SBU credited
Fire at Novatek terminal (gas processing equipment believed struck); Reuters: drone attacks damaged pipeline infrastructure
Consequence. Plant offline, repairs possibly months; Ust-Luga oil terminal expected ~350k bpd in Sept 2025, about half usual (Reuters)
Cause as reported. Governor Drozdenko: ~10 drones attacked Ust-Luga port, fire localized, fuel tanks not damaged; Russian MoD: 13 drones destroyed over Ust-Luga; Ukrinform: SBU and SSO struck gas processing facility
Russian MoD said a nuclear power plant was slightly damaged during overnight drone attack
Consequence. Not specified in source
Cause as reported. Russian Defence Ministry: drone attack
Drone strike on pumping station; transformer station reportedly hit
Consequence. Crude flows via Druzhba to Hungary and Slovakia halted (Transpetrol, MOL confirmed stoppage)
Cause as reported. Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces commander Brovdi confirmed 14th Regiment drones attacked station; Hungarian FM Szijjarto blamed Ukrainian attack
Fire after strike; capacity 8.5m t/yr
Consequence. Production and crude intake suspended (two industry sources)
Cause as reported. Ukraine said it struck the refinery on 15 Aug
Huge fires
Consequence. Refinery shut down (two sources)
Cause as reported. Drone strike (Reuters factbox)
Damage and large-scale fire
Consequence. Supplies to Hungary and Slovakia interrupted
Cause as reported. Drone attack (Reuters factbox)
Explosion and fire
Consequence. Extent unclear
Cause as reported. Overnight drone attack (Reuters factbox)
Fire from fallen drone debris
Consequence. Extent unclear
Cause as reported. Russian local authorities: drone debris
Two oil tanks caught fire
Consequence. Fires extinguished per local authorities
Cause as reported. Drone attack; local authorities reported fire
Drone attack
Consequence. About half of refining capacity halted (three industry sources)
Cause as reported. Drone attack (Reuters)
Drone attack late July 2025
Consequence. Primary processing halted since 2 Aug (two industry sources)
Cause as reported. Drone attack (Reuters factbox)
Drone strike caused large fire; pipeline between product tanks damaged, reservoir explosion; reservoir collapsed 23-24 Mar; fire area up to 2,000 m2
Consequence. Station out of operation
Cause as reported. CPC press service blamed Ukrainian actions; media: Ukrainian drones
At least seven drones hit the largest pumping station on the CPC system
Consequence. CPC: station out of service; system operating at reduced flow rates
Cause as reported. CPC confirmed drone hits; Ukrainian security official said SBU responsible (also for Ilsky refinery strike same night)
Drone strike
Consequence. Plant operations / fuel output halted; damaged unit resumed end-Aug 2025
Cause as reported. Ukrainian drone attack (Euromaidan Press); industry sources
Drone hit primary unit CDU-7 (~155k bpd; plant >17m t/yr); fire extinguished in 20 minutes
Consequence. RIA: production not disrupted
Cause as reported. Drone attack (Reuters factbox; ~1,300 km from front)
Fire engulfed primary refining unit (CDU-5, 47% of plant)
Consequence. Plant halted all production (industry sources)
Cause as reported. Drone attack (Reuters factbox)
Burned for hours; one of two CDUs damaged (CDU-6, 70% of plant)
Consequence. Unit offline until ~end April 2024 (preliminary)
Cause as reported. Drone attack (Reuters factbox)
Plant set ablaze; two primary units (AVT-4, AVT-6) shut; AVT-6 halted
Consequence. Crude intake at ~60% of normal (169k bpd)
Cause as reported. Drone attack (Reuters factbox)
Fire; main CDU AVT-6 damaged (53% of plant capacity; plant ~15.8m t/yr)
Consequence. At least half of output halted (industry sources)
Cause as reported. Russian officials reported drone attack
CDU-5 (18% of plant) stopped after drone attack
Consequence. Unit offline 3-22 Feb 2024
Cause as reported. Drone attack (Reuters table)
Fire damaged one installation (night 24-25 Jan 2024)
Consequence. Extent not disclosed by Rosneft
Cause as reported. Ukrinform: SBU drones; Russian authorities did not state direct cause
Fire; two storage tanks and a pumping station damaged (Russian agencies)
Consequence. Novatek suspended processing; ~2 months to resume, ~$2m/day losses (industry sources per OSW)
Cause as reported. Novatek: 'external influence'; Interfax-Ukraine sources: Ukrainian security services operation; Reuters could not confirm drone cause
Unit SPGK (51% of plant) stopped
Consequence. Offline 29-31 Oct 2023
Cause as reported. Drone attack (Reuters table)
CDU-5 (28% of plant) stopped
Consequence. Offline 4-12 May 2023
Cause as reported. Drone attack (Reuters table)
CDU/VDU-1 (50% of plant) stopped after drone attack
Consequence. Offline 22 Jun - 28 Jul 2022
Cause as reported. Drone attack (Reuters table)
At home: violence by returning soldiers
Men sent to the war — among them convicts recruited from prisons and pardoned — come back to Russian towns. Independent Russian media count the killings and grave injuries they commit after return from court records; Russian law now lets defendants avoid trial by signing a military contract. Counts are minimums: courts publish less every year. No graphic detail; victims are not named.
| Figure | What it counts | Date | Source | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| C | 1,016+ victims: at least 551 killed, 465 seriously injured | People killed and seriously injured inside Russia by returning war participants (cumulative since Feb 2022) Media reports + Russian court databases; 900+ criminal cases (Arts. 105, 111, 264, 109, 230, 108, 114, 118 UK RF); only cases where war participation before the crime confirmed; 918 perpetrators (521 pardoned/paroled ex-convicts, 397 servicemen) | Verstka (with Die Welt) verstka.media ↗ | |
| C | 750+ victims: at least 378 killed, 376 seriously injured; 166 murders (196 victims), 112 fatal GBH | Victims of returnees (earlier Verstka snapshot) Media + court databases; sample 392 ex-convicts + 284 servicemen | Verstka verstka.media ↗ | |
| C | at least 242 killed, 227 seriously injured (~2.5 years) | Victims of returnees (earlier Verstka snapshot) Media + court records, 350+ criminal cases; 292 published sentences analysed | Verstka verstka.media ↗ | |
| C | 190+ criminal cases | Criminal cases against pardoned Wagner fighters after return Media + court records | Verstka (via Novaya Gazeta Europe) novayagazeta.eu ↗ | |
| C | at least 989 cases since 2023; convictions 38 (2022) -> 266 (2023) -> 346 (2024); 377 cases Jan–Sep 2025 | Murder (Art.105) and fatal GBH (Art.111 pt.4) cases in Russian military courts Analysis of military (garrison) court case files; servicemen only; includes crimes at front and in rear (not separated) | Mediazona (via The Moscow Times Russian service) ru.themoscowtimes.com ↗ | |
| C | 116 (almost 6x pre-war level) | Servicemen convicted of murder in 2023 Official Judicial Department annual data | Mediazona, based on Supreme Court Judicial Department statistics zona.media ↗ | |
| C | ~8,000 verdicts since 2022 (~350 in 2022, ~2,500 in 2023, 4,700+ in 2024, ~1,100 found for 2025 so far); 900+ prosecuted for murder/assault; 423 deaths; 1,385 ex-Wagner; 656 pardoned prisoners | Verdicts mentioning defendant's participation in the 'SVO' Analysis of published verdicts of civilian (~7,000) and military (~1,000) courts | Novaya Gazeta Europe ('Дом, в который пришла война') novayagazeta.eu ↗ | |
| C | at least 294 deaths (110 murder convictions/124 victims; 108 fatal GBH; 46 road crashes/54 deaths) | Deaths caused by returning veterans Court verdicts | 7x7 (via Novaya Gazeta Europe) novayagazeta.eu ↗ | |
| C | at least 263 people, incl. 13 charged with murder and 11 with fatal GBH, at least 1 rape | Defendants given suspended sentences / released from colonies because they signed military contracts Court records review | Verstka verstka.media ↗ | |
| C | max ~137,000–140,000 returned to civilian life | Official count of returned servicemen Official statement | Jun 2025 | Russian officials (cited by Verstka / NGE via RIA) verstka.media ↗ |
| C | 0.4% (vs up to 40% general recidivism) | Putin's claimed recidivism among pardoned SVO participants Official statement, no methodology | V. Putin, meeting with war correspondents (Interfax via Meduza) meduza.io ↗ | |
| C | 'Atoning with blood' on the battlefield | Kremlin position on pardoned convicts Official statement | D. Peskov (RFE/RL) rferl.org ↗ | |
| C | Head of Presidential Human Rights Council V. Fadeev proposed police supervision of returning ex-convicts convicted of violent crimes, while doubting rising-crime reports | Official proposal on returnee supervision Official statement | Novaya Gazeta Europe citing Daily Storm interview novayagazeta.eu ↗ | |
| C | Supreme Court Judicial Department classified 2025 data on crimes committed by servicemen (and political articles) | Official statistics availability Observation of the Judicial Department's published 2025 statistics | The Moscow Times (Russian service), first noticed by Verstka ru.themoscowtimes.com ↗ | |
| B | up to 180,000 (as of Nov 2024) | Convicts recruited to fight (context) Intelligence estimate | Ukrainian Foreign Intelligence Service (via Ukrainska Pravda) pravda.com.ua ↗ |
The legal mechanism
- 2022–2023 (secret decrees) — Presidential pardon decrees for convicts recruited by Wagner PMC (later MoD 'Storm-Z'): Putin confirmed on 13 Jun 2023 he signs pardon decrees for convicts who fought; decrees not published. Peskov (10 Nov 2023) described this as convicts 'atoning with blood'. meduza.io ↗
- 2023-06-24 — Federal Law No. 270-FZ 'On peculiarities of criminal liability of persons involved in the SVO' and No. 269-FZ: Release from criminal liability/punishment for minor and medium-gravity crimes after contract service during mobilisation/martial law/wartime; 269-FZ allowed contracts with persons with criminal records and suspects whose investigations were suspended (with exclusions: terrorism, treason, sexual crimes vs minors, etc.). rapsinews.ru ↗
- 2024-03-23 — Federal Law No. 64-FZ (amending Criminal Code & CPC: new Art. 78.1 UK RF) and No. 61-FZ (amending military service law Art. 34; repealing 270-FZ): Art. 78.1: a person who committed a crime and was called up or signed a contract (or committed a crime while serving) is released from criminal liability from the day of receiving a state award or of discharge (age, health, end of mobilisation/martial law). Investigation suspended at the unit's request. Exclusions: sexual crimes against minors, terrorism, treason, extremism etc. pravo.ppt.ru ↗
- 2024-10-02 — Federal Law No. 340-FZ (amending Art. 78.1 UK RF and CPC) and No. 341-FZ (amending Art. 34 military service law): Extends the mechanism to the trial stage: courts may suspend cases of defendants who sign contracts, cancel detention, and release from liability; also covers convicts whose sentence is not yet final (appeal stage). Bills 705033-8 and 708911-8 (Supreme Court initiative). ppt.ru ↗
- 2026-08-04 — Federal Law No. 300-FZ amending Art. 78.1 UK RF (with No. 308-FZ amending Art. 34 military service law): Clarifies which crimes are excluded from release under Art. 78.1, linked to expanding categories of persons with criminal records allowed to sign contracts. Details not verified. garant.ru ↗
Documented cases (38)
Beat a relative (great-uncle) to death; the victim was the father of a man the perpetrator had killed in 2018
Perpetrator. Pardoned convict (recruited by Wagner from prison 2023, pardoned Mar 2024); prior: 2018 group killing of two people (9.5 yrs), 2024 assault
Outcome. 8 yrs 9 mos strict regime (2026); court noted positive Wagner reference
Stabbed cohabiting woman during a drunken quarrel; she died (Art. 111 pt.4)
Perpetrator. Former MoD contract soldier with state award; record expunged after contract; previously convicted of murder
Outcome. 6 yrs strict regime (reported 18 May 2026; prosecution sought 8)
Strangled a woman and hid the body; theft
Perpetrator. Pardoned convict
Outcome. 8 yrs 1 mo strict regime
Murder of a drinking companion (multiple stab wounds)
Perpetrator. Pardoned convict (left colony to fight, pardoned May 2023); repeatedly convicted
Outcome. 18 yrs strict regime (Apr 2026) + 1m RUB compensation
Set cohabiting partner on fire; she died a week later
Perpetrator. Pardoned Wagner convict
Outcome. 16 yrs strict regime
Killed neighbour after dispute over loud music
Perpetrator. War veteran, age 20
Outcome. 9 yrs strict regime (reported 9 Mar 2026); said he wanted to return to the front
Attempted murder: stabbed acquaintance in the neck during argument about the war
Perpetrator. Veteran, reportedly recruited from prison; prior convictions incl. 2021 knife attack on a woman
Outcome. 6 yrs strict regime (Oymyakon court, 2025); 'For Courage' medal counted as mitigating
Two men beat a 22-year-old acquaintance; he died
Perpetrator. Two pardoned convicts (war participants); per victim's mother, prior convictions incl. murder
Outcome. Investigation ongoing as of Nov 2025; charged under Art. 111 pt.4; suspects sought to return to the front
Fatally stabbed a 55-year-old man at a bus stop after a verbal conflict
Perpetrator. Recidivist recruited from colony as 'Storm' assault soldier
Outcome. Detained; case handled by military investigators
Killed a drinking companion in a dispute
