One place for the documented record: United Nations findings first, Ukrainian national data second, independent investigations third — always labelled, always dated.
Status · 23 Oct 2026
In the last 24 hours: three Russian aerial bombs on a residential area of Kramatorsk on 23 October killed one person and injured six, three of them children (regional prosecutor's office); strikes on Dnipro destroyed a private house, killing one person and injuring eight, with three more injured in Pidhorodne community (regional military administration, as of 18:30). Overnight Russia launched 176 drones, with hits at 19 locations (Air Force). The White House announced a US-brokered local ceasefire in occupied Oleshky from 29 October to let aid in and civilians out; the Kremlin confirmed it, saying the evacuation will take at least several days.
What was added or changed, newest first. Each line opens the page it refers to.
Latest
Case file
Kyiv: an operating theatre in daylightKyiv and Kyiv region · 20–21 Oct 2026 · day and night
The 24-storey apartment block in Sviatoshynskyi district, Kyiv, after the drone strike, early morning of 21 Oct. Photo: State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · 2026-10-21 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
6 killed · 2 medical facilities hit in daylight. A drone hit the operating theatre of the Strazhesko Institute of Cardiology, wounding a patient — the second strike on the institute. Three killed by a highway in Chabany, one at a petrol station, two in a 24-storey apartment block overnight.
Prime Minister; Kyiv mayor and city military administration; Kyiv regional prosecutor's office · Tier B · preliminary
Blind spots that are not thereRussia's Arria-formula meeting · UN Security Council · 14 Oct 2026
The UN records both sides — Russia lets it see only one. 75 of 134 Russian POWs held by Ukraine and 124 of 129 Ukrainian POWs released by Russia described ill-treatment. Nebenzia misquoted the Committee against Torture; none of the 14 other members backed the claims.
OHCHR, 29 Jun 2026 · CAT/C/UKR/CO/7 · UN Web TV · Tier A
Nova Vodolaha: a drone on a town parkKharkiv region · 19 Oct 2026 · afternoon
The central park of Nova Vodolaha after the drone strike, 19 Oct. Photo: State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · 2026-10-19 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
6 killed, two of them children, girls aged 1 and 11 · 15 injured, seven of them children. A Geran-3 attack drone hit the central park while families were walking there. No military object has been named.
Kharkiv regional military administration; regional prosecutor's office · Tier B · preliminary
Oleshky: a town starved under occupation~1,700 people trapped · no food by road since 26 May · ceasefire due 29 Oct
Oleshky before the full-scale invasion: the central square, 2007. Photo: Gottinight · 2007 · CC BY-SA 3.0 · original ↗
"People can't get out, food can't get in." Russia has held the town and every road into it since 2022; Ukraine drops food by drone, and a list of evacuees was agreed with Russia — 358 people verified for immediate evacuation, the ICRC ready. Russia confirmed nothing for five months; on 23 Oct the White House announced a local ceasefire from 29 October and the Kremlin confirmed it.
UN monitoring mission · Tier A; Ombudsman of Ukraine · Tier B; White House, Kremlin · 23 Oct
Oleshky: a blockade with no authorEight Russian statements, 21 Sep – 16 Oct 2026
From "hypocrisy" to "tragedy". Moscow now admits the crisis and blames Kyiv for blockading a town Russia holds. None of eight statements proposes the evacuation the UN, the ICRC and the Pope asked for.
Kremlin, MFA, Russian Mission to the UN · checked against UN, HRW, OSCE records
16–17 Oct 2026: Vinnytsia without power332 drones + ballistic, cruise and Kalibr missiles · 15+ power facilities attacked
Lutsk, 16 Oct: firefighters at a burning garage cooperative after the Russian attack. Photo: State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · 2026-10-16 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
A city without electricity and water pumping. A damaged substation cut power to Vinnytsia; outages also in Lutsk, Rivne and Zhytomyr. No ballistic missile was reported intercepted.
Air Force; President of Ukraine; Vinnytsia city and regional authorities · Tier B · preliminary
14–15 Oct 2026: Lutsk, Kropyvnytskyi and beyond850+ attack drones in 33 hours · 17 killed in six regions
Fire after the strike on civilian buildings, 14 Oct. Photo: State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · 2026-10-14 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
A wholesale market in Lutsk: 6 killed. Almost 360 drones over Kirovohrad region in one night — 3 killed in Kropyvnytskyi. Russia's MoD named only a port in Izmail.
President of Ukraine; Air Force; regional administrations · Tier B · preliminary
Kyiv, 14 Oct 202639 ballistic missiles + 128 drones · all three CHP plants
Kyiv, Desnianskyi district: the residential block burning after the strike (SES Kyiv, night of 9–10 October). Photo: State Emergency Service, Kyiv · 10 Oct 2026 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
600,000 without electricity; 4 killed, 25 injured. Only 4 missiles were intercepted. Russia's MoD listed the heat-and-power plants by name as "military-industrial" — the conduct the ICC qualified as war crimes in 2024.
Secretary-General, 7 Oct · Council briefers, 9 OctFifteen entries, 23 Sep – 19 Oct, each linked to the official record
"Strongly condemns the ongoing attacks on major Ukrainian cities" — the Secretary-General, 7 Oct. Two days later the Council heard: more than 100 civilians killed and 429 injured in one week (OHCHR). On 14 Oct the Deputy Spokesperson confirmed all three Kyiv heat-and-power plants attacked, ~600,000 without power and water.
Only military targetsNebenzia at the Security Council, 9 Oct 2026 · eight claims · seven-page dossier
"Only military facilities", air defence "in residential areas", "provocations and hoaxes", energy "used for military production" — set against the UN's count for that week (more than 100 civilians killed), Russia's own Ministry of Defence target list naming Pryluky, and the ICC warrants for the earlier energy campaign.
Russian Mission text, 9 Oct 2026 · SC/16472 · HRMMU, 15 Oct 2026 · ICC · Tier A
Kharkiv, 2–12 Oct 2026Five strikes on residential districts in eleven days
Kharkiv: firefighters at the residential block whose entrance section collapsed, 12 October. Photo: State Emergency Service, Kharkiv region · 12 Oct 2026 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
16 killed in five strikes (derived). Guided bombs on 2 Oct (2 killed), 5 Oct (6 killed, 59 injured) and 11 Oct; a missile on a grocery store in Pisochyn (3 killed, incl. a 16-year-old); ~10 Banderol missiles on 12 Oct (4 killed, 41 injured, entrance section collapsed).
State Emergency Service; regional administration · Tier B
27,591 under Russia-related sanctionsNine official lists, counted once · updated daily
16,432 people and companies are listed by Ukraine but not by the European Union. Search the registers, see which makers of the weapons in our case files are still off some lists, and what has been lifted.
276,000 soldiers killed, confirmed by namePeople, equipment, military assets, economy
Ukraine's General Staff counts 1,574,620 personnel losses; Oryx has photographed 24,192 pieces of lost equipment. Russia's budget deficit for January–September 2026: 5.2 trillion roubles.
General Staff of Ukraine; Mediazona/BBC; Oryx; Ministry of Finance of Russia · Tier B / C
New: the front line and the occupation on one map — 117,112 km² occupied (19.4% of Ukraine, Tier C, derived), 0 of 16 Russian capture claims since 1 October confirmed, and every strike measured by its distance from the front. Open the map →
Five files that run across the whole war. Each opens with its UN-verified figure, then the national figure, then the accountability step already taken. These are the pages for the question "what is the bigger picture".
EnergyStrikes on the electricity and heat system · since Oct 2022
4ICC warrants for the 2022–23 energy campaign A · ICC ↗
Established. ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II found reasonable grounds that strikes on electricity infrastructure, Oct 2022 – Mar 2023, were war crimes and crimes against humanity (warrants for Kobylash, Sokolov, 5 Mar 2024; Shoigu, Gerasimov, 24 Jun 2024). The Commission of Inquiry reached the same conclusion on the winter 2022–23 campaign (A/HRC/52/62).
Now. Every major thermal and hydro plant has been hit at least once (Ministry of Energy, 2025). Fourth winter campaign opened 29–30 Sep 2026; Kyiv dark on 8 Oct.
Ask. Air-defence and transformer deliveries before December; name the energy campaign as a pattern in national statements.
ICC, 5 Mar and 24 Jun 2024; COI A/HRC/52/62; Ministry of Energy of Ukraine; KSE damage assessment (energy sector, 2025) · Tier A / B / C
Established. ICC warrants for Putin and Lvova-Belova (17 Mar 2023) for unlawful deportation and transfer of children. The Commission of Inquiry found that transfers violated IHL and amounted to a war crime (A/HRC/52/62, 2023; reiterated 2024–25).
Now. Returns run through third-country mediation (Qatar, Vatican, UAE); identification of children relocated inside Russia remains the bottleneck. Russian "re-education" and adoption decrees documented by Yale HRL.
Ask. Join the International Coalition for the Return of Ukrainian Children; raise the ICC warrants whenever Russia speaks of "evacuation".
Ombudsman of Ukraine / childrenofwar.gov.ua, 7 Oct 2026; Bring Kids Back UA; ICC; COI; Yale HRL · Tier A / B / C
PrisonersExecution and torture of POWs and detained civilians
129Ukrainian POWs executed after capture, documented by OHCHR A · OHCHR ↗
9,048Ukrainians returned from captivity since 2022 B · Coordination HQ ↗
Established. OHCHR interviews with released POWs: 95% report torture or ill-treatment; 48 died in custody. The Commission of Inquiry found torture of POWs and civilians to be systematic and a crime against humanity (A/79/549, Oct 2024).
Now. Over 16,000 civilians recorded as detained by Russia; more than 1,000 held since 2022. Olenivka (29 Jul 2022) still without an international investigation on site.
Ask. Demand ICRC access to all places of detention; support the all-for-all exchange and the return of civilian detainees as a separate track.
OHCHR briefing, 10 Aug 2026; COI A/79/549; Coordination HQ for the Treatment of POWs, Oct 2026 · Tier A / B
Sexual violenceConflict-related sexual violence · 2022–2026
1,004cases documented by OHCHR, 89% attributed to Russian authorities A · OHCHR ↗
401cases registered by prosecutors · 116 suspects · 19 verdicts B · Prosecutor General ↗
Established. OHCHR report of 18 Sep 2026: most victims are men in detention (electric shocks to the genitals, beatings, threats); women and children mainly under occupation. The Commission of Inquiry found rape by Russian forces to be a war crime (A/77/533).
Now. In May 2026 the Secretary-General listed Russian armed and security forces for the first time in the annex of his report on conflict-related sexual violence.
Ask. Keep the listing until perpetrators are held to account; demand OHCHR and ICRC access to all places of detention; no amnesty for sexual violence.
OHCHR, 18 Sep 2026; Secretary-General, May 2026; COI A/77/533, A/79/549; Prosecutor General, 19 Jun 2026 · Tier A / B
Nuclear safetyOccupied Zaporizhzhia plant, Chornobyl, the grid
26complete losses of off-site power at the occupied Zaporizhzhia plant since 2022 A · IAEA ↗
99states voted for GA resolution 78/316: demilitarise the plant, return it to Ukraine A · A/RES/78/316 ↗
Established. Seized under fire on 4 Mar 2022; the latest blackout kept the plant on diesel for 18 days (20 Aug – 7 Sep 2026). A drone breached the Chornobyl New Safe Confinement on 14 Feb 2025; the IAEA found it lost its confinement function.
Now. Russia has issued "licences" for units 1 and 2 to Rosatom; strikes on substations cut power to nuclear sites in every winter campaign.
Ask. Demilitarisation and return of the plant to Ukraine (78/316); no recognition of Russian "licences"; no strikes on the grid that nuclear sites depend on.
IAEA Updates 362–364 (Aug–Sep 2026); A/RES/78/316 (11 Jul 2024); World Nuclear Association · Tier A / C
My brief: pick the items, print one documentAny case file, UN statement or figure on this site
Press Add to my brief under any card, UN entry or key figure as you read. The yellow My brief button at the bottom left opens your list: print it or save it as a PDF with every source and link, or copy it as text into a statement. The list stays in this browser only; nothing is sent to us.
Assembled automatically from the newest items on the site: the three most recent facts with sources, one legal line, one ask. Copy it into a statement, a talking-points note or an e-mail. Replaced every time the site is updated; the date in the header is the date of the data.
Week of 12 Oct 2026 · updated 14 Oct
Three factsNewest first · each with tier and date
Generated from the site data · verify date before usePDF
Calendar
Moments that need a briefA brief is prepared 24 h before each; dates to be confirmed against the UN Journal
~15 Nov
OHCHR October casualty update — pulse and home indicators refreshed the same day
Oct–Nov
Third Committee: interactive dialogue with the Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine (report to the 81st session)
Oct–Nov
Security Council meetings on Ukraine as requested after major strikes; monthly humanitarian briefing
Dec
General Assembly action on Ukraine-related resolutions; ICC Assembly of States Parties
24 Feb
Anniversary of the full-scale invasion — Emergency Special Session; annual digest
Legal line
One sentenceEstablished layer only
Attacks on residential buildings far from the front, with no military objective identified, engage Rome Statute art. 8(2)(b)(i) and (ii); the Commission of Inquiry has already found this pattern to constitute war crimes (A/77/533, A/HRC/52/62).
Ask
This weekFor the Security Council and the Third Committee
Name Kramatorsk (8 Oct), Pryluky (7 Oct), Zaporizhzhia (10 Oct) and the Kyiv energy strike (14 Oct) in national statements; cite the ICC energy warrants whenever Russia says "military-industrial"; confirm ballistic-capable air defence and transformer deliveries before the December cold.
UN on the record
This weekQuote the speaker and the date
7 Oct · Secretary-General: "strongly condemns the ongoing attacks on major Ukrainian cities" — "a record number of civilian casualties".
9 Oct · ASG Khiari, Security Council: more than 100 civilians killed and at least 429 injured in one week (OHCHR).
14 Oct · Spokesperson: all three Kyiv heat-and-power plants attacked; ~600,000 without power and water.
OHCHR September update published 16 Oct (328 killed, 2,105 injured) — pulse and home indicators already refreshed; this brief is renewed on Monday.
Case files
One incident, one page, one fixed structure: what happened, what is verified and by whom, the legal qualification in three honest layers, who is responsible, what Russia said, and what we ask. Each card opens a printable one-pager. Ten files from the last month; earlier files are in the Archive.
Historical dossiers are named, not numbered. Each is a six-page document built from the UN record, Ukrainian proceedings and independent investigations, with an evidence panel of openly licensed photographs and a downloadable pack. Figures and sources are rechecked at every release.
Dossier
Kyiv, 20 August: ballistic missiles on World Humanitarian DayKyiv and Kyiv region · night of 19–20 August 2026
Kyiv after the night attack of 20 August 2026 — ArmyInform release, lead frame. Photo: ArmyInform · 2026-08-20 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
17
killed — 16 in Kyiv city (UN-verified: 16, 9 men and 7 women) and one in the region A
7
killed in one nine-storey residential block in Solomianskyi district B
Overnight Russia fired ballistic missiles, 46 cruise missiles and 168 drones with Kyiv region as the main target. None of the ballistic missiles was intercepted. Seventeen people died — sixteen in the city, seven of them in a nine-storey block in Solomianskyi district — and one in the region. A children's hospital and a school were damaged. The UN Secretary-General condemned the attack. Russia listed six military-industrial targets and did not mention the block.
16 civilians killed and 38 injured in Kyiv city by missiles and drones — established (OHCHR)Kyiv campaign 2026: ballistic salvoes on residential districts (14 May, 2 Jul, 6 Jul, 5 Aug, 20 Aug, 1 Sep) — patternIndiscriminate attack / attack on civilians, war crime — position (Art. 438(2) CCU)
Russia said. Russian Ministry of Defence · official statement · 20 Aug 2026: “Tonight, the Russian Armed Forces delivered a massive strike with high-precision weapons from ground, air, and sea-based platforms, as well as long-range unmanned aerial vehicles [on] military industrial enterprises, a transport and logistics center, and warehouses in the city of Kiev and the Kiev region.” — The list omits every civilian impact. The Air Force recorded hits at 28 locations; OHCHR verified 16 civilians killed in Kyiv city; seven to ten died in one residential block; a children's hospital and a school were damaged. Ballistic missiles fired at night into a city of three million do not become precise by being called so. If the six targets are real, the attack must still satisfy proportionality and precautions for the blocks around them (AP I art. 57); the MoD offers nothing on either.
Evidence held: OHCHR/HRMMU, Protection of Civilians, August 2026 (16 Sep 2026); UN Secretary-General, via spokesperson S. Dujarric, 20 Aug 2026; Ukrainian Air Force, 20 Aug 2026 (09; DSNS, 20–21 Aug 2026.
Photo & video · 4 photos
Kyiv after the night attack of 20 August 2026 — ArmyInform release, lead frame
Download pack (ZIP · 4 files)Openly licensed official material only; videos are linked to the official post. No image shows the dead; images of graphic aftermath are blurred until tapped and marked sensitive in the pack. This is not an evidence repository: originals are held by the Prosecutor General (warcrimes.gov.ua) and the ICC OTP.
Kryvyi Rih: the second drone came for the rescuersKryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk region · 21 August 2026
Firefighters at the Sun Gallery shopping centre, 21 August 2026. Photo: State Emergency Service of Ukraine · 2026-08-21 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
16
civilians killed, according to Ukrainian authorities (the UN has verified 13; verification continuing) B
130 → 140
injured, 23 of them children; 29 in a serious condition on the first night, five of them children B
On a Friday afternoon two Russian strike drones hit the Sunny Gallery, the largest shopping centre in a city of 600,000, about half an hour apart. The first set the building on fire with shoppers and staff inside; the second arrived while firefighters and medics were working. Ukrainian authorities count 16 dead and about 140 injured, 23 of them children; the UN has verified 13 dead and 126 injured. No Russian ministry has claimed the strike.
Two drones ~30 min apart on an operating shopping centre; 13 killed, 126 injured — established (OHCHR, verification continuing)Double-tap strikes on rescuers; attacks on retail and logistics companies — patternWar crime: attack on civilians and on rescue personnel — position (Art. 438(2) CCU)
Russia said. Vladimir Putin · President · Vesti interview · 22 Aug 2026: “We have begun to respond to the enemy's actions against our civilian industrial facilities and logistics … It opened this Pandora's box itself.” — A statement of intent, not a legal justification. Reprisals against the civilian population are prohibited without exception (AP I art. 51(6)). A declared policy of 'response' the day after 16 civilians died in a shopping centre is evidence of state policy, not a defence.
Evidence held: OHCHR/HRMMU, Protection of Civilians, August 2026 (16 Sep 2026); Same update; Office of the Prosecutor General, 21 Aug 2026; Dnipropetrovsk regional administration (O. Hanzha), 21–22 Aug 2026.
Photo & video · 4 photos
Firefighters at the Sun Gallery shopping centre, 21 August 2026
State Emergency Service of Ukraine · 2026-08-21 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 b90d8cac9e8e5f98… · 240 KB
The shopping centre after the two strikes
State Emergency Service of Ukraine · 2026-08-25 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 33770c38241d77e7… · 342 KB
Rescuers searching inside the building
State Emergency Service of Ukraine · 2026-08-25 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 2d91de92ee95c619… · 206 KB
An injured person carried out of the shopping centre
State Emergency Service of Ukraine · 2026-08-21 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 cb4a6c2095581be6… · 134 KB
Download pack (ZIP · 4 files)Openly licensed official material only; videos are linked to the official post. No image shows the dead; images of graphic aftermath are blurred until tapped and marked sensitive in the pack. This is not an evidence repository: originals are held by the Prosecutor General (warcrimes.gov.ua) and the ICC OTP.
Pechenihy: two missiles on a village crossroads at twenty to ninePechenihy, Chuhuiv district, Kharkiv region · 18 August 2026
The centre of Pechenihy after the missile strike of 18 August 2026 — regional administration release, frame 1 of 6. Photo: Kharkiv Regional State Administration · 2026-08-18 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
10
civilians killed at the crossroads — identification by DNA; the toll was given as preliminary B
17 → 18
injured — 14 hospitalised, most with severe burns and shrapnel wounds B
On a Tuesday morning two Russian Banderol cruise missiles hit the busiest crossroads of Pechenihy, a settlement on the Siverskyi Donets, about fifty metres apart — one on a café, one on the car park by the bus stop. Ten people died, among them the café's cashier and the man grilling meat outside; at least eighteen were injured. The community head: no military objects in the impact zone. Russia's Ministry of Defence has not commented.
Two cruise missiles on a village café and bus-stop car park; 10 killed — reported by Ukrainian authorities; no Tier A incident record yetCafés and markets in Kharkiv region villages as targets — Hroza 2023, Pechenihy 2026 — patternWar crime: attack on civilians, Art. 438(2) CCU — position (Kharkiv regional prosecutor, 18 Aug 2026)
Russia said. Russian Ministry of Defence · no statement · 18 Aug 2026: “(The Ministry of Defence did not comment on the strike — The Insider, 18 Aug 2026. No later statement located.)” — A strike Russia does not claim is still a strike Russia made. Two guided cruise missiles of a Russian type on a crossroads with no military object; 10 killed, 18 injured; a war-crimes investigation opened the same day. Russia publishes a target list when it claims a target; here it published none.
Evidence held: OHCHR/HRMMU, Protection of Civilians, August 2026 (16 Sep 2026); OHCHR/HRMMU, <i>Attack on Funeral Reception in Hroza</i> (31 Oct 2023); Kharkiv regional administration (O. Syniehubov), 18 Aug 2026; Pechenihy community head (O. Husarov), 18 Aug 2026.
Photo & video · 6 photos
The centre of Pechenihy after the missile strike of 18 August 2026 — regional administration release, frame 1 of 6
Kharkiv Regional State Administration · 2026-08-18 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 03725780f649122b… · 134 KB
The centre of Pechenihy after the missile strike of 18 August 2026 — regional administration release, frame 2 of 6
Kharkiv Regional State Administration · 2026-08-18 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 b1c86c0344314898… · 226 KB
The centre of Pechenihy after the missile strike of 18 August 2026 — regional administration release, frame 3 of 6
Kharkiv Regional State Administration · 2026-08-18 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 42f41055b65c92af… · 181 KB
The centre of Pechenihy after the missile strike of 18 August 2026 — regional administration release, frame 4 of 6
Kharkiv Regional State Administration · 2026-08-18 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 2b0cba25b6a9b89b… · 199 KB
The centre of Pechenihy after the missile strike of 18 August 2026 — regional administration release, frame 5 of 6
Kharkiv Regional State Administration · 2026-08-18 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 0fb159dbd0fffd0d… · 139 KB
The centre of Pechenihy after the missile strike of 18 August 2026 — regional administration release, frame 6 of 6
Kharkiv Regional State Administration · 2026-08-18 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 72dcb5fc97eafac8… · 172 KB
Download pack (ZIP · 6 files)Openly licensed official material only; videos are linked to the official post. No image shows the dead; images of graphic aftermath are blurred until tapped and marked sensitive in the pack. This is not an evidence repository: originals are held by the Prosecutor General (warcrimes.gov.ua) and the ICC OTP.
Kyiv, 2 July: 74 missiles, 496 drones, one nightKyiv · night of 1–2 July 2026 · anchor of the Kyiv 2026 campaign
An apartment building burning in Kyiv on the night of 2 July 2026. Photo: State Emergency Service of Ukraine · 2026-07-02 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
30
civilians killed, verified — 18 men, 11 women, one girl (Ukraine counts 31) A
104
injured, verified minimum (Ukraine counts 102) A
The deadliest attack on Kyiv in 2026 was announced a day ahead by the President and executed from shortly after midnight: 74 missiles — 24 of them ballistic — and 496 drones. A nine-storey block in Darnytskyi lost its lower six floors with the residents inside; an ambulance station and a hotel were hit. The UN verified 30 civilians killed, among them a girl, and at least 104 injured. Russia called it retaliation for Ukrainian strikes on Russia.
30 civilians killed, 104 injured, in a missile and drone attack on Kyiv — established (OHCHR, named incident)Kyiv 2026 campaign: repeated mass-casualty nights, ballistic missiles on residential districts — patternIndiscriminate attack and attack on civilians; reprisal against the civilian population — position (Art. 438(2) CCU; AP I art. 51(6))
Russia said. Russian Ministry of Defence · statement · 2 Jul 2026: “[Strikes on] military and energy facilities around Kyiv [and military airfields], in retaliation for Ukraine's attack on civilian infrastructure. (as reported by Al Jazeera)” — A declared reprisal — prohibited whatever the target. Additional Protocol I art. 51(6) prohibits attacks against the civilian population by way of reprisals, without exception. The record of harm is 30 verified civilian dead, a residential block without its lower six floors, an ambulance station hit with its crews inside.
Evidence held: OHCHR/HRMMU, press release, 13 Aug 2026; OHCHR/HRMMU, July 2026 PDF; Ukrainian Air Force, 2 Jul 2026 (09; DSNS, 2–4 Jul 2026.
Photo & video · 7 photos
An apartment building burning in Kyiv on the night of 2 July 2026
State Emergency Service of Ukraine · 2026-07-02 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 0036b520518f66fe… · 342 KB
The collapsed section of the apartment block in Darnytskyi district
State Emergency Service of Ukraine · 2026-07-02 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 6cb5a926c855e85d… · 240 KB
The 16-storey block after rescue work ended
State Emergency Service of Ukraine · 2026-07-02 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 206a262eb9ef50e8… · 203 KB
A historic hotel building in central Kyiv, hit the same night
State Emergency Service of Ukraine · 2026-07-02 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 22d475e30ef51594… · 156 KB
Unexploded cluster bomblets from a Kh-69 missile found in Kyiv
National Police of Ukraine · 2026-07-02 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 b76078f7583521bb… · 198 KB
A school building damaged the same night
Kyiv City State Administration · 2026-07-02 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 f5cd2d5118f4dacb… · 322 KB
Rescuers clean petroleum products from Kyrylivske Lake after a strike on a nearby site
State Emergency Service of Ukraine · 2026-07-05 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 aa6e34400c42318a… · 145 KB
Download pack (ZIP · 7 files)Openly licensed official material only; videos are linked to the official post. No image shows the dead; images of graphic aftermath are blurred until tapped and marked sensitive in the pack. This is not an evidence repository: originals are held by the Prosecutor General (warcrimes.gov.ua) and the ICC OTP.
Kherson: a city hunted from the airKherson city and the right bank of the Dnipro · July 2024 – present
A Kherson municipal bus attacked three times by Russian drones; drivers and passengers unhurt, 17 May 2024. Photo: Kherson City Military Administration, via ArmyInform · 2024-05-17 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
200+ / 2,000+
civilians killed / injured by drones across Kherson, Mykolaiv and Dnipropetrovsk regions (not only Kherson's right bank) since July 2024, according to local authorities A
300 km
of riverfront under attack across Kherson, Mykolaiv and Dnipropetrovsk regions — Kherson city and 16 localities in the first report A
Since July 2024 Russian drone operators on the occupied left bank of the Dnipro have used small camera drones to find and strike people on the other side — pedestrians, cyclists, buses, ambulances, rescuers — and have posted the videos. The UN Commission of Inquiry found the crimes against humanity of murder and forcible transfer, under a command that reports to the Chief of the General Staff. Local authorities count more than 200 killed and 2,000 injured.
Crimes against humanity of murder and forcible transfer — established (Commission of Inquiry, 2025)Short-range drones as the main killer of civilians near the front — pattern (HRMMU 2025–26)War crimes, Art. 438 CCU — position (notices of suspicion to ten operators, 9 Jun 2026)
Russia said. Russian Telegram channel linked to the drone units · post cited by the Commission · 2024: “Get out of the city before the leaves fall, you who are destined to die.” — A threat the Commission treated as evidence of intent. The post accompanies videos of civilians being struck; the Commission found that recurrent attacks, posted videos and threats together form a coordinated policy to force residents out — the crime against humanity of forcible transfer (A/80/497, para. 54).
Evidence held: Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/59/CRP.2, 'They are hunting us' (28 May 2025); Commission of Inquiry, A/80/497 (21 Oct 2025); Kherson regional administration (Prokudin); Kherson city military administration, data to 21 Jul 2025.
Photo & video · 5 photos
A Kherson municipal bus attacked three times by Russian drones; drivers and passengers unhurt, 17 May 2024
Kherson City Military Administration, via ArmyInform · 2024-05-17 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 e69b02b3c1adad0f… · 150 KB
Drone damage to public transport in Kherson, 17 May 2024
Kherson City Military Administration, via ArmyInform · 2024-05-17 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 b076f31c310b94f3… · 139 KB
Public transport damaged by Russian drones in Kherson, 17 May 2024
Kherson City Military Administration, via ArmyInform · 2024-05-17 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 d7657d4d8915f31e… · 147 KB
Vehicles of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs damaged by a Russian drone in Korabelnyi district, Kherson, 14 May 2026
Download pack (ZIP · 5 files)Openly licensed official material only; videos are linked to the official post. No image shows the dead; images of graphic aftermath are blurred until tapped and marked sensitive in the pack. This is not an evidence repository: originals are held by the Prosecutor General (warcrimes.gov.ua) and the ICC OTP.
Children: the crime with a warrant for the head of stateDeportation and forcible transfer of Ukrainian children · occupied Ukraine → Russia and Crimea · 2022 – present
"Bring Ukrainian children back!" — demonstration in Berlin, 24 Aug 2025. Photo: Roy Zuo · 2025-08-24 · CC BY-SA 4.0 · original ↗
20,651
recorded cases of children deported or forcibly transferred; 2,363 more listed as missing B
2,665
children returned to Ukraine since 2022 — 83 through Qatar's mediation, 30 with the US First Lady's involvement B
Since 2022 Russia has moved Ukrainian children from occupied territory into camps, foster families and adoption inside Russia, issued them passports and, in most cases, told their relatives nothing. Ukraine has recorded 20,651 cases and brought 2,665 children home. The ICC issued arrest warrants for Vladimir Putin and his children's commissioner in March 2023; in March 2026 the UN Commission of Inquiry found the deportations to be crimes against humanity.
Unlawful deportation and transfer of children — established (ICC warrants, 17 Mar 2023; COI; ECtHR)Camps, re-education, passports, adoption — pattern (COI; OSCE; Yale HRL)Genocide, Art. 442 CCU / Art. II(e) Genocide Convention — position (Ukraine)
Russia said. Dmitry Peskov · Kremlin spokesman · 17 Mar 2023: “Any decisions of this kind are null and void for the Russian Federation from the point of view of law.” — Binding on 125 states parties regardless. The warrants oblige every Rome Statute state party to arrest the suspects on its territory; the Court's jurisdiction rests on Ukraine's declarations and, since 1 Jan 2025, its membership. Russia's non-recognition does not touch third states' obligations.
Evidence held: ICC, 17 Mar 2023; Commission of Inquiry; Ombudsman's Office, 7 Oct 2026; Bring Kids Back UA (Maksym Maksymov), 21 Sep 2026.
Photo & video · 2 photos
"Bring Ukrainian children back!" — demonstration in Berlin, 24 Aug 2025
Russia's own photograph: "about 1,500 children" from Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions arrive in Yevpatoria, occupied Crimea, for "rest and recovery", 2022
Управление информационной политики Мининформ РК · 2022-10-08 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 fe9ab243400216b1… · 326 KB
Download pack (ZIP · 2 files)Openly licensed official material only; videos are linked to the official post. No image shows the dead; images of graphic aftermath are blurred until tapped and marked sensitive in the pack. This is not an evidence repository: originals are held by the Prosecutor General (warcrimes.gov.ua) and the ICC OTP.
Sumy: two missiles on a Sunday morningSumy city centre · 13 April 2025, Palm Sunday
Burning cars in central Sumy after the strike, 13 April 2025. Photo: ДСНС України · 2025-04-13 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
35
civilians killed, including two children B
129
injured, including 15 children (SBU: 125, of whom 22 minors — the hub shows both) B
At about 10:15 on Palm Sunday two Iskander-M ballistic missiles struck the centre of Sumy, 30 km from the Russian border, as people walked past the university congress centre. The second fell as passers-by ran to help; a trolleybus full of passengers burned. 35 civilians were killed, two of them children. Russia said it had hit a 'command meeting' and killed 'over 60 servicemen'. A year later Ukraine charged eight officers.
Deadly ballistic strike on civilians in a city centre — recorded by HRMMU (31 killed verified by 24 Apr 2025); condemned by the Secretary-GeneralIskander strikes on city centres with a second missile on rescuers — pattern (Kryvyi Rih 4 Apr 2025, Sumy 13 Apr 2025)War crime causing death, by a group — position (Art. 438(2) CCU; eight officers charged 10 Apr 2026)
Russia said. Russian Ministry of Defence · official statement · 14 Apr 2025: “The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, despite active electronic warfare, carried out a strike with two Iskander-M operational-tactical missiles on a location where a command meeting of the 'Siversk' operational-tactical group was taking place in the city of Sumy. Over 60 Ukrainian servicemen were eliminated.” — One serviceman identified among 35 dead. The dead were on a street and in a trolleybus; the UN verified 31 civilians killed by 24 Apr 2025. Ukrainian sources identify one military fatality. No name, image or document for the 'command meeting' or the 'over 60' has been produced.