Perpetrator. Serviceman on sick leave from the war
Outcome. 9.5 yrs strict regime (Veliky Novgorod garrison court); war service, wound, awards mitigating
Stabbed his wife and killed her alleged lover
Perpetrator. Defendant who signed military contract
Outcome. 8 yrs 1 mo, converted to a suspended sentence at the request of a military commissariat
Group killing of a fellow veteran by drug overdose to seize his ~3m RUB injury payout
Perpetrator. War participants (organiser a reserve corporal)
Outcome. Organiser 19 yrs strict regime (jury, 1st Eastern District Military Court, 19 Aug 2026); one acquitted; two co-defendants returned to the front and their cases were suspended (spring 2026)
Suspect in killing of a woman and her 6-year-old son (confessed)
Perpetrator. Arrested suspect (pre-war crime, not a returnee)
Outcome. Per victim's relative, signed a contract and left for the front instead of trial
Knife-point robbery of a woman ~5 months after contract-based parole
Perpetrator. Paroled convict (prior rape and robbery) released on contract
Outcome. 7.5 yrs incl. unserved term; stripped of rank
Fatal stabbing of a relative after quarrel
Perpetrator. Wounded contract soldier
Outcome. Sentenced June 2025 (terms not published)
Fatal stabbing of a friend in a social-centre kitchen
Perpetrator. Pardoned convict (disabled)
Outcome. 5 yrs strict regime
Beat his mother, causing brain haemorrhage
Perpetrator. Ex-Wagner convict
Outcome. 2 yrs 9 mos general regime
Rape and murder of former partner and her 7-year-old daughter
Perpetrator. Contract soldier on wound leave; prior: 2023 sentence of 20 yrs for rape and murder of a woman, went to war instead, pardoned after being wounded
Outcome. Life imprisonment (25 May 2026)
Two crashes after falling asleep at the wheel; three killed incl. a 16-year-old
Perpetrator. Serviceman absent without leave
Outcome. 7.5 yrs general regime
Abduction, rape and murder of an 8-year-old girl
Perpetrator. Contract soldier who left service and returned home
Outcome. Life imprisonment (Rostov Regional Court, 2025)
Knife attack on ex-wife and her mother in the street
Perpetrator. War veteran
Outcome. 14 yrs; said he planned to return to the front
Beat his father to death during drinking
Perpetrator. Ex-convict, Wagner; five prior convictions incl. similar offence
Outcome. 6.5 yrs strict regime
Double murder (drinking companion and a 64-year-old relative), arson to conceal
Perpetrator. Ex-Wagner convict; prior 2020 sentence of 11 yrs for murder
Outcome. 20 yrs (Supreme Court of Yakutia, 10 Oct 2024)
Fatal assault on neighbour after drinking
Perpetrator. Contract soldier awaiting discharge
Outcome. 5 yrs strict regime; service and wound mitigating
Stabbed two men, one died
Perpetrator. Wagner fighter
Outcome. 14 yrs strict regime
Fatally stabbed his father during argument
Perpetrator. Ex-convict veteran serving 22 yrs (since 2017) for robbery and two murders
Outcome. 8.5 yrs strict regime
Attempted strangulation of a taxi passenger he believed opposed the war
Perpetrator. Wagner; prior robbery and murder, serving 18 yrs since 2013
Outcome. 8.5 yrs strict regime
Strangled minor nephew during family dispute (survived)
Perpetrator. Ex-convict serving 17 yrs since 2013 for killing a young child
Outcome. 6 yrs strict regime; war service mitigating
Serious assault on partner's ex-husband
Perpetrator. Veteran serving 15.5 yrs (since 2018) for murder of four people
Outcome. 3 yrs suspended
Severe beating of girlfriend (brain haemorrhage, fractures)
Perpetrator. Wagner fighter
Outcome. 2 yrs suspended; later invited to speak at schools
Killed an 18-year-old acquaintance and hid the body
Perpetrator. Pardoned convict; 2013 sentence of 20 yrs for double murder
Outcome. 9 yrs strict regime
Fatal assault on partner
Perpetrator. Ex-convict veteran; had served 13 yrs for murder, released after enlisting
Outcome. 5.5 yrs strict regime; war service and 'Medal for Bravery' mitigating
Drug-impaired, unlicensed driving; head-on crash killed a driver and injured his wife
Perpetrator. Akhmat unit serviceman
Outcome. 6 yrs settlement colony; freed on appeal after commander requested he be sent back to the SVO
Drunk speeding hit-and-run; pedestrian died
Perpetrator. Contract soldier
Outcome. 5.5 yrs settlement colony
Shot a 19-year-old after a dispute over loud music; victim died a month later
Perpetrator. War participant (Wagner patch)
Outcome. Suspended sentence (1 yr 3 mos per body text; 1.5 yrs per headline) under Art. 109 (negligent death), Mar 2025; mother appealing
Killed his mother during an argument; beat stepfather
Perpetrator. Combat veteran
Outcome. 12 yrs strict regime
Rape and murder of an 85-year-old woman about a week after return
Perpetrator. Wagner, pardoned spring 2023; prior 14-yr sentence for murder
Outcome. 22 yrs (Apr 2024), raised to 23 on appeal; released from colony 19 Aug 2024 after signing MoD contract and sent to the front
Shot at strangers at a guest house: one killed, one wounded
Perpetrator. Wagner fighter
Outcome. 17 yrs strict regime
Economy
The cost of the war in Russia's own figures — the Ministry of Finance, the Central Bank, Rosstat, government decrees (marked RU) — set beside the IMF and independent trackers. The link to sanctions is direct: the oil price cap and the shadow-fleet listings act on the same revenues that fund the war.
| Indicator | Value | Period | Source | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Federal budget | ||||
| RU | Federal budget deficit, Jan-Sep 2026 | 5.2 RUB trillion (2.2% GDP) | Jan-Sep 2026 | Minfin RF preliminary estimate, via Trading Economics tradingeconomics.com ↗ |
| RU | Federal budget deficit, Jan-Aug 2026 | 5.8 RUB trillion (2.5% GDP) | Jan-Aug 2026 | Minfin RF preliminary estimate, via Meduza meduza.io ↗ |
| RU | Oil and gas revenues, Jan-Sep 2026 | 5.471 RUB trillion | Jan-Sep 2026 | Minfin RF, via Xinhua/The Star and Trading Economics thestar.com.my ↗ |
| RU | Revised 2026 federal budget deficit (plan) | 7.3 RUB trillion (3.2% GDP) | 2026 | Minfin RF / revised budget, via Trading Economics; Reuters via Daily Maverick tradingeconomics.com ↗ |
| RU | 2027 draft budget: national defence spending | 17.1 RUB trillion | 2027 (plan) | Draft budget documents, reported by Reuters (via Daily Maverick) dailymaverick.co.za ↗ |
| RU | 2027-2029 draft budget deficits | 5.5 / 5.1 / 5.3 RUB trillion (~2% GDP each) | 2027/2028/2029 | Draft budget submitted by government, via Meduza meduza.io ↗ |
| RU | VAT standard rate raised from 20% to 22% | 22 % | from 1 Jan 2026 | Federal Law No. 425-FZ signed 28 Nov 2025 (via Sovos) sovos.com ↗ |
| RU | Oil and gas revenues, September 2026 | 5.43 USD billion | Sep 2026 | Minfin RF data cited by The Bell, via United24 Media united24media.com ↗ |
| RU | Federal budget deficit, full year 2025 | 5.6 RUB trillion (2.6% GDP) | 2025 | Minfin RF, via Informat.ro; % GDP confirmed by Siluanov via Interfax (15 Jan 2026) informat.ro ↗ |
| RU | Oil and gas budget revenues, full year 2025 | 8.48 RUB trillion | 2025 | Minfin RF data, Reuters (via Oil&Gas360) oilandgas360.com ↗ |
| C | 2027 draft budget: defence and security share of federal spending | 35 / 44 % of expenditures (defence / defence+security) | 2027 (plan) | Bloomberg calculations on draft budget, via kurs.com.ua kurs.com.ua ↗ |
| National Wealth Fund | ||||
| RU | National Wealth Fund liquid assets | 3.8 RUB trillion (USD 44.45 bn; 1.6% GDP) | as of 1 Oct 2026 | Minfin RF, via TASS tass.com ↗ |
| RU | National Wealth Fund liquid assets (pre-invasion baseline) | 9.73 RUB trillion (USD 116.5 bn; 7.3% GDP) | as of 1 Feb 2022 | Minfin RF statistics as tabulated on Wikipedia (secondary compilation - verify on minfin.gov.ru before publishing) en.wikipedia.org ↗ |
| Immobilised reserves | ||||
| C | Immobilised Russian central bank reserves (G7/EU) | 300 USD billion (approx.) | since Feb 2022 | GlobalSecurity.org compilation of EU/press data globalsecurity.org ↗ |
| B | EU decision to immobilise Russian CB assets indefinitely (Art. 122 TFEU) | adopted | 12 Dec 2025 | EU Council written procedure (25 for, 2 against), via GlobalSecurity / Euromaidan Press euromaidanpress.com ↗ |
| B | EU EUR 90 bn loan to Ukraine for 2026-2027 (instead of reparations loan) | 90 EUR billion | 2026-2027 | European Council 18-19 Dec 2025; Commission package 14 Jan 2026, via Ukrainska Pravda pravda.com.ua ↗ |
| B | G7 ERA loans backed by windfall profits on immobilised assets | 50 USD billion | 2024-2025 onward | G7 ERA, via GlobalSecurity globalsecurity.org ↗ |
| C | Sanctioned Russian assets on Euroclear Bank balance sheet | 202 EUR billion | as of 30 Jun 2026 | Euroclear H1 2026 results euroclear.com ↗ |
| Economy | ||||
| RU | CBR key rate | 14 % p.a. | held 11 Sep 2026 | Bank of Russia, via TASS tass.com ↗ |
| RU | CPI inflation, y/y | 6.35 % | Sep 2026 | Rosstat, via Trading Economics tradingeconomics.com ↗ |
| A | IMF WEO Oct 2026: Russia real GDP growth forecast | 0.9 / 0.9 % (2026 / 2027) | 2026 / 2027 | IMF World Economic Outlook Oct 2026, via Meduza meduza.io ↗ |
| RU | Minek RF GDP growth forecast | 0.6 / 1.4 % (2026 / 2027) | 2026 / 2027 | Ministry of Economic Development RF (Sep 2026 scenario), via Meduza meduza.io ↗ |
| RU | CBR key rate peak | 21 % p.a. | Oct 2024 - Jun 2025 | Bank of Russia decisions, via Meduza meduza.io ↗ |
| RU | Real GDP growth, 2025 (Rosstat second estimate) | 1.0 % | 2025 | Rosstat, via Interfax interfax.com ↗ |
| Oil revenues and sanctions | ||||
| C | Russian fossil fuel export revenues (CREA) | 625 EUR million per day | Sep 2026 | CREA monthly analysis energyandcleanair.org ↗ |
| C | Urals discount to Brent | 23 USD/bbl (21%) | Sep 2026 | CREA monthly analysis energyandcleanair.org ↗ |
| C | EU/G7 price cap on Russian crude | 44.1 USD/bbl | since 1 Feb 2026 | CREA (citing EU dynamic cap; frozen under EU 21st package) energyandcleanair.org ↗ |
| C | Share of Russian seaborne oil carried by sanctioned shadow tankers | 57 % | Sep 2026 | CREA monthly analysis energyandcleanair.org ↗ |
| C | Russian oil export revenues (KSE Russian Oil Tracker) | 13.8 USD billion | Jul 2026 | KSE Institute, Russian Oil Tracker August 2026 sanctions.kse.ua ↗ |
| C | Cumulative oil export revenue losses since Mar 2022 (KSE estimate) | 205 USD billion | Mar 2022 - Jul 2026 | KSE Institute, Russian Oil Tracker August 2026 sanctions.kse.ua ↗ |
| Fuel and refining | ||||
| C | Russian refining capacity offline or attacked (Kpler) | 58 % of capacity (downtime + attacked); 1.5-2.0 mb/d effectively offline | mid-Jul 2026 | Kpler, via Reuters/Al Arabiya english.alarabiya.net ↗ |
| RU | Gasoline and diesel export ban extended | to 31 Jan 2027 | 1 Aug 2026 - 31 Jan 2027 | Government of RF decree, via The Moscow Times themoscowtimes.com ↗ |
| RU | Retail gasoline price increase since end-2025 | 21.4 % | end-Dec 2025 - 12 Oct 2026 | Rosstat, via The Moscow Times (Russian edition) ru.themoscowtimes.com ↗ |
| C | Small-scale wholesale gasoline price | 95-105 RUB per litre | 22 Jun 2026 | The Public (citing Reuters traders, SPIMEX, Rosstat) thepublic.info ↗ |
| Labour | ||||
| RU | Unemployment rate | 2.2 % | Aug 2026 | Rosstat, via Trading Economics tradingeconomics.com ↗ |
| RU | Projected labour shortage to 2030 | 3 million workers (more than) | to 2030 | Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RSPP), via Ukrainska Pravda; Nabiullina: labour shortage 'first time in modern history' pravda.com.ua ↗ |
The ask
Pressure works — keep it. A widening budget deficit, a reserve fund drained to a fraction of its 2022 level and a higher VAT are Russia's own figures. Easing now would refinance the war.
Hit the revenue. Enforce and lower the oil price cap, list the remaining shadow-fleet tankers and the traders behind them — see Sanctions.
Use the immobilised assets. Russia's central bank reserves held in partner jurisdictions should pay for the damage its strikes cause.
Calendar
Where and when Russia's war against Ukraine is on the agenda in the next months — UN bodies in New York, Geneva, Vienna, The Hague, London and Montreal, the OSCE, NATO, the European Union, the Council of Europe, the G7 and G20 and the coalition formats. Each entry says why the war is on that table and what to bring: a case file, the UN record, the sanctions gaps. After the event the entry links to what was said. Dates are tier A when taken from the body's official schedule and tier B when expected from its established pattern and still to be confirmed. Last reviewed .
Coming up
Deportation and transfer of Ukrainian children; Russia's armed forces are listed in the Secretary-General's annual report.
Greek presidency signature event: Black Sea shipping, strikes on ports, the shadow fleet.
Shadow-fleet safety, flag-state responsibility, seafarers in the Black Sea.
Russian interference with satellite and GNSS signals; ITU Council resolutions on harmful interference.
Leaders' format that includes Ukraine, the UK, Türkiye and the Western Balkans.
Sanctions packages, Ukraine Facility, accountability; usually followed by a defence session on 17 Nov.
Adopted every year since 2016; the Third Committee vote comes in mid-November, plenary adoption in December.
Military support, EPF, air defence.
Director General's report on nuclear safety in Ukraine; Zaporizhzhia NPP under occupation. Usually the third week of November; exact dates in the IAEA media advisory.
Use of riot-control agents and chloropicrin by Russian forces; Ukraine's and partners' statements go on the record.
Long-term financing of support to Ukraine sits inside the MFF; date marked tentative in the Leaders' Agenda.
Held in early December every year (3 Dec 2025); date to be confirmed on nato.int.
Only OSCE format at ministerial level; Russia blocks decisions, so statements and side events carry the record.
Published around the 10th of each month; the figure every partner quotes.
Last Council before the 31 January renewal of sectoral sanctions.
Russia attends the G20; the war is contested in the leaders' declaration.
Safety of navigation in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov; substandard shipping.
Plenary vote usually in mid-December.
MFF and enlargement; Ukraine conclusions; political green light for the next sanctions package.
Mandated before the end of 2026; date to be determined by the Council.
Published around the 10th of each month.
Attacks on health care in Ukraine (WHO surveillance system) and the Ukraine health-emergency item.
Held in the last week of January each year; Special Tribunal, deported children and prisoners of war are standing items.
Council Regulation 833/2014 — renewal requires unanimity before 31 January.
Held in February each year; date to be confirmed.
Where partners' Ukraine positions are stated for the year ahead.
Resolutions have been put to the Assembly around 24 February in 2023, 2024 and 2025; new sanctions packages are timed to the date.
Regulation 269/2014 — listings extended before 15 March; delistings are typically announced at this point.
Annual resolution on the health emergency in Ukraine.
Follow-up on harmful interference from Russia.
Host confirmed; dates not yet announced.
Enlarged Partial Agreement adopted 15 May 2026; judges and prosecutor to be appointed before the first indictments.
Ukraine is on the agenda of every European Council in 2026; defence, MFF and competitiveness.
OHCHR findings on civilian casualties, detention and occupied territory presented to member states.
Requested by Denmark, France, Greece, Latvia and the UK; USG DiCarlo briefed.
Interactive dialogue; the Commission's findings are the UN-mandated record of violations.
Nothing in this window with these filters. Show all upcoming →
- UN Security Council. Ukraine is not on the Council's monthly programme; briefings are convened on request of Ukraine and the European members (23 Sep, 27 Jul, 9 Jul 2026) — expect at least one a month, announced days ahead.
- OSCE. OSCE Permanent Council meets every Thursday in Vienna; Ukraine is a standing item and statements are published the same day.
- OHCHR / HRMMU. OHCHR civilian-casualty update around the 10th of each month; HRMMU periodic report every three months.
- European Union. Sanctions packages have no fixed calendar; renewals fall on 31 January, 15 March, 31 July and 15 September.
Found automatically, not yet reviewed
Meetings mentioning Ukraine found on the bodies' own schedule pages (checked daily at 10:40 UTC; last run 2026-10-19T11:07). An editor moves them into the calendar above with the reason they matter.
October 2026 Training Mobile Youth Work. Training of Trainers 26 - 30 October 2026 Lviv, Ukraine Workshop Online Media Literacy Workshops 26 - 28 October 2026 Online
3 November 2026 Peace Palace, The Hague Seminar Media and Reality: Dimensions of Responsibility 18 - 22 November 2026 Zakarpattia region, Ukraine Training Call for Applications: 2026 Roma Leadership Academy “Nicolae Gheo
Eventus OPCW Event Management System Annual Meeting of National Authorities 18 – 20 November 2026 CSP-31 – Thirty First Session of the Conference of the States Parties 23 – 27 November 2026 OPCW
Annual Meeting of National Authorities 18 – 20 November 2026 CSP-31 – Thirty First Session of the Conference of the States Parties 23 – 27 November 2026 OPCW OPCW by the Numbers 193 States committed to the Chemical Weapo
December 2026 Seminar Justice, Law and Society. Seminar for Judges 2 - 6 December 2026 Zakarpatska Oblast, Ukraine Ministerial council 33rd OSCE Ministerial Council Hosted by Switzerland – OSCE Chairpersonship 2026
Ministerial council 33rd OSCE Ministerial Council Hosted by Switzerland – OSCE Chairpersonship 2026 3 - 4 December 2026 Lugano, Switzerland Conference UN Water Conference Side Event "Inclusive Water Governance for Peace,
What we ask
Put Ukraine on the agenda where it is not. Request Security Council briefings after each mass strike; table Ukraine items at the IMO, ICAO, ITU and WHO governing bodies where Russia's conduct falls squarely within the mandate.
Bring the record into the room. Each entry above links to the case file, UN statement or register to cite — use Add to my brief to assemble them in one document before the meeting.
Tell us what is missing. If your mission tracks a meeting that is not here, send it; the calendar is reviewed weekly and the ICS feed updates with the site.
Map & data
One map for the whole war: where the front runs and how it moved since 24 February 2022, where Russian strikes land, what Russia claims and what the UN has found. The front line is a background layer from independent open-source maps, shown with a delay of at least 48 hours; this page never shows Ukrainian positions, units or movements.
Front line from 8 Jul 2024: © DeepStateMap.live, occupied territory as of (via the daily open mirror github.com/cyterat/deepstate-map-data). 24 Feb 2022 – 7 Jul 2024: VIINA territorial control (University of Michigan, ODbL; majority vote of DeepStateMap, Wikipedia maps and news reports, settlement level — approximate). Borders: Natural Earth. Base map: © OpenStreetMap contributors, © CARTO. Areas are derived by the Hub (Tier C); the line is an independent estimate, not a statement of the Hub or of any government.
Week on the front · 11–17 Oct 2026
Bottom line
Russia attacked along the whole line — up to 304 clashes a day — and announced the capture of more than a dozen settlements. Independent analysts confirmed none of it: ISW recorded no confirmed Russian advance on any day from 11 to 16 October, and the occupied area on the DeepState map was slightly smaller at the end of the week than at the start. What did not stop were the strikes on cities far behind the line.
C No confirmed Russian advance. ISW assessed that neither side advanced on 14 October and recorded no confirmed Russian gains on 11–16 October. Since 1 September, ISW counts a net Russian loss of about 122 km²; in September alone Russia seized about 176 km² and lost about 256 km². ISW/CTP, 14 Oct 2026 ↗ · ISW/CTP, 16 Oct 2026 ↗ · ISW/CTP, 1 Oct 2026 ↗
C The map agrees. On the DeepState map the occupied area changed by −33 km² in seven days and −17 km² in 30 days (derived by the Hub). Over the past year Russia gained about 1,977 km² — 1.7% of what it already held. DeepStateMap.live polygons, derived by the Hub ↗
B Pressure without result. The General Staff reported 221 to 304 combat clashes a day; the Pokrovsk direction was the most attacked every day (60 assaults on 16 October), followed by Kostiantynivka, South Slobozhanskyi and Huliaipole. General Staff via Fakty ICTV, 11–17 Oct 2026 ↗
B Ukrainian counter-attacks (Ukrainian claim). The 3rd Army Corps said on 14 October that the fourth phase of its operation near Lyman retook 101 km² — 277 km² and 16 settlements in all phases. ISW reports this as a Ukrainian claim; it assessed on 15 October that the Russian salient north of Lyman had collapsed. Kyiv Independent, 14 Oct 2026 ↗ · ISW/CTP, 15 Oct 2026 ↗
Russia says What Russia said. At the Security Council on 9 October Ambassador Nebenzia said the front line was getting worse "for the Ukrainian regime" and that Russia would reach its goals by military means. On 16 October General Gerasimov reported Russian troops 5 km from Zaporizhzhia city; ISW measured at least 21 km. Russian Mission to the UN, 9 Oct 2026 ↗ · ISW/CTP, 16 Oct 2026 ↗
B Civilians on the line. On 11 October the Donetsk regional administration widened the compulsory evacuation of children in Kramatorsk. In occupied Oleshky, about 2,000 people including nearly 50 children remain without food, power or water, with no agreed evacuation (Kherson regional administration, 7 October); the UN monitoring mission reported in June that people "can't get out" and food "can't get in". Case file 14 → Ukrainska Pravda, 11 Oct 2026 ↗ · Mezha, 8 Oct 2026 ↗ · UN News, 25 Jun 2026 (HRMMU) ↗
| Direction | This week | What the record shows | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| Pokrovsk – Dobropillia | Heaviest assaults | Most attacked direction every day. Russia claimed to encircle and then take Dobropillia; ISW observed only limited infiltration, and Ukrainian forces refuted the claims. | C ISW/CTP, 13 Oct 2026 ↗ · ISW/CTP, 16 Oct 2026 ↗ |
| Kostiantynivka | Contested | Russia has claimed the city since July. ISW: Russian forces have infiltrated less than 40% of it; Ukrainian forces geolocated in the west of the city on 10 October. | C ISW/CTP, 9 Oct 2026 ↗ · ISW/CTP, 11 Oct 2026 ↗ |
| Lyman | Ukrainian counter-attacks | Ukrainian counter-attacks north and south of the city; ISW assesses the Russian salient north of Lyman collapsed. | C ISW/CTP, 15 Oct 2026 ↗ |
| Kupiansk – Oskil | Ukrainian counter-attacks | ISW geolocated Ukrainian advances north of Kupiansk; Russian claims to Palamarivka and Kovalivka not confirmed. | C ISW/CTP, 15 Oct 2026 ↗ · ISW/CTP, 16 Oct 2026 ↗ |
| Sumy – Kharkiv border | No Russian gains | Claimed Russian encirclements near Nefedivka and Varvarivka not observed. Gerasimov claimed 461 km² in the north; ISW counts a net 115 km² since January. | C ISW/CTP, 14 Oct 2026 ↗ · ISW/CTP, 16 Oct 2026 ↗ |
| Huliaipole – Zaporizhzhia | No Russian gains | No confirmed Russian advance; limited Ukrainian advances near Stepnohirsk and south-west of Orikhiv. ISW: Ukraine holds about 25% of the oblast, against the 16.5% claimed by Moscow. | C ISW/CTP, 15 Oct 2026 ↗ · ISW/CTP, 16 Oct 2026 ↗ |
| Kherson – Dnipro | River line | Russian boat landings in the Dnipro delta repelled on 12 and 16 October. Drone attacks on civilians on the right bank continue — a pattern the UN Commission found to be a crime against humanity. | C ISW/CTP, 13 Oct 2026 ↗ · ISW/CTP, 16 Oct 2026 ↗ |
Russia claims · the record
Settlements Russia's Ministry of Defence said it captured, checked against the independent map and Ukrainian military statements. Of 15 claims since 1 October 2026, 0 are confirmed by the independent map at the time of review. A claim is marked contradicted only when an independent source or the Ukrainian military places the settlement outside Russian control.
| Settlement | Russia claimed | Status | The record |
|---|---|---|---|
| Omelnyk Zaporizhzhia | Russian Ministry of Defence via Moscow 24, 19 Oct 2026 ↗ | Not confirmed | Russia's Ministry of Defence said units of its "Vostok" group had taken control of the village. Not yet assessed by ISW at the time of review; the independent map is published with a 48-hour delay. DeepStateMap.live ↗ |
| Lidyne Donetsk | ISW/CTP, 12 Oct 2026 ↗ | Contradicted by the record | ISW: no evidence; about 13.5 km beyond the furthest Russian advance. A Russian milblogger later conceded Ukrainian control (ISW, 15 Oct). ISW/CTP, 12 Oct 2026 ↗ · ISW/CTP, 15 Oct 2026 ↗ |
| Petrivka and Novotroitske Donetsk | ISW/CTP, 11 Oct 2026 ↗ | Contradicted by the record | ISW: the flag-raising video released as proof was AI-altered; Petrivka lies about 10 km beyond the front. ISW/CTP, 11 Oct 2026 ↗ |
| Mykilske Zaporizhzhia | ISW/CTP, 12 Oct 2026 ↗ | Contradicted by the record | ISW: about 18 km beyond the furthest Russian advance; no confirmed Russian advance near Huliaipole. ISW/CTP, 12 Oct 2026 ↗ |
| Samiilivka Dnipropetrovsk (per ISW) | ISW/CTP, 5 Oct 2026 ↗ | Contradicted by the record | ISW: no evidence of any Russian presence; about 16 km from the Russian line. ISW/CTP, 5 Oct 2026 ↗ |
| Kyianytsia Sumy | ISW/CTP, 9 Oct 2026 ↗ | Contradicted by the record | Ukraine's 8th Air Assault Corps says it holds the village. ISW/CTP, 9 Oct 2026 ↗ |
| Novoandriivka Zaporizhzhia | ISW/CTP, 16 Oct 2026 ↗ | Contradicted by the record | Claimed by Gerasimov; Ukraine's 17th Army Corps said on 15 October it controls the village. ISW/CTP, 15 Oct 2026 ↗ |
| Zaporizhzhia city "5 km away" Zaporizhzhia | ISW/CTP, 16 Oct 2026 ↗ | Contradicted by the record | ISW: Russian forces are at least 21 km from the city (11.6 km counting infiltration attempts). ISW/CTP, 16 Oct 2026 ↗ |
| Dobropillia Donetsk | ISW/CTP, 13 Oct 2026 ↗ · ISW/CTP, 16 Oct 2026 ↗ | Not confirmed | Encirclement claimed from 7 October, capture on 16 October. ISW observed only limited infiltration; the General Staff denied the capture. ISW/CTP, 16 Oct 2026 ↗ |
| Kostiantynivka Donetsk | ISW/CTP, 9 Oct 2026 ↗ | Contested | First claimed in July 2026, repeated 9 October. ISW: under 40% infiltrated; the DeepState map does not show the city as occupied. ISW/CTP, 9 Oct 2026 ↗ · DeepStateMap.live polygons, derived by the Hub ↗ |
| Nefedivka and Chorne Kharkiv | ISW/CTP, 15 Oct 2026 ↗ | Not confirmed | ISW: not confirmed; a Russian Northern Grouping source says Ukrainian forces remain in Nefedivka. ISW/CTP, 15 Oct 2026 ↗ |
| Palamarivka and Kovalivka Kharkiv | ISW/CTP, 16 Oct 2026 ↗ | Not confirmed | Claimed by Gerasimov. ISW: the nearest assessed Russian advance is more than 5 km away. ISW/CTP, 16 Oct 2026 ↗ |
| Riznykove and Kupyne Kharkiv | ISW/CTP, 11 Oct 2026 ↗ | Not confirmed | ISW: no Russian advance in northern Kharkiv on 10–11 October; Kupyne had already been claimed once, in August. ISW/CTP, 11 Oct 2026 ↗ |
| Nova Kozacha Kharkiv | ISW/CTP, 3 Oct 2026 ↗ | Not confirmed | ISW: not confirmed; a Russian source says only infiltration groups are present. ISW/CTP, 9 Oct 2026 ↗ |
| Vysoka Yaruha, Nesterne, Rublene Kharkiv | ISW/CTP, 1 Oct 2026 ↗ | Not confirmed | ISW: no evidence of the claimed advances. ISW/CTP, 1 Oct 2026 ↗ |
Distance from the front
Every strike in the current log is measured from the nearest ground Russia holds — the front line, occupied Crimea or the Russian border. Russia says it strikes military targets; the record shows where its missiles and drones land. Distances are derived by the Hub from the coordinates and rounded to 5 km.
| Strike | Killed / injured | Distance |
|---|
Civilians killed per month, 2026 A PDF
Table view
| Month | Killed | Injured | Note |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sep | 328 | 2,105 | |
| Aug | 372 | 2,349 | |
| Jul | 448 | 2,675 | revised |
| Jun | 293 | 1,990 | |
| May | 288 | 1,814 | derived |
| Apr | 238 | 1,404 | |
| Jan–Mar | 577 | 2,770 | aggregate |
Incident map · Oct 2026 B
Select a marker. Size = civilians killed; dashed rings = regions with emergency power outages on 8–9 Oct.