Evidence held: HRMMU press release, 24 Apr 2025; UN Secretary-General via his Spokesperson, 13 Apr 2025; Sumy regional administration and Interior Ministry, 13–14 Apr 2025; HUR, 13 Apr 2025.
Photo & video · 6 photos
Burning cars in central Sumy after the strike, 13 April 2025
ДСНС України · 2025-04-13 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 7d33ea6ff1bc2b79… · 187 KB
Rescuers among damaged cars on the street
ДСНС України · 2025-04-13 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 14a1e756412ca41c… · 301 KB
The street in the city centre after the strike
ДСНС України · 2025-04-13 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 a02cbdd906f5cb45… · 435 KB
Rescuers at work
ДСНС України · 2025-04-13 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 43507a2cbd020c2d… · 315 KB
A building of Sumy State University, Petropavlivska Street 57, after the strike
National Police of Ukraine · 2025-04-13 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 0788bbd8b6a421af… · 258 KB
Destruction in central Sumy on the morning of Palm Sunday
National Police of Ukraine · 2025-04-13 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 6e2eaf80559f69c3… · 416 KB
Download pack (ZIP · 6 files)Openly licensed official material only; videos are linked to the official post. No image shows the dead; images of graphic aftermath are blurred until tapped and marked sensitive in the pack. This is not an evidence repository: originals are held by the Prosecutor General (warcrimes.gov.ua) and the ICC OTP.
Kryvyi Rih: nine children on a playgroundKryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk region · 4 April 2025, 18:50
The residential area on the evening of the strike. Photo: State Emergency Service of Ukraine · 2025-04-04 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
20
civilians killed, nine of them children aged 3 to 17 A
9
children killed — the deadliest single strike harming children verified by the UN since February 2022 A
On a Friday evening an Iskander-M ballistic missile detonated over a residential district of Kryvyi Rih — above a playground, a restaurant and the blocks around them. 20 civilians were killed, nine of them children aged three to seventeen. The UN High Commissioner called it 'an unimaginable horror'. Russia said it had hit 'a meeting of unit commanders and Western instructors' and killed 'up to 85 servicemen'. The restaurant's cameras show a birthday party.
No military presence; possibly indiscriminate attack — established on site (OHCHR / HRMMU, 6 Apr 2025)Area-effect ballistic strikes on city districts with a 'military meeting' claim — pattern (Kryvyi Rih, Sumy, Apr 2025)War crime causing death, by a group — position (Arts. 28(2), 438(2) CCU; four officers charged 24 Nov 2025)
Russia said. Russian Ministry of Defence · Telegram statement · 4 Apr 2025: “A high-precision strike [was carried out on] a meeting of unit commanders and Western instructors [in a restaurant in Kryvyi Rih]. Enemy losses total up to 85 servicemen and officers of foreign countries, and up to 20 vehicles.” — The restaurant's cameras show a birthday party. France 24 published the restaurant's CCTV at the moment of impact: patrons and staff, no soldiers. HRMMU heard from staff and the business association that a beauty-industry forum had just ended. The detonation was over the playground, 70–80 m from the restaurant. Nine of the 20 dead were children; no serviceman has been identified among them by anyone.
The children's playground after the strike, 4 April 2025
National Police of Ukraine · 2025-04-04 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 6654238b4e5b2205… · 165 KB
The residential area on the evening of the strike
State Emergency Service of Ukraine · 2025-04-04 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 0cf40ccfe7abfd71… · 145 KB
Police at the cordoned site
National Police of Ukraine · 2025-04-04 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 773d690db94d2a49… · 212 KB
Damaged apartment blocks
National Police of Ukraine · 2025-04-04 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 06c3347eebf8d37d… · 277 KB
A flat with its windows blown out
19 загиблих та майже 70 постраждалих: російська армія атакувала Кривий Ріг ракет · 2025-04-04 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 555c2af57ccf3c89… · 165 KB
A carousel on the playground
19 загиблих та майже 70 постраждалих: російська армія атакувала Кривий Ріг ракет · 2025-04-04 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 554de15ce80c3b43… · 178 KB
Download pack (ZIP · 6 files)Openly licensed official material only; videos are linked to the official post. No image shows the dead; images of graphic aftermath are blurred until tapped and marked sensitive in the pack. This is not an evidence repository: originals are held by the Prosecutor General (warcrimes.gov.ua) and the ICC OTP.
Okhmatdyt: a cruise missile into a children's hospitalKyiv · Okhmatdyt children's hospital · 8 July 2024
Okhmatdyt children's hospital minutes after the strike, 8 Jul 2024: smoke over the toxicology building and crowds of rescuers and volunteers. Photo: State Emergency Service of Ukraine · 2024-07-08 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
2
adults killed at the hospital — a young doctor and a patient's relative; at least 18 injured A
670
children in the hospital at the moment of the strike, with more than 1,000 staff A
At 10:45 on 8 July 2024 a Kh-101 cruise missile flew intact into the toxicology building of Ukraine's national children's hospital, with 670 young patients and over a thousand staff inside. Two adults were killed and the dialysis ward was destroyed. The UN assessed a direct hit by a Russian missile; Russia told the Security Council the same day that it was a Ukrainian air-defence missile. Ukraine has since charged three generals of Long-Range Aviation.
Direct hit by a Russian Kh-101 — established (OHCHR)Attacks on health care: 3,000+ verified — pattern (WHO)Intentional attack on a protected hospital, war crime — position (Art. 438 CCU)
Russia said. Vassily Nebenzia · Permanent Representative, presiding · Security Council, 9 Jul 2024: “It was a Ukrainian air defence missile that hit the hospital.” — Wrong weapon, on video. The impact was filmed from several angles. OHCHR's expert, Bellingcat, CIT and the NYT identified a Kh-101 cruise missile: mid-body wings, a protruding turbofan engine, a stable controlled flight — features the NASAMS interceptor does not have. More than 30 fragments were recovered from the site. OHCHR: hit directly by a missile, not by interception debris.
Evidence held: OHCHR/HRMMU, 9 Jul 2024; OHCHR/HRMMU, 9 Aug 2024; SBU, 8 Jul 2024; Kyiv Scientific Research Institute of Forensic Expertise, 10 Jul 2024.
Photo & video · 7 photos
Okhmatdyt children's hospital minutes after the strike, 8 Jul 2024: smoke over the toxicology building and crowds of rescuers and volunteers
State Emergency Service of Ukraine · 2024-07-08 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 d47f9e964a0bb1ca… · 289 KB
The destroyed toxicology building of Okhmatdyt
Security Service of Ukraine · 2024-07-08 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 810cfb697d2b0887… · 310 KB
Smoke rising over the hospital complex
Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine · 2024-07-08 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 6b803e9dde30dffc… · 217 KB
Rescuers, medical staff and volunteers clear the rubble
State Emergency Service of Ukraine · 2024-07-08 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 66417fc4e9c2b109… · 413 KB
Volunteers pass debris hand to hand at the hospital
State Emergency Service of Ukraine · 2024-07-09 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 943cd2199f7a4663… · 272 KB
Police and rescuers at the site
Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine · 2024-07-08 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 a4650c300e64c06d… · 220 KB
A damaged ward of the hospital
Оксана Іванець, Олександр Шульман / АрміяInform · 2024-07-08 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 9ce026bb18217e0b… · 413 KB
Download pack (ZIP · 7 files)Openly licensed official material only; videos are linked to the official post. No image shows the dead; images of graphic aftermath are blurred until tapped and marked sensitive in the pack. This is not an evidence repository: originals are held by the Prosecutor General (warcrimes.gov.ua) and the ICC OTP.
Hroza: a sixth of a village at one mealHroza, Kharkiv region · 5 October 2023
The site of the Suputnyk café in Hroza after the strike, 5 Oct 2023. Photo: National Police of Ukraine · 2023-10-05 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
59
civilians killed: 36 women, 22 men, one boy aged 8 A
63
people sat down to the memorial meal at about 13:00 A
One Iskander-M ballistic missile on a village café during a memorial meal, 50 km from the front line. 59 civilians killed — 36 women, 22 men and a boy of eight. The UN found no military target and reasonable grounds to attribute the launch to Russia. In 2026 Ukraine indicted the chain of command, from a colonel-general to the two brothers who passed on the address.
Attack on civilians with no military target — established (OHCHR)Precision strikes on gatherings — patternDeliberate killing of civilians, war crime — position (Art. 438 CCU)
Russia said. Dmitry Peskov · Kremlin spokesman · 6 Oct 2023: “The Russian military does not strike civilian targets. Strikes are carried out against military infrastructure.” — The UN found no military target. OHCHR visited the site twice and interviewed 35 people: no military personnel or other legitimate military target was present at or near the café; all 59 killed were civilians. Either the target was not verified or civilians were targeted deliberately.
Evidence held: OHCHR / HRMMU, report of 31 Oct 2023; USG DiCarlo to the Security Council, 9 Oct 2023; SBU, 11 Oct 2023; Kharkiv regional prosecutor, 5 Oct 2025.
Photo & video · 6 photos
The site of the Suputnyk café in Hroza after the strike, 5 Oct 2023
National Police of Ukraine · 2023-10-05 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 911782af9b0eebc0… · 325 KB
Rescuers search the rubble of the café
Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine · 2023-10-05 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 4602672c2dddd19f… · 270 KB
Rescuers work among the collapsed slabs of the building
Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine · 2023-10-05 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 7e8d202f72cbc836… · 196 KB
A missile fragment found at the site
National Police of Ukraine · 2023-10-05 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 47a5d8cac1e2595f… · 276 KB
Police investigators at the scene
National Police of Ukraine · 2023-10-05 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 fd8f5880999bd8c9… · 270 KB
A car destroyed by the blast next to the café
National Police of Ukraine · 2023-10-05 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 b5cdb56cdbd36c3a… · 372 KB
Download pack (ZIP · 6 files)Openly licensed official material only; videos are linked to the official post. No image shows the dead; images of graphic aftermath are blurred until tapped and marked sensitive in the pack. This is not an evidence repository: originals are held by the Prosecutor General (warcrimes.gov.ua) and the ICC OTP.
Kakhovka: the dam that broke from the insideKakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant, Nova Kakhovka, Kherson region · 6 June 2023
Settlements on the left bank under water after the dam was destroyed, June 2023. Photo: АрміяInform · 2023-06-06 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
15
civilians identified by OHCHR as killed by the flood on the occupied left bank — a floor, not a toll A
34 · 59 · 'hundreds'
killed — Ukraine's count on its bank; the occupation's count on the other; AP's finding for Oleshky alone B
At about 02:50 on 6 June 2023 the dam Russia had held for fifteen months gave way. 620 km² flooded, about 100,000 people directly affected, nearly US$14 billion in damage and loss. The dead on the Ukrainian bank are counted: 34. The dead on the occupied bank are not: OHCHR could identify 15, the occupation said 59, AP found hundreds in Oleshky alone. No international body has attributed the breach; independent analyses point to an explosion inside a structure only Russia controlled.
Denial of evacuation and humanitarian access on the occupied bank — established (OHCHR, 4 Oct 2023)Explosion from inside a Russian-held dam — pattern (NYT, NORSAR, GRC, ISW); not adjudicatedEcocide and war crime, Arts. 441, 438(2) CCU — position (Ukraine; SBU suspicion 6 Jun 2024)
Russia said. Dmitry Peskov · Kremlin spokesman · RBC, 6 Jun 2023: “We can unequivocally state that this is a deliberate sabotage by the Ukrainian side… pursuing the goal of depriving Crimea of water.” — Unsupported; the physical evidence points inside. The dam and its gallery were under Russian control; the NYT's engineers place the charge in the passageway through the base; NORSAR registered man-made seismic events at 02:35 and 02:54. Russia has produced no evidence and no investigation.
Evidence held: OHCHR, report on Ukraine 1 Feb – 31 Jul 2023 (4 Oct 2023), paras. 4, 36–39; Government of Ukraine – UN Post-Disaster Needs Assessment, 17 Oct 2023; Ministry of Internal Affairs; SBU, 9 Jun 2023.
Photo & video · 6 photos
Settlements on the left bank under water after the dam was destroyed, June 2023
Kherson the day after the dam was destroyed, 7 June 2023
Дмитро Завтонов / АрміяInform · 2023-06-07 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 59a88481ad3b8d19… · 106 KB
Police evacuate residents from a flooded area of Kherson region, 9 June 2023
Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine · 2023-06-09 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 10c4bb743fb72f09… · 297 KB
The village of Novohrednieve under water, 10 June 2023
State Emergency Service of Ukraine · 2023-06-10 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 ed01b8066834c01a… · 171 KB
Kalynivske after the water receded, 14 June 2023
Kherson Regional State Administration · 2023-06-14 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 104d6ef5e153020d… · 129 KB
EU ECHO daily map of the flood extent, 8 June 2023
ERCC - Emergency Response Coordination Centre · 2023-06-08 · Public domain · original ↗
SHA-256 3f6ec130426be0c1… · 402 KB
Download pack (ZIP · 6 files)Openly licensed official material only; videos are linked to the official post. No image shows the dead; images of graphic aftermath are blurred until tapped and marked sensitive in the pack. This is not an evidence repository: originals are held by the Prosecutor General (warcrimes.gov.ua) and the ICC OTP.
Dnipro: one entrance of a nine-storey block, 46 peopleDnipro, Naberezhna Peremohy 118 · 14 January 2023
The nine-storey block on Naberezhna Peremohy Street burning after the strike, 14 January 2023. Photo: State Emergency Service of Ukraine · 2023-01-14 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
46
civilians killed, including 6 children; the youngest 11 months old B
80 · 11
injured (16 of them children) · still unaccounted for when the search ended B
On a Saturday afternoon a Kh-22 — a 1960s anti-ship missile with a warhead of roughly one tonne, fired by a Tu-22M3 bomber — cut one entrance out of a nine-storey apartment block on the Dnipro embankment. 46 civilians were killed, six of them children; 236 flats were destroyed. The Kremlin said Russia does not strike residential buildings and blamed Ukrainian air defence. Ukraine has named the regiment and its commander.
Deadly strike on a residential building — condemned by the UN Secretary-General as a suspected violation of the laws of war (16 Jan 2023)Kh-22 anti-ship missiles fired at cities — pattern (Kremenchuk, Serhiivka, Dnipro)War crime, Art. 438(2) CCU — position (notice of suspicion to the regiment commander, 24 Jan 2023)
Russia said. Russian Ministry of Defence · daily bulletin · 14 Jan 2023: “A missile strike was launched against Ukraine's military command and control system and associated energy facilities. All designated targets were hit. The objective of the strike has been achieved.” — The 'designated targets' included a residential block. One of the Kh-22 fired that day fell on Naberezhna Peremohy 118. The Kh-22 has no precision land-attack mode; its error against ground targets runs to hundreds of metres.
Evidence held: UN Secretary-General, statement attributable to the Spokesperson, 16 Jan 2023; HRMMU, as relayed by UN News on 16 Jan 2023; Prosecutor General, 15 and 24 Jan 2023; Air Force commander Lt-Gen Mykola Oleshchuk, 15 Jan 2023.
Photo & video · 6 photos
The nine-storey block on Naberezhna Peremohy Street burning after the strike, 14 January 2023
State Emergency Service of Ukraine · 2023-01-14 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 443707c8b4dc3a30… · 319 KB
Rescuers at the collapsed entrance at night
State Emergency Service of Ukraine · 2023-01-14 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 9192acbeba01f4a6… · 95 KB
Cranes and rescuers clearing the rubble
State Emergency Service of Ukraine · 2023-01-16 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 cd750af4b870b28c… · 433 KB
The block on the evening of the strike
Dnipropetrovsk Regional State Administration · 2023-01-14 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 552b25a2318a5bf0… · 376 KB
Residents and rescuers outside the building
Dnipro City Council · 2023-01-16 · CC BY-SA 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 52e1c652fc1a71fd… · 360 KB
The building the next day, 15 January 2023
Wanderer777 · 2023-01-15 · CC BY-SA 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 1b6ebe033ca15780… · 585 KB
Download pack (ZIP · 6 files)Openly licensed official material only; videos are linked to the official post. No image shows the dead; images of graphic aftermath are blurred until tapped and marked sensitive in the pack. This is not an evidence repository: originals are held by the Prosecutor General (warcrimes.gov.ua) and the ICC OTP.
Izium: 447 graves in a forestIzium, Kharkiv region · occupied March – 10 September 2022
The burial site in the pine forest by the Pishchanske cemetery, Izium, 16 Sep 2022. Photo: Світлана Кирган / АрміяInform · 2022-09-16 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
447
bodies exhumed from the forest burial site, 16–23 Sep 2022: 425 civilians including 5 children, 22 soldiers B
30+
bodies with visible signs of torture — bound hands, ropes, broken limbs B
Six days after Izium was liberated, police found a burial site of more than 440 graves in the pine forest by the municipal cemetery. In a week of exhumations, 447 bodies were recovered — 425 civilians, among them five children, and 22 soldiers; at least 30 bore signs of torture. Ten torture sites were documented in the town. Russia called it a lie and 'a second Bucha'. By 2026 every body had a name, and the first life sentence had been handed down in absentia.
Killings and disappearances of civilians — established in part (OHCHR, individual cases)Torture sites and mass graves under occupation — pattern (Bucha, Izium, Kherson)Systematic torture and murder, policy of the occupying force — position
Russia said. Dmitry Peskov · Kremlin spokesman · 19 Sep 2022: “It's a lie… the same scenario as the provocation in Bucha.” — The ground was moved before liberation. Satellite imagery shows about 55,000 m² excavated at the cemetery between 6 April and 1 July 2022, while the town was under Russian control, with a Russian artillery position 100 m away (Yale HRL, Maxar). The graves were numbered; the morgue records for one victim show burial on 12 May 2022 (OHCHR, para. 92). A staging would have needed six months and the occupier's cooperation.
Evidence held: OHCHR, report of 24 Mar 2023 (1 Aug 2022 – 31 Jan 2023), paras. 45–46; OHCHR, report on detention of civilians, 27 Jun 2023, paras. 54, 92; Kharkiv regional prosecutor's office, 24 Sep 2022; National Police, 16 Sep 2022.
Photo & video · 8 photos
The burial site in the pine forest by the Pishchanske cemetery, Izium, 16 Sep 2022
Світлана Кирган / АрміяInform · 2022-09-16 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 dd81b23ce2027d61… · 387 KB
Graves with wooden crosses at the burial site, Dec 2022
Kharkiv Regional State Administration · 2022-12-09 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 1cb541d53be57076… · 525 KB
A numbered wooden cross at the burial site
Kharkiv Regional State Administration · 2022-12-09 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 fc97d9640675df52… · 190 KB
Exhumation under way at the burial site, 16 Sep 2022
Світлана Кирган / АрміяInform · 2022-09-16 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 873f8c77529311ca… · 297 KB
DNA laboratory set up in Izium to identify the dead, 21 Dec 2022
Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine · 2022-12-21 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 e0f62f8de37b560c… · 135 KB
The apartment block at 2 Pershotravneva St, struck on 9 Mar 2022
Kharkiv Regional State Administration · 2022-12-09 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 64d631330786a7cf… · 468 KB
2 Pershotravneva St: the collapsed section of the building
Kharkiv Regional State Administration · 2022-12-09 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 f6ee54431785ee21… · 346 KB
Body bags at the exhumation site — graphic aftermath, blurred
Світлана Кирган / АрміяInform · 2022-09-16 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 38d0d119e8dc8905… · 361 KB
Download pack (ZIP · 8 files)Openly licensed official material only; videos are linked to the official post. No image shows the dead; images of graphic aftermath are blurred until tapped and marked sensitive in the pack. This is not an evidence repository: originals are held by the Prosecutor General (warcrimes.gov.ua) and the ICC OTP.
Olenivka: 193 prisoners in one barrackOlenivka, occupied Donetsk region · 28–29 July 2022
Ukrainian servicemen returned from Russian captivity in a prisoner exchange, 6 May 2023. Photo: National Guard of Ukraine · 2023-05-06 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
193
prisoners of war moved into the barrack the day before — all from the Azov regiment A
51+
killed, at least 139 injured — all men; 9 died for lack of emergency care (Ukrainian investigation) A
On 27 July 2022, 193 Ukrainian prisoners of war from Azovstal were moved into a converted industrial shed at Correctional Colony No. 120. The next night the shed exploded and burned. At least 50 died; the wounded waited hours for care. Russia said Ukraine had hit its own men with HIMARS. The UN excluded HIMARS, found the ordnance came from the east, and recorded that Russia blocked every attempt to investigate — including the Secretary-General's own mission.
Not HIMARS; Russia failed to protect, treat and investigate — established (OHCHR)Denial of medical care to POWs — patternPlanned mass killing of prisoners of war — position (Art. 438 CCU)
Russia said. Russian Ministry of Defence · daily briefing · 29 Jul 2022: “A missile strike from the U.S.-made HIMARS multiple launch rocket system.” — Excluded by the UN. OHCHR, after more than 50 interviews and 70 images: the explosions were not caused by HIMARS rockets; the damage is not characteristic of HIMARS; multiple explosions were heard; the ordnance travelled east to west. The fragments shown to Russian journalists were displayed outside the barrack, not in situ (4 Oct 2023, paras. 83–84, 88).
Evidence held: OHCHR, report on treatment of POWs, 24 Mar 2023, paras. 72–76; OHCHR, 36th periodic report, 4 Oct 2023, paras. 82–90; General Staff, 29 Jul 2022; Prosecutor General, 1 Aug 2022 – 28 Jul 2025.
Photo & video · 5 photos
Ukrainian servicemen returned from Russian captivity in a prisoner exchange, 6 May 2023
National Guard of Ukraine · 2023-05-06 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 8baf8b19b608297d… · 242 KB
Returned prisoners of war after an exchange, 6 May 2023
National Guard of Ukraine · 2023-05-06 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 1cef027646d92fc4… · 233 KB
Defenders returned from captivity in the exchange of 8 Feb 2024
Сергій Шведюк / National Guard of Ukraine · 2024-02-08 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 cdd99d735f2b38c1… · 135 KB
Returned prisoners of war, 8 Feb 2024
Сергій Шведюк / National Guard of Ukraine · 2024-02-08 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 fc4a7a838790e22f… · 209 KB
'Free Mariupol Defenders' banner on Lviv Town Hall, 25 Jul 2023
Download pack (ZIP · 5 files)Openly licensed official material only; videos are linked to the official post. No image shows the dead; images of graphic aftermath are blurred until tapped and marked sensitive in the pack. This is not an evidence repository: originals are held by the Prosecutor General (warcrimes.gov.ua) and the ICC OTP.
Vinnytsia: Kalibrs on a city centre at eleven in the morningCentral Vinnytsia · 14 July 2022
Central Vinnytsia minutes after the strike, 14 July 2022. Photo: State Emergency Service of Ukraine · 2022-07-14 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
29
civilians killed, including three children; 154 injured — the SBU's and Prosecutor General's final figures (28 and 202 in 2022 reporting) B
22+
killed, including three children, and more than 100 wounded — the UN Secretary-General's count on the day A
Kalibr cruise missiles launched from the Black Sea hit the centre of Vinnytsia — 400 km from the front — at about 10:45 on a Thursday: the Officers' House concert hall, a clinic, an office block and a car park. 28–29 civilians died, three of them children, among them four-year-old Liza Dmytriieva, just out of a speech-therapy session. Russia said it had struck a meeting of the Air Force command with foreign arms suppliers and 'the participants were eliminated'.
Missile strike on a civilian city centre, 29 civilians killed — established on the record (UN SG; Ukrainian investigation; Russian admission of the strike)Sea-launched cruise missiles on cities far from the front, with an invented military target — patternWar crime combined with premeditated murder — position (Arts. 28(2), 438(2) CCU; Osipov charged)
Russia said. Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation · daily briefing, Moscow, 15 Jul 2022 (relayed by RIA Novosti; translation via Novaya Gazeta Europe / Ukrainian News): “Yesterday, high-precision Kalibr missiles attacked the garrison house of officers in Vinnytsia; at that moment a meeting of the command of the Ukrainian Air Force with representatives of foreign arms suppliers was held … As a result of the strike, the participants in the meeting were eliminated.” — No such meeting, no such participants. The dead are 29 civilians including three children; none was an Air Force officer or a foreign national, and Russia has never named one. The missiles also hit a clinic, an office block and a car park, which the statement omits.
Evidence held: UN Secretary-General, 14 Jul 2022; EU High Representative and Commissioner for Crisis Management, 14 Jul 2022; General Staff (Deputy Chief of Main Operational Directorate O. Hromov) and Air Force, 14 Jul 2022; SBU, 12 Jul 2023.
Photo & video · 7 photos
Central Vinnytsia minutes after the strike, 14 July 2022
State Emergency Service of Ukraine · 2022-07-14 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 cf4d62c2c778e28f… · 275 KB
Burnt-out cars on the parking lot by the Officers' House
State Emergency Service of Ukraine · 2022-07-14 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 be4b4729c00563c0… · 232 KB
The office block opposite, its windows blown out
State Emergency Service of Ukraine · 2022-07-14 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 3f2302779fa76043… · 151 KB
Fire on the parking lot by the Officers' House
State Emergency Service of Ukraine · 2022-07-01 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 88ad0aafefa1c929… · 224 KB
Missile fragments on the pavement
George Chernilevsky · 2022-07-23 · CC BY-SA 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 5d3fbaec57d8f940… · 506 KB
Flowers and toys at the site
George Chernilevsky · 2022-07-23 · CC BY-SA 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 f8b4aaaa2949a2bc… · 424 KB
The pink pram of four-year-old Liza Dmytriieva, who was killed
State Emergency Service of Ukraine · 2022-07-14 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 6d77e38afa6f38ba… · 442 KB
Download pack (ZIP · 7 files)Openly licensed official material only; videos are linked to the official post. No image shows the dead; images of graphic aftermath are blurred until tapped and marked sensitive in the pack. This is not an evidence repository: originals are held by the Prosecutor General (warcrimes.gov.ua) and the ICC OTP.
Kremenchuk: an anti-ship missile on a shopping centreAmstor shopping centre, Kremenchuk, Poltava region · 27 June 2022
The Amstor shopping centre burning after the strike, 27 June 2022. Photo: State Emergency Service of Ukraine · 2022-06-27 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
21
killed and 'dozens' injured — the Commission of Inquiry's figure; the city's count of 2 Jul 2022 is 22 dead and missing A
~1,000
people in the shopping centre when the missile hit, by the President's account B
On a Monday afternoon two Kh-22 missiles — 1960s anti-ship weapons with a ~950 kg warhead and an accuracy measured in hundreds of metres — were fired from Tu-22M3 bombers over Kursk region at Kremenchuk, 250 km from the front. One hit the Amstor shopping centre with hundreds of people inside. 21–22 people died. Russia confirmed the strike the next day and said the mall was closed and caught fire from exploding Western ammunition. CCTV and receipts say otherwise.
Indiscriminate attack with an inaccurate anti-ship missile on a populated area — established (Commission of Inquiry)Kh-22 strikes on civilian buildings far from the front — pattern (Serhiivka, Dnipro, Kremenchuk)War crime — position (G7 leaders; Art. 438 CCU; three commanders under suspicion)
Russia said. Dmitry Polyanskiy · First Deputy Permanent Representative of Russia to the UN · 27 Jun 2022: “We'll have to wait and see what our Ministry of Defence says, but there are too many obvious inconsistencies.” — Abandoned by the Ministry of Defence the next day. On 28 June the Russian MoD confirmed that its Aerospace Forces had struck Kremenchuk. A provocation staged by Ukraine and a Russian missile strike cannot both be true; the Commission of Inquiry attributes the attack to Russian armed forces.
Evidence held: Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/52/62 (15 Mar 2023), para. 31; G7 Leaders' Statement, Elmau, 27 Jun 2022; DSNS, 27 Jun 2022; Air Force Command and SBU, 27–30 Jun 2022.
Photo & video · 5 photos
The Amstor shopping centre burning after the strike, 27 June 2022
State Emergency Service of Ukraine · 2022-06-27 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 2bb85699d769a61f… · 52 KB
Firefighters inside the burning shopping centre
State Emergency Service of Ukraine · 2022-06-27 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 376ddf15878eb9c9… · 135 KB
Rescuers in the collapsed structure
State Emergency Service of Ukraine · 2022-06-27 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 8456cb5858a968a2… · 98 KB
The ruins of the shopping centre the next day, 28 June 2022
State Emergency Service of Ukraine · 2022-06-28 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 ff070a363899c881… · 396 KB
A rescuer during debris removal, 30 June 2022
State Emergency Service of Ukraine · 2022-06-30 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 096d1a5824b02de8… · 241 KB
Download pack (ZIP · 5 files)Openly licensed official material only; videos are linked to the official post. No image shows the dead; images of graphic aftermath are blurred until tapped and marked sensitive in the pack. This is not an evidence repository: originals are held by the Prosecutor General (warcrimes.gov.ua) and the ICC OTP.
Kramatorsk station: 'For the children', on the childrenKramatorsk railway station, Donetsk region · 8 April 2022
The Tochka-U rocket body with the inscription "For the children" beside the station, 8 April 2022. Photo: armyinform.com.ua · 2022-04-08 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
59
killed and 92 injured — the UN Commission of Inquiry's figures; Ukrainian authorities count 61–63 dead, HRW at least 58 A
7 – 9
children among the dead (7: SBU, regional administration; 9: Interior Ministry 2024) B
At 10:28 on 8 April 2022 a Tochka-U ballistic missile opened its cluster warhead over the forecourt of Kramatorsk station, where hundreds of people were waiting for evacuation trains. At least 58–63 civilians died, among them seven to nine children; more than 100 were injured. The rocket motor carried the words 'ЗА ДЕТЕЙ' — 'for the children'. Within hours Russia had announced strikes on other stations, denied this one and blamed a Ukrainian brigade.
Indiscriminate attack, no feasible precautions, hundreds of civilians present — established (Commission of Inquiry)Cluster munitions on evacuation points and gatherings — patternWar crime, violation of the laws and customs of war — position (Art. 438 CCU; HRW: apparent war crime)
Russia said. Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation · official statement · Moscow, 8 Apr 2022, 13:41: “All the claims by representatives of the Kiev nationalist regime that Russia allegedly carried out a 'missile attack' on April 8 against the railway terminal in Kramatorsk are a provocation and completely have nothing to do with reality. The Russian Armed Forces had no fire tasks and planned none in the town of Kramatorsk on April 8.” — Contradicted by the MoD's own briefing three hours earlier. At about 10:10 the same ministry announced strikes with 'high-precision air-based missiles' on railway stations at Pokrovsk, Sloviansk and Barvinkove, on the same network. The Commission of Inquiry lists the Kramatorsk attack among those launched or likely launched by Russian armed forces.
Evidence held: Commission of Inquiry, A/HRC/52/62 (15 Mar 2023), paras. 31–32; UN Crisis Coordinator, 8 Apr 2022; SBU, 21 May 2022; Prosecutor General's Office, 8 Apr 2022.
Photo & video · 7 photos
The Tochka-U rocket body with the inscription "For the children" beside the station, 8 April 2022
armyinform.com.ua · 2022-04-08 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 07d882d3eb00b747… · 254 KB
The station forecourt after the strike: abandoned belongings of people waiting to evacuate
armyinform.com.ua · 2022-04-08 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 f5664c0dbb9551e7… · 183 KB
Remains of the rocket on the grass outside the station
National Police of Ukraine · 2022-04-08 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 a7a5faa55c1e89c1… · 323 KB
Ambulances and medics at the station
National Police of Ukraine · 2022-04-08 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 13485bbc31b980a0… · 170 KB
Luggage left on the platform side of the station
armyinform.com.ua · 2022-04-08 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 36a7169821d26c34… · 271 KB
First anniversary: residents and officials lay candles at the station, 8 April 2023
Donetsk Regional Military Civil Administration · 2023-04-08 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 6db84732cc3eb4ce… · 122 KB
Toys on the station fence, 8 April 2023
Donetsk Regional Military Civil Administration · 2023-04-08 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 477d6a6935263025… · 115 KB
Download pack (ZIP · 7 files)Openly licensed official material only; videos are linked to the official post. No image shows the dead; images of graphic aftermath are blurred until tapped and marked sensitive in the pack. This is not an evidence repository: originals are held by the Prosecutor General (warcrimes.gov.ua) and the ICC OTP.
Mariupol theatre: the shelter marked 'CHILDREN'Donetsk Regional Academic Drama Theatre, Mariupol · 16 March 2022
The Donetsk Regional Drama Theatre in Mariupol before the war — eastern façade. Photo: Sergienkod · 2019-08-10 · CC BY-SA 4.0 · original ↗
~600
people likely killed, reconstructed from 23 survivor and rescuer accounts and two sets of floor plans C
~300
killed — the first official estimate, never updated: the city lost access to the site B
Two 500-kg bombs on a theatre where up to 1,200 civilians had sheltered, with the Russian word for children painted outside in letters visible from orbit. Nobody has been allowed to count the dead: the city said about 300, AP's reconstruction about 600, Amnesty confirmed a dozen and said many more died. The OSCE called it a war crime within a month. Russia blamed Azov, then demolished the ruins.