Strike log · nights with 100+ drones and missiles
PDFAir Force of Ukraine preliminary morning counts, 16 Sep – 19 Oct 2026. Missile counts have not been published consistently since August; where a package included ballistic or cruise missiles this is noted. 28 such nights or days in one month; September alone saw 3,177 jet-powered drones (Air Force, 29 Sep).
| Night / day | Launched | Intercepted or suppressed | Hits (locations) | Note |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19 Oct (day) | Geran-3 attack drone on Nova Vodolaha; Banderol missile on Kryvyi Rih | n/a | n/a | Nova Vodolaha (Kharkiv region), about 16:30: a drone on the central park — 6 killed, three of them children, incl. an infant; 15 injured, seven of them children (Kharkiv regional military administration, 18:20) → CF-15. Kryvyi Rih, morning: 2 killed, 7 injured incl. a boy (15) (Dnipropetrovsk regional military administration) |
| 18–19 Oct | 269 drones (59 jet-powered) + Iskander-M/S-400 ballistic and Iskander-K cruise missiles | 243 drones (43 jet-powered) + 4 Iskander-K | 25 | Debris at 8 locations; attack still under way at 09:00 (Air Force). Kyiv: 1 killed, 8 injured (city military administration); Irpin: a woman killed, 17 injured incl. 8 children (Kyiv regional military administration, as of 11:00; Irpin city council); Dnipro: 1 injured (regional administration) |
| 17–18 Oct | 180 drones (26 jet-powered) + 1 Iskander-M ballistic missile | 152 drones (16 jet-powered) | 20 | Debris at 4 locations; about 10 drones still in the airspace at 08:00 (Air Force). Zaporizhzhia: 1 killed, 2 injured incl. a girl (6); Dnipropetrovsk region: 3 injured (regional administrations) |
| 17 Oct (day) | 157 drones (25 jet-powered) + 6 S-8000 Banderol missiles | 140 drones (22 jet-powered) + all 6 missiles | n/a | Daytime wave, 07:30–19:30; about 30 more drones in the airspace at 22:00 (Air Force) |
| 16–17 Oct | 332 drones (31 jet-powered) + Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic, Kh-22/32 and 4 Kalibr cruise missiles | 289 drones + 4 Kalibr; no ballistic missile reported intercepted | 22 | More than 15 power facilities attacked (President); Vinnytsia left without electricity, main water station without power; outages in Lutsk, Rivne, Zhytomyr → CF-13. Over the day 7 killed, about 90 injured in eight regions (regional administrations) |
| 15–16 Oct | 149 drones (108 jet-powered) | 114 drones (77 jet-powered) | 24 | Volyn region: 370,000 without electricity; an enterprise in Manevychi hit, 1 killed, 8 injured. Over the day at least 4 killed (Kherson region 2, Kramatorsk 1, Manevychi 1) and at least 52 injured in 11 regions (regional administrations) |
| 14–15 Oct | 580 drones + 2 Kh-59 | 536 drones | 31 | Part of 850+ drones in 33 hours (President). Over 14–15 Oct at least 17 killed in six regions, incl. Lutsk 6 (14 Oct, daytime) and Kropyvnytskyi 3; 67 injured → CF-08 |
| 13–14 Oct | 39 ballistic (Iskander-M, KN-23, S-400, Zircon/Oniks) + 128 drones | 4 missiles + 115 drones | 22 | All three Kyiv CHPs; 600,000 without power → CF-06 |
| 12–13 Oct | 5 ballistic + 9 Banderol + 108 drones | 88 drones | 17 | Kyiv: 2 killed; Lozova 1 |
| 11–12 Oct | 121 drones + 1 Kh-59 | 89 | 15 | |
| 9–10 Oct | 160 drones (110 jet-powered) | n/a | 14 | Zaporizhzhia glide bombs the same night → CF-05 |
| 8–9 Oct | 136 drones (93 jet-powered) | 114 | 8 | |
| 7–8 Oct | 142 drones (82 jet-powered) | 126 | 7 | Kyiv energy facility hit by day; blackout |
| 6–7 Oct | 48 cruise + ballistic + anti-ship (~70 missiles) + 130 drones | 39 cruise + 5 ballistic + 117 drones | 18 | Pryluky, Kremenchuk, Oleksandriia, Kyiv → CF-03 |
| 4–5 Oct | 205 drones (49 jet-powered) | 172 | 13 | Kharkiv glide bombs by day → CF-07 |
| 2–3 Oct | 157 drones | 131 | 12 | Mykolaiv port: Iskander-M |
| 1–2 Oct | 108 drones (47 jet-powered) | 88 | 11 | Kyiv Southern Bridge hit five times |
| 30 Sep (day) | 285 drones (174 jet-powered) | 254 | — | Daytime wave after the night strike |
| 29–30 Sep | 188 drones + Zircon/Oniks + Iskander-M/S-400 | 155 drones + 5 missiles | 18 | Largest energy strike since April; Trypilska TPP |
| 28–29 Sep | 152 drones + 3 missiles | 106 drones + 3 missiles | 24 | |
| 26–27 Sep | 170 drones (76 jet-powered) | 147 | 18 | Kharkiv glide bombs: 22 injured incl. 6 children |
| 25–26 Sep | 173 drones | 134 | — | Zaporizhzhia: 2 killed |
| 25 Sep (day) | 162 drones | 127 | — | Kyiv: 7 killed incl. 2 children (with the night wave) |
| 24–25 Sep | 295 drones | 267 | 16 | |
| 23–24 Sep | 282 drones + Zircon, Iskander-M, S-400, KN-23 | 219 drones + 4 Zircon + 3 ballistic + 1 Banderol | 13 | Kyiv maternity hospital damaged; 2 killed |
| 22–23 Sep | 161 drones + Banderols | 119 + 3 | 18 | |
| 21–22 Sep | 212 drones + 4 Kalibr + 8 Banderol + Oniks + ballistic | 186 | 22 | Dnipro Interpipe plant: 4 killed; Naftogaz facility destroyed |
| 19–20 Sep | 138 drones | 101 | 17 | |
| 16–17 Sep | 157 drones + ballistic + 4 Kalibr + Oniks | 124 drones + 7 Banderol; 0 ballistic | 36 | Kyiv water supply cut on the left bank; 20 injured |
Sources: Air Force of Ukraine daily summaries as relayed by Ukrinform, Kyiv Independent, Censor.net, RBC-Ukraine, UNN, Hromadske, ISW (16 Sep – 16 Oct 2026). Preliminary figures; not a Tier A series.
Open data, feeds and widgets
Everything on this site is also available as files that update with every publication (CC BY 4.0 — attribute "Ukraine Evidence Hub" and the original source named in each record).
strikes.json · strikes.csv — the strike log
losses.json — Russian losses, assets, facilities, economy
sanctions_docs.json · sanctions/index.json — legal acts and registers
un-record.json — UN statements
beyond.json — Beyond Ukraine
updates.json — the update log, six languages
hub.json — every figure on the site in one file
feed.xml — all updates
feed-cases.xml — case files only
feed-un.xml — UN record
feed-cost.xml — the cost of the war
calendar.ics — the Calendar page as a feed: meetings, reports, deadlines
Latest strikes, the key figures or a case file as a small frame on your own page. Preview ↗
<iframe src="https://ukraine-evidence.org/widget.html?type=strikes" width="100%" height="360" style="border:0" loading="lazy" title="Ukraine Evidence Hub"></iframe>type = strikes · kpis · cases · cost · calendar; add &lang=fr for another language
Live preview — this is what the frame looks like on another site:
Occupation, 2014 → now
- Crimea occupiedRussia seizes Crimea and stages a "referendum". On 27 March the General Assembly affirms Ukraine's territorial integrity and calls on states not to recognise any change of status — 100 in favour, 11 against, 58 abstentions (resolution 68/262). A GA/11493 ↗
- Parts of Donetsk and Luhansk seizedRussian-controlled forces take parts of the two regions; the occupation line holds with fighting until 2022. Context
- Full-scale invasionOn 2 March the General Assembly deplores Russia's aggression "in the strongest terms" and demands full withdrawal — 141 in favour, 5 against, 35 abstentions (ES-11/1). A GA/12407 ↗
- Four regions "annexed"On 12 October the General Assembly condemns the "attempted illegal annexation" of Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia regions — 143 in favour, 5 against, 35 abstentions (ES-11/4). A GA/12458 ↗
- Withdraw "immediately, completely and unconditionally"General Assembly resolution ES-11/6 — 141 in favour, 7 against, 32 abstentions. A GA/12492 ↗
- From 109,361 to 117,102 km²Over 27 months Russia added about 7,741 km² — 1.3% of Ukraine — at the cost of continuous assaults (derived from DeepState snapshots). C DeepStateMap.live polygons, derived by the Hub ↗
- "Realities on the ground"At the General Assembly Ambassador Nebenzia says the status of the annexed regions is "not subject to discussion" and demands recognition of the situation on the ground. The General Assembly's position (ES-11/4) is unchanged. Russia says Russian Mission to the UN, 1 Sep 2026 ↗
Legal qualification
Established — by bodies with a mandate
Aggression and annexation. The General Assembly deplored Russia's aggression and demanded its withdrawal (ES-11/1), and condemned the "attempted illegal annexation" of four regions (ES-11/4). GA/12458 ↗
Killing of prisoners. The Commission of Inquiry found a Russian policy of killing surrendering soldiers — a war crime (A/HRC/58/67). A/HRC/58/67 ↗
Crimes against humanity. Torture and enforced disappearance in occupied territory (A/HRC/58/67); murder and forcible transfer by drone attacks on civilians in Kherson, Dnipropetrovsk and Mykolaiv regions (A/80/497); deportation and forcible transfer of children (A/HRC/61/61). A/80/497 ↗ · A/HRC/61/61 ↗
Pattern — what the record shows repeatedly
Strikes far from the front. Many of the deadliest strikes in the 2026 log hit cities far behind the line, where no Russian ground force is in contact (see "Distance from the front", derived).
Claims ahead of diplomacy. Russia announces captures that independent maps do not show — 0 of 15 confirmed since 1 October; the Dobropillia "encirclement" was first announced during UN General Assembly high-level week (22 Sep). ISW/CTP daily assessments ↗
Occupation as a system. Passportization, conscription of protected persons, property seizure and the ban on the Ukrainian curriculum recur in every UN report on the occupied territories since 2022. A/HRC/62/59 ↗
Position — Ukraine's qualification
Ukraine qualifies the occupation as a continuing act of aggression and the forcible transfer of Ukrainian children as genocide under Article II(e) of the Genocide Convention. These are Ukraine's legal positions, not findings of a UN body.
What we do not know
- The front line is an independent estimate. The DeepState polygons show territory assessed as occupied; contested "grey zones" are not shown, and a settlement outside the polygon is not necessarily under Ukrainian control.
- The 2014–2022 line in Donetsk and Luhansk regions and the March 2022 maximum extent of the occupation are not drawn: we have no open, attributable dataset for them yet.
- Distance is measured to the nearest Russian-held ground. Missiles and drones are often launched from much farther away — from Russian territory, Crimea or the Black Sea.
- Strike coordinates are approximate (city or district level). Casualty figures are preliminary Ukrainian figures (Tier B) until OHCHR verifies them.
- A claim marked "not confirmed" may be confirmed later; statuses are reviewed weekly. OCHA's October figures and the IAEA's October updates on Zaporizhzhia were not yet available at review.
What we ask
Do not recognise "realities on the ground". Reaffirm General Assembly resolution ES-11/4 in national statements; no change of status by force, no matter how much territory is held.
Do not repeat claims that the record does not support. Russian announcements of captured towns are not facts until an independent source confirms them. Use this table before citing them.
Open the occupied territories to the UN. Press for unimpeded access for HRMMU, the Commission of Inquiry and the ICRC to occupied areas and to prisoners of war — and for an ICRC-mediated evacuation of Oleshky.
Protect the cities behind the line. Air defence and sanctions on the supply chains of glide bombs, drones and missiles: the deadliest strikes land far from the front.
Rules for this page: front-line data only after an independent source has published it and at least 48 hours have passed; no Ukrainian positions, units or movements; Russian claims always labelled as claims; every figure with source, date and tier (A — UN-mandated bodies, B — Ukrainian authorities, C — independent researchers). Report an error: Corrections.
Accountability
What exists already: six ICC arrest warrants, unit designations by the US, UK and EU, convictions in absentia in Ukrainian courts. Click a node in the chain for the evidentiary link and the status.
Select a node. Each node: office, holder, link to the strike, warrants or sanctions.
| ICC warrant | Date | Conduct |
|---|---|---|
| Vladimir Putin | 17 Mar 2023 | Unlawful deportation and transfer of children |
| Maria Lvova-Belova | 17 Mar 2023 | Same |
| Lt Gen Sergei Kobylash | 5 Mar 2024 | Attacks on civilian objects, CAH — strikes on electricity infrastructure, Oct 2022 – Mar 2023 |
| Adm Viktor Sokolov | 5 Mar 2024 | Same (Black Sea Fleet) |
| Sergei Shoigu | 24 Jun 2024 | Same (Minister of Defence at the time) |
| Gen Valery Gerasimov | 24 Jun 2024 | Same (Chief of the General Staff) |
| Bucha units | Designation / status |
|---|---|
| 234th Guards Air Assault Regiment (Pskov); 76th Division | US State Dept, 28 Jun 2022; commander identified (NYT, Dec 2022) |
| 64th Separate Motor Rifle Brigade (Khabarovsk) | US, 28 Jun 2022; UK sanctions on commander; "Guards" title from Putin, 18 Apr 2022 |
| Nine servicemen, Bucha | Convicted in absentia, Irpin City Court, Aug 2023 (11–12 years) |
| Maxim Grigoriev (author of the Bucha denial) | EU sanctions 2026; Canada SEMA Aug 2024 — state propaganda |
What we ask
No amnesty for war crimes in any settlement · cooperation with the ICC and the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression · renewal of the Commission of Inquiry mandate and funding for HRMMU · support for the Register of Damage and the International Claims Commission.
What happened next
The question asked most often: "and then what?" One row per major incident — the UN finding, the national proceeding, the international step. Empty cells are honest: they show where accountability has not yet reached.
| Incident | UN finding A | Ukrainian proceedings B | International step |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bucha, Mar 2022 | OHCHR: 73 civilians killed, documented by name (7 Dec 2022); COI: war crimes (A/77/533) | 9 servicemen convicted in absentia (Irpin, Aug 2023); 72 murders solved (National Police) | US designation of 234th Regt and 64th Bde (28 Jun 2022); GA res. ES-11/3 |
| Kramatorsk station, 8 Apr 2022 | OHCHR: 61 killed incl. 7 children; indiscriminate attack | Proceedings under art. 438 CCU; Tochka-U unit identified | Cited in COI report A/77/533 |
| Olenivka, 29 Jul 2022 | UN fact-finding mission established, denied access, disbanded Jan 2023; OHCHR: Russia's account not credible | Investigation open; survivors interviewed after exchanges | — (no on-site investigation to date) |
| Energy campaign, Oct 2022 – Mar 2023 | COI: war crimes and possible CAH (A/HRC/52/62) | Evidence shared with ICC OTP via JIT | ICC warrants: Kobylash, Sokolov (5 Mar 2024); Shoigu, Gerasimov (24 Jun 2024) |
| Children, since 2022 | COI: unlawful transfer, war crime (A/HRC/52/62) | Ombudsman register: 20,651 cases; 2,665 returned | ICC warrants: Putin, Lvova-Belova (17 Mar 2023); International Coalition for the Return of Ukrainian Children |
| Hroza, 5 Oct 2023 | HRMMU on site within 24 h: 59 killed, no military objective found | Two local informants charged with treason; Iskander unit identified | Raised at UNSC, Oct 2023 |
| Okhmatdyt, 8 Jul 2024 | OHCHR: high likelihood of a direct hit by a Kh-101 | Proceedings open; missile fragments documented | UNSC emergency meeting 9 Jul 2024 |
| Pryluky, 7 Oct 2026 | UN ASG Khiari, UNSC 9 Oct: "the deadliest attack… at least 19 people, including five children"; OHCHR verification pending | Proceedings opened under art. 438 CCU; evidence shared with ICC OTP | Security Council meeting 9 Oct 2026 (10237th) |
| Kramatorsk buses, 8 Oct 2026 | High Commissioner Türk, 8 Oct: direct attacks on civilians "could amount to war crimes"; ASG Khiari: "at least 33" | Proceedings under art. 438 CCU; weapon identified (UMPB D-30SN) | Security Council meeting 9 Oct 2026; Russia silent by name |
| Kyiv energy, 13–14 Oct 2026 | ICC warrants of 2024 cover the same conduct; COI statement 21 Sep 2026; ASG Khiari 9 Oct: "all attacks on energy infrastructure… must cease" | Proceedings; MoD target list preserved as evidence | — (no Council meeting yet) |
The named
Who has been named, by whom, and at what level of the ladder: an ICC warrant, a conviction (in absentia in Ukraine, or by a foreign court), a notice of suspicion, or sanctions only. Each row links to the document that names the person. Interpol issues no red notices for Russian servicemen (art. 3 of its Constitution), so the Ukrainian wanted database and the ICC are the only live lists. No photographs are reproduced here; the linked pages carry them.
| Person | Position | Level | Date | Conduct / act | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Vladimir Putin | President of the Russian Federation | ICC warrant | 17 Mar 2023 | Unlawful deportation and transfer of children (art. 8(2)(a)(vii), 8(2)(b)(viii)); command responsibility | ICC ↗ |
| Maria Lvova-Belova | Presidential Commissioner for Children's Rights | ICC warrant | 17 Mar 2023 | Same conduct | ICC ↗ |
| Sergei Kobylash | Lt Gen; Commander, Long-Range Aviation (2022–23), now Aerospace Forces | ICC warrant Suspicion · UA | 5 Mar 2024 · 10 Sep 2024 | Strikes on the electricity system Oct 2022 – Mar 2023 (war crimes, CAH); Ukraine: Okhmatdyt strike, 8 Jul 2024 (art. 438) | ICC ↗ · SBU/OPG ↗ |
| Viktor Sokolov | Admiral; Commander, Black Sea Fleet | ICC warrant Suspicion · UA | 5 Mar 2024 · 25 May 2023 | Same campaign (Kalibr strikes on energy); Ukraine: arts. 438, 437, 110 | ICC ↗ · SBU ↗ |
| Sergei Shoigu | Minister of Defence (to May 2024); Secretary of the Security Council | ICC warrant | 24 Jun 2024 | Strikes on the electricity system 10 Oct 2022 – 9 Mar 2023 | ICC ↗ |
| Valery Gerasimov | General; Chief of the General Staff | ICC warrant Wanted · UA | 24 Jun 2024 · since 5 Aug 2015 | Same campaign; Ukraine: art. 437 (Ilovaisk, 2014), on the wanted list | ICC ↗ · SBU ↗ |
| Alexander Lapin | Col Gen; Commander, Central Military District (2022); Leningrad MD | Convicted in absentia | Jun 2026 | Life imprisonment — arts. 110, 437: the offensive on Kyiv and the north, Feb–Mar 2022 | Court report ↗ |
| Andrei Bizyaev and eight servicemen | 64th Separate Motor Rifle Brigade (Khabarovsk) | Convicted in absentia | Aug 2023 | Irpin City Court: 11–12 years, art. 438 — Bucha and Kyiv region, Mar 2022 | JusticeInfo ↗ |
| Voislav Torden (Yan Petrovsky) | Commander, "Rusich" unit | Convicted · Finland | 14 Mar 2025 · 31 Aug 2026 | Helsinki District Court: life; Court of Appeal: 12.5 years for three counts of war crimes (Luhansk region, 2014) | Report ↗ · TRIAL UJIM ↗ |
| Senior seaman, 177th Marine Regiment, Caspian Flotilla | Guard, filtration camp, Melitopol | Extradited · Lithuania | 30 Oct 2025 | Vilnius court ordered detention; first extradition of a Russian serviceman to an EU state for war crimes in Ukraine | Report ↗ |
| Azatbek Omurbekov | Commander, 64th Separate Motor Rifle Brigade | Suspicion · UA | 1 Jul 2025 | Art. 438 — Bucha, Mar 2022; US and UK sanctions since 2022 | Report ↗ |
| Andrei Mordvichev | Lt Gen; Commander, 8th Army (Mariupol); now C-in-C Ground Forces | Suspicion · UA | 29 Sep 2022 | Arts. 110, 437 — siege of Mariupol | SBU ↗ |
| Nikolai Gostev | Lt Gen; Commander, 4th Air and Air Defence Army | Suspicion · UA | 28 Jul 2023 | Air strikes on Mariupol, incl. incendiary munitions | SBU ↗ |
| Platoon commander, 234th Air Assault Regiment (name withheld by OPG) | 76th Air Assault Division (Pskov) | Suspicion · UA | 31 Oct 2025 | Execution of 17 civilians, Bucha, Mar 2022 | OPG ↗ |
| 121 commanders | Long-Range Aviation, Navy, Missile and Artillery Forces | Sanctions · UA | 17 Apr 2026 | Decree 303/2026 — strikes on Okhmatdyt, Sumy, Chernihiv, Hroza, Ternopil, Kremenchuk; names in the annex | Decree ↗ |
| 173 individuals | Officials, "educators", military and church figures involved in deportation of children | Dossiers · HUR | 17 Aug 2026 | War & Sanctions portal: role, description, sources per person | HUR ↗ |
| Sergei Yevsyukov, Vyacheslav Yakurnov | Head and operations officer, Colony No. 120 (Olenivka) | Identified · NGO | 2022–26 | Olenivka, 29 Jul 2022 — identification by the Media Initiative for Human Rights; Ukrainian proceedings open C | MIHR ↗ |
| Igor Bagnyuk and 33 officers | Main Computing Centre of the General Staff — missile targeting | Identified · OSINT | 23 Oct 2022 | Bellingcat / The Insider / Der Spiegel identification C | Report ↗ |
ICC — the six warrants with the Chamber's decisions: icc-cpi.int ↗ A
Wanted database of the Ministry of Internal Affairs — cards with photo, date of birth, article of the Criminal Code; Russian servicemen under arts. 437–438 among them: wanted.mvs.gov.ua ↗ B
War & Sanctions (Defence Intelligence) — dossiers: child abductors, "war managers", "engineers of aggression", propagandists: war-sanctions.gur.gov.ua ↗ B
State sanctions register (NSDC) — every sanctioned person with decree number and term: drs.nsdc.gov.ua ↗ B
Prosecutor General — aggregate figures and case releases; no public register of suspects by name: war.gp.gov.ua ↗ B
Universal-jurisdiction cases — TRIAL International's UJIM database (Torden and others): ujim.trialinternational.org ↗ C
In: a person named in an ICC decision, a court judgment, a notice of suspicion published by the Prosecutor General or the SBU, a sanctions decree, or an official intelligence dossier. Each row carries the level and the link.
Out: Myrotvorets and similar anonymous lists (not a state resource; contains known errors), personal data of relatives, photographs — the linked official pages carry those under their own responsibility.
Interpol: no red notices for Russian servicemen since 2014 (art. 3 of the Interpol Constitution). Why ↗
Next: the 22 commanders convicted in absentia (Prosecutor General, Feb 2026) are not published as one list — requested; the annex to decree 303/2026 will be added as a searchable table.
Method
Source tiers
A UN-mandated bodies. OHCHR / Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, the Independent International Commission of Inquiry, UNESCO, IAEA, WHO, UNHCR; ICC decisions. These are the figures the Secretariat cites and the only ones that cannot be dismissed as "Ukrainian numbers".
B Ukrainian authorities. Prosecutor General, National Police, Ombudsman, Air Force, State Emergency Service, regional administrations. Fuller and faster; always labelled as national data.
C Independent investigations. Maxar, NYT and AP visual investigations, Bellingcat, CIR, Yale HRL; sanctions listings.
Tiers are never merged in one figure. When a Tier A figure exists, it replaces Tier B on this site.
Legal qualification, three layers
Established found by a UN mechanism or court · Pattern the argument Ukraine makes from the documented pattern · Position Ukraine's qualification, pending international findings. Never presented as one.
Rules
- Every figure carries a source and a date; derived figures are marked "derived".
- No graphic images of the dead. Maps, numbers, satellite imagery, memorials, portraits with family consent.
- One idea per page, one figure per headline.
- Our own imprecisions are corrected publicly, in one sentence.
- Every item ends with an ask: what a Member State can do.
- When a UN body publishes a figure lower than ours, both are shown the same day, with their dates. No delay, no footnote.
- Every external source is linked and snapshotted to the Wayback Machine when first cited; the Sources page lists every link with its access date.
Update cycle
| Mass strike | Air Force summary at T+10 h → case card at T+24 h → FR/ES at T+48 h → OHCHR figures replace national ones when published |
| Monthly pulse | OHCHR Protection of Civilians update, 10th–16th of each month |
| Indicators | Weekly check; dated on the tile |
| Fact-checks | Per Russian document; 1–2 days; circulated to the SG when warranted |
Map outline schematic.
Photo and video
State Emergency Service (DSNS) and its regional directorates publish photo galleries and video from every major strike site within hours, under dsns.gov.ua ↗ and 24 regional sites (cn., dn., zp., kh., kyiv.dsns.gov.ua …). Their content is released under Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 — reusable with credit. Each case file carries one DSNS photo with the credit, the date and a link to the original post, and an "Official media" line to the full gallery and video.
Other official sources used for links (not yet for embedded images): National Police (weapon fragments, scene documentation), Air Force (launch and interception summaries), regional military administrations (casualty lists, damage surveys), Prosecutor General (proceedings), Office of the President. Satellite imagery is requested from Maxar News Bureau and shown only with its licence line.
What is never shown. No images of the dead or of identifiable injured people, no close-ups of body bags, no children's faces without consent; galleries that contain such images are linked, not embedded, and the link says so. Images are not cropped to alter meaning; the DSNS watermark stays.
Chain of custody. The file name encodes source, region, date and subject (photo-zaporizhzhia_2026-10-11_rubble.jpg); the original URL and a Wayback copy are in the sources register; the image is listed with its hash under Files and integrity.