Attack on a marked civilian shelter — established (OSCE Moscow Mechanism, 13 Apr 2022)Siege of Mariupol: strikes on shelters, hospitals, evacuation routes — patternWar crime combined with murder, Art. 438(2) CCU — position (SBU/PGO suspicion, 19 Aug 2025)
Russia said. Russian Ministry of Defence · official statement · 16 Mar 2022: “Militants of the Azov nationalist battalion carried out another bloody provocation by blowing up the rigged theater building.” — Not plausible on any credible evidence. Amnesty examined the Azov hypothesis and found it not plausible: the evidence points to two 500-kg aerial bombs. Witnesses saw no soldiers inside beyond the occasional man bringing food. The OSCE noted Russia never claimed the theatre as a legitimate target.
Evidence held: OSCE Moscow Mechanism, report of 13 Apr 2022 (experts Benedek, Bílková, Sassòli; 45 participating States); OHCHR, periodic report 1 Feb – 31 Jul 2022 (para. 22); Mariupol City Council, 25 Mar 2022; SBU and Donetsk regional prosecutor, 19 Aug 2025.
Photo & video · 5 photos
The Donetsk Regional Drama Theatre in Mariupol before the war — eastern façade
Sergienkod · 2019-08-10 · CC BY-SA 4.0 · original ↗
The theatre and the surrounding square — the space where "CHILDREN" was later written
Федоров Микита · 2022-10-27 · CC BY-SA 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 5941daefd6b10c2a… · 86 KB
The theatre in April 2022, after the strike of 16 March
ОленаСугак · 2022-04-12 · CC BY-SA 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 d5e85b089a037f1b… · 380 KB
Ukrainian postage stamp "Cities of Heroes. Mariupol", 2025
Scanned by Roysma · 2025-03-23 · Public domain · original ↗
SHA-256 e77040e30a0ac149… · 129 KB
Download pack (ZIP · 5 files)Openly licensed official material only; videos are linked to the official post. No image shows the dead; images of graphic aftermath are blurred until tapped and marked sensitive in the pack. This is not an evidence repository: originals are held by the Prosecutor General (warcrimes.gov.ua) and the ICC OTP.
Yahidne: a village in a school basementYahidne, Chernihiv region · 3–30 March 2022
The school in Yahidne whose basement held the village for 28 days. Photo: Enno Lenze · 2023-06-29 · CC BY 2.0 · original ↗
365
civilians confined in the school basement for 28 days, 70 of them children A
10
older persons died during the confinement; their names were written on the basement wall A
For 28 days Russian troops held almost the whole population of a village — about 365 people, 70 of them children, the youngest six weeks old — in the 197 m² basement of the school they used as their headquarters. Ten elderly people died in the dark. The Commission of Inquiry called it inhuman treatment and a war crime; Ukrainian courts have convicted 16 servicemen in absentia and charged the brigade's general.
Inhuman treatment and unlawful confinement, war crime — established (CoI)Civilians used to shield positions — patternCommand responsibility of the 55th Brigade and 41st Army — position
Russia said. Sergei Lavrov · Foreign Minister · BBC interview, 16–17 Jun 2022: “UN officials are under Western pressure and act as a mouthpiece for Western fakes.” — The UN went to the basement. The Commission of Inquiry visited the basement and saw the names of the dead on the wall (A/77/533, para. 79). Its figures match those of a Ukrainian court that heard 84 victims and of Human Rights Watch, which interviewed 13 former detainees. The 'fake' consists of a room with 365 people's names and dates in it.
Evidence held: High Commissioner for Human Rights, Human Rights Council special session, 12 May 2022; Commission of Inquiry, A/77/533 (18 Oct 2022), paras. 54, 78, 79, 102; Chernihiv regional prosecutor, 22 May 2022; Chernihiv District Court, 11 Mar 2024.
Photo & video · 7 photos
The school in Yahidne whose basement held the village for 28 days
The school basement, photographed during the visit of the US Secretary of State, 7 Sep 2023
U.S. Department of State · 2023-09-07 · Public domain · original ↗
SHA-256 7094a02b8b427a12… · 263 KB
Download pack (ZIP · 7 files)Openly licensed official material only; videos are linked to the official post. No image shows the dead; images of graphic aftermath are blurred until tapped and marked sensitive in the pack. This is not an evidence repository: originals are held by the Prosecutor General (warcrimes.gov.ua) and the ICC OTP.
MH17: a Buk from Kursk, 298 dead, three courtsFlight MH17 · near Hrabove, Donetsk region · 17 July 2014
Dutch and Australian police investigators at the MH17 crash site in eastern Ukraine. Photo: Ministerie van Defensie · 2014-08-03 · CC BY-SA 4.0 · original ↗
298
people killed: 283 passengers and 15 crew, 80 of them children A
53rd
Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade, Kursk — the Russian unit whose Buk-TELAR fired A
A Russian Buk-TELAR of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade, driven into occupied Donetsk region and back the same night, fired one missile at a Boeing 777 at 33,000 feet. All 298 on board died, 80 of them children. A Dutch court convicted three men of murder in 2022; in 2025 the ICAO Council and the European Court of Human Rights held Russia responsible. Russia answered with a fighter jet, a retired missile, a withdrawn radar tape and the word 'void'.
Unlawful downing of a civil aircraft, 298 murders — established (District Court of The Hague; ECtHR; ICAO)Denial, counter-narratives, obstruction of investigations — patternAct of the Russian state through forces under its overall control — position (Netherlands, Australia, Ukraine)
Russia said. Lt-Gen Andrei Kartapolov · Head of the Main Operations Directorate, General Staff · Russian MoD briefing, Moscow, 21 Jul 2014: “A Ukraine Air Force military jet was detected gaining height, its distance from the Malaysian Boeing was 3 to 5 km. The SU-25 fighter jet can gain an altitude of 10 km, according to its specification.” — Withdrawn by Russia's own radar data. The Safety Board excluded an air-to-air missile: the damage pattern and the bow-tie fragments fit only a Buk warhead. On 26 Sep 2016 the Russian MoD released radar data showing no second aircraft near MH17 — the Su-25 disappeared from Russia's own account.
Evidence held: Dutch Safety Board, 13 Oct 2015; JIT, 24 May 2018; Ukraine's Prosecutor General and SBU; Ukraine restricted only lower altitudes; the Safety Board found it had sufficient reason to close its eastern airspace entirely..
Photo & video · 5 photos
Dutch and Australian police investigators at the MH17 crash site in eastern Ukraine
Ministerie van Defensie · 2014-08-03 · CC BY-SA 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 3310706596840165… · 407 KB
Flight data of MH17 on 17 July 2014, 13:17–13:20 UTC, from the Dutch Safety Board preliminary report
Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid · 2014-09-09 · Public domain · original ↗
SHA-256 5f97d0c1eabe488b… · 100 KB
Coffins of MH17 victims arrive at Eindhoven air base from Kharkiv, July 2014
Hille Hillenga · 2014-07-25 · CC BY-SA 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 382aac102e7f23e7… · 54 KB
Union and Dutch flags at half-mast in Downing Street, July 2014
Foreign and Commonwealth Office · 2014-07-23 · CC BY 2.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 710b47613e4f0913… · 127 KB
The National Monument MH17 at Vijfhuizen near Schiphol
Download pack (ZIP · 5 files)Openly licensed official material only; videos are linked to the official post. No image shows the dead; images of graphic aftermath are blurred until tapped and marked sensitive in the pack. This is not an evidence repository: originals are held by the Prosecutor General (warcrimes.gov.ua) and the ICC OTP.
Kyiv and Kyiv region, 20–21 Oct 2026Drones on a cardiology operating theatre, a highway, an apartment block · day and night
The 24-storey apartment block in Sviatoshynskyi district, Kyiv, after the drone strike, early morning of 21 Oct. Photo: State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · 2026-10-21 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
6
killed in Kyiv and on its outskirts B
2
medical facilities hit in daylight; one patient wounded B
On Tuesday Russian attack drones struck Kyiv from the morning rush hour into the evening. One hit the sixth-floor operating theatre of the Strazhesko Institute of Cardiology, wounding a patient — the second strike on the institute after 28 September 2025; debris damaged a second medical facility in Holosiivskyi district, injuring two. Near the Kyiv–Odesa highway in Chabany a drone killed three people, among them the driver of the military memorial cemetery shuttle bus; at a petrol station on the city boundary one person was killed. Overnight a drone hit a 24-storey apartment block in Sviatoshynskyi district, killing a man of 28 and a woman of 30. Preliminary figures; OHCHR verification pending.
Attacks on hospitals — protected objects; Okhmatdyt direct hit likely per HRMMU (2024)These strikes — position
Russia said. Russian media, citing the Ministry of Defence, reported strikes on transport and warehouse infrastructure in Kyiv's Solomianskyi district — where the cardiology institute stands — and named no hospital. At the Security Council on 9 October Russia said it strikes "only military facilities".
Evidence held: Prime Minister S. Koretskyi (institute, 20 Oct); Kyiv mayor V. Klitschko and Kyiv city military administration (20–21 Oct); Kyiv city health department (17:50 toll); Kyiv regional and city prosecutor's offices (Chabany; Sviatoshynskyi); State Emergency Service; Air Force (186 drones and Iskander-K, night of 20–21 Oct).
Photo & video · 9 photos
The 24-storey apartment block in Sviatoshynskyi district, Kyiv, after the drone strike, early morning of 21 Oct
State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · 2026-10-21 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 812627f6c66998e1… · 52 KB
The 24-storey apartment block in Sviatoshynskyi district, Kyiv, after the drone strike, early morning of 21 Oct
State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · 2026-10-21 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 812627f6c66998e1… · 52 KB
Rescuers in the burnt-out apartment on the 20th floor, 21 Oct
State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · 2026-10-21 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 60a7e94e83453c2e… · 61 KB
A rescuer carries a cat out of the damaged block, 21 Oct
State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · 2026-10-21 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 110c1d84049f5674… · 53 KB
Burnt cars in the courtyard of the block, 21 Oct
State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · 2026-10-21 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 864074e3c892fdab… · 84 KB
Chabany, Kyiv region, 20 Oct: rescuers put out a car set on fire by the drone strike near the Kyiv–Odesa highway
State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · 2026-10-20 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 7f1448d80a5cf3fc… · 127 KB
Chabany, 20 Oct: a burnt-out car beside the highway
State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · 2026-10-20 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 0899aec3f026f872… · 83 KB
Chabany, 20 Oct: a bus windscreen pierced by a fragment
State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · 2026-10-20 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 eaf8d86c1be2fad0… · 89 KB
Kyiv, evening of 20 Oct: rescuers at a garage cooperative hit by a drone
State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · 2026-10-20 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 68142e11d02616fb… · 57 KB
Download pack (ZIP · 9 files)Openly licensed official material only; videos are linked to the official post. No image shows the dead; images of graphic aftermath are blurred until tapped and marked sensitive in the pack. This is not an evidence repository: originals are held by the Prosecutor General (warcrimes.gov.ua) and the ICC OTP.
Nova Vodolaha, Kharkiv region, 19 Oct 2026Attack drone on a town park · afternoon
The central park of Nova Vodolaha after the drone strike, 19 Oct. Photo: State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · 2026-10-19 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
6
killed, two of them children: girls aged 1 and 11 B
15
injured, seven of them children B
At about 16:30 on Monday a Geran-3 attack drone hit the central park of Nova Vodolaha, about 27 km from Kharkiv, while families with children were walking there. Six people were killed, two of them children: a girl aged 1, killed in her stroller together with her mother, and a girl aged 11; 15 injured, seven of them children, were taken to hospitals in Kharkiv. A café in the park was damaged. Updated toll of the regional military administration, 20 Oct (first reports on 19 Oct named three children among the dead); preliminary, OHCHR verification pending.
War crimes — pattern (CoI A/80/497, drone attacks on civilians)This strike — position
Russia said. No statement on Nova Vodolaha found as of the evening of 19 October. At the Security Council on 9 October Russia said it strikes "only military facilities"; no military object has been named in the park.
Evidence held: Kharkiv regional military administration (O. Syniehubov, 18:20; updated toll, 20 Oct); Kharkiv regional prosecutor's office (time, weapon); Minister of Internal Affairs I. Vyhivskyi; Kharkiv regional emergency medical centre.
Photo & video · 4 photos
The central park of Nova Vodolaha after the drone strike, 19 Oct
State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · 2026-10-19 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 ccb3b68f6051e8d6… · 232 KB
The central park of Nova Vodolaha after the drone strike, 19 Oct
State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · 2026-10-19 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 ccb3b68f6051e8d6… · 232 KB
The damaged café in the park
State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · 2026-10-19 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 0668e6469cd8fe66… · 141 KB
A child's stroller at the impact site — graphic aftermath, blurred
State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · 2026-10-19 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 6a130477b7e64c90… · 166 KB
Download pack (ZIP · 4 files)Openly licensed official material only; videos are linked to the official post. No image shows the dead; images of graphic aftermath are blurred until tapped and marked sensitive in the pack. This is not an evidence repository: originals are held by the Prosecutor General (warcrimes.gov.ua) and the ICC OTP.
Vinnytsia, Lutsk, Rivne, Zhytomyr, 16–17 Oct 2026Night strike on the power system · a city without electricity
Lutsk, 16 Oct: firefighters at a burning garage cooperative after the Russian attack. Photo: State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · 2026-10-16 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
15+
power generation and transmission facilities attacked
332
drones + ballistic, cruise and Kalibr missiles
From 18:00 on 16 Oct: 332 drones, Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles, Kh-22/32 and 4 Kalibr cruise missiles; 289 drones and the 4 Kalibr downed, no ballistic missile reported intercepted; hits at 22 locations. Vinnytsia: a damaged substation left the city without electricity, the main water station lost power, critical facilities on back-up supply, electric transport stopped; 6 injured in the region. Severe disruptions also in Lutsk, Rivne, Zhytomyr, Shepetivka, Slavuta and Netishyn.
War crimes — established (ICC, energy campaign 2022–23)This strike — patternCAH — position
Russia said. The Ministry of Defence (17 Oct) reported a "massive strike on Ukraine's metallurgical plants and energy facilities", naming Kryvyi Rih, Zaporizhzhia and a substation in Zhytomyr. It did not mention Vinnytsia, where a damaged substation cut power to the whole city and its water station.
Evidence held: Air Force summary (08:00, 17 Oct); President of Ukraine; Vinnytsia mayor; Vinnytsia Regional Military Administration; Vinnytsiaoblenergo; Vinnytsiaoblvodokanal; Vinnytsia regional council; regional administrations; Russian MoD statement of 17 Oct.
Photo & video · 5 photos
Lutsk, 16 Oct: firefighters at a burning garage cooperative after the Russian attack
State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · 2026-10-16 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 ff6cca296c3acff5… · 83 KB
Lutsk, 16 Oct: firefighters at a burning garage cooperative after the Russian attack
State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · 2026-10-16 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 ff6cca296c3acff5… · 83 KB
Lutsk: firefighters on a burning roof
State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · 2026-10-16 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 a3e635099d740600… · 76 KB
Lutsk: smoke over the garages
State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · 2026-10-16 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 fa3bd85f71643f01… · 48 KB
Lutsk: firefighters at the burning buildings
State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · 2026-10-16 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 829cc829f66476a2… · 72 KB
Download pack (ZIP · 5 files)Openly licensed official material only; videos are linked to the official post. No image shows the dead; images of graphic aftermath are blurred until tapped and marked sensitive in the pack. This is not an evidence repository: originals are held by the Prosecutor General (warcrimes.gov.ua) and the ICC OTP.
Lutsk, Kropyvnytskyi and beyond, 14–15 Oct 2026More than 850 attack drones in 33 hours
Fire after the strike on civilian buildings, 14 Oct. Photo: State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · 2026-10-14 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
17
killed in six regions, 67 injured (preliminary)
850+
Shahed-type drones, 00:00 14 Oct – 09:00 15 Oct
Lutsk, 14 Oct: a jet-powered Shahed hit the "Yevrohurt" wholesale market on Koniakina Street — 6 killed, 12 injured. Overnight 580 drones and 2 Kh-59 missiles; almost 360 drones over Kirovohrad region alone, the largest attack on it since 2022 — 3 killed in Kropyvnytskyi. Further deaths in Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv and Kherson regions; injured in Rivne, Kyiv, Zaporizhzhia and Ternopil regions.
War crimes — patternCAH — position
Russia said. The MoD reported strikes on Izmail port "used for unloading and storing military and dual-use cargo". It said nothing about a market in Lutsk or homes in Kropyvnytskyi.
Evidence held: Air Force summaries (14–15 Oct); Volyn, Kirovohrad, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv and Kherson regional administrations; Lutsk City Council; SES; National Police photographs of the Lutsk site.
Photo & video · 9 photos · 2 videos
Fire after the strike on civilian buildings, 14 Oct
State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · 2026-10-14 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 90f3779f19e86ca9… · 60 KB
Fire after the strike on civilian buildings, 14 Oct
State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · 2026-10-14 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 90f3779f19e86ca9… · 60 KB
Rescuers at the site, 14 Oct
State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · 2026-10-14 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 6cae525b00a3696c… · 70 KB
A child's shoe at the strike site, 14 Oct
State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · 2026-10-14 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 31aedeec292382f2… · 132 KB
Kirovohrad region, night of 14–15 Oct: firefighters at a burning building
State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · 2026-10-15 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 829cc829f66476a2… · 72 KB
Kirovohrad region: firefighters put out the fire
State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · 2026-10-15 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 8cf0b34421662d57… · 68 KB
Kirovohrad region: a firefighter in the burning ruins
State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · 2026-10-15 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 6434478d599c8b3e… · 65 KB
Firefighters at a night fire after the drone attack, 15 Oct
State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · 2026-10-15 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 e96cb29ffe298876… · 107 KB
A burning house after the drone attack, 15 Oct
State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · 2026-10-15 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 f482adb6fdbd4a09… · 58 KB
▶ Video official post
Video — official post of the State Emergency Service
State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · 2026-10-14 · watch ↗
▶ Video official post
Video — official post of the State Emergency Service
State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · 2026-10-15 · watch ↗
Download pack (ZIP · 9 files)Openly licensed official material only; videos are linked to the official post. No image shows the dead; images of graphic aftermath are blurred until tapped and marked sensitive in the pack. This is not an evidence repository: originals are held by the Prosecutor General (warcrimes.gov.ua) and the ICC OTP.
Kyiv, 14 Oct 2026Night strike on the capital's heat and power · 39 ballistic missiles + 128 drones
Kyiv, Desnianskyi district: the residential block burning after the strike (SES Kyiv, night of 9–10 October). Photo: State Emergency Service, Kyiv · 10 Oct 2026 · CC BY 4.0 · original post ↗
600,000
without electricity in Kyiv; outages in 9 regions
3 of 3
Kyiv CHP plants hit; 4 killed, 25 injured
Only 4 of 39 ballistic missiles were intercepted. All three combined heat-and-power plants that warm a city of three million were hit at the start of the heating season; three women were killed in a nine-storey block in Desnianskyi district. Fourth winter campaign: 29–30 Sep, 7 Oct, 8 Oct, 13–14 Oct.
War crimes — establishedCAH — patternContinuing CAH — position
Russia said. MoD, 14 Oct: "five energy facilities used for the needs of the military-industrial complex", naming CHP-4, 5 and 6. The ICC qualified exactly this conduct as war crimes and crimes against humanity in 2024.
Evidence held: Air Force radar track and launch count; Ukrenergo damage reports; MoD target list (Interfax, 14 Oct, archived); SES site documentation, Desnianskyi block. Satellite imagery requested (Maxar News Bureau).
Photo & video · 1 photo
Kyiv, Desnianskyi district: the residential block burning after the strike (SES Kyiv, night of 9–10 October)
State Emergency Service, Kyiv · 10 Oct 2026 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 574ef5272aa7d251… · 40 KB
Download pack (ZIP · 1 files)Openly licensed official material only; videos are linked to the official post. No image shows the dead; images of graphic aftermath are blurred until tapped and marked sensitive in the pack. This is not an evidence repository: originals are held by the Prosecutor General (warcrimes.gov.ua) and the ICC OTP.
Kharkiv, 2–12 Oct 2026Five strikes on residential districts in eleven days
Kharkiv: firefighters at the residential block whose entrance section collapsed, 12 October. Photo: State Emergency Service, Kharkiv region · 12 Oct 2026 · CC BY 4.0 · original post ↗
16
killed in five strikes (derived)
160+
injured, incl. at least 10 children
Guided bombs on 2 Oct (2 killed), 5 Oct (6 killed, 59 injured) and 11 Oct; a missile on a grocery store in Pisochyn (3 killed, incl. a 16-year-old); ~10 Banderol missiles on 12 Oct (4 killed, 41 injured, entrance section collapsed). The Commission of Inquiry qualified the Kharkiv glide-bomb campaign as war crimes in 2024.
War crimes — establishedCAH — pattern
Russia said. OSCE envoy Polyanskiy, 8 Oct: "impossible to hide the scale of the failure of Ukraine's air defence". Glide bombs are not engaged by air defence at all — the argument concedes whose bombs they are.
Since this file. Overnight into 21 October a Russian drone attack on Korotych, on the western edge of Kharkiv, killed an 81-year-old woman and an 83-year-old man; 13 houses damaged; a two-month-old boy and an eight-year-old girl among 11 people treated for acute stress (Kharkiv regional military administration, O. Syniehubov, 21 Oct · Tier B · preliminary).
Evidence held: KAB and Banderol fragments (police); regional administration casualty lists per strike; HRW documentation of the Kryvyi Rih hospital strike (same weapon family); COI 2024 findings on Kharkiv.
Photo & video · 9 photos · 2 videos
Kharkiv: firefighters at the residential block whose entrance section collapsed, 12 October
State Emergency Service, Kharkiv region · 12 Oct 2026 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 c2855a3281b8dab0… · 209 KB
Kharkiv, 12 Oct: a crane and fire engines at the damaged high-rise
State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · 2026-10-12 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 92eda536c4e59572… · 107 KB
Rescuer-climbers work on the roof of the damaged building
State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · 2026-10-12 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 3b77590abd84a79d… · 64 KB
Rescuers secure the damaged roof
State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · 2026-10-12 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 17022b941e17c99b… · 101 KB
The hole in the roof left by the strike
State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · 2026-10-12 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 fbac2c8da367a6e3… · 68 KB
A search dog at the site, evening of 12 Oct
State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · 2026-10-13 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 e5af6a97a272747d… · 110 KB
Night clearing of the collapsed section
State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · 2026-10-13 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 364c340dfc17ef05… · 142 KB
A crane at the damaged building
State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · 2026-10-13 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 1ff8d6499eb0e93d… · 128 KB
Korotych, Kharkiv district, night of 21 Oct: rescuers search a house destroyed by a drone
State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · 2026-10-21 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 837b171e93124c71… · 68 KB
▶ Video official post
Video — official post of the State Emergency Service
State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · 2026-10-12 · watch ↗
▶ Video official post
Video — official post of the State Emergency Service
State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · 2026-10-13 · watch ↗
Download pack (ZIP · 9 files)Openly licensed official material only; videos are linked to the official post. No image shows the dead; images of graphic aftermath are blurred until tapped and marked sensitive in the pack. This is not an evidence repository: originals are held by the Prosecutor General (warcrimes.gov.ua) and the ICC OTP.
Zaporizhzhia, 10 Oct 2026Five guided bombs on a residential district · night
Zaporizhzhia: rescuers on the collapsed entrance section, 11 October. Photo: State Emergency Service, Zaporizhzhia region · 11 Oct 2026 · CC BY 4.0 · original post ↗
23
killed, incl. 4 children · 32 injured incl. 3 children
5
glide bombs; 26 residential buildings damaged
An entrance section of a three-storey block collapsed with residents inside; rescue work ran through 11 October (320 t of debris removed), declared a day of mourning. Final SES figures of 11 Oct replace the 10 Oct count of 20. 160 drones were launched nationwide the same night, 110 of them jet-powered. OHCHR verification pending.
War crimes — establishedCAH — pattern
Russia said. Nothing — no MoD, MFA or Kremlin statement mentions the block. The same day Russia's OSCE envoy wrote that "nothing will be left of Ukraine's infrastructure".
Zaporizhzhia: rescuers on the collapsed entrance section, 11 October
State Emergency Service, Zaporizhzhia region · 11 Oct 2026 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 89542fa93e296844… · 132 KB
Rescuers and machinery at the destroyed residential building, Zaporizhzhia
State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · 2026-10-10 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 a628e8501ae6873d… · 135 KB
Rescuers dismantle the rubble
State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · 2026-10-10 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 a897e6782daf54bb… · 132 KB
A search dog on the rubble
State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · 2026-10-10 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 4944a53ff97fc540… · 120 KB
An excavator clears the collapsed section
State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · 2026-10-10 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 32ce3ae6cae71a48… · 122 KB
Rescuers on the rubble
State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · 2026-10-10 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 a9bcdc143a6539f9… · 93 KB
▶ Video official post
Video — official post of the State Emergency Service
State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · 2026-10-10 · watch ↗
Download pack (ZIP · 6 files)Openly licensed official material only; videos are linked to the official post. No image shows the dead; images of graphic aftermath are blurred until tapped and marked sensitive in the pack. This is not an evidence repository: originals are held by the Prosecutor General (warcrimes.gov.ua) and the ICC OTP.
Kramatorsk, 8 Oct 2026Guided bomb on two passenger buses · ~10:00
Kramatorsk: the strike site on the morning of 8 October; the burnt-out bus is behind the fire engine. Photo: State Emergency Service, Donetsk region · 8 Oct 2026 · CC BY 4.0 · original post ↗
33
killed on two city buses
1
UMPB D-30SN glide bomb identified by police
The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights called it "today's horrifying strike hitting two public buses" that "could amount to war crimes"; the Security Council was briefed the next day ("at least 33"). Three more were killed the same day in Bilenke.
Direct attack on civilians — establishedCAH — pattern
Russia said. Nothing by name. The next day at the Security Council Amb. Nebenzia said Ukraine targets "civilian buses… time and time again" — a mirror claim, one week after the MFA alleged "216 buses" attacked by Ukraine.
Since this file. On 20 October Russia struck Kramatorsk three times in daylight, including with aerial bombs on residential blocks (State Emergency Service): three heat-supply workers checking the network before the heating season were killed and an FPV drone killed a fourth person; six injured; at least 15 apartment buildings and two educational institutions damaged (Donetsk regional military administration, V. Filashkin, 20 Oct · Tier B · preliminary).
Evidence held: UMPB D-30SN fragments with markings (National Police); CCTV and dash-cam video, geolocated; victim identification list (SES); High Commissioner statement; UN verbatim record of 9 Oct.
Photo & video · 10 photos · 1 video
Kramatorsk: the strike site on the morning of 8 October; the burnt-out bus is behind the fire engine
State Emergency Service, Donetsk region · 8 Oct 2026 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 84802184323ff3fa… · 125 KB
The scheduled passenger bus hit by a guided bomb, Kramatorsk, 8 Oct
State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · 2026-10-08 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 a09d14ac425a1842… · 167 KB
Firefighters at the burnt-out bus — graphic aftermath, blurred
State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · 2026-10-08 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 0cb07d73d0c32415… · 144 KB
The street after the strike
State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · 2026-10-08 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 f99035e3683a12e2… · 151 KB
The road next to the bus after the strike — graphic aftermath, blurred
State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · 2026-10-08 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 98832afd9022d089… · 140 KB
Kramatorsk, 9 Oct (next day): an ambulance burning after a Russian strike
State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · 2026-10-09 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 6693db68ccee8f8f… · 102 KB
Kramatorsk, 9 Oct: firefighters inside the burning ambulance station
State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · 2026-10-09 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 6a62714b294d261c… · 62 KB
Kramatorsk, 20 Oct: firefighters at a five-storey block hit by aerial bombs, twelve days after the bus strike
State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · 2026-10-20 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 9f6b2e6b72052fee… · 125 KB
Kramatorsk, 20 Oct: rescuers on a burnt-out balcony of the same block
State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · 2026-10-20 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 46c07461071a4a8c… · 121 KB
Kramatorsk, 20 Oct: an emergency-service vehicle damaged by a Russian FPV drone
State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · 2026-10-20 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 9f614c6f509a68bf… · 123 KB
▶ Video official post
Video, 9 Oct — official post of the State Emergency Service
State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · 2026-10-09 · watch ↗
Download pack (ZIP · 10 files)Openly licensed official material only; videos are linked to the official post. No image shows the dead; images of graphic aftermath are blurred until tapped and marked sensitive in the pack. This is not an evidence repository: originals are held by the Prosecutor General (warcrimes.gov.ua) and the ICC OTP.
Pryluky, 7 Oct 2026Chernihiv region · cruise missile · residential building · 150 km from the front
Pryluky: the residential block after the strike; search and rescue continued until 8 October. Photo: State Emergency Service, Chernihiv region · 8 Oct 2026 · CC BY 4.0 · original post ↗
22
killed, incl. 5 children
54
injured, incl. 7 children
Part of a two-wave strike of 48 cruise missiles, ballistic and anti-ship missiles and 130 drones; the UN called Pryluky "the deadliest attack" of the night (32 killed nationwide). Kremenchuk: 2 killed, 47 injured; Oleksandriia: 2 killed.
War crimes — establishedCAH — pattern
Russia said. MoD, 7 Oct: a "massive strike with high-precision weapons" on "military-industrial facilities", listing a plant in Pryluky. No mention of the residential building or the five children.
Evidence held: missile fragments (prosecutors); Air Force launch/interception log; MoD target list (Telegram 68011, archived); SES identification list; UN ASG briefing. Satellite imagery requested — current photo is a placeholder.
Photo & video · 10 photos · 4 videos
Pryluky: the residential block after the strike; search and rescue continued until 8 October
State Emergency Service, Chernihiv region · 8 Oct 2026 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 9d37d3e398fc1f34… · 142 KB
The five-storey residential block in Pryluky after the Kh-101 missile strike, 7 Oct
State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · 2026-10-07 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 4d23328278cd6456… · 109 KB
Rescuers at the collapsed section
State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · 2026-10-07 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 f89da667d17a2d1d… · 123 KB
The collapsed entrance section
State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · 2026-10-07 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 2ae346c24b579362… · 113 KB
A crane lifts slabs during the search
State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · 2026-10-07 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 df512f33397d59d8… · 134 KB
Rescuers on the rubble with the crane
State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · 2026-10-07 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 9799d93dffb15214… · 118 KB
The block after the search
State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · 2026-10-07 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 acbdc27c0cbd1ee3… · 87 KB
Night search in the rubble
State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · 2026-10-08 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 d939a1519ddd0673… · 83 KB
The building after the search-and-rescue operation ended, 8 Oct
State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · 2026-10-08 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 41d63cec57394157… · 106 KB
Search dogs of the Sumy rapid-response centre at the site, 8 Oct
State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · 2026-10-09 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 981f66aa2c34c7f2… · 99 KB
▶ Video official post
Video — official post of the State Emergency Service
State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · 2026-10-07 · watch ↗
▶ Video official post
Video — official post of the State Emergency Service
State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · 2026-10-07 · watch ↗
▶ Video official post
Video — official post of the State Emergency Service
State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · 2026-10-08 · watch ↗
▶ Video official post
Video — official post of the State Emergency Service
State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · 2026-10-08 · watch ↗
Download pack (ZIP · 10 files)Openly licensed official material only; videos are linked to the official post. No image shows the dead; images of graphic aftermath are blurred until tapped and marked sensitive in the pack. This is not an evidence repository: originals are held by the Prosecutor General (warcrimes.gov.ua) and the ICC OTP.
Dnipro, 28 Sep 2026Jet drone hits a city-centre office building · midday · + 22 Sep ballistic strike on Interpipe
Dnipro, 28 September: firefighters at the burning office building in the city centre. Photo: State Emergency Service, Dnipropetrovsk region · 28 Sep 2026 · CC BY 4.0 · original post ↗
3
killed · 21 injured incl. an 8-year-old girl
49
people evacuated from the burning office building
At about 11:20 on a working Monday a jet-powered drone hit an eight-storey office building in Shevchenkivskyi district; floors 5–6 were gutted and windows blown out in six residential buildings nearby. Evening figures of 28 Sep (21 injured) replace interim counts of 12–18; three women remained in hospital on 29 Sep. On 22 Sep a ballistic missile killed four workers at the Interpipe plant and halted production. OHCHR verification pending.
War crimes — establishedCAH — pattern
Russia said. Nothing about Dnipro. The MoD said its overnight strikes hit logistics, communications, port infrastructure and vessels (RFE/RL summary); the office block was hit in daylight. No statement names the Interpipe plant.
Evidence held: regional administration casualty reports (28–29 Sep); SES rescue record (49 evacuated); police statements taken at an on-site mobile point; Air Force launch and interception data; Interpipe statement on 22 Sep losses. Satellite imagery requested.
Photo & video · 1 photo
Dnipro, 28 September: firefighters at the burning office building in the city centre
State Emergency Service, Dnipropetrovsk region · 28 Sep 2026 · CC BY 4.0 · original ↗
SHA-256 2df94fe0e58505c8… · 97 KB
Download pack (ZIP · 1 files)Openly licensed official material only; videos are linked to the official post. No image shows the dead; images of graphic aftermath are blurred until tapped and marked sensitive in the pack. This is not an evidence repository: originals are held by the Prosecutor General (warcrimes.gov.ua) and the ICC OTP.
Sumy, 26 Sep 2026Glide bombs on residential areas · daytime
2
killed · 23 injured incl. 4 children
2
kindergartens damaged; dozens of apartment blocks, 20+ vehicles
Guided bombs hit several locations in the Sumy community; two people were killed in a residential area of Kovpakivskyi district. Three girls aged 14, 8 and 11 months were hospitalised. The deadliest of five glide-bomb attacks on Sumy from 18 Sep to 4 Oct (6 killed in all); on 29 Sep a school was hit during lessons. OHCHR verification pending.
War crimes — establishedCAH — pattern
Russia said. Nothing on this strike. Gen. Gerasimov announced (RIA, 31 Dec 2025) that Putin ordered the "buffer zone" in Sumy and Kharkiv regions expanded in 2026.
Open-source record: regional and city administration statements; Air Force overnight summary; media photo of damaged block. Not located: SES incident report, prosecutor's proceedings, OHCHR incident verification.
Kyiv, 25 Sep 2026Drones on an apartment block, an office car park and a court · night and day
Kyiv, Solomianskyi district, 25 September: rescuers at the office building and car park hit by a drone. Photo: State Emergency Service, Kyiv · 25 Sep 2026 · CC BY 4.0 · original post ↗
7
killed, incl. a 14-year-old boy · 59 injured incl. at least 2 children
295
drones launched nationwide that night; 267 downed
A drone hit a 16-storey apartment block in Pecherskyi district at about 08:00, killing a 14-year-old boy; in the afternoon another hit an office building in Solomianskyi district, killing four people in its car park. The High Council of Justice building and a food warehouse were also hit. Mayor's final figures of 25 Sep (21:20) replace interim counts of 46 and 57 injured; early reports of "2 children" referred to the injured, not the dead. OHCHR verification pending.
War crimes — establishedCAH — pattern
Russia said. The MoD claimed strikes on "defence industry sites, logistics centres and vessels" (Reuters). Kyiv's dead, the apartment block and the court building went unmentioned; Russia denies targeting civilians.
Evidence held: SES and police scene reports (Pecherskyi, Solomianskyi, Shevchenkivskyi, Podilskyi); Air Force launch and interception data; drone fragments; city damage survey. Prosecutor proceedings under art. 438 CCU to be confirmed.
Nikopol district, 16 Sep 2026FPV drone on a scheduled passenger minibus · morning
Nikopol district, 16 September: the front of the passenger minibus, marked by fragments (cropped). Photo: State Emergency Service, Dnipropetrovsk region · 16 Sep 2026 · CC BY 4.0 · original post ↗
5
killed at the scene — 4 men, 1 woman, aged 29–60
7
injured
A Russian FPV drone hit a scheduled minibus on the road in Nikopol district, across the Dnipro from occupied Enerhodar. The district declared a day of mourning. This was the third bus strike in the district in 2026, after 7 April (4 killed) and 8 August (driver killed). The UN COI has found Russia's drone campaign against civilians on the Dnipro right bank, including Dnipropetrovsk oblast, to be a crime against humanity of murder. HRMMU verification of this incident is pending.
CAH of murder — established (COI, drone campaign)This strike — verification pending
Russia said. Nothing. Russia made no comment on the strike (AFP, 16 Sep). Its standing line is that it does not deliberately target civilians, but the UN COI found the drone attacks systematic and under centralised command (A/80/497).
Publicly available: regional administration photos of the minibus and official casualty statements; Prosecutor General's proceedings under art. 438 CCU. HRMMU verification not yet published; the perpetrating unit has not yet been publicly identified.
Earlier. Sumy, 26 Sep 2026 (glide bombs on residential areas, 2 killed) · Nikopol district, 16 Sep 2026 (FPV drone on a passenger minibus, 5 killed) · Bucha, Mar 2022 (A3 one-pager) · "Heirs of Goebbels" — the 2026 Bucha denial — the 2026 Bucha denial (6 pp.). In the Archive and on the Fact-checks page.
In preparation. Izium, Yahidne, Olenivka, Hroza, Okhmatdyt (2022–24).
Each card: 24–48 h after verification; UN figures replace national figures when published; every change is logged on the Method page.
When Russia circulates a denial — as a report, a Security Council statement or a ministry briefing — we check it against the mandated record and publish the result in full. The method is the same each time: every verifiable claim, its source, what it actually establishes, what the document omits, and what it concedes compared with earlier Russian positions. Every fact-check is issued as a multi-page dossier on the model of "Heirs of Goebbels" — the 2026 Bucha denial: page 1 is the one-page summary; the following pages give the speaker and the venue, each claim against the record, the omissions, the concessions since 2022, and the sources.
What Moscow concedes, 13 Sep – 21 Oct 2026 · What Moscow itself concedes
Zakharova · Peskov · Ministry of Defence · Gerasimov · Moscow · 13 Sep – 21 Oct 2026. Russia's own spokespeople, in five weeks, named the targets: a passenger train at the Polish border, a plant in Pryluky, a Kyiv data centre and locomotive depot, and "massive strikes on Ukraine's energy facilities". Each statement was meant as a defence. Read against the UN record, each one is an admission — of the strike, of the aim-point, or of the motive. Eight statements, what the record shows, and what each concedes.
The recordRussia names its targets, and the names answer the case. "Plastmass-Pryluky" on 7 Oct was a five-storey apartment block with 22 dead. A "railway train of the Armed Forces of Ukraine used to deliver military cargo" on 13 Sep was the Kyiv–Warsaw passenger service. A "data centre", a "locomotive depot" and a polymer plant on 19 Oct are civilian objects unless Russia shows otherwise — and it has shown nothing.
Fair to sayUkraine does strike refineries, depots and ships; the IAEA has not said who flies the drones at Zaporizhzhia; OHCHR relays, but cannot verify, Russian-reported casualties in Russia. None of this makes a passenger train, an apartment block or a city's heating a military objective.
Claim 1 · Maria Zakharova, MFA spokesperson · 13 Oct“Our retaliatory actions — and the strikes were carried out only against objects linked to the military-industrial complex of the Kyiv regime — became a painful boomerang for Kyiv. (translated)”TASS, 13 Oct 2026, as carried by Vedomosti · source ↗
Contradicted by monitors — and concedes a reprisal motiveThe UN Secretariat told the Security Council on 9 Oct, with OHCHR figures, that "over 100 civilians" were killed and "at least 429 injured" in that week alone; a missile "destroyed a residential building" in Pryluky (7 Oct, reportedly 19 killed including five children) and a glide bomb hit two passenger buses in Kramatorsk (8 Oct, at least 33 killed) (SC/16472). HRMMU: 328 civilians killed and 2,105 injured in September, the highest September toll since February 2022, 53% by missiles and long-range drones (15 Oct). The Ministry of Defence's own 4 Oct statement, cited in the same Vedomosti report, says strikes are "precisely in response to the actions of the Kyiv regime". AP I art. 51(6): "Attacks against the civilian population or civilians by way of reprisals are prohibited"; art. 52(1): civilian objects "shall not be the object of attack or of reprisals". Concedes: That the strikes are retaliation — a motive IHL prohibits — and that Russia decides what counts as "linked to the military-industrial complex" after the fact.Evidence tiers: A · C
Claim 2 · Maria Zakharova · answer to a media question, mid.ru · 15 Sep“[Western visitors are] "political tourists"… [whom Kyiv uses as a] "living shield" to provide cover for its military trains… no one can guarantee the safety of their tours… Western politicians and diplomats should soberly assess the existing risks. (translated; English phrases as rendered by The Moscow Times)”Russian MFA, 15 Sep 2026, via Gordon (16 Sep) and Odessa Journal/The Moscow Times (15 Sep) · source ↗
No evidence presented — and the Ministry of Defence concedes the strikeOn 13 Sep a drone struck the locomotive of the Kyiv–Warsaw passenger train at Yahodyn, Volyn region, about 5 km from the Polish border, while a separate train carrying Boris Johnson, David Petraeus, a German chancellery adviser and other Western officials was halted on the same line under a drone alert (Ukrzaliznytsia; Der Spiegel eyewitnesses; AP). The Russian MoD said the crew "hit a railway train of the Armed Forces of Ukraine used to deliver military cargo" (15 Sep, via iStories). No evidence of military cargo, military trains or any military use of the Kyiv–Warsaw service was produced. The Secretariat's rule applies to trains as to buses: attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure "wherever they occur" violate IHL (SC/16472). Security Council Report records that the 13 Sep strikes "temporarily disrupted operations at the Yahodyn–Dorohusk border crossing". Concedes: The strike on the passenger train — and a standing threat to foreign officials travelling in Ukraine ("no one can guarantee").Evidence tiers: A · B · C
Claim 3 · Maria Zakharova · comment, mid.ru · 5 Oct“[Ukrainian forces struck] 200 metres from the plant's power units [and] twice shelled the radioactive-waste processing building… Ukraine continues to strike the ZNPP and its related infrastructure… [We] call on the IAEA leadership to resolutely condemn the criminal actions of Kyiv and its sponsors. (translated)”Russian MFA comment, 5 Oct 2026, as carried by 360.ru · source ↗
Unverified — the IAEA does not attributeThe IAEA's statement of 3 Oct 2026 recorded drone strikes on 19, 20 and 27 Sep that damaged transformers at the Zaporizhzhia Thermal Power Plant switchyard "vital for maintaining the ZNPP's off-site power supply", and a 22 Sep strike that "reportedly disabled an off-site radiation monitoring station"; it "did not specify who carried out the attacks" and said Director General Grossi was negotiating an eighth local ceasefire for repairs (Kyiv Independent, 3 Oct). For the 4–5 Oct incident, Rosatom reported roof damage to a laboratory building and the radioactive-waste processing building with no casualties (5 Oct); the IAEA's Update 370 (9 Oct 2026) records the incident as "a reported drone attack" without attribution: its team "requested access… and were granted limited access more than 48 hours after the reported attack", found broken windows that "had already been covered" and "various UAV components and debris… placed on display at the site", and called for "prompt, unfettered access to the sites of reported attacks". That is not the independent inspection RT described. In every previous ZNPP incident the IAEA has recorded damage and declined to attribute (e.g. 31 May 2026 turbine-hall strike: "the IAEA does not say which side is responsible"). The plant's status is adjudicated: IAEA Board and General Conference resolutions (Sept 2022, Mar 2024, Sept 2024) call for Russia to withdraw its personnel and return the plant to Ukrainian control. Concedes: That the IAEA is the authority — which has repeatedly called for Russia's withdrawal from the plant it demands the IAEA defend.Evidence tiers: A · C
Claim 4 · Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation · 7 Oct“[A "massive strike" with "high-precision long-range air-, land- and sea-launched weapons and attack drones" on "military-industrial facilities" — enterprises listed: "Smart Ammunition" (Kyiv), "Fanplit" (Kyiv), the Obukhiv cardboard-and-paper mill, "Plastmass-Pryluky" (Pryluky, Chernihiv region), the "Oleksandriia" industrial group, Pivdenmash (Dnipro), AvtoKrAZ and the JTI tobacco factory (Kremenchuk), a mechanical plant in Lozova, "Dunai Sudoremont" (Izmail).] (translated; list as published by Rossiyskaya Gazeta from the MoD report)”Russian MoD, 7 Oct 2026, via Rossiyskaya Gazeta · source ↗
Contradicted on the ground — concedes the Pryluky aim-pointOn the morning of 7 Oct a cruise missile hit a five-storey apartment building in Pryluky, Chernihiv region: 22 killed including five children, 54 injured including seven children (State Emergency Service, 8 Oct · Tier B, operational; Meduza). The UN told the Security Council the missile "destroyed a residential building", reportedly killing 19 including five children (SC/16472, 9 Oct). The EU counted "around 70 missiles — many of them ballistic — and drones, killing at least 22 people, including 5 children" (OSCE PC 1580, 8 Oct). Nothing in the MoD list — a cardboard mill, a tobacco factory, a plastics plant — is shown to be a military objective; AP I art. 52(3) presumes an object normally dedicated to civilian purposes is not used for military action "in case of doubt". Russia's UN representative two days later: strikes hit "military-industrial facilities, including energy infrastructure supporting military production and logistics" (SC/16472). Concedes: That Pryluky was a chosen aim-point of a planned strike — the fact that converts a "stray" into a targeting decision.Evidence tiers: A · B · C
Claim 5 · Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation · 19 Oct“As a result of the strike, military-industry enterprises, storage sites for cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles, and a data centre in the city of Kyiv and Kyiv region were hit… [named: the "Data Group" data centre, the "Fire Point" logistics hub, the "Kyiv" locomotive depot, the "Khimvolokno" industrial enterprise (Kyiv), the "Planeta Plastik" plant (Irpin); a cargo ship 130 km south-west of Odesa "carrying military and dual-use cargo"]. (translated)”Russian MoD on its MAX channel, 19 Oct 2026, via Profile.ru and Expert.ru · source ↗
No evidence presented — concedes civilian infrastructure as targetsA data centre, a locomotive depot and a plastics plant are objects "normally dedicated to civilian purposes"; the burden is on the attacker to show effective contribution to military action and a definite military advantage (AP I art. 52(2)–(3)). The MoD offered none. The same day Russia's President had said (15 Oct, Delovaya Rossiya forum): "They took the first step. We began to respond. Now they are already squealing about energy, and about other objects, including data centres" (RIA Novosti) — framing the data centre as retaliation. HRMMU's October figures are pending; its 16 Oct statement called the first two weeks of October "among the deadliest for civilians in recent years", with mass-casualty incidents in Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, Kramatorsk and Kyiv. Concedes: The target set, in Russia's own words: data, rail and plastics — the civilian economy.Evidence tiers: A · C
Claim 6 · Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff · report to the President · 15–16 Oct“The Armed Forces of Russia have begun to carry out new massive strikes on Ukraine's energy facilities… A list of these objects and the necessary allocation of means to strike them has been determined. [Since early September, 14 fuel, energy and transport infrastructure facilities have been struck.] (translated)”Interfax/TASS, 16 Oct 2026, via Gordon and Novaya Gazeta Europe · source ↗
Already adjudicatedICC Pre-Trial Chamber II issued an arrest warrant for Gerasimov himself on 24 Jun 2024 for "missile strikes carried out by the Russian armed forces against the Ukrainian electric infrastructure from at least 10 October 2022 until at least 9 March 2023": the war crimes of directing attacks at civilian objects (art. 8(2)(b)(ii)) and of causing excessive incidental harm (art. 8(2)(b)(iv)), and the crime against humanity of inhumane acts (art. 7(1)(k)); the Chamber found reasonable grounds that "the alleged strikes were directed against civilian objects" and, where an installation might have been a military objective, that the expected civilian harm "would have been clearly excessive to the anticipated military advantage". Warrants of 5 Mar 2024 for Kobylash and Sokolov cover the same campaign. The Commission of Inquiry found the attacks from 10 Oct 2022 may amount to crimes against humanity (A/HRC/55/66) and on 21 Sep 2026 warned that continued energy attacks were "increasing civilians' vulnerability" before winter. The UN Secretariat on 9 Oct: attacks on energy "risk leaving large numbers of civilians without heating, electricity and water" (SC/16472). HRMMU recorded the resumption of "large-scale coordinated attacks on power and heating infrastructure" on 30 Sep (15 Oct update). Concedes: A planned campaign against the energy system, with a target list, announced by an officer already charged for the previous one — the elements of policy and knowledge.Evidence tiers: A
Claim 7 · Dmitry Peskov, Kremlin spokesman · briefing · 15 Sep“We, on the whole, certainly consider this a very good idea, a good initiative… [and the second thing that needs to be done is, of course,] to lift sanctions (against Russia) and these unlawful restrictions on energy supplies. (translated; English phrases per Reuters)”Reuters, 15 Sep 2026 (via Internazionale); Novaya Gazeta Europe, 15 Sep · source ↗
Contradicted by Russia's own Ministry of DefenceThe US President announced on 14 Sep that Russia and Ukraine had agreed to stop energy strikes; the Financial Times reported Moscow had agreed to nothing; Reuters noted that "neither side has confirmed" the claim and that Russia struck petrol stations in Kyiv the same day (15 Sep). Ukraine said it would support a reciprocal halt if Washington secured Russia's commitment (SCR, 23 Sep). Asked again on 12 Oct, the Kremlin said only: "Contacts are continuing" (Astra/Reuters). On 30 Sep HRMMU recorded the resumption of large-scale coordinated attacks on power and heating infrastructure in three regions and Kyiv (15 Oct); on 16 Oct the General Staff reported "massive strikes on Ukraine's energy facilities" (claim 6). The "very good idea" was conditioned on sanctions relief and was never implemented by the side that praised it. Concedes: That an energy truce is feasible and desirable — and that Russia attaches a price (sanctions) to not striking civilian energy.Evidence tiers: A · C
Claim 8 · Dmitry Peskov · briefings · 12 and 21 Oct“[Both President Putin and officials at other levels have repeatedly stated that] we do not want a ceasefire. We want long-term peace… [21 Oct, asked whether the position on an energy truce had changed: "Nothing has changed. We need peace, not a truce… someone in Kyiv must make a responsible decision." (Anadolu, 21 Oct 2026)] (English per Reuters)”Reuters, 12 Oct 2026 (via UNITED24 Media), answering Zelensky's proposal of a 60-day ceasefire for elections; Anadolu, 21 Oct 2026 · source ↗
Fair to say — and the answer to "who blocks the ceasefire"A self-description, taken at face value: Russia does not want a ceasefire. The Kremlin's one offer: Russia "will be ready to give the order not to strike Ukraine on election day… Specifically on election day" (Peskov, 12 Oct, via Meduza/TASS). Ukraine accepted a full, unconditional 30-day ceasefire on 11 Mar 2025 (Jeddah) and 47 States restated it at the Security Council on 23 Sep 2026; the UN Secretariat asked for a "full, immediate and unconditional ceasefire" on 9 Oct (SC/16472); Russia's OSCE envoy said on 8 Oct that "no one intends to give such a gift to the Kyiv regime". Russia's UN representative said on 9 Oct that Moscow "has never refused" negotiations and that Kyiv "consciously chose to aggravate the situation" (SC/16472). "Peace, not a truce", while the General Staff lists energy targets for the winter, means the strikes continue until Russia's terms are met. Concedes: That the absence of a ceasefire is Russia's choice, stated — not a Ukrainian or European obstruction.Evidence tiers: A · C
What we askPut the Russian MoD's own target lists (7 and 19 Oct) and Gerasimov's 16 Oct report on the Security Council record next to the ICC warrants of 5 Mar and 24 Jun 2024 · ask Russia to substantiate the military use of each named civilian object — the Pryluky plant, the Kyiv data centre, the locomotive depot, the Kyiv–Warsaw train — or withdraw the claim · support HRMMU's October casualty update and the Commission of Inquiry's work on the autumn energy campaign · ask the IAEA Director General to brief on the September–October incidents at Zaporizhzhia and on the eighth local ceasefire · restate the ceasefire Ukraine accepted on 11 Mar 2025 and ask Moscow, which says it does not want one, to say so to the Council.
SourcesVedomosti/TASS, 13 Oct 2026 · Gordon and Odessa Journal/Moscow Times on the MFA comment of 15 Sep · iStories on the MoD, 15 Sep · 360.ru on the MFA comment of 5 Oct · Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 7 Oct · Profile.ru, 19 Oct · Novaya Gazeta Europe and Gordon on Gerasimov, 16 Oct · Reuters/Internazionale and Novaya Gazeta Europe on Peskov, 15 Sep · UNITED24 Media/Reuters on Peskov, 12 Oct · kurs.com.ua/RIA on Putin, 15 Oct · UN Meetings Coverage SC/16472, 9 Oct 2026 · HRMMU, Sept 2026 update (15 Oct) · ICC, 5 Mar and 24 Jun 2024 · UN News on A/HRC/55/66 · Security Council Report, 23 Sep and 13 Oct 2026 · EU statement, OSCE PC 1580 · Kyiv Independent on the IAEA, 3 Oct · Meduza, 8 Oct · full list on page 6
What Moscow concedes, 13 Sep – 21 Oct 2026 · 7-page dossier (PDF)p.1 one-page summary · p.2 the occasion, the speakers, what others said and what was left out · p.3–4 the eight claims against the record · p.5 the record side by side · p.6 the law, lines to take and Q&A · p.7 sources and method · v1 · 21 Oct 2026
Polyanskiy at the OSCE, 1–10 Oct 2026 · Vienna: three statements, one admission
Dmitry Polyanskiy, Russia's Permanent Representative to the OSCE · Permanent Council, Vienna · 1, 8 and 10 Oct 2026. In ten days Russia's new envoy to the OSCE told the Permanent Council that the war will go on until Europe's "party of war" is "out of business" — "or else until the complete military collapse of the Kyiv regime", the outcome he called more likely, that no one will give Kyiv "the gift" of a ceasefire because of Minsk, and that it "turns out" striking power plants, bridges and railways "is not allowed". The record answers each line — and the third one is an admission the International Criminal Court has already charged.
The recordThe admission is on the record. "It turns out that striking bridges, power plants, railway facilities and warehouses is not allowed." It does not "turn out": the ICC found reasonable grounds in 2024 that Russia's strikes on Ukraine's electric infrastructure were directed at civilian objects, and issued warrants for the officers who ran them. The Russian Mission to the OSCE has now said, in writing, that power plants are the target.
Fair to sayUkraine does strike refineries, depots and bridges inside Russia and says so; OHCHR relays Russian-reported casualties (496 killed, Jan–Sep 2026) it cannot verify. The law binds both sides. It does not make one side's violations a licence for the other's — and Ukraine has accepted a full ceasefire since March 2025; Russia, in Vienna, said it will not.
Claim 1 · Dmitry Polyanskiy · PC No. 1579 · 1 Oct“Our SMO will continue until the "party of war" in Europe is out of business and the European elites stop "putting spokes in the wheels" of efforts to achieve real peace. Or else until the complete military collapse of the Kyiv regime. [RIA Novosti adds: in Polyanskiy's view the probability of the second scenario looks even higher, given the pace of the Russian troops' advance.] (translated)”Statement at a closed session of the OSCE Permanent Council, Vienna, 1 Oct 2026, text published by RIA Novosti, 1 Oct 2026, 15:05 Moscow time — ria.ru/20261001/rossija-2121468488.html (translated from the Russian) · source ↗
Fair to say — and contradicted by Russia's own line at the UNThis is a self-description and is taken as such: the stated condition for ending the war is the military defeat of Ukraine's government. Eight days later at the Security Council (9 Oct, SC/16472) Russia's representative said Moscow "has never refused" negotiations and that it was Kyiv that "consciously chose to aggravate the situation". The UN Secretariat the same day called for a "full, immediate and unconditional ceasefire" (SC/16472). Ukraine accepted a full 30-day ceasefire on 11 Mar 2025 (Jeddah joint statement) and 47 States restated that at the Council on 23 Sep 2026. Concedes: The war aim: not "security guarantees" or "denazification" but the collapse of the government of a UN member State — the object of UN Charter art. 2(4).Evidence tiers: A
Claim 2 · Dmitry Polyanskiy · PC No. 1580 · 8 Oct“Kyiv may well be ready for a ceasefire — to lick its wounds, stock up on weapons and gather its strength — but no one intends to give such a gift to the Kyiv regime and its sponsors again, remembering the history of the Minsk agreements. (translated)”Statement at the OSCE Permanent Council, 8 Oct 2026, text published by RIA Novosti, 8 Oct 2026, 14:00 — ria.ru/20261008/rossija-2123186991.html (translated from the Russian) · source ↗
Misreads Minsk — Russia wrote itPoint 1 of the Minsk Package of Measures (12 Feb 2015) is an "immediate and comprehensive ceasefire"; Russia's ambassador co-signed it in the Trilateral Contact Group, and Russia drafted and sponsored Security Council resolution 2202 (2015), adopted unanimously on 17 Feb 2015, which "calls on all parties to fully implement the Package of measures, including a comprehensive ceasefire" (SC/11785). For seven years Russia called itself a guarantor and demanded the Package be implemented "word for word" (Churkin, SC/11785). On 22 Feb 2022 President Putin said the agreements "no longer exist". The ECtHR Grand Chamber has since found that Russia controlled the "republics" from 11 May 2014 (9 Jul 2025) — a party, not a guarantor. The "gift" Russia now refuses is the thing it put its name to. Concedes: That Russia refuses a ceasefire on principle — the answer to "who blocks the ceasefire", in Russia's own words.Evidence tiers: A
Claim 3 · RIA Novosti gloss on Polyanskiy's "history of the Minsk agreements" · 8 Oct“[After the start of the SMO, Hollande, Merkel and Johnson said that] neither France, nor Germany, nor the United Kingdom ever took the Minsk agreements seriously… and only used them to buy time so that Kyiv could build up its forces and prepare for a conflict with Russia. (translated; RIA's words, carried with the statement)”RIA Novosti, 8 Oct 2026, same article; the claim recurs in Russian MFA and Mission statements since Dec 2022 · source ↗
Misquotes Merkel and Hollande; no Johnson statement foundMerkel, Die Zeit, 7 Dec 2022: "The 2014 Minsk agreement was an attempt to give Ukraine time. It also used this time to become stronger, as can be seen today" ("…war der Versuch, der Ukraine Zeit zu geben"). Hollande, Kyiv Independent, 28 Dec 2022: "Yes, Angela Merkel is right on this point… It is the merit of the Minsk agreements to have given the Ukrainian army this opportunity." Neither said the agreements were never taken seriously or were a ruse; both described a frozen conflict that bought time. Putin's own reaction (Bishkek, 9 Dec 2022): "Frankly, this was completely unexpected for me" — i.e. Moscow had treated the German side as sincere. No statement by Boris Johnson that the UK "never took Minsk seriously" has been found; the UK was not part of the Normandy format (France, Germany, Russia, Ukraine). The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission recorded ceasefire violations by both sides throughout 2015–2022 (daily reports). Concedes: That Minsk was a ceasefire that held, however badly, for seven years — which is what the 2026 "gift" would be.Evidence tiers: A · C
Claim 4 · Dmitry Polyanskiy · PC No. 1580 · 8 Oct“The head of the Kyiv regime never tires of threatening Russia with an escalation he is in no position to deliver… the targets hit by the Russian Armed Forces' retaliatory strikes on facilities supporting Kyiv's war machine are so many… (translated)”Statement at the OSCE Permanent Council, 8 Oct 2026, text published by RIA Novosti, 8 Oct 2026, 14:01 — ria.ru/20261008/zelenskij-2123187188.html (translated from the Russian) · source ↗
Contradicted by monitorsThe "targets" of the previous night and day: on 7 Oct Russia launched about 70 missiles plus dozens of Shahed and 46 jet-powered drones (Zelensky / Air Force via Reuters, 7 Oct); the EU statement at the Permanent Council spoke of "around 70 missiles — many of them ballistic — and drones, killing at least 22 people, including 5 children" (EU statement, PC No. 1580, 8 Oct). The UN Secretariat told the Security Council on 9 Oct that a missile "destroyed a residential building" in Pryluky, killing at least 19 including five children, and that in one week more than 100 civilians were killed and at least 429 injured (SC/16472). Russia's Ministry of Defence listed "Plastmass-Pryluky" among the enterprises struck on 7 Oct (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 7 Oct) — the hit was a five-storey apartment block; according to Ukrainian authorities 22 were killed including five children and 54 injured (Ukraine's State Emergency Service, 8 Oct · Tier B, operational). HRMMU's September update: 328 killed, 2,105 injured, 53% by missiles and long-range drones (15 Oct 2026). Concedes: The 7 Oct barrage, its scale, and its motive in his own word — "retaliatory": a reprisal, which AP I art. 52(1) forbids against civilian objects.Evidence tiers: A · B · C
Claim 5 · Dmitry Polyanskiy · Mission Telegram, relayed by RIA Novosti · 10 Oct“It turns out that striking bridges, power plants, railway facilities and warehouses is not allowed. Or rather, no one is allowed to — except Zelensky. (translated)”Russian Mission to the OSCE, Telegram post 8616, 10 Oct 2026 — t.me/RusMissionOSCE/8616; relayed by RIA Novosti, 10 Oct 2026, 14:56 — ria.ru/20261010/polyanskiy-2123675265.html (translated from the Russian) · source ↗
Already adjudicated — and self-incriminatingICC Pre-Trial Chamber II, 5 Mar 2024: arrest warrants for Lt-Gen Sergei Kobylash (Long-Range Aviation) and Adm. Viktor Sokolov (Black Sea Fleet) for "missile strikes carried out by the Russian armed forces against the Ukrainian electric infrastructure from at least 10 October 2022 until at least 9 March 2023" — the war crimes of directing attacks at civilian objects (art. 8(2)(b)(ii)) and causing excessive incidental harm (art. 8(2)(b)(iv)), and the crime against humanity of inhumane acts (art. 7(1)(k)). 24 Jun 2024: the same charges against Sergei Shoigu and Valery Gerasimov; the Chamber found reasonable grounds that "the alleged strikes were directed against civilian objects" and, for any installation that might have been a military objective, that the expected civilian harm "would have been clearly excessive to the anticipated military advantage". The Commission of Inquiry found the waves of attacks on energy infrastructure from 10 Oct 2022 may amount to crimes against humanity (A/HRC/55/66, Mar 2024) and on 21 Sep 2026 warned that continued attacks were "increasing civilians' vulnerability" before winter. Power plants are not "allowed" when the foreseeable effect is to cut heat, water and light to millions (AP I arts. 51(5)(b), 52, 54). Concedes: In writing, from the Mission's own channel: that power plants, railways and bridges are the targets — the element the ICC had to prove.Evidence tiers: A · C
Claim 6 · Dmitry Polyanskiy · Mission Telegram · 10 Oct“Make up your minds about your principled position, ladies and gentlemen — and for a start, restrain your protégés in Kyiv, otherwise nothing will be left of Ukraine's infrastructure before long! (translated)”t.me/RusMissionOSCE/8616; RIA Novosti, 10 Oct 2026 · source ↗
Self-incriminating — a threat against civilian infrastructureAP I art. 51(2) prohibits "acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population"; art. 54(2) prohibits attacking, destroying or rendering useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population. On 15–16 Oct the Chief of the General Staff reported to the President that Russian forces "have begun massive strikes on Ukraine's energy facilities" and that a "list of these objects" had been drawn up (Interfax/TASS, 16 Oct); on 15 Oct President Putin said "they are already squealing about energy… and other objects, including data centres" (RIA Novosti). The UN Secretariat: "repeated attacks on energy infrastructure risk leaving large numbers of civilians without heating, electricity and water" as winter approaches (SC/16472, 9 Oct). OCHA has a $358 million winter plan for 2 million people, and "no amount of preparedness can substitute for protecting the infrastructure civilians depend on" (SC/16472). Concedes: Intent: the destruction of a country's infrastructure as leverage on third States — reprisal logic, which AP I art. 52(1) forbids.Evidence tiers: A · C
Claim 7 · Dmitry Polyanskiy · Mission Telegram · 10 Oct“Now all those who once rejoiced at Ukrainian militants' hits on infrastructure in Russia, who threatened our bridges and our energy sector, have suddenly raised a howl about the objects struck in Ukraine. (translated)”t.me/RusMissionOSCE/8616; RIA Novosti, 10 Oct 2026 · source ↗
Partly fair — and tu quoque is no defenceUkraine strikes refineries, fuel depots, airfields and bridges in Russia and says so; Russia's representative listed them at the Security Council on 9 Oct (SC/16472). OHCHR records reports of 496 civilians killed and 3,394 injured in Russia by Ukrainian attacks, Jan–Sep 2026 — figures "reported by Russian authorities" that OHCHR cannot verify, since Russia gives it no access (SC/16472; DiCarlo, 23 Sep 2026). The Secretariat's rule covers both: "All attacks targeting civilians and civilian infrastructure, wherever they occur, are a violation of international humanitarian law and must end immediately" (SC/16472). A refinery is not a power plant serving a city: the distinction is between a military objective (AP I art. 52(2)) and an object indispensable to civilian survival (art. 54). And a violation by one party never licenses the other — reprisals against civilian objects are prohibited (art. 52(1)). Concedes: That Russian strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure are a response to Ukrainian strikes — a reprisal motive, stated.Evidence tiers: A · C
What we askAsk the OSCE Secretariat to post the Russian PC.DEL texts of 1 and 8 Oct 2026 promptly, so the record is the Council's, not RIA's · put the 10 Oct "power plants" statement on the record at the next Permanent Council and in the Security Council, next to the ICC warrants of 5 Mar and 24 Jun 2024 · ask Russia to say whether it stands by its own resolution 2202 (2015) and the Minsk ceasefire it co-signed · support the Commission of Inquiry's and HRMMU's work on the autumn energy campaign and the OCHA Winter Response Plan ($358 m) · restate the ceasefire Ukraine accepted on 11 Mar 2025 and ask Russia, in Vienna, to accept it.