The DSNS post that closes a search-and-rescue operation is the first final figure for a strike — killed, children, injured, rescued, responders, tonnes of debris. It arrives 24–48 h after the strike and precedes the regional administration summary and OHCHR verification. This site takes the DSNS closing figure as its Tier B number (Zaporizhzhia: 23 killed incl. 4 children, 11 Oct; Pryluky: 22 incl. 5 children, 8 Oct) and shows the earlier interim figure in the corrections log.
Reading a DSNS post. The interim count carries a time stamp ("as of 18:45"); the closing post says "search and rescue completed". Only the closing figure is used in headlines; interim figures are shown with their hour.
Video. DSNS posts embed video (YouTube/Facebook); it is linked from the "Official media" line, never re-hosted. A still is taken only when no photo is published.
What we do not know
Occupied territory. OHCHR has no access; the Commission of Inquiry works from released detainees and open sources. Civilian deaths in Mariupol (2022), in the occupied parts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions, and in filtration are counted only where a name and two sources exist. The true figures are higher by an unknown margin; this site does not estimate them.
Prisoners and detainees. The number of civilians held by Russia is a minimum (16,000+ recorded); Russia publishes no lists and admits no ICRC access. Deaths in custody are known mainly from exchanges.
Children. 20,651 is the number of recorded cases with identifying data, not the number of children taken; estimates run far higher and are not used here.
Strike packages. Air Force launch and interception counts are preliminary morning figures; missile counts have not been published consistently since August 2026. The strike log is a lower bound.
Attribution below unit level. Which regiment, which crew: known in some cases (Bucha, Hroza), not in most. The chain of command on the Accountability page stops where the evidence stops.
Casualties in Russia. OHCHR records them (496 killed Jan–Sep 2026); this site cites that figure when Russia raises the subject and does not verify it independently.
Rule
Where we do not know, we say so on the page itself — not in a footnote. A reader who is told the limits of a figure will trust the figure.
Why the UN figure is lower
OHCHR counts only what it has verified: each civilian casualty is corroborated from at least two independent sources, or by the Monitoring Mission's own field visit. Casualties in occupied territory and in places under intense fighting — Mariupol in 2022, Bakhmut, Avdiivka — are largely absent from its tables. OHCHR says so in every update: the real figures are "considerably higher".
Ukrainian bodies count what they have recorded: the Prosecutor General registers every proceeding; the Ombudsman registers every reported child. These figures are fuller and faster, and they are the national record. They are not lower-quality — they measure something different.
So when a reader sees 16,431 (OHCHR) beside a larger Ukrainian number, both are right. This site shows the UN figure first because it is the one international bodies and most governments will repeat; the national figure is shown beside it, labelled, never merged.
Corrections log
Every change to a published figure or wording, with date and reason. Nothing is silently edited.
| Date | Was | Now | Why |
|---|---|---|---|
| 19 Oct 2026 | Case files: 124 civilians killed in the incidents on the ten cards, 22 Sep – 17 Oct | 128, 22 Sep – 19 Oct | Case file 15 (Nova Vodolaha, 6 killed) added; Case file 12 (Sumy, 2 killed) moved to the Archive |
| 19 Oct 2026 | Strike log: 27 nights or days with 100+ drones and missiles, 16 Sep – 18 Oct | 28, 16 Sep – 19 Oct | The night of 18–19 Oct (269 drones with ballistic and cruise missiles, Air Force) added to the count and to the strike log PDF |
| 19 Oct 2026 | Irpin, night of 18–19 Oct: 1 killed, 6 injured incl. 3 children, 3 missing | 1 killed, 17 injured incl. 8 children | Kyiv regional military administration (T. Tkachenko), as of 11:00 on 19 Oct: updated count; 84 objects damaged; no update on the missing; map, strike log and timeline updated |
| 19 Oct 2026 | Kyiv, evening and night of 18–19 Oct: 1 killed, 3 injured | 1 killed, 8 injured | Kyiv city military administration, morning of 19 Oct: updated toll after the overnight missile and drone attack; map, timeline and strike log updated |
| 19 Oct 2026 | Kyiv, evening of 18 Oct: 1 killed, 2 injured | 1 killed (a woman, 21), 3 injured | Kyiv mayor V. Klitschko, night of 18–19 Oct: a second missile strike damaged a metro station and a residential building in the Solomianskyi district; map and timeline updated |
| 18 Oct 2026 | St Petersburg and Leningrad region, night of 18 Oct (cost of the war): casualties in Leningrad region not recorded | Leningrad region: 10 injured, including 5 children; 7 in hospital | Leningrad region health committee via TASS (Vedomosti, 18 Oct); regional governor A. Drozdenko: a woman and three children poisoned by smoke from a fire caused by drone debris in Vsevolozhsk district |
| 18 Oct 2026 | Sumy, 17 Oct: 1 killed, 2 injured | 2 killed, 3 injured | Toll for the day from the Sumy regional police (morning of 18 Oct): a man (30) killed by a drone and a man (42) by guided bombs in the Sumy community; map and timeline updated |
| 18 Oct 2026 | St Petersburg, night of 18 Oct (cost of the war): 'no casualties reported by the city governor' | 1 killed, 5 injured; fires also at the Ruchyi oil depot and Kolpino warehouses; 12 apartment buildings and 2 houses damaged | Later statement by St Petersburg governor A. Beglov (Interfax, 09:30 Moscow time, 18 Oct); Leningrad region governor: 145 drones downed (earlier 126–127) |
| 18 Oct 2026 | Sloviansk, 17 Oct: 3 killed, 16 injured | 6 killed, 15 injured | Toll for the day of 17 Oct from the Sloviansk city military administration (V. Liakh), morning of 18 Oct: some victims were killed by FPV drones; bodies remain under the rubble; map and timeline updated |
| 18 Oct 2026 | Zaporizhzhia, 18 Oct: 1 killed, 1 injured | 1 killed, 2 injured incl. a girl (6) | Updated count from the Zaporizhzhia regional military administration (M. Semikin): two overnight strikes; map and timeline updated |
| 18 Oct 2026 | Nights or days with 100+ drones and missiles, 16 Sep – 17 Oct: 26 | 27 (16 Sep – 18 Oct) | Overnight wave of 17–18 Oct (180 drones and an Iskander-M ballistic missile, Air Force) added to the strike log; strike log PDF re-issued (v5) |
| 18 Oct 2026 | Poltava, 17 Oct: 1 killed, 2 injured | 1 killed, 4 injured | Updated count from the Poltava regional military administration (V. Diakivnych); map and timeline updated |
| 18 Oct 2026 | Nights or days with 100+ drones and missiles, 16 Sep – 17 Oct: 25 | 26 | Daytime wave of 17 Oct (157 drones and 6 Banderol missiles, Air Force) added to the strike log; strike log PDF re-issued (v4) |
| 17 Oct 2026 | Calendar: "36th meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (NATO HQ), 15 Oct 2026" | Entry removed | The source announced the meeting of 15 Oct 2025, not 2026; no UDCG meeting on 15 Oct 2026 has been announced or reported (2026 meetings: 12 Jan, 15 Apr, 18 Jun, September online) |
| 17 Oct 2026 | Sloviansk, 17 Oct: 1 killed, 10 injured | 3 killed, 16 injured | Injured in the 03:40 strike rose to 13 (as of 13:06); a second strike around 09:20 killed 2 and injured 3 (Sloviansk city military administration); map and timeline updated |
| 17 Oct 2026 | Kherson, 17 Oct: 1 killed, 22 injured | 1 killed, 37 injured in the city (Kherson region over the day: 1 killed, 40 injured incl. 3 children) | Kherson regional prosecutor's office, as of 17:30: 35 injured in the 04:00 aerial-bomb strike, an ambulance driver killed in a repeat strike on the same address, 2 injured by a drone; map and timeline updated |
| 16 Oct 2026 | Strike log, 15–16 Oct: "Over the day 3 killed (Kherson region 2, Kramatorsk 1)" | At least 4 killed (Kherson region 2, Kramatorsk 1, Manevychi 1) | Volyn regional administration reported 1 killed and 8 injured at an enterprise in Manevychi in the same overnight attack (16 Oct); site and strike log PDF updated |
| 16 Oct 2026 | Nights or days with 100+ drones and missiles, 16 Sep – 16 Oct: "at least 21" (site); strike log PDF: 22 to 14 Oct | 24 (every row of the strike log, 16 Sep – 16 Oct, incl. two daytime waves) | Recounted row by row from the strike log table; the earlier site figure under-counted rows, and the PDF had not been re-issued since 14 Oct (now v2) |
| 16 Oct 2026 | 17,257 civilians killed incl. 835 children, 53,693 injured (OHCHR, as of 31 Aug 2026); "+55% Jan–Aug 2026 vs 2025" | 17,605 killed, 55,846 injured (as of 30 Sep 2026); "+59% Jan–Sep 2026 vs 2025" (2,570 killed, 15,211 injured) | OHCHR September 2026 update (16 Oct) replaced the August figures on the home indicators and the pulse; the child total is not repeated until OHCHR states it in text |
| 15 Oct 2026 | Map: "Volyn region · 15 Oct", 6 killed (night of 14–15 Oct); "Lutsk · 14 Oct", 3 killed | "Lutsk · 14 Oct", 6 killed, 12 injured; the separate Volyn entry removed | The six deaths in Volyn were the 14 Oct daytime strike on a Lutsk market (Lutsk City Council; Volyn regional administration), already on the map with an early toll of 3 |
| 14 Oct 2026 | "509 civilians" (Bucha Wall of Remembrance, used in some speeches) | "residents of the Bucha community killed during the occupation" | The wall includes local defence volunteers, as its plaques state; the legal record (OHCHR: 73 by name) never relied on the memorial |
| 14 Oct 2026 | July 2026: 286 killed (preliminary) | 448 killed | OHCHR revision in the September update after verification of July incidents |
| 14 Oct 2026 | 16,431 civilians killed incl. 803 children (OHCHR, as of 30 Jun 2026); "+37% H1 2026 vs H1 2025" | 17,257 incl. 835 children (as of 31 Aug 2026); "+55% Jan–Aug 2026 vs 2025" | OHCHR August 2026 update (16 Sep) and USG DiCarlo's Security Council briefing of 23 Sep replaced the mid-year figures |
| 14 Oct 2026 | Zaporizhzhia, 10 Oct: "20 killed incl. 3 children; five-storey block" | 23 killed incl. 4 children, 32 injured incl. 3 children; entrance section of a three-storey block | SES Zaporizhzhia region final report of 11 Oct (search and rescue completed) replaces the 10 Oct interim count; map, card, brief and the derived weekly total (99 → 98) updated; PDF re-issued as v2 |
| 14 Oct 2026 | Pryluky: "19 killed" (UN briefing, 9 Oct) | 22 killed (SES final) | Both figures shown with their dates; the UN figure was given before rescue work ended |
| 14 Oct 2026 | Map period "Oct 2026", 7 entries | 16 Sep – 14 Oct 2026, 28 entries | Full sweep of the four-week window; earlier version under-counted strikes |
| 14 Oct 2026 | "130,000+ war-crime proceedings" (Prosecutor General) | 225,000+ war crimes of 256,000+ crimes linked to the aggression; 1,191 suspects, 856 indicted, 254 convicted | Figure replaced with the latest published OPG total (7 May 2026; ZMINA, UNN). Earlier figure was out of date |
| 14 Oct 2026 | Map period limited to Oct 2026 | 2022–2026 by year | Site update v0.4 |
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Files and integrity
SHA-256 of every PDF published on this site. A file whose hash does not match was not published here — relevant for a resource that fact-checks forgeries.
| File | SHA-256 | Size |
|---|---|---|
| beyond-apt28-spd-czechia-2024.pdf | 0ac523900382fa6ee7510cd744ae9a292740df8f840d49d473d375ca28c186ef | 43 KB |
| beyond-bulgaria-arms-depot-explosions.pdf | f6baf46ef667033c8b1bee5b80b0dc5c51aeb9a24300ee22fb811d6383c19665 | 44 KB |
| beyond-bulgarian-spy-ring-uk-2020-2023.pdf | 2d84a8bd4dfceb2cf4c962f6c983340a5ea5344a32163e43392ff0cf969e1dac | 42 KB |
| beyond-bundestag-hack-2015.pdf | 0c57d6b419c8d35b21834d10ecc26adbf6b1a60644b3dba45d56168b7613f9df | 41 KB |
| beyond-car-gold-sanctions.pdf | 7f4cc3b013b5a791bbe303e086d8bb50ea12ab12a8336e9d4efbfb967f68775d | 43 KB |
| beyond-car-panel-of-experts-2021.pdf | 3303e4bead7fd415250537597127f260ca4b4a792cd0cfb5f929a71088889430 | 43 KB |
| beyond-car-un-experts-2021.pdf | 769be49796c24dcf8a1627581852157e8a4c57f35c6bf61c22c55c08bef601c6 | 42 KB |
| beyond-dhl-dpd-incendiary-parcels-2024.pdf | fb3f4b5c9d15b874126c5b737d11e7060b1c7407f7fc2bffcacaac61daecf8a1 | 42 KB |
| beyond-estonia-cyberattacks-2007.pdf | 03cf668a86e0cbe2532d0b8471fef303e30af2594fb6db54b8aabc2718c90c7b | 43 KB |
| beyond-estonia-interior-minister-car-attack-2023.pdf | e20d4dcff79769303bb6e657f0ace8c8fccb8efb136a56d934a323903f57def7 | 42 KB |
| beyond-estonia-mig31-airspace-2025-09.pdf | f61bf2c84014e2978ede3f2e98dac4fe9a391c8cd0337e4c6f0f9519e13925d9 | 43 KB |
| beyond-estonia-milrem-arson-2026.pdf | d553382e7a2744dad0b746bc2a6a89abe871a8af6b0b6ec9ea090c8303a1593f | 40 KB |
| beyond-estonia-slava-ukraini-restaurant-arson-2025.pdf | e5735c7d5144db8fd0b17a833994222468075c621015fafec0b606c07a2bb2ca | 41 KB |
| beyond-eu-wagner-sanctions.pdf | 08ad43716fc6a3750fe98ca48a37671d3d73618a4c684ef70c7bfbe078347c06 | 42 KB |
| beyond-france-apt28-attribution-2025.pdf | 4eee9fb20a29e6f5bcb4d820d0e46b916c0cc38752315f32d771fbedc19a1bf9 | 42 KB |
| beyond-frankfurt-ukrainian-veteran-plot-2024.pdf | ed1275e50fe3f665649c578ed15f90257a6f9ddb5694e5b3e78bbc0d42e360c7 | 40 KB |
| beyond-gebrev-sofia-2015.pdf | 0a3ff9ccbb401f3237a04ed4627dfa4355e03643fb78fe35719a7af4865f9042 | 41 KB |
| beyond-germany-dfs-cyberattack-2024.pdf | cd575d811bbb45755a1dcd91e7979db296ba1f9b0e9015c292fd0aa562b9fc81 | 41 KB |
| beyond-germany-dieter-s-sabotage-plot-2024.pdf | cf53364dcd943d5b58feba5a3842cc6405b4e6603b75267a59567b635849900f | 41 KB |
| beyond-germany-leipzig-airport-explosive-drone-2026.pdf | f8aae74d262b89b8f2a191cba760f1333c897abdee0952ae2c0cbe4a9bedda0c | 42 KB |
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| beyond-germany-storm1516-election-2025.pdf | 9fab991419721242de9899e50b64b4c31b7d14e6d1129dd1c437b56fdf9015e9 | 41 KB |
| beyond-gnss-interference-icao-2025.pdf | 5c7e8cb1debd090c05079d58827c49ab195e93d2c4fbfe4c2b5b60b2f1833c83 | 44 KB |
| beyond-israilov-vienna-2009.pdf | 0a107f408a64fbd3a0563f9a57440b15b1bb6309ae5f6be0e5ee3531d0babb5e | 42 KB |
| beyond-khangoshvili-berlin-2019.pdf | e449c9bd260518d18901b20b54b426bcae65b4b2ee109ce10954da99aab7ef93 | 41 KB |
| beyond-libya-wagner-panel-2021.pdf | 02e50a988b86114d7ae5f6295809e617554846287e0dcc5a1bf88520956d1c5f | 43 KB |
| beyond-lithuania-ikea-vilnius-arson-2024.pdf | ee7ba5119251e009001a7063fe2dbb4989ec78b71efc27108a41cc3faf403c1d | 43 KB |
| beyond-litvinenko-london-2006.pdf | 918001b5949c4e83e6c9e14464fcc3ce81564cb73d1f20781d035c344e77e92d | 42 KB |
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Open data
All figures on this site, with source, date and tier, as one JSON file — licence CC BY 4.0, attribution "Ukraine Evidence Hub". Partners may embed and republish; the live file is at /data/hub.json and is refreshed with every release.
Update log
Every change to the site, newest first. Corrections to figures are listed separately in the corrections log above.
| v1.5.7 · 19 Oct | Map: Russia dropped four guided aerial bombs on Kushuhum, Zaporizhzhia region, on the morning of 19 Oct, killing a man of 57 and damaging private houses (regional authorities, Tier B) |
| v1.5.7 · 19 Oct | Case file 15 — Nova Vodolaha: a Russian attack drone hit a town park in Kharkiv region, killing 6, three of them children, incl. an infant, and injuring 15, seven of them children (regional authorities, preliminary) |
| v1.5.7 · 19 Oct | Case file 14 — Oleshky: Ukraine's Ombudsman says talks with Russia on a ceasefire and evacuation directly to Ukrainian-controlled territory have reached "the final details"; no agreement yet |
| v1.5.7 · 19 Oct | Map: Russian shelling killed one resident each in Kramatorsk and Druzhkivka on 18 Oct (Donetsk regional authorities). Strike log: 28 mass air attacks since 16 Sep, PDF updated |
| v1.5.7 · 19 Oct | Cost of the war: a radar station near Trubchevsk (Bryansk region) and ammunition depots in occupied Donetsk region hit, says Ukraine's General Staff (Tier B) |
| v1.5.6 · 19 Oct | Every figure, row and card on the site can now be added to My brief and printed. Source titles on Beyond Ukraine and Sanctions are translated into all six languages |
| v1.5.5 · 19 Oct | Kryvyi Rih: a Russian missile strike on an industrial enterprise killed 2 and injured 7, incl. a boy of 15 (regional authorities). Irpin after the night attack: 1 killed, 17 injured incl. 8 children (Kyiv region). Russia claims Omelnyk — unconfirmed |
| v1.5.4 · 19 Oct | Strike log, map and timeline: night of 18–19 Oct — 269 drones plus ballistic and cruise missiles, hits at 25 locations (Air Force). Irpin: a woman killed, 6 injured incl. 3 children, 3 missing; Kyiv toll now 1 killed, 8 injured (regional authorities) |
| v1.5.3 · 19 Oct | Map and timeline: Kyiv, night of 18–19 Oct — a second Russian missile strike damaged a metro station on the left bank and hit a 25-storey residential building in the Solomianskyi district; toll now 1 killed (a woman, 21) and 3 injured (Kyiv mayor V. Klitschko; corrections log) |
| v1.5.2 · 18 Oct | Map and timeline: Kyiv, evening of 18 Oct — a Russian missile strike hit a medical centre building in the Desnianskyi district and a non-residential building in the Dniprovskyi district; one person killed, two injured (Kyiv city military administration, preliminary) |
| v1.5.1 · 18 Oct | New: a Contact section for media and researchers — how to cite the record (CC BY 4.0, no permission needed), the reliability tiers A/B/C, ready-to-use case files, fact-checks, open data and card images, and one address for questions, data extracts and background briefings. Corrections and requests are in the same place. |
| v1.4.0 · 17 Oct | New section: Calendar — where Ukraine is on the agenda in the coming months (UN bodies in New York, Geneva, Vienna, The Hague, London and Montreal; OSCE, NATO, EU, Council of Europe, G20 and coalition formats), with what to bring to each meeting, tiers A/B, an ICS feed and a weekly "Week ahead" subscription; My brief — mark case files, UN statements and figures as you read and print them as one document; reading layer: mobile menu, page contents, show-more lists, period filters, "new since your last visit", search over the sanctions registers, charts, print styles; Subscribe: topics for the strike log, Beyond Ukraine, Sanctions, Cost of the war and Week ahead, rhythm explained; Open data, RSS feeds, calendar and widgets on the Data page; automatic daily intake of General Staff losses, OFAC actions, UN noon briefings, OHCHR updates and schedule pages; weekly link check with archived copies; faster pages (translations loaded on demand) |
| v1.5.0 · 18 Oct | Fact-check 04 — Oleshky. Moscow now calls the town's situation "critical" and "a tragedy" and blames Kyiv for blockading a town Russia has held since 2022. None of eight Russian statements proposes the evacuation the UN, the ICRC and the Pope asked for |
| v1.5.0 · 18 Oct | Case file 14 — Oleshky: about 1,700 people, 47 of them children, trapped in a town Russia has held since 2022. No food by road since 26 May (UN monitoring mission); Ukraine drops food by drone. Six-page dossier with testimonies of those who got out |
| v1.5.0 · 18 Oct | Map & data: one map for the whole war — the front line since 24 Feb 2022 with a time slider, Russian strikes and their distance from the front, and Russia's capture claims checked against the record (0 of 14 confirmed since 1 Oct) |
| v1.5.0 · 18 Oct | Cost of the war: Daily tally of Russia's losses (General Staff of Ukraine, with independent floors from Oryx and Mediazona/BBC) and a register of struck objects in Russia and occupied territory — refineries, ports, data centres — each as PDF and image |
| v1.4.14 · 18 Oct | The cost of the war for Russia: St Petersburg and Leningrad region, night of 18 Oct — the regional health committee now reports 10 injured in Leningrad region, including 5 children (corrections log) |
| v1.4.13 · 18 Oct | Map and timeline: Sumy, 17 Oct — toll revised to 2 killed and 3 injured in the Sumy community: a man killed by guided bombs and another by a drone (Sumy regional police; corrections log) |
| v1.4.12 · 18 Oct | The cost of the war for Russia: St Petersburg, night of 18 Oct — the city governor now reports 1 killed and 5 injured and fires at the oil terminal, the Ruchyi oil depot and Kolpino warehouses (corrections log); General Staff: a Russian attack-drone launch site near Donetsk and a vehicle repair base near Sukhodilsk hit |
| v1.4.11 · 18 Oct | The cost of the war for Russia: St Petersburg oil terminal, night of 18 Oct — fire after a drone attack, confirmed by the city governor; about 20,000 people without power in Leningrad region (regional governor) |
| v1.4.11 · 18 Oct | Map and timeline: Sloviansk, 17 Oct — toll revised to 6 killed, 15 injured (Sloviansk city military administration); Zaporizhzhia, 18 Oct — two overnight strikes, 2 injured incl. a girl (6) |
| v1.4.11 · 18 Oct | Strike log: night of 17–18 Oct — 180 drones and an Iskander-M ballistic missile, 152 drones downed, hits at 20 locations (Air Force); 27 mass attacks since 16 Sep; strike log PDF re-issued (v5, six languages) |
| v1.4.10 · 18 Oct | Map and timeline: Zaporizhzhia, night of 18 Oct — a strike on a multi-storey residential building killed a 27-year-old woman and injured another woman (Zaporizhzhia regional military administration, preliminary); Poltava, 17 Oct: injured revised from 2 to 4 |
| v1.4.10 · 18 Oct | Strike log: daytime wave of 17 Oct — 157 drones and 6 Banderol missiles, 140 drones and all missiles downed (Air Force); 26 mass attacks since 16 Sep; strike log PDF re-issued (v4, six languages) |
| v1.4.9 · 17 Oct | Map and timeline: Poltava, evening of 17 Oct — a drone strike on a private residential area killed one person and injured two; four houses damaged (Poltava regional military administration, preliminary) |
| v1.4.8 · 17 Oct | Case file 13 (Vinnytsia) updated to v2: 6 injured in the region, 1 in intensive care; 24 drones downed over the region; by the evening power was back at the water station; Russia's MoD statement of 17 Oct names Kryvyi Rih, Zaporizhzhia and Zhytomyr but not Vinnytsia. One-pager in six languages |
| v1.4.8 · 17 Oct | Open data: every figure on the site — indicators, strike log, incidents, UN record — as one file at /data/hub.json, refreshed with every release |
| v1.4.7 · 17 Oct | Calendar: the European Council of 15–16 Oct now links to its adopted conclusions, which include Ukraine |
| v1.4.7 · 17 Oct | Map and timeline: Kherson, 17 Oct — a repeat aerial-bomb strike on the same address killed an ambulance driver, 37 injured incl. a one-month-old baby; Sloviansk, 17 Oct — a second glide-bomb strike, toll now 3 killed, 16 injured |
| v1.4.6 · 17 Oct | Strike log PDF re-issued (v3, 16 Sep – 17 Oct, six languages) with the 16–17 Oct row: 25 mass attacks in one month |
| v1.4.6 · 17 Oct | Case file 13: Vinnytsia left without electricity and water pumping after the night of 16–17 Oct — 332 drones, Iskander-M/KN-23, Kh-22/32 and 4 Kalibr missiles; no ballistic missile reported intercepted; 15+ power facilities attacked (Air Force, President of Ukraine, Vinnytsia authorities · tier B). One-pager PDF in six languages |
| v1.4.5 · 17 Oct | Case file 13: Vinnytsia left without power after the night strike of 16–17 Oct — 332 drones and ballistic, cruise and Kalibr missiles, more than 15 power facilities attacked; one-pager in six languages; Case file 11 moved to the Archive |
| v1.4.5 · 17 Oct | Strike log and map: 16–17 Oct — 332 drones and missiles, hits at 22 locations; Kherson, Sumy and Sloviansk, 17 Oct — 1 killed in each |
| v1.4.5 · 17 Oct | UN on the record: IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi, 16 Oct — diesel at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant running low before winter |
| v1.4.5 · 17 Oct | Sanctions — easing: US Executive Order of 16 Oct waives the tariffs and secondary sanctions of the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026; existing Russia sanctions unaffected |
| v1.4.5 · 17 Oct | The cost of the war for Russia: railway bridge over the Unecha (Bryansk region), 16–17 Oct; drone maker near Lenina (Rostov region), 16 Oct; supply depots in occupied Donetsk region; missile-brigade supply depot near Latyshi (Bryansk region), 12 Oct |
| v1.4.4 · 17 Oct | Social media: a daily plan of about ten posts (Russian losses, strike log, case files, UN on the record, sanctions, calendar, cost of the war, Beyond Ukraine, verified figures, economy) with cards; X account @UkraineEvidence |
| v1.4.1 · 17 Oct | Telegram channel: new update-log rows and the Monday "Week ahead" are posted as cards; link previews of the site now carry a card image (og:image); social cards available at /cards/ |
| v1.3.4 · 16 Oct | The cost of the war for Russia: two communications towers, Olenivka area (Crimea), 15–16 Oct; Ryazan refinery: primary unit shut down after the 15 Oct attack (Reuters) |
| v1.3.4 · 16 Oct | Sanctions: EU listings of 77 persons over the Duma elections held in occupied Ukrainian territory (12 Oct) |
| v1.3.3 · 16 Oct | Sanctions: EU listings of 1,569 individuals and companies (12 Oct) and of 3 individuals and 9 entities for circumvention (15 Oct); UK package of 38 designations (8 Oct) |
| v1.3.3 · 16 Oct | The cost of the war for Russia: Nebo-U radar near Magri (Krasnodar region) and two radars and an EW station in Bryansk region, 15–16 Oct |
| v1.3.3 · 16 Oct | Map and timeline: Dnipro, 16 Oct — 1 killed, 4 injured; Nikopol district, 16 Oct — 1 killed, 2 injured |
| v1.3.2 · 16 Oct | Case files 09–11: official photographs of the State Emergency Service added to the cards and one-page PDFs; The cost of the war for Russia: 5 military assets and 6 damaged facilities, 9–16 Oct 2026 |
| v1.3.1 · 16 Oct | Case files 09–12: Kyiv, 25 Sep; Dnipro, 22 and 28 Sep; Nikopol district, 16 Sep; Sumy, 26 Sep — cards and one-page PDFs in six languages; the Case files page now shows the ten latest files and the Home page ten latest items; The cost of the war for Russia: latest additions and new military assets and damaged facilities (to 9 Oct) |
| v1.3.0 · 16 Oct | New sections: Sanctions — the legal acts, registers of sanctioned companies, individuals and vessels from nine official lists (updated daily), gaps between the lists, the makers of the weapons in our case files, and what has been lifted or eased; The cost of the war for Russia — people, equipment, military assets, damaged facilities, violence by returning soldiers and the economy |
| v1.2.2 · 16 Oct | Strike log and map: Manevychi (Volyn region), 15–16 Oct — 1 killed, 8 injured; toll for the night raised to 4 killed; Kharkiv, 16 Oct — 2 killed, 12 injured; UN record: IOM, 16 Oct; timeline to 16 Oct |
| v1.2.1 · 16 Oct | Permanent pages for every case file, fact-check and UN record entry, in six languages, so that each can be found by search engines and linked directly |
| v1.2.0 · 16 Oct | New home page: latest Russian strikes and what is new on the site at the top, key figures in a column on the right; the brief is now assembled automatically from the newest items; timeline, archive documents and data tables listed newest first |
| v1.1.6 · 16 Oct | Strike log PDF re-issued (v2, 16 Sep – 16 Oct, six languages) with the 14–15 and 15–16 Oct rows; count of mass-attack nights or days corrected to 24 |
| v1.1.5 · 16 Oct | OHCHR September update: monthly pulse (chart, table, PDF in six languages) and home indicators updated; UN record: HRMMU, 16 Oct; strike log: 15–16 Oct; timeline to 16 Oct |
| v1.1.4 · 15 Oct | Case files: six files; killed-on-these-cards figure updated to 115 (2–15 Oct) to include Case file 08 |
| v1.1.3 · 15 Oct | UN record: briefers named (Stéphane Dujarric, Farhan Haq); OCHA, 13 Oct (Kyiv and Kharkiv) added |
| v1.1.2 · 15 Oct | Case file 08 — 850+ attack drones in 33 hours, 14–15 Oct (Lutsk, Kropyvnytskyi): card, one-pager PDF in six languages; strike log and map updated |
| v0.4.2 · 14 Oct | Full Spanish version of every page; Prosecutor General figures updated to 7 May 2026 |