SourcesRIA Novosti, 1, 8 and 10 Oct 2026 · Russian Mission to the OSCE, Telegram 8616, 10 Oct · EU statement, PC No. 1580, 8 Oct · UN Meetings Coverage SC/16472, 9 Oct 2026 · HRMMU, Protection of Civilians, Sept 2026 (15 Oct) · ICC, 5 Mar and 24 Jun 2024 · COI A/HRC/55/66; COI statement 21 Sep 2026 (via SCR) · S/RES/2202 (2015); SC/11785 · Die Zeit, 7 Dec 2022; Kyiv Independent, 28 Dec 2022; TASS, 30 Dec 2022 · Kremlin, 22 Feb 2022 · ECtHR GC, 9 Jul 2025 · Security Council Report, Sep–Oct 2026 · Meduza, 8 Oct 2026 · Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 7 Oct 2026 · full list on page 6
Polyanskiy at the OSCE, 1–10 Oct 2026 · 7-page dossier (PDF)p.1 one-page summary · p.2 the occasion, the speakers, what others said and what was left out · p.3–4 the seven claims against the record · p.5 the record side by side · p.6 the law, lines to take and Q&A · p.7 sources and method · v1 · 21 Oct 2026
Nebenzia at the Security Council, 9 Oct 2026 · Only military targets
Vassily Nebenzia · UN Security Council, 10237th meeting · 9 Oct 2026. Two days after a cruise missile destroyed a five-storey apartment block in Pryluky and a day after a glide bomb hit two buses in Kramatorsk, Russia's Permanent Representative told the Security Council that Russian targets "have been and remain only military facilities". The UN Secretariat had just put the week's toll on the record: more than 100 civilians killed. Eight claims, the record, and what each concedes.
The recordThe claim fails on the week it was made in. "Only military facilities" was said to a Council that had just heard the UN's count for that week — more than 100 civilians killed — with an apartment block in Pryluky and two buses in Kramatorsk among the sites.
Fair to sayUkraine did announce a 40-day campaign on 25 June; Ukrainian strikes inside Russia do kill civilians, and the UN relays Russian figures while saying it cannot verify them. Article 58 binds Ukraine. None of this makes a residential block or a city bus a military objective.
Claim 1 · Vassily Nebenzia · 9 Oct“We decisively reject baseless accusations that the Russian Armed Forces have presumably targeted the civilian population of Ukraine on purpose… Our targets have been and remain only military facilities and infrastructure involved in supporting combat operations.”Statement at the 10237th meeting, russiaun.ru/en/news/409102026 · source ↗
Contradicted by monitorsAt the same meeting the Secretariat reported, on OHCHR figures, more than 100 civilians killed and at least 429 injured in the preceding week; a missile on 7 Oct "destroyed a residential building" in Pryluky (≥19 killed incl. 5 children) and a glide bomb on 8 Oct hit two passenger buses in Kramatorsk (≥33 killed) (SC/16472). HRMMU's September update: 328 killed, 2,105 injured, the worst September since Feb 2022; long-range missiles and drones caused 53% of casualties (15 Oct 2026). The ICC found reasonable grounds in 2024 that Russian commanders directed attacks at civilian objects (warrants of 5 Mar and 24 Jun 2024). The Commission of Inquiry found drone attacks on civilians in Kherson to be crimes against humanity "part of a coordinated state policy" (28 May 2025). Concedes: That the standard is military objectives only — AP I art. 52 — and that Russia accepts it as binding.Evidence tiers: A
Claim 2 · Vassily Nebenzia · 9 Oct“The Kiev authorities are ascribing the blame for the tragedies that are occurring due to the inadequate performance of Ukraine's air defense systems, including the fall of anti-aircraft missiles and debris from intercepted targets, to us without any proof… none of the Western countries would even consider blaming Kiev for violating Article 58 of Additional Protocol I…”Statement at the 10237th meeting, russiaun.ru · source ↗
Contradicted by Russia's own MoDRussia's Ministry of Defence described the 7 Oct strike as "massive strikes on enterprises of Ukraine's military-industrial complex" and listed the enterprise "Plastmass-Pryluky" in Chernihiv region (MoD via Telegram, 7 Oct 2026) — a plant, not an air-defence battery. The same morning a Kh-101 cruise missile hit a five-storey apartment building in Pryluky; 22 people were killed, including five children, and 54 injured (regional administration/DSNS, 8 Oct — B). No Russian source has claimed a military objective in the building, in the Kramatorsk buses, or in the Kyiv residential districts hit on 7 Oct. Art. 58 obliges a defender to take precautions "to the maximum extent feasible"; art. 51(8) says a breach by one side does not release the other from its obligations. The Kramatorsk weapon was a glide bomb dropped from aircraft (SC/16472) — not a missile that Ukrainian air defence intercepts over a city; no interceptor or debris has been claimed for either site. Concedes: That Russia aimed at Pryluky on 7 Oct — and that art. 58 is law, which means arts. 51, 52 and 57 are too.Evidence tiers: A · B
Claim 3 · Vassily Nebenzia · 9 Oct“…the Russian Armed Forces naturally responded by targeting Ukrainian defense and industrial facilities, as well as energy infrastructure used for military production and logistics.”Statement at the 10237th meeting, russiaun.ru · source ↗
Self-incriminatingThe statement itself puts energy infrastructure on Russia's target list and frames the strikes as a "response" to Ukrainian strikes inside Russia. HRMMU: on 30 Sep attacks "damaged generation, distribution and transmission facilities in three regions and Kyiv city"; Russian forces "resumed large-scale coordinated attacks" on electricity and heating (15 Oct 2026). The ICC's warrants of 5 Mar 2024 (Kobylash, Sokolov) and 24 Jun 2024 (Shoigu, Gerasimov) cover exactly this category — attacks on the electricity system as war crimes of directing attacks at civilian objects and the crime against humanity of inhumane acts. Reprisals against civilian objects are prohibited (AP I arts. 51(6), 52(1)); "used for military production and logistics" is Russia's characterisation, with no facility named. Concedes: The energy campaign, its timing before winter, and a reprisal motive.Evidence tiers: A · C
Claim 4 · Vassily Nebenzia · 9 Oct“As early as 25 June, the head of the Kiev junta loudly announced a 40-day operation to force Russia into peace…”Statement at the 10237th meeting, russiaun.ru · source ↗
Fair to say — the announcement is realOn 25 Jun 2026 President Zelensky wrote: "I approved a 40-day operation by the Service to influence the aggressor state in order to press for an end to the war" (Reuters, 25–26 Jun 2026 — C). Ukraine's strikes have mainly targeted oil refineries, fuel depots and airfields. OHCHR recorded reports of 496 civilians killed and 3,394 injured in Russia in Jan–Sep 2026 (SC/16472); HRMMU says it "could not verify most of these claims" (15 Oct 2026). The same rule applies to Ukraine; a Ukrainian campaign does not make Ukrainian civilians a lawful target (AP I art. 51(6)). Concedes: That Russia dates its escalation to a Ukrainian campaign aimed at ending the war — i.e. that the strikes are retaliation, not a response to a military necessity at the sites hit.Evidence tiers: A · C
Claim 5 · Vassily Nebenzia · 9 Oct“They're attempting to shift the blame for their own failures onto Russia… The latest example is the so-called drone incident in Leipzig… They're resorting to various provocations and hoaxes. Instead of evidence and facts, the highly likely approach is used yet again.”Statement at the 10237th meeting, russiaun.ru · source ↗
No evidence presented — the “staged” line againA drone carrying explosives was found near a runway at Leipzig/Halle airport after the night of 4–5 Aug 2026. On 1 Sep 2026 Germany's Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt said that "police investigations, patterns of the offences and intelligence findings" establish Russian responsibility for the attempted attack; Foreign Minister Wadephul announced the closure of a Russian consulate and summoned the ambassador (Reuters, Euronews, 1 Sep 2026). Russia's answers — Peskov: accusations "should be supported by evidence"; Embassy: "fabricated provocation" — offer no alternative account. The attribution is a state finding, not a UN one; no UN body has examined it. Concedes: That the incident happened — the dispute is over who sent the drone, and Russia has put nothing on the record.Evidence tiers: A · C
Claim 6 · Vassily Nebenzia · 9 Oct“Russia has never refused to engage in negotiations aimed at a just and sustainable resolution of the Ukrainian crisis. However, this is impossible without overcoming the legacy of the Maidan, removing the root causes… we will continue to achieve the objectives of the special military operation by military means.”Statement at the 10237th meeting, russiaun.ru · source ↗
Contradicted by Russia's own statementsKremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov, 28 Aug 2026: talks are "deeply on pause", "there are no new ideas at the moment" (Interfax). Lavrov to the same Council, 23 Sep 2026: "we are not going to have a pause in our special military operation" (transcript, 10227th meeting). Peskov, 12 Oct 2026: Russia will not agree to a 60-day ceasefire for Ukrainian elections, offering only not to strike "specifically on election day" (TASS/Meduza). Ukraine "has agreed to a full, immediate and unconditional ceasefire" since March 2025 (joint statement of the EU and 46 states, 23 Sep 2026); the Secretariat asked for the same on 9 Oct (SC/16472). Resolution 2774 (24 Feb 2025) calls for a lasting peace; the ceasefire proposed at Jeddah on 11 Mar 2025 was accepted by Ukraine and not by Russia. Concedes: That the war continues by Russia's choice until its political conditions — "root causes", the "legacy of the Maidan" — are met.Evidence tiers: A · C
Claim 7 · Vassily Nebenzia · 9 Oct“…the total number of people injured by the AFU in various regions of Russia exceeded 8,000 people, including at least 425 children… Last week alone, 29 civilians, including two children, were killed… Out of 228 such incidents [attacks on civilian vessels] since the beginning of the special military operation…”Statement at the 10237th meeting, russiaun.ru · source ↗
UnverifiedOHCHR relays Russian figures but cannot verify them: for Jan–Sep 2026 it "recorded reports" of 496 civilians killed and 3,394 injured in Russia (SC/16472); for September HRMMU notes Russian authorities' statements of 53 killed and 462 injured in Russia and 87 killed and 436 injured in occupied territory, and "could not verify most of these claims"; it verified 18 killed and 44 injured in occupied territory (15 Oct 2026). The 8,000 injured, 425 children and 228 vessels figures are Russian government figures with no independent verification; OHCHR has no access to Russia (OHCHR, 29 Jun 2026, para. 14). The Hub applies the same label to unverified figures from any side. Concedes: That civilian casualties are the measure that matters — the measure on which the UN's verified count for Ukraine runs to 17,257 killed (DiCarlo, 23 Sep 2026).Evidence tiers: A
Claim 8 · Vassily Nebenzia · 9 Oct“Terror against civilians and civilian infrastructure has long become one of the tools of Zelensky's state policy. Residential neighborhoods, civilian buses, hospitals, ambulances, and energy and life-support facilities are targeted time and time again.”Statement at the 10237th meeting, russiaun.ru · source ↗
Said the day after KramatorskThe list — residential neighbourhoods, buses, energy — describes the Russian strikes of the same week as the UN Secretariat put them to the Council: a missile that "destroyed a residential building" in Pryluky (7 Oct) and a glide bomb on two passenger buses in Kramatorsk (8 Oct, at least 33 killed); attacks on energy that "risk leaving large numbers of civilians without heating, electricity and water" (SC/16472). OHCHR relays Russian reports of 496 civilians killed in Russia in Jan–Sep 2026 and cannot verify them; HRMMU verified 2,570 civilians killed in Ukraine in Jan–Sep 2026, 59% more than in the same period of 2025 (15 Oct 2026). The asymmetry is in the record, not hidden by it. Concedes: That residential buildings, buses, hospitals and energy facilities are protected civilian objects — the standard by which the strikes of that week are measured.Evidence tiers: A
What we askAnswer "only military targets" with the Council's own record of 9 Oct — SC/16472 (>100 killed in one week) — and the MoD's own 7 Oct target list naming Pryluky · ask Russia to name the military objective in the Pryluky apartment block and the Kramatorsk buses, or withdraw the claim · put the energy concession on the record alongside the ICC warrants of 5 Mar and 24 Jun 2024 and support the moratorium on energy and Black Sea attacks · ask the Russian delegation for a date for the unconditional ceasefire Ukraine accepted in March 2025 · request that OHCHR be given access to Russia so that Russian casualty figures can be verified like Ukraine's · circulate HRMMU's September 2026 update (15 Oct) to capitals before the next Council meeting.
SourcesRussian Mission to the UN, 9 Oct 2026 · UN Meetings Coverage SC/16472, 9 Oct 2026 · HRMMU Protection of Civilians, September 2026 (15 Oct) · OHCHR report of 29 Jun 2026 · Russian MoD via news.ru, 7 Oct 2026 · Meduza, AP, Kyiv Independent, 8 Oct 2026 · Reuters/Euronews on Leipzig, 1 Sep 2026 · Interfax/Hromadske on Peskov, 28 Aug 2026 · TASS/Meduza, 12 Oct 2026 · UN transcript of the 10227th meeting, 23 Sep 2026 · joint statement of 46 states, 23 Sep 2026 · ICC warrants 2024 · COI 28 May 2025 · Security Council Report, 13 Oct 2026 · France at the UN, 9 Oct 2026 · full list on page 6
Nebenzia at the Security Council, 9 Oct 2026 · 7-page dossier (PDF)p.1 one-page summary · p.2 the occasion, the speakers, what others said and what was left out · p.3–4 the eight claims against the record · p.5 the record side by side · p.6 the law, lines to take and Q&A · p.7 sources and method · v2 · 21 Oct 2026 · merged and re-checked
Lavrov at the Security Council, 23 Sep 2026 · Five claims, one Council
Sergey Lavrov · UN Security Council, 10227th meeting · 23 Sep 2026. At the high-level briefing on Ukraine during UN General Assembly week, Russia's Foreign Minister told the Council that a peace treaty was "initialed" in 2022 and banned by Boris Johnson, that Ukraine has imposed "a total ban on the Russian language in all spheres", that Crimea voted in a "referendum", that Kyiv's leaders are "terrorists" — and that "we are not going to have a pause". Each claim against the record; the last one is the one to keep.
The recordThe Istanbul story has documents — and Lavrov tabled none. At the 10227th meeting Russia presented no document. What was initialled in 2022 is contested: Charap and Radchenko describe the 29 March communiqué as largely Ukraine's proposal (Tier C), and Lavrov himself says the principles were Ukraine's; in June 2023 Putin displayed a draft he said had been initialled. The drafts that followed (published by the NYT in June 2024) show Russia adding a veto for itself over any guarantee, limits on Ukraine's army and the repeal of language laws. Nothing was "banned"; nobody has produced the treaty.
Fair to sayThe Venice Commission did find faults in the language law and UN special rapporteurs have criticised the 2024 law on religious organisations; Ukraine should answer both. Neither is a "total ban".
Claim 1 · Sergey Lavrov · 23 Sep“After several rounds in [Belarus] and Istanbul, the Ukrainians proposed key principles for settlement… The document was initialed by the delegations of Ukraine and Russia… The then UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson banned the Ukrainians from concluding a legally binding document.”UN auto-generated transcript, 10227th meeting (from 1:09:35) · source ↗
No evidence presentedNo document was tabled at the 10227th meeting. What was initialled in Istanbul is contested: Charap and Radchenko (Foreign Affairs, 16 Apr 2024) and the drafts published by the NYT describe the 29 Mar 2022 communiqué as largely Ukraine's proposal — a list of principles (neutrality with guarantees, Crimea deferred), not a treaty (Tier C); in June 2023 Putin displayed a draft treaty that he said had been initialled by the Ukrainian delegation. The drafts that followed are published: Russia's 15 Apr 2022 text made any guarantor response conditional on the agreement of all guarantors, including Russia — "in essence a veto"; the 17 Mar text demanded limits on Ukraine's army and the lifting of all restrictions on Russian (NYT, 15 Jun 2024). Charap and Radchenko, working from the drafts, conclude the talks failed over these terms, Bucha and the course of the war; Johnson told The Times he "expressed concerns" and called the sabotage claim "total nonsense" (Jan 2024). On the "ban": no document, no date, no witness has been offered in four years. Concedes: In Lavrov's own account the "key principles" were Ukraine's proposal, offered a week into the invasion — the opposite of a party that refuses to negotiate.Evidence tiers: C
Claim 2 · Sergey Lavrov · 23 Sep“…there's a total ban on the Russian language in all spheres… [and] in the canonical Ukrainian Orthodox Church.”UN auto-generated transcript, 10227th meeting · source ↗
Misstates the lawLaw 2704-VIII (2019) regulates the state language in public life; art. 2(2): the law "does not extend to the sphere of private communication and the performance of religious rites". The Venice Commission (CDL-AD(2019)032, 6 Dec 2019) "fully understands the need to promote the use of Ukrainian as the State language", criticises the differential treatment of Russian against EU languages, media quotas and the sanctions mechanism, and recommends amendments — a critique of a public-sphere law, not of a ban. Law 3894-IX (20 Aug 2024) allows the dissolution of religious organisations affiliated with the Russian Orthodox Church; it concerns organisational ties, not liturgical language. In the Chamber, Poland's Foreign Minister replied: "I can assure him that the Russian language is widely spoken there" and that minorities "have the right to speak their language in offices, in courts, in schools" (23 Sep 2026). Concedes: That language rights are a matter of law and monitoring — fields in which the Council of Europe has reviewed Ukraine and in which Russia has refused all monitoring of occupied territory, where Ukrainian-language schooling has been eliminated (OHCHR periodic reports).Evidence tiers: A
Claim 3 · Sergey Lavrov · 23 Sep“…there was the referendum in Crimea for independence from the Nazi Kyiv regime and joining Russia.”UN auto-generated transcript, 10227th meeting · source ↗
Already adjudicatedGeneral Assembly resolution 68/262 (27 Mar 2014, 100–11–58) affirms Ukraine's territorial integrity and declares the 16 Mar 2014 referendum as "having no validity". The European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea), 25 Jun 2024: Russia exercised effective control over Crimea from 27 Feb 2014 and is responsible for a pattern of violations there. Putin, 17 Apr 2014: "our military personnel was behind the backs of Crimea's self-defense" (RIA Novosti English) — after having said on 4 Mar 2014 that the armed men were "local militias". The ICC has issued warrants for crimes in occupied Ukrainian territory since 2023. Concedes: That the vote was held under the control of forces Russia later admitted were its own.Evidence tiers: A
Claim 4 · Sergey Lavrov · 23 Sep“…the Kyiv regime cannot consider itself a government that represents the inhabitants of Crimea, Donbass and Novorossiya… They are terrorists instead.”UN auto-generated transcript, 10227th meeting · source ↗
Already adjudicatedResolution ES-11/4 (12 Oct 2022, 143–5–35) declares the "attempted illegal annexation" of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions invalid and demands reversal. The ICJ ordered Russia on 16 Mar 2022 (13–2) to "immediately suspend the military operations". The ECtHR Grand Chamber, Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (9 Jul 2025), found Russia in effective control of the "DPR/LPR" from 11 May 2014 and responsible for violations there, including the downing of MH17. "Novorossiya" has no territory, government or recognition; "terrorists" has been applied by Russia to the elected government with which it negotiated in 2022 and 2025. Concedes: That Russia's war aim is the removal of a government, not the protection of anyone — which is why no pause is acceptable to it (claim 5).Evidence tiers: A
Claim 5 · Sergey Lavrov · 23 Sep“…we are not going to have a pause in our special military operation. Europe, whatever it thinks, just wants to get a pause… to pump the Kyiv regime with weapons.”UN auto-generated transcript, 10227th meeting · source ↗
Fair to say — and contradicted by Russia's own "never refused negotiations"The sentence is Russia's position and is consistent with its record: the 30-day ceasefire proposed at Jeddah on 11 Mar 2025 was accepted by Ukraine and not by Russia; Peskov, 28 Aug 2026: talks "deeply on pause"; Peskov, 12 Oct 2026: no 60-day ceasefire for elections. It is inconsistent with what Russia's Permanent Representative told the same Council on 9 Oct 2026: "Russia has never refused to engage in negotiations". The UN's call at this meeting was for "an immediate, full and unconditional ceasefire as a first step" (DiCarlo); 46 states and the EU stated that Ukraine "has agreed to a full, immediate and unconditional ceasefire" since March 2025 and called on Russia "to finally do the same". Concedes: Who refuses the ceasefire. The Council asked; Russia answered.Evidence tiers: A
What we askAnswer the Istanbul claim with the published drafts (NYT, 15 Jun 2024) and ask Russia to table the "initialed" treaty it describes · answer "total ban" with art. 2(2) of Law 2704-VIII and the Venice Commission's opinion, and commit publicly to implementing the Commission's outstanding recommendations · decline to re-litigate Crimea and the annexations: cite 68/262, ES-11/4, the ICJ order of 16 Mar 2022 and the ECtHR judgments · keep "we are not going to have a pause" on the record as Russia's answer to the Council's ceasefire call, beside the 46-state declaration · ask the Secretariat to read the civilian toll at every Ukraine meeting.
SourcesUN transcript of the 10227th meeting, 23 Sep 2026 · Polish MFA, Sikorski's statement, 23 Sep 2026 · DPPA, DiCarlo's briefing · joint declaration of the EU and 46 states, 23 Sep 2026 · NYT, 15 Jun 2024 · Charap and Radchenko, Foreign Affairs, 16 Apr 2024 · Kyiv Post/The Times, Jan 2024 · Venice Commission CDL-AD(2019)032 · Law 2704-VIII · UN special rapporteurs, 1 Oct 2025 · UNGA 68/262 and ES-11/4 · ICJ order 16 Mar 2022 · ECtHR GC 25 Jun 2024, 9 Jul 2025 · Kremlin 17 Apr 2014 · Peskov 28 Aug and 12 Oct 2026 · Nebenzia 9 Oct 2026 · full list on page 6
Lavrov at the Security Council, 23 Sep 2026 · 7-page dossier (PDF)p.1 one-page summary · p.2 the occasion, the speakers, what others said and what was left out · p.3–4 the five claims against the record · p.5 the record side by side · p.6 the law, lines to take and Q&A · p.7 sources and method · v1 · 21 Oct 2026
Blind spots that are not there, 14 Oct 2026 · Blind spots that are not there
Russia's Arria-formula meeting of 14 October 2026, "Piercing the Blind Spots of Violations of International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law in the Context of the Ukrainian Crisis". Russia argued that the UN ignores violations by Ukrainian forces. The UN's own reports record them — because Ukraine lets the UN in — and record torture in Russian custody on a far larger scale, where Russia lets no one in. Eight claims by Vassily Nebenzia, Rodion Miroshnik and Larry C. Johnson, checked against OHCHR, the Committee against Torture and the Commission of Inquiry, and against the UN Web TV transcript. Related: Oleshky.
The recordOHCHR, 29 Jun 2026: torture or ill-treatment described by 75 of 134 POWs held by Ukraine and by 124 of 129 Ukrainian POWs released by Russia; 31 executions of persons hors de combat by Ukrainian forces and 129 by Russian forces since Feb 2022. OHCHR has full access in territory held by Ukraine and none in Russia or occupied Ukraine.
Fair to sayUkrainian violations are real and on the UN record, and Ukraine has opened investigations. They are known because Ukraine gives the UN and the ICRC the access Russia refuses. None of it is a "blind spot".
Claim 1 · Vassily Nebenzia · 14 Oct“…the conclusions of the UN Committee against Torture regarding the systematic torture and sexual violence [against Russian servicemen in Ukrainian custody]”
Misquotes the CommitteeThe Committee's review of Ukraine (CAT/C/UKR/CO/7, adopted 1 May 2025) lists "allegations of torture, including sexual violence against" Russian prisoners of war, notes 20 investigations opened and asks for their results (para. 17(a)). It does not call them systematic. Its words "widespread and systemic torture, including sexual violence" are in para. 19 — about Ukrainian POWs and civilians held by the Russian occupying authorities. Concedes: That the Committee against Torture is an authority — including on Russia.
Claim 2 · Vassily Nebenzia · 14 Oct“…it goes to great lengths to avoid documentation of the crimes of the Kiev regime… making unfounded accusations against Russia, which is particularly characteristic of the OHCHR headed by Mr. Volker Türk.”
The UN documents both sidesOHCHR's latest report (29 Jun 2026): 75 of 134 POWs held by Ukraine reported torture or ill-treatment, mainly in transit facilities (para. 93); 31 executions of persons hors de combat by Ukrainian forces since Feb 2022 (para. 96); 108 cases of conflict-related sexual violence by Ukrainian officials (para. 100). The Commission of Inquiry found violations by Ukrainian authorities against people accused of collaboration (7 Nov 2025). Concedes: That UN documentation counts — yet Russia has not answered OHCHR's access requests.
Claim 3 · Rodion Miroshnik · 14 Oct“In the border area, which is controlled by Kyiv, there is a whole network of dozens of secret prisons, which in the reports of international human rights organizations are called "transit camps"…”
No evidence presentedNo number, list or location was put on the record. Miroshnik's own "Secret Prisons" material calls the sites "transit points" (360.ru, 26 Feb 2026) — the category the UN already reports: two unofficial places of internment in or near Kyiv in 2025, one in Donetsk region and one in Kharkiv region in 2024 (OHCHR, 30 Jun 2025, paras. 48–55). No UN body, the ICRC or the OSCE has confirmed a "network". In the meeting Miroshnik himself said an OHCHR report noted "accurately in passing" that most of the crimes were committed at the early stages of detention. Concedes: That the UN does report on Ukrainian detention — Miroshnik says so himself, which is the opposite of the meeting's premise.
Claim 4 · Rodion Miroshnik · 14 Oct“[Prisoners mention] electric chairs… field telephones… barbaric pseudo-medical procedures, the limbs amputated, medieval torture, being branded…”
Partly on the UN record, presented selectivelyOHCHR has published cases of torture of Russian POWs by Ukrainian personnel, including electric shocks at an unofficial site in Kharkiv region in 2024 (30 Jun 2025, para. 55). It has no record of amputations or branding. The same reports record torture in Russian custody on another scale: 124 of 129 released Ukrainian POWs (29 Jun 2026, para. 86); OHCHR has called it "widespread and systematic" (1 Oct 2024). Concedes: That torture of prisoners must be investigated — a standard Russia does not apply to its own facilities.
Claim 5 · Vassily Nebenzia · 14 Oct“…where Ukrainian forces are extensively imposing logistical blockades… [Miroshnik] personally visited the sites of shelling and blockades, including in Alyoshki.”
The town is Russian-heldRussia has occupied Oleshky since 24 Feb 2022 and controls every road into it. The UN monitoring mission: "an occupying power has the duty to ensure food and medical supplies for the population and to facilitate humanitarian relief" (25 Jun 2026). A list of evacuees was agreed with Russia, Ukraine's Ombudsman has verified 358 people who need immediate evacuation and the ICRC is ready to take part — Russia did not confirm it for five months (Ombudsman, 16 Sep 2026); on 23 Oct the White House announced a US-brokered local ceasefire from 29 Oct, and the Kremlin confirmed it. Full check: Oleshky: a blockade with no author, 16 Oct 2026. Concedes: A humanitarian crisis in a town Russia occupies.
Claim 6 · Vassily Nebenzia · 14 Oct“Kiev terrorizes the civilian population even deep in Russia.”
Unverified figures — and a rule that binds Russia tooRussian authorities report 205 civilians killed and 1,302 injured by Ukrainian attacks across 27 regions (Dec 2025 – May 2026); OHCHR "has not been able to verify the circumstances" (para. 68). The Commission of Inquiry has found Ukrainian authorities responsible for some violations of humanitarian law. In the same six months OHCHR verified at least 1,272 civilians killed and 6,871 injured in Ukraine (para. 64). Concedes: His own principle: IHL "must be observed by all countries".
Claim 7 · Vassily Nebenzia · 14 Oct“[The UN Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights, Claudia Fuentes Julio,] couldn't make time to attend our meeting…”
Arria meetings are informalAn Arria-formula meeting is not a meeting of the Security Council; it is convened by a member, usually leaves no record, and its briefers are mostly from civil society (Security Council Report). The Secretariat had briefed the Council formally on Ukraine five days earlier (9 Oct). OHCHR's findings — on both sides — are public. Concedes: That Russia wants the UN human rights office in the room — while barring it from Russia and occupied Ukraine.
Claim 8 · Larry C. Johnson · 14 Oct“At least 12,404 civilians have been killed by Ukrainian Armed Forces since 2014… The record of Russia in Ukraine is consistent with a policy of not targeting civilians.”
Adds a UN total to a Russian figureThe number appears to add OHCHR's 2014–2021 total for Donbas to the Russian MFA's claim of "more than 9,000" since 2022. The OHCHR total counts civilians killed by all parties on both sides of the contact line, and includes the 298 people on flight MH17 (at least 3,393 as of 30 Sep 2021). The 9,000 is not UN-verified. On targeting: the Commission of Inquiry found that Russian forces committed murder of civilians with drones in Kherson as a crime against humanity, "part of a coordinated state policy" (28 May 2025); in Bucha the UN documented the killing of 73 civilians while Russian forces held the town (OHCHR, 7 Dec 2022). Concedes: The UN's count: he cites HRMMU's 16,431 civilians killed since Feb 2022 (as of 14 Jul 2026) as reliable.
The roomAll 14 other Council members spoke. None endorsed the claim that the UN hides Ukrainian violations.
Access is the pointDenmark called the meeting a "charade"; Latvia, the UK, France and Greece pointed to Russia's refusal of access — to occupied territory, to Ukrainian POWs, to Oleshky. Panama, Colombia and Liberia backed the UN's monitoring mechanisms.
Blind spots that are not there, 14 Oct 2026 · six-page dossier (PDF)p.1 one-page summary · p.2 the meeting, the speakers and what the 14 other members said · p.3–4 the eight claims against the record · p.5 the record side by side, the law, lines to take and Q&A · p.6 sources and method · v1, 19 Oct 2026
Oleshky: a blockade with no author, 16 Oct 2026 · Oleshky: a blockade with no author
Eight Russian official statements on occupied Oleshky, 21 September – 16 October 2026: the Kremlin, the Foreign Ministry, the Permanent Representative to the UN and the occupation authorities. Moscow now calls the situation "critical", "a catastrophe", "a tragedy" — and blames Ukraine for blockading a town Russia has held, with every road into it, since 24 February 2022. None of the statements proposes the evacuation, corridor or ceasefire the UN, the ICRC and Pope Leo XIV have asked for. Context: Oleshky.
The recordRussia controls Oleshky and every road into it. The UN monitoring mission recorded no food delivery by road after 26 May: "People can't get out, food can't get in." A list of evacuees was agreed with Russia and 358 people are verified for immediate evacuation; the ICRC is ready. Russia did not confirm it for five months; on 23 Oct the Kremlin confirmed a US-brokered local ceasefire from 29 Oct.
Fair to sayUkrainian drones are active over the roads. The UN has not attributed individual attacks; HRW found indications that both sides use drones and mines there. That does not move the occupier's duty to feed the town and accept relief (Fourth Geneva Convention, arts. 55 and 59).
Claim 1 · Dmitry Peskov · Kremlin · 21 Sep“The Kyiv regime is literally doing everything to obstruct these deliveries… The situation is indeed critical.”
The town is Russian-heldRussia has occupied Oleshky since 24 Feb 2022 and controls every road into it. The UN recorded no food delivery after 26 May and reminded Russia, as occupying power, of its duty to ensure food and medical supplies. Concedes: A "critical" situation in a town Russia controls.
Claim 2 · Rodion Miroshnik · MFA · 27 Sep“For more than a year the Armed Forces of Ukraine have been trying to create an artificial blockade of civilians.”
Contradicted by monitorsISW assessed in July that Russia is "effectively blockading" the town; OSCE/ODIHR received accounts of Russian forces preventing residents from leaving. Exit is possible only through Russian checkpoints with Russian documents (HRW). Concedes: That civilians are under blockade.
Claim 3 · Maria Zakharova · MFA · 30 Sep“They are trying to make a new Bucha out of this story — "Bucha 2.0".”
Pre-emptive framingThe Bucha denial of 2022 ("not a single civilian suffered") was abandoned by Russia itself in 2026. Calling Oleshky "Bucha 2.0" in advance attributes a catastrophe Moscow had denied four months earlier. Concedes: That a humanitarian catastrophe exists.
Claim 4 · Vladimir Saldo · occupation head · 7 Oct“The humanitarian cargo was destroyed. Thank God, the drivers were saved.”
UnverifiedNo independent verification; Russia's Ministry of Defence did not comment. HRW found credible indications that Ukrainian drones and mines are also used on roads around the town; responsibility for individual strikes is open. Russia has not accepted the corridor or ceasefire that would protect convoys. Concedes: Russia cannot get aid by road into a town it controls.
Claim 5 · Yana Lantratova · Russian ombudsman · 10 Oct“The main cause of the humanitarian crisis is the blockade deliberately imposed by the Ukrainian armed forces.”
Contradicted by the evacuation recordA list of evacuees was agreed with Russia; Ukraine's Ombudsman has verified 358 people who need immediate evacuation, and the ICRC is ready to take part. For five months Russia did not confirm it would carry out the evacuation (Ombudsman, 16 Sep, 8 Oct); on 19 Oct the Ombudsman said the sides were agreeing the final details, and on 23 Oct the Kremlin confirmed a US-brokered local ceasefire from 29 Oct (White House; Kremlin via TASS). The ombudsman channel returned 5 people in June, then stalled. Concedes: That outside negotiation — including a channel to the US — is needed to supply a town Russia holds.
Claim 6 · Rodion Miroshnik · MFA · 15 Oct“In reality Russian troops are protecting and clearing the way out for civilians… what volunteers can bring, they bring by hand.”
ContradictedPeople leave on foot over 20–25 km of mined road under drones, or via Russia and Belarus with Russian documents, which exposes men to conscription (HRW). Ukraine's drones delivered 8–10 t in two nights; Miroshnik puts Russian supplies at about 2 t a month. Concedes: No road deliveries reach the town.
Claim 7 · Vassily Nebenzia · UN · 14 Oct“Indeed, Alyoshki is just one example… the tragedy in Alyoshki.”
A tragedy with no cause namedThe statement names no party responsible and proposes no evacuation, corridor or ceasefire. Miroshnik, at the same meeting, said there are no troops in the town; HRW, ISW and the Kherson administration report troops there. Concedes: That Oleshky is "a tragedy".
Claim 8 · Kremlin readout · Putin–Pope Leo XIV · 16 Oct“Exhaustive explanations were given of the Kyiv regime's responsibility for the difficult humanitarian situation in the Russian city of Alyoshki.”
What the readout leaves outThe Holy See: the Pope asked for a ceasefire to allow food, medical aid and a voluntary, safe evacuation. The Kremlin text supports "supplies" and "security" — not evacuation, not a ceasefire. "Russian city": the General Assembly declared the annexation invalid (A/RES/ES-11/4). Concedes: A "difficult humanitarian situation"; that outside help is needed.
"Heirs of Goebbels" — the 2026 Bucha denialInternational Public Tribunal on the Crimes of Ukrainian Neo-Nazis · Moscow, 2026 · 21 pp.
0 / 16
"eyewitnesses" from Bucha
0
mentions of OHCHR, COI, Maxar or the 234th Regiment
3
named "combatants" executed after capture, 4 Mar 2022
≈25
of 509 memorial names challenged (5%)
What it concedes. Four years after "not a single civilian suffered" (UNSC, 5 Apr 2022), the report no longer disputes that the deaths occurred under Russian occupation. It argues about who the dead were. That is an acknowledgement.
Our own precision. The Bucha Wall of Remembrance lists residents of the community killed during the occupation, including local defence volunteers whose plaques say so. "509 civilians", used in some speeches, was imprecise. The legal record never depended on it.
Russia claimsThe wall of 509 names is the proof — and it includes soldiers.
Straw manThe memorial was never the evidentiary basis. OHCHR documented 73 civilians by name, status assessed case by case.
Russia claimsThey were combatants, so killing them was lawful (AP I art. 51(3)).
Self-incriminatingVerbovyi, Rudenko and Turovskyi were seized, searched and shot at 144 Yablunska St. A captured fighter is hors de combat; killing him is murder (Common Art. 3).
Russia claimsSome died elsewhere — Vorzel, Moshchun, Irpin.
IrrelevantThe memorial covers the Bucha community (14 settlements). Legal casualty counts are geo-specific and separate.
Russia claimsA 68-year-old died of cancer.
UnsourcedOne case, no document. OHCHR counts killings only.
Russia claimsUkraine kills its own citizens for the cameras — 16 eyewitnesses.
Not about BuchaAll 16 interviewed in occupied Donbas towns; none mentions Bucha. The report admits its conclusion is "by analogy".
Russia claimsLike Gleiwitz 1939 — a staged provocation.
RefutedMaxar imagery dates the bodies to 9–21 March; soldiers called home from victims' phones. Moscow's story has changed three times since.
Kryvyi Rih and Sumy, April 2025 · Two cities, one script
Russian MoD, Kremlin, Russian Mission to the UN · Kryvyi Rih and Sumy · April 2025. Nine days apart in April 2025, two Russian ballistic missiles air-burst over a playground in Kryvyi Rih and a city-centre street in Sumy on Palm Sunday. Each time the Russian Ministry of Defence announced the destruction of a military gathering — "commanders and Western instructors", "the command staff" — with a round number of dead soldiers and no names, photographs or coordinates. The UN verified 20 and at least 31 civilians killed, nine and two of them children. Eight claims, the record, and what each concedes: that the aim-points were in the middle of residential cities.
The recordThe same script, twice. A ballistic missile, a city centre, and within 24 hours a Ministry of Defence post naming a military meeting and a round number of soldiers killed — 85, then "more than 60". No evidence was published for either number, then or since.
Fair to sayIn Sumy a military award ceremony had reportedly been planned that day; Ukraine's government dismissed the regional governor over it. That is on the record below. It does not make an air-burst over a street full of churchgoers and bus passengers a lawful attack.
Claim 1 · Russian Ministry of Defence · 4 Apr 2025, evening“At 18:49 Moscow time a strike with a high-explosive missile was carried out on a restaurant in Kryvyi Rih where a meeting of unit commanders with Western instructors was being held… the enemy's losses amounted to up to 85 servicemen and officers of foreign states, and up to 20 vehicles. [translated]”MoD Telegram channel, t.me/mod_russia/50918, as quoted by BFM.ru and The Insider, 4–5 Apr 2025 · source ↗
Contradicted by monitorsOHCHR (6 Apr 2025): "Just before 7 pm local time… a missile detonated over a residential area of Kryvyi Rih"; nine children killed, "most while playing in a park"; "the use of an explosive weapon with wide area effects… in a densely populated area — and without any apparent military presence — demonstrates a reckless disregard for civilian life". HRMMU (24 Apr 2025): 20 civilians killed including nine children, at least 46 injured; "the missile exploded in the air, and the shrapnel spread across the public park" — the highest number of children killed in a single attack it has verified since Feb 2022. Restaurant CCTV obtained by France 24 shows no military personnel inside at the moment of impact; RFE/RL's Systema and local sources identified a beauty-industry forum and a birthday party as the events in the restaurant. OSINT geolocation (D. mojavensis, CIT) places the burst about 20 m from the playground and 70–80 m from the restaurant (Tier C). Concedes: The launch, the time and the aim-point — a restaurant in a residential district of a city of 600,000, next to a playground.Evidence tiers: A · C
Claim 2 · Vassily Nebenzia · Security Council, 8 Apr 2025“Unfortunately, owing to the unprofessional actions of the Ukrainian air defence, it was the intercepting Ukrainian missile that caused the deaths of civilians in the area adjacent to the restaurant.”S/PV.9893, 9893rd meeting, 8 Apr 2025 · source ↗
Contradicted by Russia's own MoDThe MoD's 4 April post describes one precision strike with a high-explosive missile on the restaurant and says nothing of an interception. Four days later the Mission told the Council the civilians were killed by a Ukrainian interceptor — a second missile for which no debris, trajectory or imagery was presented. The UN describes one weapon: "a missile detonated over a residential area" (OHCHR, 6 Apr); "the missile exploded in the air" (HRMMU, 24 Apr). Ukraine's Air Force (Tier B, operational fact, labelled) said no air-defence missile was launched at the target and that interceptors self-destruct if they miss. Nebenzia offered both versions in the same speech: the warhead hit the meeting, and the civilians were killed by someone else. Concedes: That civilians died at the aim-point — and, in his own words, that the "military meeting" was "in a residential building located in a densely populated urban area".Evidence tiers: A · B
Claim 3 · Vassily Nebenzia · Security Council, 8 Apr 2025“…troop concentrations and Western officers and instructors sent to assist the Kyiv regime are legitimate targets for the Russian army. The very fact that a military meeting was held in a residential building located in a densely populated urban area [shows disregard for civilians].”S/PV.9893, 8 Apr 2025 · source ↗
No evidence presentedNo name, rank, nationality or image of a commander or "Western instructor" has been published. Witnesses told UN Human Rights there was no military presence at the restaurant or in the area at the time (OHCHR, 6 Apr). OHCHR's legal note answers the premise: "Even if the Russian authorities had information that military personnel could be present, the mode and circumstances of attack may constitute an indiscriminate attack"; such attacks "if they amount to attacks directed against civilians may constitute war crimes". Slovenia at the same meeting: "We heard claims that a high precision strike has been launched to target a military group" — claims it said had been disproved. Concedes: That Russia chose to fire a ballistic missile at a building it knew to be in a densely populated residential area — which is precisely what Additional Protocol I arts. 51(5)(b) and 57 regulate.Evidence tiers: A
Claim 4 · Vassily Nebenzia · Security Council, 8 Apr 2025“[The videos] clearly show a large volume of smoke and dust, which indicates that a blast fragmentation warhead was used [and not cluster munitions].”S/PV.9893, 8 Apr 2025 · source ↗
Beside the pointUkraine's General Staff (Tier B) said the Iskander-M carried a cluster warhead; Russia says a blast-fragmentation warhead. The Hub does not adjudicate the warhead. The UN's finding does not depend on it: "a military weapon exploded into shrapnel above them" (Türk); "the missile exploded in the air, and the shrapnel spread across the public park, which sharply increased casualties" (HRMMU). An air-burst fragmentation warhead over a playground is an "explosive weapon with wide area effects" in a populated area under either description. Concedes: That the weapon was Russian and that it burst in the air over the park — the mechanism the UN describes.Evidence tiers: A · B
Claim 5 · Russian Ministry of Defence · 14 Apr 2025“…a strike with two Iskander-M operational-tactical missiles on the venue of a meeting of the command staff of the 'Seversk' operational-tactical group… more than 60 servicemen of the Ukrainian Armed Forces were destroyed. [translated]”MoD Telegram channel, 14 Apr 2025, as quoted by Izvestia, Meduza and Mediazona · source ↗
No evidence presented · contradicted by monitorsHRMMU (24 Apr 2025): "On 13 April, on Palm Sunday morning, two ballistic missiles struck the historic center of Sumy city"; the first reportedly hit the Sumy University Congress Center; "a second missile exploded above ground only two minutes later", sending shrapnel across a wide public area and causing most of the casualties; at least 31 civilians killed, including two boys aged 11 and 17, at least 80 injured including 14 children; many of the dead were bus passengers. Secretary-General (SG/SM/22621, 13 Apr): "deeply alarmed and shocked"; the attack "continues a devastating pattern". DiCarlo to the Council (S/PV.9908, 29 Apr): "a missile struck the historic centre of Sumy, reportedly killing 35 people". Ukrainian authorities: 35 killed, 129 injured including 15 children (Tier B). The MoD published nothing to support "more than 60": no unit roster, no imagery, no names. Independent researchers found no obituaries of senior officers linked to the "Seversk" group (Novaya Gazeta Europe, 15 Apr). Concedes: Two ballistic missiles, fired by Russia, at the historic centre of a city of 250,000 on a Sunday morning.Evidence tiers: A · B · C
Claim 6 · Russian Ministry of Defence · 14 Apr 2025“The Kyiv regime continues to use the Ukrainian population as a human shield, placing military facilities and holding events with the participation of servicemen in the centre of a densely populated city. [translated]”MoD Telegram channel, 14 Apr 2025 (quoted by Novaya Gazeta Europe and Euromaidan Press) · source ↗
Self-incriminating · misstates the lawThe sentence is the Ministry's own description of its aim-point: "the centre of a densely populated city". Under Additional Protocol I art. 51(8), a violation by the defender — even if proven — "shall not release the Parties to the conflict from their legal obligations with respect to the civilian population", including the rules on proportionality (art. 51(5)(b)) and precautions, which require choosing means and methods that avoid or minimise civilian loss (art. 57(2)(a)(ii)) and cancelling an attack that would be disproportionate (art. 57(2)(b)). A second air-burst over the same street two minutes after the first, with people helping the wounded, is the fact HRMMU records. Concedes: That the target was in the centre of a densely populated city, and that Russia knew it.Evidence tiers: A
Claim 7 · Dmitry Peskov · Kremlin briefing, 14 Apr 2025“I can only repeat and remind you of the repeated statements of our President and of our military representatives that our military strikes exclusively military and near-military targets. [translated]”Kremlin briefing, 14 Apr 2025, as quoted by Meduza; TASS, "Russian forces only hit military targets — Kremlin comments on Sumy strike" (tass.com/politics/1943297: "our forces carry out strikes solely on military and paramilitary targets") · source ↗
Contradicted by monitorsIn the 24 days before Peskov spoke, HRMMU had verified 848 civilian casualties in Ukraine; in the two strikes at issue the UN counted 20 and at least 31 civilians killed, with no military casualty verified by any mandated body. The UN Secretary-General placed Sumy in "a devastating pattern of similar assaults on Ukrainian cities and towns in recent weeks" (13 Apr). OHCHR had already called Kryvyi Rih the deadliest single strike for children it had verified in the war (24 Apr). "Near-military targets" is not a category of international humanitarian law. Concedes: That the Russian military fired the missiles — Peskov referred all questions on Sumy to the MoD.Evidence tiers: A
Claim 8 · Sergey Lavrov · Kommersant interview, 14 Apr 2025 — and Vassily Nebenzia · Security Council, 29 Apr 2025“We have facts about who was at the facility that was hit in Sumy… There was another 'gathering' of Ukrainian military commanders with their Western colleagues, disguised either as mercenaries or I do not know who. — …outright fakes, as was the case, for example, with the deaths of civilians in Kryvyi Rih and Sumy on 4 and 13 April, which appear to be the result of the Kyiv regime's egregious violation of international law, as has already been proven irrefutably.”Sputnik/GlobalSecurity mirror of the Kommersant interview, 14 Apr 2025 · S/PV.9908, 9908th meeting, 29 Apr 2025 · source ↗
No evidence presentedNeither the "facts" nor the "irrefutable proof" has been placed before the Council, the IAEA-style fact-finding Russia demands of others, or the public. The two statements show the script travelling from Kryvyi Rih to Sumy unchanged: "Western instructors" become "Western colleagues"; "up to 85" becomes "more than 60". At the 29 April meeting Denmark called Sumy "the single worst mass casualty attack on Ukraine's civilian population this year"; the UK spoke of "the revolting strike in Sumy on Palm Sunday"; no member endorsed the Russian account. Concedes: That the burden of proof is Russia's — Lavrov says the facts exist; the Hub asks for them.Evidence tiers: A
What we askPut the two MoD statements beside the UN figures in every statement on April 2025 and ask Russia to table the evidence for "85" and "more than 60" · cite OHCHR's legal note of 6 Apr 2025 — "even if… military personnel could be present… may constitute an indiscriminate attack" — as the standard · support the ICC and Ukrainian investigations of both strikes, including identification of the launching units · ask Ukraine to publish the outcome of its inquiry into the Sumy award ceremony, so that the "human shield" line is answered with facts · request that HRMMU's incident verifications for Kryvyi Rih and Sumy be annexed to the next periodic report with weapon and impact details.
SourcesRussian MoD Telegram, 4 and 14 Apr 2025 (via BFM.ru, The Insider, Izvestia, Meduza, Mediazona) · S/PV.9893 (8 Apr 2025) and S/PV.9908 (29 Apr 2025) · OHCHR, 6 Apr 2025 · HRMMU/OHCHR, 24 Apr 2025 · SG/SM/22621, 13 Apr 2025 · Security Council Report, 17 and 28 Apr 2025 · Kommersant/Sputnik, 14 Apr 2025 · Novaya Gazeta Europe, 8 and 15 Apr 2025 · EUvsDisinfo, Apr 2025 · StopFake · Kyiv Independent, Meduza, Washington Post on the Sumy ceremony · full list on page 6
Kryvyi Rih and Sumy, April 2025 · 7-page dossier (PDF)p.1 one-page summary · p.2 the occasion, the speakers, what others said and what was left out · p.3–4 the eight claims against the record · p.5 the record side by side · p.6 the law, lines to take and Q&A · p.7 sources and method · v1 · 21 Oct 2026
Lvova-Belova, Nebenzia, Peskov · Moscow, New York · 2023–2026. Russia's account of the Ukrainian children taken to Russia and the occupied territories has three words in it: evacuation, holiday camps, family reunification. The International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for the President and his Children's Commissioner for unlawful deportation and transfer (17 Mar 2023); the UN Commission of Inquiry found war crimes (2023) and then crimes against humanity (12 Mar 2026); the ECtHR found "a systematic programme of long-term, indeed permanent, removal" (9 Jul 2025). Russia's own figures — 380 orphans placed in Russian families, 700,000 children "accommodated" — concede the transfers. Eight claims, the record, and what each concedes.
The record"Evacuation" is a legal term with a time limit. An occupying power may evacuate civilians temporarily for their safety and must return them "as soon as hostilities in the area in question have ceased" (GC IV, art. 49); it may not change children's personal status or adopt them out (art. 50). The Commission of Inquiry found the children "placed long-term with families or institutions in 21 regions of the Russian Federation and in the occupied territories"; the ECtHR found a programme of "long-term, indeed permanent, removal". That is not evacuation.
Fair to saySome children left frontline areas with parents or guardians and some evacuations from Donetsk and Luhansk before 24 Feb 2022 may have met IHL requirements (OSCE Moscow Mechanism). Ukrainian totals above 19,000 are not UN-verified. Returns through Qatar, the Vatican and the ICRC do happen — because the children are where Russia put them.
Claim 1 · Vassily Nebenzia, Permanent Representative · interview to TASS, New York, 31 Mar 2023“[The evacuation of children was carried out] in full compliance with international humanitarian law and the Convention on the Rights of the Child… millions of people have been evacuated [since the start of the special military operation]… [most children arrived with parents, guardians or custodians; those from orphanages are] a small number… 15 children from eight families have already been reunited with their relatives.”TASS, "Evacuating children from Ukrainian conflict zone complies with law — Russian envoy to UN", 31 Mar 2023 · source ↗
Misstates the lawGC IV art. 49 permits an occupying power to evacuate an area only "if the security of the population or imperative military reasons so demand", within the occupied territory "except when for material reasons it is impossible", and requires return "as soon as hostilities in the area in question have ceased"; AP I art. 78 forbids evacuating children to a foreign country except temporarily, for compelling health or safety reasons, with the written consent of parents or guardians. The Commission of Inquiry: IHL allows evacuations only as temporary measures; the children were instead placed long-term in 21 regions of Russia and occupied areas (12 Mar 2026). The ECtHR found violations of Arts. 3, 5 and 8 (9 Jul 2025). "15 children from eight families" is Russia's own measure of the scale of return thirteen months into the practice. Concedes: That children, including children from institutions, were moved from occupied Ukraine to Russia by the Russian state — the act the ICC warrants describe — and that reunification is a Russian obligation.Evidence tiers: A · C
Claim 2 · Vassily Nebenzia · Arria-formula meeting, UNHQ, 5 Apr 2023 (concept note and statement)“[The term "adoption" is] deliberately misleading… [Russia's role is] temporary guardianship. … We organized our meeting in order to tell the truth about this situation. … You don't need the truth, you have already reached a verdict based on false facts and speculation.”Security Council Report, What's in Blue, 4 Apr 2023 (concept note); TASS, 5 Apr 2023 (statement) · source ↗
Contradicted by Russia's own commissionerThe day before, Lvova-Belova told a press conference at the Russian MFA that 380 Ukrainian orphans had been placed in foster families in Russia, including 22 minors found in Mariupol, and that adopted children were given Russian nationality (AFP/Kyiv Post, 4 Apr 2023). Her office's 2023 report lists 288 children from the "DPR" and 92 from the "LPR" "subsequently given over to Russian foster families". A presidential decree of 30 May 2022 created a simplified path to Russian citizenship for orphans and children without parental care from Ukraine and the "DPR"/"LPR" (Novaya Gazeta Europe; Ukrainska Pravda, 30 May 2022). Yale HRL identified 314 children in the adoption and fostering system (3 Dec 2024). The ECtHR: "transfer of children to Russia and their adoption there" is among the organised abuses found (9 Jul 2025). Guardianship that changes a child's name, citizenship and family is what GC IV art. 50 prohibits. Concedes: That Russia exercises "guardianship" over Ukrainian children — custody by the occupying power, which is the transfer.Evidence tiers: A · C
Claim 3 · Maria Lvova-Belova, Presidential Commissioner for Children's Rights · Arria-formula meeting, by video, 5 Apr 2023“[The situation had an] emergency character… [Russia had to] move these children from under shelling and move them to safe areas.”CBS News report of the meeting, 5 Apr 2023; no UN record exists (not webcast) · source ↗
Evacuation must be temporary — these were notThe Commission of Inquiry accepted that Russian authorities described the relocations shortly before and after 24 Feb 2022 as "evacuations" for safety, and rejected the justification: IHL allows evacuation only as a temporary measure for compelling reasons of health, medical treatment or safety; the children were placed long-term with families or institutions; 80% of documented cases have not been returned; the policy was "directed at the highest level of the Russian state" (12 Mar 2026). The OSCE Moscow Mechanism: evacuation is lawful only if provisional; the children were not returned and were integrated into Russian families (4 May 2023). The ECtHR: "a systematic programme of long-term, indeed permanent, removal" (9 Jul 2025). Yale HRL documented 43 camps and facilities holding at least 6,000 children in Feb 2023, with political "re-education" as their primary purpose and some military training for children from 14 (Tier C). Concedes: That the Russian state organised the movement of the children — the actus reus of deportation and transfer. Shelling by the attacking state is not a ground for that state to keep the children.Evidence tiers: A · C
Claim 4 · Maria Lvova-Belova · press conference, Russian MFA, Moscow, 4 Apr 2023“[Russia is ready to return children if their families ask.] Write to me… to find your child. [She said she had not been contacted by] any representative of the Ukrainian authorities. [She declined to publish a list of the children brought to Russia.] (English as reported by AFP)”AFP via Kyiv Post, "Russia says ready to return Ukraine children if parents request", 4 Apr 2023 · source ↗
Burden reversedGC IV art. 50 obliges the occupying power to facilitate the identification of children and the registration of their parentage; art. 26 obliges it to facilitate enquiries by dispersed families; AP I art. 78(3) requires a card for each evacuated child to be sent to the ICRC Central Tracing Agency. The Commission of Inquiry recommended in March 2023 that Russia disclose the number and location of transferred children; it sent 39 written requests and received no reply (12 Mar 2026). The OSCE Moscow Mechanism found no functioning reunification mechanism and obstacles for parents who tried (4 May 2023). The children were returned, when they were, through Qatar, the Vatican, the ICRC and private journeys by relatives — not through a Russian list. Lvova-Belova's own tally on 13 Feb 2025: 95 children from 75 families reunited with relatives in Ukraine and other countries since 2023. Concedes: That the children are in Russian custody and that the names are known to Russia — which has chosen not to publish them.Evidence tiers: A · C
Claim 5 · Office of the Presidential Commissioner for Children's Rights · annual report, Jul 2023“[Since February 2022 Russia has] accommodated about 4.8 million residents of Ukraine and the Donbas republics, of whom more than 700,000 were children. … [288 children from the "DPR" and 92 from the "LPR" were] subsequently given over to Russian foster families.”Report on the Commissioner's website, Jul 2023, as reported by Novaya Gazeta Europe, Moscow Times, Ukrinform, 31 Jul 2023 · source ↗
Self-incriminating — and unverifiableThe 700,000 figure is Russia's and cannot be checked: it counts everyone who crossed, including families, and no body has had access to confirm it. The 380 figure is specific, Russia's own, and matches what the ICC, the Commission and Yale HRL describe: children without parental care from occupied Donetsk and Luhansk taken into Russian families. GC IV art. 50: the occupying power "shall not, in any case, change their personal status, nor enlist them in formations or organizations subordinate to it". The Commission's verified count (1,200+) is a floor built case by case without access to Russia; the Ukrainian figure (19,000+, Tier B) is a register of reported cases. The gap between Russia's 700,000 and the UN's 1,200+ is a gap in access, not in fact. Concedes: The transfer of at least 380 children without parental care into Russian families — the core of the ICC charge — in Russia's own words.Evidence tiers: A · B · C
Claim 6 · Dmitry Peskov, Presidential press secretary · Moscow, 17 Mar 2023“We consider the very raising of the question outrageous and unacceptable. Russia, like a number of other countries, does not recognise this court's jurisdiction, and accordingly, any decisions of this sort are null and void for Russia from a legal point of view.”TASS / Anadolu, 17 Mar 2023 · source ↗
Misstates the lawThe ICC's jurisdiction does not depend on Russia's consent: Ukraine accepted the Court's jurisdiction over crimes on its territory by declarations under art. 12(3) of the Rome Statute (9 Apr 2014; 8 Sep 2015) and became a State Party on 1 Jan 2025 after ratifying the Statute in 2024; under art. 12(2)(a) the Court may act where the conduct occurred. Art. 27 makes official capacity, including as head of state, irrelevant. The 125 states parties are obliged to arrest (art. 89); the Pre-Trial Chamber found that Mongolia failed to comply by not arresting Putin during his visit in Sep 2024 (decision of 24 Oct 2024). The warrants are public because the Chamber considered that awareness "may contribute to the prevention of the further commission of crimes" (ICC, 17 Mar 2023). Concedes: That the warrants exist and name the President — and that they bind every state party, as the Court's Mongolia decision of 24 Oct 2024 shows.Evidence tiers: A
Claim 7 · Maria Lvova-Belova · Telegram statement on a Qatar-mediated handover, 13 Feb 2025“On this occasion eight children aged five to fifteen are going to relatives in Ukraine. [translated] … [Since 2023, 15 children from 10 families have been reunited with relatives in Russia and 95 children from 75 families with relatives in Ukraine and other countries.] … [Ukraine] did nothing [to evacuate children from Mariupol].”RTVI, 13 Feb 2025, citing Lvova-Belova's Telegram (Russian; translated); Qatar MFA statement 14 Feb 2025 · source ↗
Concedes the transfers; the scale is not matchedQatar's mediation, begun in 2023, had reunited 107 children with their families by 21 Aug 2025 — in both directions (Qatar MFA, 22 Aug 2025). The Commission of Inquiry: 1,200+ children verified as deported or transferred, 80% not returned (12 Mar 2026). Ukraine's Bring Kids Back UA initiative counted 1,345 children returned by all routes as of 4 Jun 2025; the Ombudsman's Office counts 2,665 returned as of 7 Oct 2026 (via Ukrinform, Tier B). Each child handed over by Russia confirms that Russia held the child. On Mariupol: Russian forces besieged and shelled the city from 24 Feb 2022; the 22 "abandoned" Mariupol children Lvova-Belova cites were taken into Russian families, and the boy she adopted is one of them (claim 8). Concedes: That the children were in Russia, that Russia decides who leaves, and that the number it has let go is in the dozens.Evidence tiers: A · B · C
Claim 8 · Maria Lvova-Belova to Vladimir Putin · Kremlin, 16 Feb 2023“Now I know what it means to be a mother of a child from Donbas. [She had adopted a 15-year-old from Mariupol.]”Kremlin meeting, 16 Feb 2023, as reported by The Moscow Times, "Putin's children's envoy reveals she adopted child from Mariupol", 16 Feb 2023 · source ↗
Self-incriminatingOne month later the ICC issued arrest warrants for both participants in this conversation for the unlawful deportation and transfer of children from occupied Ukraine (17 Mar 2023). The boy, Filipp, was among the Mariupol children taken to the Moscow region in 2022; Lvova-Belova later said another Mariupol teenager who wanted to return was not allowed to leave Russia (Ukrainska Pravda, 4 Apr 2023, Tier C). Adoption of a child from occupied territory by the occupying power's official is the clearest case of what GC IV art. 50 prohibits. The ECtHR listed "transfer of children to Russia and their adoption there" among the Convention violations found (9 Jul 2025). Concedes: That the Commissioner's programme reached into her own family: the personal status of a Ukrainian child from an occupied city was changed by the official in charge, with the President's encouragement.Evidence tiers: A · C
What we askSupport execution of the ICC warrants and the Commission's 2026 findings in all accountability texts, including the crimes-against-humanity characterisation · call on Russia to provide the Commission, OHCHR, the ICRC and UNICEF with the names, ages and locations of all transferred children, as GC IV arts. 26 and 50 and AP I art. 78 require · back the International Coalition for the Return of Ukrainian Children and Qatar's, the Vatican's and the ICRC's channels, and ask Russia to scale them from dozens to all · press Russia to halt adoptions, citizenship changes and "re-education" of transferred children (OSCE MM recommendations, 4 May 2023) · keep the children's return as a non-negotiable element of any settlement, with verification by a UN mechanism.
SourcesNebenzia, TASS 31 Mar and 5 Apr 2023; SCR What's in Blue 4 Apr 2023 · Lvova-Belova, Kremlin 16 Feb 2023 (Moscow Times); MFA 4 Apr 2023 (AFP/Kyiv Post); report Jul 2023 (Novaya Gazeta Europe); RTVI 13 Feb 2025 · Peskov 17 Mar 2023 (Anadolu/Ukrainska Pravda) · ICC 17 Mar 2023 (Lawfare) · COI A/HRC/52/62; COI 12 Mar 2026 (ukraine.un.org; UN Geneva) · OSCE Moscow Mechanism 4 May 2023 (osce.org; EJIL:Talk) · ECtHR GC 9 Jul 2025 (press release, Q&A) · Yale HRL 14 Feb 2023, 3 Dec 2024 (RFE/RL; JURIST) · Qatar MFA 22 Aug 2025 · Bring Kids Back UA 4 Jun 2025; Ombudsman via Ukrinform 9 Oct 2026 · CBS 5 Apr 2023 · full list on page 6
Ukrainian children, 2023–2025 · 7-page dossier (PDF)p.1 one-page summary · p.2 the occasion, the speakers, what others said and what was left out · p.3–4 the eight claims against the record · p.5 the record side by side · p.6 the law, lines to take and Q&A · p.7 sources and method · v1 · 21 Oct 2026
Kremenchuk 2022 and Dnipro 2023 · Air defence and depots
Russian MoD, Kremlin, Russian Mission to the UN · Kremenchuk 2022 and Dnipro 2023 · the Kh-22 strikes. Two of the deadliest single strikes of the war were carried out with the same weapon: the Kh-22, a Soviet anti-ship missile with a warhead of nearly a tonne, fired from Tu-22M3 bombers. In Kremenchuk on 27 June 2022 it destroyed a working shopping mall; in Dnipro on 14 January 2023 it brought down the entrance of a nine-storey block. For each, Russia produced two explanations that exclude each other — a weapons depot and a mall that was "not functioning"; "we do not strike residential buildings" and "our missile was shot down by Ukrainian air defence". Six claims, the record, and what each concedes. The facts of each strike are in the Hub's historical case files.
The recordThe depot that explains nothing. Russia says it hit hangars of Western weapons at the Kremenchuk road-machinery plant and that the fire "spread" to a mall that was "not functioning". The mall took a direct hit, 450 metres from the plant, with buildings between them untouched; it was open, with staff, shoppers and receipts to prove it; and no secondary explosions followed.
Fair to sayThe UK Ministry of Defence assessed on 29 June 2022 that a nearby infrastructure target was a "realistic possibility" as the intended target in Kremenchuk; the Hub shows it. An unintended hit with a weapon of this kind in a city is the definition of an indiscriminate attack, not a defence to one.