| v1.1 · 15 Oct | New section "Beyond Ukraine": Russia's attacks and operations in other countries since 2004 — killings, sabotage, airspace violations, cyber operations, election interference, Wagner and Africa Corps — each with its degree of proof, sources and a one-page PDF in six languages |
| v1.0 · 15 Oct | The site is live at ukraine-evidence.org; e-mail subscriptions by topic, language and frequency, confirmed by e-mail in six languages; privacy note on subscriber data |
| v0.10 · 15 Oct | Links inside each language open the material in that language; PDF buttons download the file; two new pattern files — sexual violence (PF-04) and nuclear safety (PF-05) — in six languages; private usage statistics without cookies or personal data; release gate: nothing is published until every language is complete |
| v0.9 · 15 Oct | Full versions in French, Spanish, Russian, Arabic and Chinese: every page, every figure label and every PDF (case files, pattern files, fact-check dossiers, brief, pulse, strike log) in its own language; PDF buttons open the version in the reader’s language; typography adjusted for Cyrillic, Arabic and Chinese |
| v0.8 · 15 Oct | Emblem in the header and favicon; slogan "The record Russia cannot deny"; language selector as a dropdown in the header; audience wording removed; "The named" on Accountability — ICC warrants, convictions in absentia and abroad, notices of suspicion, sanctions and dossiers, with links to the official registers; indicator on Home |
| v0.7 · 14 Oct | "UN on the record" page: Secretary-General, Spokesperson, Council briefers, OHCHR and OCHA statements, 23 Sep – 14 Oct, with filters, Cite/Link and official-record links; UN entries reused on Home, the Brief and Fact-check 03; DSNS photographs (CC BY 4.0) and "Official media" links on all five case files; photo-and-video policy and DSNS-as-data-source on the Method page; Zaporizhzhia corrected to the SES closing figure (23 killed incl. 4 children); Fact-check 03 expanded to a six-page dossier; "UN statements" subscription category |
| v0.6 · 14 Oct | Permalinks and "Link" on every figure; "Report an error" on every card and claim; Requests & corrections page; narrative shift tracker; source and archived-copy links on every watch-log entry; sources register (all external links); "What we do not know"; file hashes; open-data JSON; PDFs for Fact-check 03, the Brief and the monthly pulse; UN calendar; evidence-chain line on each case file; offline support scaffold |
| v0.5 · 14 Oct | Five new case files with one-pager PDFs (Pryluky, Kramatorsk, Zaporizhzhia, Kyiv energy, Kharkiv); three pattern files as PDFs; Fact-check 03 (Nebenzia, 9 Oct) and 15 new disinformation-watch entries; incident map extended to 28 entries for 16 Sep – 14 Oct; strike log of 22 mass attacks; OHCHR figures updated to 31 Aug 2026; report links on every indicator tile; institutional references removed |
| v0.4 · 14 Oct | Brief page; pattern files (energy, children, prisoners); Cite buttons; site search; map by year; "what happened next"; UN-vs-national explainer; corrections log; Subscribe by category; six-language pages (scaffold) |
| v0.3 · 14 Oct | Sources directory with Ukrainian State bodies; archive with UN document table; distribution lists |
| v0.2 · 14 Oct | Disinformation watch (four layers); archive timeline; brighter palette |
| v0.1 · 13 Oct | First version: home, case files, fact-checks, data, accountability, method |
Sources · who verifies what
The directory behind every figure on this site. Tier A bodies carry a UN or court mandate; Tier B are Ukrainian State bodies with a statutory recording function; Tier C are independent investigations and academic trackers. Each row: what the body records, how often it publishes, and where it feeds on this site.
What the State bodies record now B
National registers, shown as such. Where a Tier A body measures the same thing (UNESCO, WHO), the UN figure leads on the thematic page and the national figure stands beside it.
A UN-mandated and judicial
| Body | What it records | Cadence | On this site |
|---|---|---|---|
| OHCHR / Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine | Civilian casualties (killed/injured, by weapon, region, age); summary executions; POW treatment; thematic reports | Monthly update, 10th–16th; half-year and annual reports | Pulse, indicators, all case files |
| Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine | Legal findings: war crimes, crimes against humanity; patterns (torture, deportation, energy strikes) | Reports to HRC (Mar) and GA (Oct); conference-room papers | Legal qualification layer "Established" |
| International Criminal Court | Arrest warrants, case status | Per decision | Accountability |
| International Court of Justice | Ukraine v. Russia (Genocide Convention); 2017 case (ICSFT/CERD) | Per order/judgment | Archive timeline |
| UNESCO | Verified damage to cultural sites (own satellite verification) | Running list, updated monthly | Planned: heritage case file |
| IAEA | Zaporizhzhia NPP and nuclear safety incidents | Updates per event; weekly during escalation | Planned: ZNPP case file |
| WHO Surveillance System for Attacks on Health Care | Verified attacks on health facilities, staff, transport | Continuous dashboard | Planned: health-care indicator |
| Register of Damage for Ukraine (Council of Europe) | Claims by category (housing, injury, death, etc.) | Statistics per category | Accountability; asks |
B Ukrainian State bodies
| Body · resource | What it records | Cadence | On this site |
|---|---|---|---|
| Office of the Prosecutor General · warcrimes.gov.ua, war.gp.gov.ua | Registered crimes linked to the aggression (256,000+, of which 225,000+ war crimes, 7 May 2026); suspects (1,191), indictments (856), verdicts (254); evidence intake | Cumulative totals in periodic briefings; per case | Case files (status), accountability |
| Commissioner for Human Rights (Ombudsman) · childrenofwar.gov.ua | Deported/forcibly transferred children; returned; missing; civilians in detention | Running; official totals monthly | Indicators, flow diagram, children case file |
| Bring Kids Back UA (Office of the President) | Returns by channel; mediation partners | Per return | Children case file |
| Coordination HQ for the Treatment of POWs | Exchanges, returns, numbers held; conditions of captivity | Per exchange; monthly summaries | Planned: POW case file (Olenivka, executions) |
| National Police · War Crimes Department | Exhumations, identifications, solved cases per location (e.g. Bucha: 72 murders solved) | Per operation | Case files |
| Security Service of Ukraine | Identification of perpetrators and units; interceptions; notices of suspicion | Per case | Chain of command |
| Defence Intelligence (HUR) | Unit identification; personnel lists of implicated formations | Per release | Chain of command |
| Air Force of Ukraine | Launched / intercepted missiles and drones per attack | Daily, ~10:00 after a strike | Strike anatomy, incident map |
| State Emergency Service | Rescue operations, casualties at the site, damage to buildings | Per incident, hourly updates | Case cards (first 24 h) |
| Regional military administrations | Casualties and damage by region; evacuations | Per incident | Incident map |
| Ministry of Culture · culture crimes register | Damaged heritage sites (1,783) and cultural facilities (2,540) as of May 2026, by region and type | Monthly | Planned: heritage case file |
| Ministry of Environment · EcoZagroza app, State Ecological Inspectorate | Environmental damage cases (4,200+), monetary assessment (UAH 2.4 trn+), Kakhovka dam | Running; annual assessment | Planned: environment case file |
| Ministry of Health | Health facilities damaged or destroyed (781 institutions, ~2,400 facilities) | Per attack; periodic totals | Planned: health-care indicator (cross-check with WHO) |
| Ministry of Education · saveschools.in.ua | Educational institutions damaged/destroyed, with map | Running | Planned: education indicator |
| Ministry of Energy · Ukrenergo · DTEK | Strikes on the grid, outages, capacity lost | Per attack; seasonal reports | Energy case file (planned), incident map |
| Ministry of Justice · humanrights.gov.ua (interagency platform) | Evidence for ECHR and ICJ proceedings; forensic missions | Per filing | Accountability |
| Ministry of Foreign Affairs · war.ukraine.ua/russia-war-crimes | Public archive of crimes for foreign audiences; MFA statements | Running | Archive; cross-link |
| Ministry of Digital Transformation · Diia, єВорог bot | Citizen reports of property damage; perpetrator identification tips | Running | Not cited directly (intake, not verified output) |
C Independent and academic
| Body | What it records | On this site |
|---|---|---|
| Kyiv School of Economics · "Russia Will Pay" | Direct damage to infrastructure by sector, USD (155 bn as of Jan 2024; updated semi-annually) | Planned: damage indicator |
| Maxar Technologies; Planet | Satellite imagery, dated passes | Case files |
| NYT / AP / Reuters visual investigations; Bellingcat; Centre for Information Resilience (Eyes on Russia) | Geolocated incident verification; unit identification; disinformation analysis | Case files, fact-checks |
| Yale Humanitarian Research Lab | Children's deportation infrastructure; filtration sites | Children case file |
| Truth Hounds; MIHR; ZMINA; Ukrainian Helsinki Union; ULAG (Ukraine 5 AM Coalition) | Field documentation; trial monitoring (e.g. Bucha verdicts) | Case files, accountability |
| EU, UK, US, Canada sanctions registers; OpenSanctions | Status of individuals and units | Chain of command, fact-checks |
Sources register · every link on this site
Generated from the page itself: every external link, where it is used, and an archived copy. Access date for this version: 14 Oct 2026. If a link dies, the archive holds the page as it was when cited.
| Used on | Link | Archive |
|---|
Rule of use
A Tier B or C figure is shown with its label until a Tier A body publishes the same measure; then the Tier A figure leads and the national figure is shown beside it as "national data". Intake platforms (reporting bots, Diia) are never cited as counts — only the verified outputs of the bodies that process them.
Archive · since 24 February 2022
Two layers of memory. Left: the documented record — key incidents, UN findings and accountability steps, year by year, so a newcomer sees the pattern in five minutes. Right: every official document Ukraine has circulated at the United Nations, searchable by year, type and subject, with the UN symbol that makes it citable.
Curated; figures as verified at the time of the entry. Each incident will link to its case file as the series is built.
Official documents circulated by Ukraine
| Symbol | Date | Subject |
|---|
Seeded from the UN Digital Library (letters from the Permanent Representative or Chargé d'affaires a.i. of Ukraine addressed to the Secretary-General, 2025–2026 sample). The full series since 2022 — several hundred letters, mostly under the Eleventh Emergency Special Session (A/ES-11/…) — is added by import from the Library; each row then links to the six-language PDF. Mission statements, Arria-formula concept notes and side-event materials form a second table once their files are supplied.
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Choose what you want to receive, in which language, and how often. One e-mail per item from the Hub's official address, plain text, PDF attached, link to the live page. Unsubscribe in one click from any message. Addresses are used only for the categories you select.
Prefer a channel to e-mail? Telegram · t.me/ukraine_evidence, X · @UkraineEvidence, Bluesky · @ukraine-evidence.org, Facebook · Ukraine Evidence Hub, Instagram · @ukraine.evidence and WhatsApp channel carry the same record as cards: new case files, UN statements, sanctions, the cost of the war, and every Monday the week ahead.
Contact: corrections, requests, media
Three ways to reach the editors, all answered within 48 hours by a person. Corrections are published in the log on the Method page with the date and the reason. There are no public comments on this site by design.
What this is. A public, verified record of Russia's crimes in Ukraine and of Russian hostile acts abroad. Every figure carries its source, date and reliability tier: A — UN-mandated bodies, B — Ukrainian authorities, C — independent researchers. Legal language is kept in three layers: what is established, what is a pattern, what is a position.
How to cite. "Ukraine Evidence Hub, [section], accessed [date], ukraine-evidence.org", and the original source named on the item. Licence: CC BY 4.0. No permission is needed.
Ready to use. Case files and fact-checks as PDFs in six languages; open data (JSON, CSV), RSS feeds, a calendar file and embeddable widgets; a card image for every update, free to post with a link back.
Questions, data extracts, background briefings. [email protected], or a message to the Telegram bot @Ukraine_evidence_bot. Please say what you are working on and your deadline.
The report and request buttons open your mail client with the request pre-filled, addressed to [email protected].
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