Claim 1 · Russian Ministry of Defence (Lt-Gen Konashenkov) · 28 Jun 2022“On 27 June a strike with high-precision air-launched weapons was carried out on hangars with weapons and ammunition received from the United States and European countries, in the area of the Kremenchuk road-machinery plant… The detonation of the stored ammunition for Western weapons caused a fire in a non-functioning shopping centre located next to the plant's territory. [translated]”MoD daily briefing, 28 Jun 2022, as published by Novaya Gazeta Europe (08:22 GMT) and TASS · source ↗
Contradicted by evidenceHRW (30 Jun 2022, 15 witnesses, two site visits): the first missile "hit the shopping center around 4 p.m., destroying it"; the second struck the north side of the road-vehicle factory "450 meters from the first", leaving a crater 16 m wide and 5 m deep; the mall "remained open"; the factory's deputy director said it made only concrete and asphalt machinery; HRW found no evidence of munitions storage. Bellingcat (29 Jun 2022): park CCTV shows two impacts seconds apart with the plume over the mall; Planet SkySat imagery of 28 Jun at 08:51 UTC shows several buildings between the two sites undamaged, so fire could not have "spread"; no secondary explosions were seen after the first impact. The UK Ministry of Defence's intelligence update of 29 Jun 2022 called a nearby infrastructure target a "realistic possibility" as the intended target — which does not rescue the depot story. Concedes: The strike, the weapon type (air-launched), the date and the location — a plant across the road from a shopping mall in a city of 220,000.Evidence tiers: C
Claim 2 · Dmitry Polyanskiy · RIA Novosti, 27 Jun 2022, and Security Council, 28 Jun 2022“We'll have to wait and see what our Ministry of Defence says, but there are too many obvious inconsistencies. — [At the Council, 28 Jun:] …an alleged strike on a shopping mall in Kremenchuk… In reality, no such strike was launched… [the strike] caused a fire, which then spread to the shopping centre… the work of the Ukrainian propagandists… [Western weapons deliveries] are only prolonging the agony of the criminal Kyiv regime.”Remarks to RIA Novosti, 27 Jun 2022, as reported by Bellingcat (29 Jun 2022); S/PV.9080, 9080th meeting, 28 Jun 2022 (UN verbatim record, via un-project.org/meeting/S-PV-9080) · source ↗
Contradicted by Russia's own MoDPolyanskiy cast doubt on the event before his own Ministry had spoken; at the Council the next day he denied any strike on the mall while conceding a Russian strike next to it. The next morning the MoD confirmed a Russian strike at the site. A staged event and a Russian precision strike with an ammunition fire cannot both be true. At the Council the Secretariat (DiCarlo) recorded 10,631 civilians killed in Ukraine as of 26 June; the United States said "the world has come together to say enough is enough". No member supported the "provocation" reading. Concedes: That Russia had no agreed account of its own strike 24 hours after it.Evidence tiers: A
Claim 3 · Sergey Lavrov · press conference, 28 Jun 2022“The strike targeted the hangar that received European and American weapons and ammunition… The ammunition detonation set fire to the nearby empty shopping mall.”TASS, "Kremenchug shopping mall catches fire after Russia strikes hangar of US weapons — Lavrov", Ashgabat, 28 Jun 2022 (tass.com/politics/1472643; English as published by TASS) · source ↗
Contradicted by evidenceSame record as claim 1. The G7 leaders at Elmau on 27 June had already "solemnly condemn[ed] the abominable attack on a shopping mall in Kremenchuk" and stated that "indiscriminate attacks on innocent civilians constitute a war crime". No Russian body has since published a photograph, inventory or coordinates of the "hangar of US weapons". Concedes: That the Foreign Minister adopted the Ministry's story and so bound the Russian state to it.Evidence tiers: C
Claim 4 · Dmitry Peskov · Kremlin briefing, 16 Jan 2023“The Russian armed forces have not been delivering strikes on residential buildings or social infrastructure facilities. Military targets — both evident and obscure — have been attacked… You yourselves saw the conclusion of some representatives of the Ukrainian side that this tragedy was the consequence of a counter-missile and of air defence. [first two sentences: TASS English; last sentence translated from the Russian]”Kremlin briefing, 16 Jan 2023: TASS English, tass.com/politics/1562725; Russian text as quoted by Meduza and Novaya Gazeta Europe · source ↗
Misquotes a retracted remark · contradicted by monitorsThe "representatives of the Ukrainian side" is one person: Oleksii Arestovych, an adviser to the head of the Presidential Office, who said on a YouTube stream on 14 January that, according to an acquaintance, the missile had been shot down. He withdrew the remark, apologised and resigned on 17 January (BBC; The Guardian). Ukraine's Defence Ministry and Air Force (Tier B, operational facts, labelled) said the weapon was a Kh-22, that such missiles deviate by hundreds of metres, and that none had ever been intercepted. The Conflict Intelligence Team (Tier C) reviewed aftermath and dashcam footage and found "no signs of air defense activity", attributing flashes on the ground to short-circuiting trolleybus wires. The UN told the Council the "missile attack… struck a residential building" and killed 45 civilians including six children (Brands Kehris, S/PV.9245); the Secretary-General said attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure "must end immediately" (16 Jan 2023). Concedes: The nationwide strike that day was Russian — Peskov argues only about which missile fell where.Evidence tiers: A · B · C
Claim 5 · Vassily Nebenzia · Security Council, 17 Jan 2023“The Russian missile launched at an energy infrastructure facility was downed by Ukraine's air-defence forces. Since the air-defence system was — in violation of the norms of international humanitarian law you care so much about — placed in a residential district, the downed missile landed on a residential building. You know the rest. [translated from the Russian text; UN English: "the remnants of the missile fell into a residential building"]”S/PV.9245, 9245th meeting, 17 Jan 2023; UN Meetings Coverage SC/15178; Russian text per Meduza, 18 Jan 2023 · source ↗
No evidence presented · contradicts the KremlinPeskov (claim 4) said Russia does not strike residential buildings; Nebenzia says a Russian missile destroyed one, after interception. Neither debris of an interceptor, nor a launch, nor radar data was presented, and the Kh-22's known performance (claim 4) makes the account implausible: an interceptor that stops a 5.8-tonne missile does not deliver its intact 950-kg warhead onto a building entrance. Ukraine's representative at the same meeting: "Unfortunately, Ukraine has no means at its disposal to shoot down this type of missile." Members who spoke on Dnipro that day — UAE, France, Albania, UK, Japan — treated it as a Russian strike on a residential building; none took up the interception story. Concedes: That the missile was Russian, launched that afternoon, and that it destroyed the apartment block — the whole of the Kremlin's denial, abandoned by its own Mission.Evidence tiers: B
Claim 6 · Vassily Nebenzia · Security Council, 17 Jan 2023“The missile was launched against an infrastructure facility which was placed in a residential district, in violation of norms of international law… [and] none of you found anything to say in condemnation of the almost daily, almost uninterrupted strikes of the Ukrainian armed forces against Donetsk.”SC/15178, summary of S/PV.9245, 17 Jan 2023 · source ↗
Misstates the lawAn "infrastructure facility" is not a military objective by location; the presumption in Additional Protocol I art. 52(3) runs the other way, and art. 51(8) provides that a defender's violation, even if proven, does not release the attacker from its own obligations. The choice of a Kh-22 for a target "in a residential district" is the precautions question (art. 57(2)(a)(ii)). The reference to Donetsk is tu quoque: it does not answer who fired at Naberezhna Peremohy Street. The Commission of Inquiry's March 2023 report found that Russian attacks with explosive weapons in populated areas were carried out without apparent regard for civilian harm (A/HRC/52/62, 15 Mar 2023). Concedes: That the aim-point was in a residential district — and that Russia knew it before launch.Evidence tiers: A
What we askUse the two-voice contradiction — Kremlin denial versus Mission admission — whenever Russia offers a "Ukrainian air defence" explanation for a mass-casualty strike · ask Russia to produce the evidence it has never shown: the inventory of the Kremenchuk "hangars", the interceptor debris in Dnipro · support the ICC and Ukrainian investigations into the 52nd Guards Heavy Bomber Regiment and the chain of command for Kh-22 use against cities · request that OHCHR publish incident-level findings on weapon and impact for Kremenchuk and Dnipro in its next periodic report · cite the G7's Elmau statement of 27 Jun 2022 as the partners' already-agreed qualification.
SourcesRussian MoD briefing 28 Jun 2022 (via Novaya Gazeta Europe, TASS) · Polyanskiy 27–28 Jun 2022 (via Bellingcat, Global News, KHPG) · Peskov 16 Jan 2023 (via Meduza, Novaya Gazeta Europe, TASS) · Nebenzia, S/PV.9245 / SC/15178, 17 Jan 2023 (via Meduza, Novaya Gazeta Europe) · S/PV.9080, 28 Jun 2022 · G7 Elmau statement 27 Jun 2022 · HRW 30 Jun 2022 · Bellingcat 29 Jun 2022 · CIT sitrep 18 Jan 2023 · BBC/Guardian 17 Jan 2023 · Ukrainska Pravda 15 Jan 2023 · Security Council Report, Feb 2023 forecast · full list on page 6
Kremenchuk 2022 and Dnipro 2023 · 7-page dossier (PDF)p.1 one-page summary · p.2 the occasion, the speakers, what others said and what was left out · p.3–4 the six claims against the record · p.5 the record side by side · p.6 the law, lines to take and Q&A · p.7 sources and method · v1 · 21 Oct 2026
"Biolabs" and "dirty bomb", 2022 · Pretexts the UN examined
Russia's "biolabs" and "dirty bomb" claims · UN Security Council, BWC consultations, IAEA · Mar 2022 – Nov 2022. Twice in 2022 Russia told the world that Ukraine was preparing a weapon of mass destruction: US-run "military biological laboratories" in March, and a "dirty bomb" in October. Both claims were put to the one place that could test them — the UN system — and both were answered there. The UN's disarmament office was "not aware of any biological weapons programmes"; the Biological Weapons Convention's first consultative meeting in 25 years ended without consensus on Russia's allegations; the Security Council gave Russia's investigation commission two votes; and IAEA inspectors visited the three Ukrainian sites Russia had named and found no indications of undeclared nuclear activities or materials. Eight claims, the record, and what each concedes.
The recordBoth claims were tested where Russia chose to bring them. Russia took the biolabs claim to the Security Council (11 and 18 Mar, 27 Oct 2022), to the BWC's consultative mechanism (Sep 2022) and to a Council vote (2 Nov 2022); it took the dirty-bomb claim to four defence ministers and the Council (25 Oct 2022), and Ukraine's invitation took it to the IAEA. The UN disarmament office, the BWC states parties, the Council and the IAEA each answered. None found what Russia described.
Fair to sayThe BWC has no verification body, so "not aware" is not the same as "verified"; the WHO did recommend in March 2022 that Ukraine destroy high-threat pathogens to "prevent any potential spills"; a US official did acknowledge "biological research facilities" in Ukraine. None of this is evidence of a weapons programme, and no mandated body has found one.
Claim 1 · Vassily Nebenzia · 11 Mar 2022, UN Security Council, 8991st meeting (requested by Russia)“[Russia has evidence of] the Kyiv regime's emergency clean-up of the traces of the biological warfare programme… [there is a network of] at least 30 biological laboratories [in Ukraine, working for the United States].”S/PV.8991, 8991st meeting, 11 Mar 2022 (UN verbatim record, via un-project.org/meeting/S-PV-8991); summary SC/14827 · source ↗
No evidence presented — answered in the same meetingIzumi Nakamitsu, High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, briefed the same meeting: "The United Nations is not aware of any biological weapons programmes"; "The BWC lacks a multilateral verification mechanism" (S/PV.8991). The "30 laboratories" are Ukraine's public-health and veterinary laboratories supported under a 2005 threat-reduction agreement — about $200 million since 2005, with "no U.S. personnel at these labs" (US Department of Defense briefing, 10 Mar 2022). The "emergency clean-up" was the destruction of high-threat pathogens that the WHO had "strongly recommended" to "prevent any potential spills" (WHO to Reuters, 10–11 Mar 2022). No document presented by Russia described a weapon, an agent or a delivery system. Concedes: That the UN Security Council and the BWC are the competent fora — where the claim was then examined and failed.Evidence tiers: A · C
Claim 2 · Maj.-Gen. Igor Konashenkov, MoD spokesman · 6 Mar 2022, briefing“We have obtained documents from employees of Ukrainian bio laboratories… the especially dangerous pathogens of plague, anthrax, tularemia, cholera and other deadly diseases [were] urgently destroyed on February 24… the Pentagon has developed serious concerns about the disclosure of information about its secret biological experiments.”MoD briefing, 6 Mar 2022, as reported in English by Interfax (interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/75769) · source ↗
Misstates a biosafety measure as a cover-upThe WHO said it had "strongly recommended" that Ukraine's Ministry of Health destroy high-threat pathogens to "prevent any potential spills" as fighting approached (WHO to Reuters, 10–11 Mar 2022). The pathogens named are endemic disease agents held by public-health laboratories worldwide for diagnosis and surveillance. Destroying stocks under threat of bombardment is a biosafety step, not evidence of a weapons programme. Concedes: That the laboratories held diagnostic stocks and destroyed them — i.e., that no agent was retained for use.Evidence tiers: C
Claim 3 · Russian Ministry of Defence (Konashenkov, Kirillov) · 10 Mar 2022, briefing“[Kirillov:] A network of over 30 biological labs was formed on Ukrainian soil… [Konashenkov:] …the transfer of pathogens by wild birds migrating between Ukraine and Russia, other countries… experiments were held with the samples of bat coronavirus… the creation of a mechanism of the covert spread of deadly pathogens.”MoD briefing, 10 Mar 2022, as reported by TASS, "US bankrolled mechanism of covert spread of pathogens in Ukraine, Russian top brass says" (tass.com/world/1419559) · source ↗
No evidence presented — rejected by the BWC states partiesRussia took these allegations to the BWC under Article V (request of 29 Jun 2022). The Formal Consultative Meeting in Geneva (26 Aug and 5–9 Sep 2022, chaired by Ambassador György Molnár of Hungary) — only the second ever, after Cuba's in 1997 — ended with "No consensus was reached regarding the outcome of the Formal Consultative Meeting" (BWC/CONS/2022/3, para. 10). Of the 42 states parties that made national statements, none backed Russia's claims (Council on Strategic Risks, 13 Sep 2022 — Tier C). Surveillance of migratory birds and bats for zoonotic pathogens is standard public-health epidemiology, not weaponisation. Concedes: That the material Russia relied on was public documents — which it could cite because the programme was not secret.Evidence tiers: A · C
Claim 4 · Dmitry Polyanskiy, Russian Federation · Security Council, 2 Nov 2022 — vote on Russia's BWC Art. VI complaint (S/2022/796) and draft S/2022/821“[The draft is] a considerable milestone… [Russia is] extremely disappointed [that the Council did not establish the commission]… the evidence accompanying our complaint still requires clarifications.”Security Council, 2 Nov 2022, as reported by AP (via News4Jax) and UN Meetings Coverage SC/15095 · source ↗
Rejected by the Council — two votesAt the 27 Oct 2022 briefing, UNODA's Adedeji Ebo told the Council that the UN's position of March — not aware of any biological weapons programmes in Ukraine — "remains the case today" (Ukrinform, 28 Oct 2022). On 2 Nov 2022 the draft received 2 votes in favour (Russia, China), 3 against (France, UK, US) and 10 abstentions; it failed for want of nine votes, so no veto was cast (SC/15095). Even members open in principle to an investigation did not vote for it: Ghana wanted "independent and impartial investigations by internationally-recognised and mandated bodies", Kenya asked states parties "to make use of the established mechanisms", Gabon called for "a transparent and impartial independent inquiry" (Security Council Report, 1 Nov 2022). Concedes: That its own evidence "still requires clarifications" — and that the Security Council, under BWC Art. VI, is the lawful route for such a complaint; Russia has not resubmitted it.Evidence tiers: A · C
Claim 5 · Sergei Shoigu · 23 Oct 2022, calls to the defence ministers of the US, UK, France and Turkey“[Shoigu] informed his British counterpart about Russia's concerns over Ukraine's possible provocations with the use of a dirty bomb. [MoD statement as reported by TASS]”Russian MoD statements on Shoigu's calls with L. Austin, B. Wallace, S. Lecornu and H. Akar, 23 Oct 2022, as reported by TASS (tass.com/defense/1526311) · source ↗
No evidence presented — rejected by the three recipients the same dayFrance, the UK and the US issued a joint statement on 23 Oct 2022 rejecting Russia's "transparently false allegations" that Ukraine was preparing to use a dirty bomb on its own territory, and warning against using the allegation as a "pretext for escalation" (US Department of State, 23 Oct 2022). The IAEA, 24 Oct: both sites Russia named are under safeguards; one was inspected a month earlier and "no undeclared nuclear activities or material were found there". Concedes: That a radiological attack in Ukraine would be an atrocity the world must prevent — a principle that binds the state that holds Europe's largest nuclear plant under military occupation.Evidence tiers: A
Claim 6 · Lt-Gen Igor Kirillov · 24 Oct 2022, MoD briefing; Russian letter to the Security Council of the same day“Two Ukrainian organizations have concrete instructions to create a so-called dirty bomb… Work is at the final stage. [Kirillov, TASS] — [Russia's letter to the Council the same day: the] works are at their concluding stage. [as summarised by Security Council Report]”MoD briefing, 24 Oct 2022, as reported by TASS (tass.com/politics/1526769); letter from the Russian Federation to the President of the Security Council, 24 Oct 2022 (Security Council Report, 27 Oct 2022) · source ↗
Contradicted by the IAEAUkraine invited the IAEA in writing on 24 Oct 2022 to verify both sites. IAEA inspectors visited three locations — the Institute for Nuclear Research in Kyiv, the Eastern Mining and Processing Plant in Zhovti Vody and the Pivdennyi Machine-Building Plant in Dnipro — and on 3 Nov 2022 the Agency reported that it "did not find any indications of undeclared nuclear activities and materials at the locations" and had "unfettered access" (IAEA, 3 Nov 2022). Russia, which named the organisations, requested no inspection and submitted no evidence to the Agency. The Council took up the letter under "any other business" on 25 Oct 2022 with no briefer and no outcome. Concedes: That the sites were identifiable and inspectable — and that the IAEA was the competent judge. Russia named them; the IAEA went; Russia has not mentioned them since.Evidence tiers: A
Claim 7 · Vladimir Putin · 27 Oct 2022, Valdai Discussion Club“It was me who ordered Shoigu to call all his counterparts and inform them about it… We even know where it is being prepared. [English as reported by TASS]”Plenary session of the Valdai Discussion Club, 27 Oct 2022, as reported by TASS (tass.com/politics/1528733) · source ↗
No evidence presented — the location was known and inspectedRussia had already named the organisations on 24 Oct; the IAEA inspected the sites within ten days and found nothing undeclared (3 Nov 2022). Putin's statement came two days after the Council's "any other business" discussion produced no outcome. Concedes: That the allegation rested on claimed knowledge of a place — which the IAEA then inspected — not on evidence of a device.Evidence tiers: A
Claim 8 · Sergey Lavrov · 24 Oct 2022, Moscow“[The accusations] are not groundless… We have specific information about those institutions in Ukraine… those scientific institutes that have the technology to create this dirty bomb… this is not an empty suspicion.”As reported by RFE/RL and Censor.net, 24 Oct 2022; TASS, 24 Oct 2022 (tass.com/politics/1526717) · source ↗
Contradicted by the IAEAThe "institutions with the technology" are the same two safeguarded sites. Possessing nuclear material under IAEA safeguards is lawful and was already verified; the question was whether anything undeclared existed, and the IAEA answered no (3 Nov 2022). The sequence — four phone calls, a Council letter, a presidential statement, then silence once inspectors reported — is the record of a pretext tested and abandoned. Concedes: That the claim could be tested by inspection of named institutions — which is what then happened.Evidence tiers: A
What we askAnswer any revival of the "biolabs" or "dirty bomb" claims with the UN record: SC/14827 (11 Mar 2022), the BWC consultative meeting outcome (Sep 2022), the vote of 2 Nov 2022 and the IAEA statement of 3 Nov 2022 · support a BWC verification mechanism at the next review cycle and ask Russia whether it will · invite Council members to recall that Ukraine, not Russia, asked for the IAEA inspection · keep the OPCW's findings on riot-control agents on the front line in the same conversation · ask that WMD allegations against any state be brought with evidence to the competent body before they are repeated at the Council.
SourcesS/PV.8991 / SC/14827, 11 Mar 2022 · BWC/CONS/2022/3 · SC/15095, 2 Nov 2022 · Security Council Report, What's in Blue, 27 Oct and 1 Nov 2022 · IAEA, 24 Oct and 3 Nov 2022 · Interfax, 6 Mar 2022 · TASS, 10 Mar, 23–24 and 27 Oct 2022 · RFE/RL, 24 Oct 2022 · US–France–UK joint statement, 23 Oct 2022 · US DoD briefing, 10 Mar 2022 · WHO via Reuters, 11 Mar 2022 · OPCW, Nov 2024 and Feb 2025 · full list on page 6
"Biolabs" and "dirty bomb", 2022 · 7-page dossier (PDF)p.1 one-page summary · p.2 the occasion, the speakers, what others said and what was left out · p.3–4 the eight claims against the record · p.5 the record side by side · p.6 the law, lines to take and Q&A · p.7 sources and method · v1 · 21 Oct 2026
Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant, 2022 – 2026 · Who shells the plant
Russian Mission to the UN, MoD, MFA · Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant · August 2022 – October 2026. Since August 2022 Russia has told the Security Council, the IAEA Board and the press that Ukraine shells and now drones its own nuclear plant. The plant has been under Russian armed control since 4 March 2022; it has been run by a Rosatom entity since a presidential decree of 5 October 2022; IAEA experts have been on site since 1 September 2022. In four years the Agency has observed shelling, drone strikes, military vehicles in the turbine halls and 26 complete losses of off-site power — and has attributed none of the attacks to either side. Seven claims, the record, and what each concedes: that whatever happens at the plant happens on a site Russia controls.
The recordThe claim and the site. "Ukraine shells its own plant" is said of a plant Russia seized by force on 4 March 2022, garrisons, claims as federal property and staffs through Rosatom. Every incident Russia reports happens inside a perimeter it controls and to which the IAEA must ask Russia's plant management for access.
Fair to sayDrones and shells have struck inside the plant perimeter; the IAEA has confirmed hits and at least one death and has urged both sides to show restraint. The Hub does not claim Ukraine has never fired near the plant. It claims only what the record supports: the attribution is unverified, and the occupation is not.
Claim 1 · Vassily Nebenzia · Security Council, 11 Aug 2022“…the Ukrainian armed forces repeatedly shelled the largest nuclear power plant in Europe… On 5 August, such a strike damaged a number of facilities… On 6 August, the Ukrainian armed forces struck the Zaporizhzhya plant with cluster munitions… [actions] in line with classic methods in the arsenal of terrorist groups.”S/PV.9109, 9109th meeting, 11 Aug 2022 (meeting requested by Russia) · source ↗
Unverified — the IAEA does not attributeGrossi, same meeting: "without a physical presence, the IAEA cannot corroborate some very important facts"; the statements from Russia and Ukraine "are frequently contradictory"; "all seven pillars have been compromised, if not entirely violated, at one point or another". The Agency's 2nd summary report (6 Sep 2022), written after its experts reached the site, records shelling at and around the plant and damage to several buildings and calls for shelling to "stop immediately" — without naming the source. No Russian submission to the Council or the Agency has since identified a firing position, a unit or a munition recovered on site. The one physical finding the Agency did report was Russian: military trucks inside the turbine halls. Concedes: That "the Zaporizhzhya plant is controlled by the Russian armed forces" and was "under their complete control" by early March 2022 — his words in the same statement.Evidence tiers: A
Claim 2 · Vassily Nebenzia · Security Council, 11 Aug 2022“[Russian soldiers] in close coordination with the plant's staff, are ensuring the protection of the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant and are repelling the Kyiv regime's attacks every day… [Russia] is not using civilian infrastructure, not to mention nuclear facilities, [for military purposes].”S/PV.9109, 11 Aug 2022 · source ↗
Contradicted by the IAEAIAEA 2nd summary report, 6 Sep 2022: "the presence of Russian military personnel, vehicles, and equipment at various places at the ZNPP, including several military trucks on the ground floor of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 turbine halls". Grossi to the Council, 6 Sep: the vehicles and equipment "currently present inside nuclear plant buildings on the site" should be removed. IAEA Board, 15 Sep 2022: deplored Russia's "persistent violent actions against nuclear facilities in Ukraine" and called on it to "immediately cease all actions against, and at" the plant. A nuclear plant with an armed garrison and military vehicles inside its buildings is a nuclear facility used for military purposes by any ordinary reading. Concedes: That Russian troops are at the plant and engage in combat from it ("repelling… attacks every day").Evidence tiers: A
Claim 3 · Vassily Nebenzia · Security Council, 23 Aug 2022“On 14 August, the Armed Forces of Ukraine fired 10 shells at the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant [including] 155-millimetre shells from American-made M777 howitzers… Russia is not placing heavy weapons on the premises of the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant… [A demilitarised zone] is an irresponsible proposal, as it completely ignores the need to maintain the conditions [for safe operation].”S/PV.9114, 9114th meeting, 23 Aug 2022 (meeting requested by Russia) · source ↗
No evidence presented · demilitarisation rejectedNo shell fragments, calibre analysis or crater survey was tabled, then or since; the Agency's experts arrived nine days later and reported what they saw (claim 2), not M777 fragments. DiCarlo, same meeting: "All military personnel and equipment must be withdrawn from the plant"; "the electricity produced at the Zaporizhzhya plant belongs to Ukraine". The UK: Russia "could resolve it immediately by withdrawing its forces from the nuclear power plant"; the US: "Russia created this risk, and only Russia can defuse it"; France: Russia "must give Ukraine back full control". The Board's resolution of 15 Sep 2022 followed. Russia's refusal of a demilitarised zone, repeated for the Agency's protection-zone proposal of 6 Sep 2022, is a matter of record. Concedes: That Russia intends to keep military forces at a nuclear power plant — the condition every mandated body has asked it to end.Evidence tiers: A
Claim 4 · Vassily Nebenzia · Security Council, 6 Sep 2022“[We regret that in your report] the source of the shelling is not directly indicated… [the plant's personnel enjoy] the well-established cooperation… with the Russian armed forces guarding the plant.”S/PV.9124, 9124th meeting, 6 Sep 2022 (meeting requested by Russia; Grossi briefing on the 2nd summary report) · source ↗
Self-incriminatingRussia's Permanent Representative confirms, on the record, that the IAEA — present on site since 1 Sep 2022 — does not say who shells the plant. Every later Russian "Ukraine shells its own plant" statement runs against that admission. Grossi, same meeting: "Wittingly or unwittingly, the physical attacks and the hits that the facility has taken" are unacceptable; "we propose the establishment of a nuclear safety and security protection zone". The US: "Russia is responsible for this crisis, and it can also resolve it now"; the UK: "the situation at Zaporizhzhya is entirely of Russia's making". Concedes: Non-attribution by the IAEA, and Russian armed guards at the plant.Evidence tiers: A
Claim 5 · Vladimir Putin · Presidential decree, 5 Oct 2022“[Putin] has instructed the government to establish Federal State Unitary Enterprise Zaporozhye Nuclear Power Plant… [the plant's facilities and related property] will become federal property. [Interfax's report of the decree]”Decree of 5 Oct 2022 as reported by Interfax (interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/83581) and RFE/RL · source ↗
Already adjudicatedUNGA res. ES-11/4 (12 Oct 2022; 143 in favour, 5 against, 35 abstentions) declared the attempted annexation of Zaporizhzhia and three other regions "unlawful" and without validity. The IAEA Board's resolution of 17 Nov 2022 expressed "grave concern that the Russian Federation has not heeded the calls of the Board" and called on it to "immediately withdraw"; Grossi has repeated that the plant is a Ukrainian facility and that its licence holder is Energoatom. The decree is Russia's statement that it owns, operates and staffs the site through Rosatom's Rosenergoatom. Concedes: Responsibility: a state that declares a nuclear plant its federal property and installs its operator answers for what happens on the site — including every incident it reports as Ukrainian.Evidence tiers: A
Claim 6 · Mikhail Ulyanov · IAEA Board of Governors, Apr 2024“[The IAEA is] afraid [to say that Ukraine was behind the drone attacks on the plant]… shooting at nuclear facilities is completely unacceptable.”IAEA Board session of 11 Apr 2024, as reported by Arms Control Today (May 2024) · source ↗
The IAEA does not attribute — by Russia's own accountOn 7 Apr 2024 drones struck several buildings including "a direct hit on the reactor dome of Unit 6"; the damage "did not compromise nuclear safety in a serious way" but set "a very dangerous precedent of the successful targeting of the reactor containment" (Grossi, Board 11 Apr; Security Council 15 Apr 2024). The Agency did not name the operator of the drones; Russia and Ukraine "traded accusations"; the United States condemned "all such actions regardless of who the culprit is". Russia's complaint that the IAEA is "afraid" is the clearest statement that the Agency has not endorsed the Russian attribution. Concedes: That the only mandated body on the site has declined to adopt Russia's version.Evidence tiers: A
Claim 7 · ZNPP press service (Rosatom) and Maria Zakharova · 5 Oct 2026“Laboratory-utility building No. 2 was attacked by two Ukrainian UAVs… The building is located about 200 metres from power units Nos. 4 and 5… No casualties and no threat to nuclear safety. — [Zakharova:] The lack of a proper reaction by the West to the attacks of the Ukrainian armed forces on the Zaporizhzhia NPP shows the real price of the statements of representatives of these countries about nuclear safety… at the IAEA and the UN… [they] are ready to support any terrorist methods used by their hangers-on. [translated]”RIA Novosti, 5 Oct 2026 (plant press service); MFA comment published on mid.ru, 5 Oct 2026, as carried by RIA Novosti · source ↗
Unverified — the IAEA does not attributeIAEA Update 370 (9 Oct 2026): the team "was informed of a reported drone attack on a laboratory and utility building and a radioactive waste processing building inside the protected area"; no casualties or radiation release; "it is essential that IAEA staff are provided with prompt, unfettered access to the sites of reported attacks in order to enable independent assessment of the nature and impact of any incident". The Agency's 3 Oct statement had already spoken of "a series of drone attacks in recent weeks" (19, 20, 27 Sep) without attribution. Ukraine's armed forces denied involvement and called the reports nuclear blackmail (Tier B, noted). In the same week the plant's sole external line, Ferosplavna-1, was being repaired under the eighth IAEA-brokered local ceasefire (Update 371, 16 Oct 2026). The Hub records the incident as reported and unattributed. Concedes: That access for independent assessment runs through Russia's plant management — the IAEA must be "provided" access by the party making the accusation.Evidence tiers: A · B
What we askKeep the two questions apart in every statement — attribution of incidents (unverified) and responsibility for the site (Russia's, since 4 Mar 2022) · cite the IAEA's own words: the 6 Sep 2022 report on Russian military equipment in the turbine halls and Grossi's request for "prompt, unfettered access" (Update 370) · press for implementation of the Board resolutions of Sep and Nov 2022 and the Five Concrete Principles, including removal of all military personnel and equipment · request a consolidated IAEA table of the 26 losses of off-site power with cause as assessed by the Agency · raise the detained Ukrainian ZNPP personnel at every Board and General Conference session · ask Russia, as the party reporting attacks, to grant the Agency immediate access to every reported impact site and to publish the munition evidence it claims to hold.
SourcesS/PV.9109 (11 Aug 2022), S/PV.9114 (23 Aug 2022), S/PV.9124 (6 Sep 2022) · IAEA 2nd summary report, 6 Sep 2022 · IAEA Board resolutions 15 Sep and 17 Nov 2022 (WNN, Cyprus Mail/Reuters) · IAEA Updates 317, 362–366, 369–371 · GOV/2025/54 · EU statements to the Board (10 Sep 2026) and General Conference (18 Sep 2026) · UNGA ES-11/4 · Interfax on the 5 Oct 2022 decree · Arms Control Today, May 2024 · RIA Novosti, 5 Oct 2026 · 360.ru, Aug 2024 · full list on page 6
Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant, 2022 – 2026 · 7-page dossier (PDF)p.1 one-page summary · p.2 the occasion, the speakers, what others said and what was left out · p.3–4 the seven claims against the record · p.5 the record side by side · p.6 the law, lines to take and Q&A · p.7 sources and method · v1 · 21 Oct 2026
Russian MoD, MFA and UN mission on Olenivka · Moscow, New York, Vienna · 29 Jul 2022 onward. Within hours of the explosion that killed at least 51 Ukrainian prisoners of war in Russian custody at Olenivka, the Russian Ministry of Defence announced the cause: a Ukrainian HIMARS strike, carried out "to intimidate" Ukrainian soldiers. Russia invited the UN and the ICRC to investigate, then gave neither the access it had offered. The UN's human rights office examined the barrack and concluded that the explosions were not caused by HIMARS rockets. Seven claims, the record, and what each concedes. The facts of the night are in the Hub's Olenivka dossier; this fact-check follows the claim.
The recordThe weapon Russia named is the one the UN excluded. Russia's Ministry of Defence announced a HIMARS strike on the morning of 29 July 2022, before any inspection. OHCHR, after interviewing more than 50 witnesses and examining over 70 images, concluded that the explosions "were not caused by HIMARS rockets" and that the damage was consistent with ordnance travelling east to west (4 Oct 2023, paras. 83–84).
Fair to sayNo UN body has publicly attributed the explosion to Russia. OHCHR could not determine the weapon or its point of origin; the UN spokesperson spoke of guarantees needed "from both sides". The Hub does not claim more than the record.
Claim 1 · Russian Ministry of Defence · 29 Jul 2022, daily briefing“A missile strike from the U.S.-made multiple launch rocket system (HIMARS) was carried out on a pre-trial detention center [in Yelenovka] … Forty Ukrainian prisoners of war were killed and 75 wounded.”MoD briefing as carried by Reuters and Al Jazeera, 29 Jul 2022 · source ↗
Contradicted by monitorsOHCHR: "the explosions were not caused by HIMARS rockets"; the damage to walls, ceiling, roof, windows and bunk beds, the size of the residual crater and the impact radius "are not characteristic" of HIMARS; "Even a single HIMARS rocket would likely have caused damage and destruction to the barracks and surrounding area on a significantly larger and more severe scale" (36th periodic report, 4 Oct 2023, para. 83). The pattern of structural damage "appeared consistent with a projected ordnance having travelled with an east-to-west trajectory" — from the Russian-held side (para. 84). A CNN forensic investigation (Aug 2022) had already concluded that the damage was not consistent with a HIMARS strike; the UN's 2023 finding confirmed it (CNN, 25 Jul 2023 — Tier C). The MoD's own toll rose to 50 dead the next day; OHCHR counts at least 51 killed and at least 139 injured (OHCHR report of 4 Oct 2023, para. 10). Concedes: That 193 Ukrainian prisoners of war were held in a barrack in Russian custody and that dozens died there — the facts that engage Russia's duties as Detaining Power whoever fired.Evidence tiers: A · C
Claim 2 · Russian Ministry of Defence · 29 Jul 2022“This egregious provocation was carried out to intimidate Ukrainian servicemen and prevent them from surrendering.”MoD briefing, 29 Jul 2022, Russian text carried by Lenta.ru; English as carried by Al Jazeera · source ↗
No evidence presented — motive asserted before any inquiryThe motive was announced on the morning of the explosion, before any autopsy or expert examination. OHCHR has not received information that Russia conducted the investigation Geneva Convention III requires (para. 87). The only physical findings on the public record point the other way: the ordnance came from the east (para. 84); the barrack had been prepared the day before — guard post moved, trench dug, body armour issued, a Grad firing westward that evening (OHCHR, 24 Mar 2023, para. 74). A motive attributed to the other side cannot substitute for evidence about the weapon. Concedes: That the dead were Ukrainian servicemen who had surrendered — prisoners of war protected by Geneva Convention III, not "militants" or "terrorists" as Russian courts later labelled the Azov regiment (2 Aug 2022).Evidence tiers: A
Claim 3 · Russian Ministry of Defence · 30–31 Jul 2022“[The Ministry of Defence,] in the interests of conducting an objective investigation, [has officially invited experts of the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross to investigate the strike on the detention centre in Yelenovka.]”MoD statement, 31 Jul 2022, as carried by TASS ("Russia invites UN, ICRC to probe attack on DPR detention center", tass.com/defense/1486943: an "impartial investigation into an attack on a pre-trial detention center in Yelenovka") and Press TV/GlobalSecurity, 31 Jul 2022 · source ↗
Self-incriminating — the invitation was never honouredICRC, 30 Jul 2022: "Our request to access the POWs from Olenivka penal facility yesterday has not been granted." By 3 Aug the ICRC had received no invitation to the site and no answer to its request; on 14 Oct 2022 it was still asking for immediate, unimpeded access to all POWs. The Secretary-General established a fact-finding mission on 3 Aug 2022 "upon request of both Ukraine and the Russian Federation"; on 5 Jan 2023 it was disbanded: "The Russian Federation provided neither satisfactory assurances about secure access for the United Nations" (OHCHR, para. 90). UN spokesperson Dujarric: "We require clear safety and access guarantees from both sides and we didn't feel we had received them" (5 Jan 2023). AP, 25 Jul 2024: Russia refused to guarantee the mission's safety, which kept it from travelling. Concedes: That an international investigation on site was the right remedy — the remedy Russia then withheld for the mission it had itself requested.Evidence tiers: A · C
Claim 4 · Russian Ministry of Defence · 30 Jul 2022“All political, criminal and moral responsibility for the bloody massacre of Ukrainians lies personally with Zelensky [and his] criminal regime [supported by Washington]. [translated]”MoD statement, 30 Jul 2022, Russian text carried by OSN (osnmedia.ru), translated · source ↗
Contradicted by monitorsResponsibility for prisoners of war lies with the Detaining Power (GC III art. 12). OHCHR's findings run against Russia on each duty: prisoners held within range of hostilities (art. 19 and 23); no medical care on site; no scene preservation; no effective investigation; access refused (4 Oct 2023, paras. 82–90). The one body with an unpublished attribution — the UN's internal ~100-page analysis reported by AP — concluded that Russia planned and executed the attack (AP, 25 Jul 2024; not public, Tier C). Concedes: That the event was "a bloody massacre" of prisoners — not an accident.Evidence tiers: A · C
Claim 5 · Maxim Buyakevich, Deputy PR of Russia to the OSCE · 9 Aug 2022, Permanent Council, 1385th (special) meeting“…the Ukrainian armed forces deliberately carried out a strike on a pretrial detention centre in Olenivka [using] munitions used in US-made HIMARS missile systems … [where] 193 fighters from Ukrainian armed formations who had surrendered [were held] … the extrajudicial execution of its own soldiers who had decided to lay down their arms.”PC.DEL/1176/22, osce.org/files/f/documents/6/1/526660.pdf (English as published by the OSCE) · source ↗
Contradicted by monitorsThe HIMARS version is excluded by OHCHR (para. 83). "Extrajudicial execution" is the right category for the killing of prisoners — and the only investigative body with site evidence placed the ordnance's origin to the east (para. 84). The OSCE record is the only verbatim Russian text on Olenivka in an international organisation's document archive; Russia has not updated it since OHCHR's findings. Concedes: That the 193 were soldiers "who had surrendered" and "decided to lay down their arms" — prisoners of war, whose protection was Russia's duty on the night they died.Evidence tiers: A
Claim 6 · Dmitry Polyanskiy · 29 Jul 2022, UN Security Council, 9104th meeting“The Kyiv regime is trying to exact vengeance even on its own military personnel, who have realized the futility of carrying out their criminal orders and surrendered… This morning a detention centre near Olenivka in the Donbas was struck by missiles from a United States-made High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, killing more than 50 Ukrainian prisoners of war. However, such scare tactics will only encourage Ukrainian servicemen to surrender.”S/PV.9104, 9104th meeting, 29 Jul 2022 (UN verbatim record, via un-project.org/meeting/S-PV-9104) · source ↗
Contradicted by monitors — same claim, hours after the explosionWhatever the exact wording, the Council record shows what followed: on 7 Sep 2022 USG DiCarlo told the Council that "the fact-finding mission to Olenivka is set to deploy in the coming days" (S/PV.9126); it never deployed. Norway welcomed the mission; Latvia later asked for a similar mission for other killings of Ukrainian soldiers (same meeting). Russia did not use its Council seat to announce access for the mission it had requested. Concedes: That the Security Council was the right place to put the Olenivka case — where the UN's findings now stand unanswered.Evidence tiers: A
Claim 7 · Russian Investigative Committee · 29 Jul – 8 Aug 2022“[Russia's Investigative Committee opened a criminal case and said the strike was carried out with HIMARS — "NATO" weapons —] in order to liquidate the witnesses of crimes committed… these were deliberate and planned actions by the Ukrainian side. [English as reported by TASS]”Investigative Committee, 29 Jul 2022 (Lenta.ru); TASS, 5 Aug 2022 ("Kiev bombarded Yelenovka POW detention center by NATO weapons — Russian investigators", tass.com/politics/1489799: "deliberate and planned actions by the Ukrainian side") · source ↗
No findings publishedOHCHR: the case was "opened against Ukraine for carrying out the strike" before expert analysis or autopsies; "Since 8 August 2022, no information has been published on the investigation" (para. 89). The scene "was not preserved in order to allow for a full and proper inspection" (para. 88). GC III art. 121 requires an official enquiry into every death of a prisoner from unusual causes; OHCHR has no information that Russia carried out these obligations (para. 87). Concedes: That a criminal investigation was owed — and that the only one Russia opened targeted the other side and went silent within ten days.Evidence tiers: A
What we askAnswer every repetition of the HIMARS version with OHCHR's findings of 4 Oct 2023, paras. 82–90 · ask Russia at the Council whether it will now give the UN and the ICRC the access it offered on 30 July 2022 · support the families' right to truth, justice and reparations (Türk, 25 Jul 2023) and press for publication of the UN's field analysis · align national sanctions with the EU's 13 Jul 2026 listings of colony staff · keep the survivors of the barrack on the exchange agenda · cross-reference the Hub's Olenivka dossier for the full timeline.
SourcesRussian MoD briefings 29–31 Jul 2022 (Al Jazeera, Reuters, Lenta.ru, OSN, Press TV) · PC.DEL/1176/22, 9 Aug 2022 · S/PV.9104, S/PV.9126 (SC/15023) · ICRC, 30 Jul 2022 · UN Secretary-General, 3 Aug 2022; Spokesperson, 5 Jan 2023 · OHCHR 24 Mar 2023, 25 Jul 2023, 4 Oct 2023 · CNN 25 Jul 2023 · AP 25 Jul 2024 · Security Council Report, Sep 2022 forecast · Ukraine Evidence Hub, Olenivka dossier · full list on page 6
Olenivka, July 2022 · 7-page dossier (PDF)p.1 one-page summary · p.2 the occasion, the speakers, what others said and what was left out · p.3–4 the seven claims against the record · p.5 the record side by side · p.6 the law, lines to take and Q&A · p.7 sources and method · v1 · 21 Oct 2026
Mariupol, March 2022 · "Azov did it": Mariupol, March 2022
Nebenzia, Lavrov, the Russian MoD and Embassy in London · UN Security Council, Antalya, Moscow, Twitter · 7–17 Mar 2022. Two days before a Russian bomb hit the maternity ward of Mariupol's Hospital No. 3, Russia told the Security Council that Ukrainian forces had expelled the staff of a Mariupol maternity hospital and set up a firing position in it. After the strike, Russia offered three versions at once: the hospital was an Azov base, the photographs were staged, and Russian aircraft flew no missions over Mariupol. A week later the same three versions were applied to the Drama Theatre, where hundreds sheltered under the word "CHILDREN" painted on the ground. The OSCE, the UN human rights office, AP, Amnesty and Human Rights Watch examined both sites. Eight claims, the record, and what each concedes.
The recordRussia announced the target before the strike. On 7 March 2022 Nebenzia told the Council that Ukrainian forces had expelled the staff of "maternity hospital No. 1" in Mariupol and set up a firing position there. On 9 March a Russian air strike hit the maternity ward of Hospital No. 3. Lavrov then cited the 7 March statement as proof the building was a legitimate target. In Russia's own account, the hospital was a target.
Fair to sayCasualty counts for the theatre remain estimates; one survivor of the hospital said she saw Ukrainian soldiers in a separate building opposite; Russia's claim that Ukrainian forces fought from civilian areas of Mariupol is not implausible in a besieged city. None of this turns a maternity ward or a marked shelter into a target.
Claim 1 · Vassily Nebenzia · 7 Mar 2022, UN Security Council — two days before the strike“Having expelled all the staff of maternity hospital No. 1 of the city of Mariupol, the Ukrainian armed forces equipped a firing position in it. [translated from the Russian text]”Statement at the Security Council meeting on the humanitarian situation in Ukraine, 7 Mar 2022, Russian text published by the Russian Mission to the UN and quoted by Meduza, 12 Mar 2022 · source ↗
Self-incriminating — the target was announced in advance, and it was the wrong hospitalThe statement, attributed by Nebenzia to "local residents", named Maternity Hospital No. 1. The building hit on 9 March was the maternity ward of City Hospital No. 3, a different institution in a different district, identified from photographs of the neighbouring buildings (Meduza, 12 Mar 2022). OHCHR: "Hospital No. 3 was hit by a Russian air strike, injuring 17 civilians"; a pregnant woman and her foetus "could not be saved" (29 Jun 2022, para. 42). The OSCE experts found the hospital "clearly identifiable and operational" and "destroyed by a Russian attack" with "no effective warning" (13 Apr 2022). No firing position was ever shown. Concedes: That Russia had Mariupol's maternity hospitals in view as targets before 9 March — the premise Lavrov relied on three days later.Evidence tiers: A · C
Claim 2 · Sergey Lavrov · 10 Mar 2022, press conference after talks with D. Kuleba, Antalya“There have been no women, children, or staff in this maternity hospital for a long time … we said that at the UN Security Council on March 7 … It was occupied by militants of the Azov battalion along with other radicals, who set up a base there … All the women in labor, all the nurses, and all the attendants were expelled.”Press conference, Antalya, 10 Mar 2022, as carried by Interfax (interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/76224) and AP · source ↗
Contradicted by monitors — and by the photographs Russia called fakeThe building Lavrov describes is the one Nebenzia named — No. 1 — not the one struck. At Hospital No. 3 the OSCE found an operational hospital; OHCHR counted 17 injured and a mother and child who died; AP's reporters filmed patients, staff and the wounded inside the compound on 9 March. The survivor Russia called an actress gave birth the next day. The Embassy in London's version — the same hospital, but the victims staged — contradicts Lavrov's: a base with no patients cannot also have fake patients. Concedes: That the hospital was struck deliberately as a target Russia had chosen — Lavrov's defence is not that Russia missed, but that the building deserved it. That is an admission of the attack.Evidence tiers: A · C
Claim 3 · Maj.-Gen. Igor Konashenkov, MoD spokesman · 10 Mar 2022“Absolutely no tasks to hit targets on the ground were accomplished by Russian military aircraft in the area of Mariupol … [the hospital strike was] a completely staged provocation to sustain anti-Russian hype among Western audiences. [second sentence translated]”MoD briefing, 10 Mar 2022, as carried by Interfax (English) and Meduza · source ↗
Contradicted by Russia's own Foreign MinisterOn the same day Lavrov justified the strike as an attack on an Azov base. The OSCE experts concluded the hospital "was destroyed by a Russian attack" and that those responsible committed a war crime (13 Apr 2022); OHCHR attributes the strike to a Russian air strike (para. 42). Video by AP's Chernov shows the crater, the gutted ward, wounded women and staff; the woman on the stretcher in the third photograph is a different patient from the one Russia named (Meduza, 12 Mar 2022). Concedes: That if the photographs are genuine, the strike is unjustifiable — which is why the MoD needed them to be fake.Evidence tiers: A · C
Claim 4 · Russian Embassy in the United Kingdom · 10 Mar 2022, Twitter“She is indeed. As she has some very realistic make-up. She is also doing well with her beauty blogs. Plus she could not be in the maternity house at the time of the strike, as it has long been taken by the neo-Nazi Azov Battalion who told all the staff to clear the place. [and, over AP's photographs:] FAKE”@RussianEmbassy, 10 Mar 2022; removed by Twitter for violating its rules (Mediaite; TechCrunch; The Guardian, 10 Mar 2022) · source ↗
Contradicted by the person it namesMarianna Vyshemirska (Podhurska), a pregnant patient, was photographed by AP leaving the bombed ward; she gave birth on 10 March; she confirmed she was a patient there and that the hospital was functioning (Meduza, 8 Apr 2022; her BBC interview as reported by CBS News, 17 May 2022). Russian state media used her later interview, given in occupied Donetsk, to claim the attack was "shelling", not an air strike; AP found the evidence contradicted that (AP, 3 Apr 2022). Twitter removed the Embassy's posts the same day. Concedes: That a pregnant woman was at the hospital at the time of the strike — the Embassy's own tweet is about her photograph.Evidence tiers: C
Claim 5 · Russian Ministry of Defence · 16 Mar 2022“During the day of 16 March Russian aviation carried out no tasks involving strikes on ground targets within the city limits of Mariupol … militants of the nationalist Azov battalion blew up the theatre building in Mariupol that they had mined. [translated]”MoD statement, 16 Mar 2022, MoD Telegram channel, as carried by Novaya Gazeta and TASS (translated) · source ↗
Contradicted by monitorsOSCE Moscow Mechanism experts (13 Apr 2022): the strike was "most likely an egregious violation" of international humanitarian law and "those who ordered or executed it committed a war crime"; the mission "received no indication" that Azov blew the building up. OHCHR: "the Drama Theatre with the word 'Children' clearly marked on the ground and hundreds of civilians hiding inside [was hit by] most likely a Russian air bomb, which caused numerous casualties" (29 Jun 2022, para. 42). Amnesty (30 Jun 2022): 53 testimonies, satellite and radar data; most likely two 500-kg bombs dropped by a Russian aircraft; an internal explosion of that size (400–800 kg TNT-equivalent on the stage) is implausible with civilians inside; "a clear war crime committed by Russian forces". The walls stand, the roof is gone — the signature of a strike from above (The Insider). Concedes: That the theatre was destroyed by a large explosion on 16 March with civilians inside — the fact Russia later tried to shrink to "14 bodies".Evidence tiers: A · C
Claim 6 · Vassily Nebenzia · 17 Mar 2022, UN Security Council“[The theatre was] originally… not designated as a target for an air strike anyway… [Azov was holding many people in the building and preparing a] "bloody provocation". [English as reported by TASS]”Statement at the Security Council, 17 Mar 2022, as reported by TASS, "Russian air force didn't target theater in Ukraine's Mariupol — Russian UN envoy", 18 Mar 2022 (tass.com/politics/1423881) · source ↗
No evidence presentedNo name, photograph, intercept or witness was put on the record. AP interviewed 23 survivors, rescuers and people who ran the shelter: "None of the witnesses saw Ukrainian soldiers operating inside the building" (4 May 2022). Amnesty: none of 28 survivors interviewed reported Ukrainian forces using the theatre as a base, weapons store or firing point, and no legitimate military target was found nearby (30 Jun 2022). HRW and the Kharkiv group documented pressure on deportees to blame Azov (7 Jun 2022). The word "ДЕТИ" on both forecourts was visible on satellite imagery of 14 March — a notice to pilots, not to saboteurs. Concedes: That the theatre was full of civilians — Russia's own claim is that they were used as a "provocation".Evidence tiers: C
Claim 7 · Maj.-Gen. Igor Konashenkov · 5 Mar 2022, MoD briefing“[Azov and Aidar fighters] fire from positions equipped in schools, hospitals, maternity wards. [translated]”MoD briefing, 5 Mar 2022, as carried by TASS ("Nationalists in Mariupol setting up emplacements in schools, hospitals — Russian top brass") and RIA Novosti · source ↗
Unverified — and no defence to the strikesA general allegation with no address, number or image. Even where it were true of a given building, Additional Protocol I art. 51(7)–(8) says the presence of combatants does not release the attacker from its obligations of distinction, proportionality and precaution, and a hospital loses protection only after a warning and a reasonable time limit (GC IV art. 19). The OSCE found "no effective warning" at Hospital No. 3; the theatre carried a warning in the other direction, painted on the ground. Concedes: That Russia knew it was striking a city with hospitals, maternity wards and shelters full of civilians — the knowledge that makes precaution mandatory.Evidence tiers: A
Claim 8 · 'DPR' authorities and Russian MoD via TASS · Jul 2022 and Dec 2025“[The theatre was] blown up from inside [and 14 bodies were found when the rubble was cleared (Jul 2022)] … the building of the Mariupol drama theatre was blown up by Ukrainian nationalists from the Azov formation as a provocation (TASS citing the MoD, Dec 2025). [translated]”"DPR" authorities via Meduza, 19 Jul 2022; MoD via TASS as documented by The Insider, Dec 2025 (translated) · source ↗
Contradicted by monitors — the scene was cleared by the party making the claimRussian-installed authorities cleared the rubble and removed bodies in mid-2022 without international observers; Maxar imagery of 30 Nov 2022 shows the site levelled (ISW). The "14 bodies" figure comes from that clearance; AP's estimate of about 600 and the city's of about 300 were made before it. The claim that "retreating" Ukrainian forces demolished the theatre is contradicted by the chronology: on 16 March fighting was on the city's outskirts and Ukraine rejected Russia's surrender ultimatum on 21 March (ISW; The Insider). Concedes: That Russia controls the site, the rubble and the remains — and has let no independent body examine them.Evidence tiers: C
What we askCite the OSCE Moscow Mechanism report of 13 Apr 2022 and OHCHR's report of 29 Jun 2022, para. 42, whenever the "Azov did it" version is repeated · put on the record that Russia announced a Mariupol maternity hospital as a target two days before striking one · support the ICC and national investigations into both strikes, as Amnesty requested · ask Russia to admit independent forensic experts to the theatre site and to account for the remains it removed in 2022 · ask platforms to keep the removed Embassy posts available to investigators · note the prosecution of Russian journalists who reported on both strikes.
SourcesNebenzia, 7 Mar 2022 (via Meduza) · Interfax and AP on Lavrov, 10 Mar 2022 · Russian MoD 5, 10, 16 Mar 2022 (RIA, Interfax, Novaya Gazeta, TASS) · @RussianEmbassy tweets (Mediaite, TechCrunch) · Sputnik on Nebenzia, 17 Mar 2022 · OSCE Moscow Mechanism report, 13 Apr 2022 · OHCHR 29 Jun 2022 · AP 4 May 2022 · Amnesty 30 Jun 2022 · HRW 16 Mar 2022, 7 Jun 2022, 8 Feb 2024 · Meduza 12 Mar and 19 Jul 2022 · The Insider, Dec 2025 · full list on page 6
Mariupol, March 2022 · 7-page dossier (PDF)p.1 one-page summary · p.2 the occasion, the speakers, what others said and what was left out · p.3–4 the eight claims against the record · p.5 the record side by side · p.6 the law, lines to take and Q&A · p.7 sources and method · v1 · 21 Oct 2026
Russian Ministry of Defence, Almaz-Antey, the Kremlin · Moscow, New York, The Hague · 2014–2025. On 17 July 2014 flight MH17 was shot down over eastern Ukraine; 298 people died. In eleven years Russia has offered at least three incompatible explanations — a Ukrainian fighter jet, a Ukrainian Buk from Zaroshchenske, a Soviet missile "delivered to Ukraine in 1986" — and has vetoed, boycotted or declared "null and void" every body that examined the evidence. Eight claims, the record, and what each concedes. The key point: Russia's versions contradict each other before anyone else has to.
The recordRussia's versions cancel each other. If a Ukrainian Su-25 shot MH17 down (MoD, July 2014), there was no Buk; if a Buk 9M38M1 was fired from Zaroshchenske (Almaz-Antey, June 2015), it was not a 9M38 (Almaz-Antey, October 2015); and if the missile was no. 8868720 from a 1986 batch (MoD, September 2018), then Russia accepts that the parts recovered by the JIT are the weapon — the Buk scenario it had first denied.
Fair to sayUkraine did not close its airspace above FL320 before 17 July 2014; the Dutch Safety Board found it had sufficient reason to do so. The Dutch court acquitted one of the four accused (Pulatov). The JIT found "strong indications" but not conclusive proof that the decision to supply the Buk was taken by President Putin.
Claim 1 · Lt-Gen Andrei Kartapolov, Russian General Staff · Moscow, 21 Jul 2014“An altitude gain was detected for a Ukrainian combat jet, supposedly a Su-25… flying at a distance of 3–5 kilometers from the Boeing… We would like Kiev to explain why a combat jet was flying almost at the same altitude and the same time.”MoD briefing, Moscow, 21 Jul 2014, as published by RIA Novosti (English) · source ↗
Abandoned by Russia itselfThe Dutch Safety Board examined the air-to-air scenario and excluded it: the damage pattern and the 9N314M fragments fit only a Buk surface-to-air missile; "no scenario other than a Buk surface-to-air missile can explain this combination of facts" (13 Oct 2015). Russia's own next two versions — Almaz-Antey (2015) and the MoD (2018) — argue about which Buk missile, not whether a Buk was used. The JIT, the Dutch court and the ECtHR all found a Buk launched from territory held by the "DPR". Concedes: That a surface-to-air Buk was the alternative Russia was arguing against — and that Russian radar data existed.Evidence tiers: A · C
Claim 2 · Lt-Gen Andrei Kartapolov · 21 Jul 2014“[The Boeing] crashed within the operating zone of the Ukrainian army's self-propelled, medium-range surface-to-air Buk… The presence of the Ukrainian combat jet can be confirmed by video shots made by the Rostov monitoring center.”Same briefing, 21 Jul 2014 (RIA Novosti English text) · source ↗
No evidence presentedNo Ukrainian Buk was ever located by any investigation within range of the launch area. The DSB's 320 km² launch area, derived from the damage pattern, lies south of Snizhne, in territory controlled by the "DPR" on 17 Jul 2014 (DSB, 13 Oct 2015). The Dutch court ruled out alternative launch areas on the basis of smoke-trail photographs, a protected witness, satellite images, intercepted calls, telecom mast data, photographs and videos of the Buk and fragment analysis, and found no evidence of tampering (summary of the judgment, 17 Nov 2022). The "Rostov video" has never been produced to any court. Concedes: That the area was within reach of a Buk — the weapon the DSB, JIT and court identified.Evidence tiers: C
Claim 3 · Yan Novikov, Director-General of Almaz-Antey · Moscow, 2 Jun 2015“[MH17 was hit by a] 9M38M1 [missile]… no longer used in Russia… [fired from south of] Zaroshchenskoye.”Almaz-Antey press conference, 2 Jun 2015 (as reported by The Moscow Times) · source ↗
Contradicted by Almaz-Antey's own second versionFour months later the same company said the missile was not a 9M38M1 but an older 9M38 with a 9N314 warhead, and denied the "I-beam" fragments it had earlier said were in the wreckage (press conference, 13 Oct 2015; Defense News, 18 Oct 2015). The DSB found a 9N314M warhead — the type fitted to the 9M38M1 — from the bow-tie fragments recovered from the wreckage and the crew's bodies (13 Oct 2015). Zaroshchenske lies about 16 km from the impact point, outside even the widest launch area modelled by the Dutch NLR (Bellingcat, 17 Oct 2015). The company presented its findings as "the basis for a court appeal against EU sanctions". Concedes: That MH17 was shot down by a Buk missile — the end of the Su-25 version.Evidence tiers: C
Claim 4 · Yan Novikov · Moscow, 13 Oct 2015 (hours before the DSB report)“We have proved beyond doubt that the missile fired over Ukraine was a 9M38… [launched] from the village of Zaroshchenskoye controlled by Ukrainian troops. The 9M38 missile was withdrawn from Russian army service.”Almaz-Antey press conference, 13 Oct 2015 (TASS, Defense News) · source ↗
Contradicted by the forensic recordThe DSB and the JIT identified a 9M38-series missile with a 9N314M warhead; the JIT recovered the missile's engine casing and venturi and "has no doubt the casing and venturi originate from a 9M38 series BUK missile" (24 May 2018). Who controlled Zaroshchenske on 17 Jul 2014 was examined by the DSB (launch area under separatist control) and by Bellingcat (no Ukrainian troops or Ukrainian Buk in the 9M38M1 area; no Ukrainian Buk in the 9M38 area, launch "highly unlikely", 29 Feb 2016). The Dutch court found the launch site was a farm field near Pervomaiskyi in "separatist-controlled territory" and ruled out other areas (17 Nov 2022). Whether the 9M38 was still in Russian service is beside the point: the court found the TELAR and its missile came from Russia. Concedes: That Almaz-Antey's June 2015 version was wrong. Russia's test used a 9M38M1 — provided, Novikov said, by the Ministry of Defence — which the company had said in June was not in Russian stocks.Evidence tiers: C
Claim 5 · Lt-Gen Nikolai Parshin · Maj-Gen Igor Konashenkov · Moscow, 17 Sep 2018“[Missile no.] 8868720… manufactured at a military plant in Dolgoprudny… in 1986… [dispatched on 29 December 1986 to] military unit 20152 [in Ukraine]… [the missile] came from the arsenals of the Ukrainian army, not from Russia.”MoD briefing, 17 Sep 2018 (Sputnik English; Mediazona Russian text) · source ↗
Self-incriminating: accepts the JIT's missile, abandons the Su-25The serial number came from the venturi and engine casing recovered by the JIT, which on 24 May 2018 had asked the public for help identifying the unit to which the missile was delivered. By answering, the MoD accepted that these parts are the weapon that destroyed MH17. The JIT had already traced the launcher — not the missile — by its unique features ("a fingerprint, as it were") to the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade in Kursk, from its journey on 23–25 Jun 2014 to its appearance in Donetsk on 17–18 Jul 2014 (24 May 2018). The court found the Buk TELAR "came from the Russian Federation, complete with a crew" (JIT transcript, 8 Feb 2023). Where a 1986 missile was stored for 28 years does not say who fired it in 2014. Konashenkov's claim that JIT videos were "fabricated" was not accepted by the court, which found no evidence of tampering. Concedes: The weapon: a 9M38-series Buk missile. And that Russia keeps 32-year-old delivery records for a single missile — but has produced no record of the 53rd Brigade's movements in June–July 2014.Evidence tiers: C
Claim 6 · Russian Ministry of Defence, statement 24–25 May 2018 · Vladimir Putin, St Petersburg, 25 May 2018“Not a single anti-aircraft missile system from the Russian Federation has ever crossed the Russia-Ukraine border. … [Putin, asked whether the missile was Russian:] Certainly not.”MoD statement, 24–25 May 2018 (TASS, Jakarta Post/AFP); Putin at SPIEF, 25 May 2018 (TASS) · source ↗
Already adjudicatedDistrict Court of The Hague, 17 Nov 2022: MH17 was destroyed by a Buk missile fired by a Buk TELAR near Pervomaiskyi; the TELAR was brought into Ukraine at Dubinskiy's request and came from the Russian Federation with a crew; Girkin, Dubinskiy and Kharchenko sentenced to life for 298 murders; compensation of more than €16 million awarded to 306 relatives. ECtHR Grand Chamber, 9 Jul 2025: the missile "was intentionally fired" from occupied territory, by a member of the Russian Buk-TELAR crew or of the "DPR" — Russia responsible either way; violations of Articles 2, 3 and 13. ICAO Council, 12 May 2025: the claims of Australia and the Netherlands "well founded in fact and in law"; Russia failed its obligations under Article 3 bis of the Chicago Convention. Concedes: Putin's own admission the same day: "We take no part in it" — Russia's absence from the investigation was its choice; the JIT invited Russian participation from 2014.Evidence tiers: A · C
Claim 7 · Vitaly Churkin, Permanent Representative · UN Security Council, 7498th meeting, 29 Jul 2015“We have repeatedly stated that we do not support the idea of setting up a tribunal under Chapter VII of the Charter. There are no grounds for it, given that in resolution 2166 (2014) the Security Council did not classify [the crash] as a threat to international peace and security… The position that we have adopted today has nothing in common with promoting impunity.”S/PV.7498, 7498th meeting, 29 Jul 2015 (UN verbatim record, via un-project.org/meeting/S-PV-7498); summary SC/11990 · source ↗
Blocks the court it says it wantsDraft S/2015/562 (Malaysia, Australia, Belgium, the Netherlands, Ukraine) received 11 votes in favour, 3 abstentions (Angola, China, Venezuela) and one against — Russia's veto. Russia had voted for resolution 2166 a year earlier, which demanded accountability and full cooperation with the investigation. The consequence of the veto was a national prosecution in the Netherlands, where Russia then refused to appear. The Netherlands: "I find it incomprehensible that a member of the Security Council obstructs justice in a tragedy that has affected so many" (Koenders). Ukraine: "There is no reason to oppose such a move unless you are one of the perpetrators" (Klimkin). Concedes: That a court would decide — and that Russia preferred it not to.Evidence tiers: A
Claim 8 · Dmitry Peskov, Presidential press secretary · Moscow, 9 Jul 2025“[Russia considers the ECtHR rulings] null and void [and will not comply].”Kremlin briefing, 9 Jul 2025, as reported by Ukrainska Pravda (citing Kommersant), pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2025/07/09/7520988 · source ↗
Misstates the lawRussia ceased to be a party to the European Convention on 16 Sep 2022, but the Court "is still competent to deal with cases concerning facts from before 16 September 2022" (ECtHR Q&A, 9 Jul 2025). Russia took part in the admissibility stage of the Ukrainian applications, answered the Court on interim measures in March 2022, then chose not to file a memorial or attend the Grand Chamber hearing of 12 Jun 2024; the Court found "insufficient cause" for this and held the "deplorable failure" to cooperate a breach of Article 38. The judgment stands on the Convention Russia ratified in 1998 and binds it for the period examined. The same week Russia called the ICAO Council's decision "illegitimate" (MFA, 14 May 2025) and had earlier called the Dutch verdict "a political bid to implicate Russia" (MFA, 17 Nov 2022). Concedes: That the judgment exists and that Russia will not implement it — non-compliance, not invalidity.Evidence tiers: A
What we askCite the three Russian versions side by side whenever Russia raises MH17 in the Council — they refute each other · call on Russia to implement the ECtHR judgment of 9 Jul 2025 and the ICAO Council decision of 12 May 2025, including reparations to the Netherlands and Australia · support the Netherlands' and Australia's pursuit of the ICAO remedies and the ECtHR just-satisfaction stage · ask Russia to transfer Girkin, Dubinskiy and Kharchenko or to prosecute them itself, as Article 2 ECHR requires · keep MH17 in every accountability text: the pattern of denial began here.
SourcesRussian MoD briefings 21 Jul 2014 (RIA/TASS) and 17 Sep 2018 (Sputnik/Mediazona); MoD statement 24–25 May 2018 (TASS) · Almaz-Antey 2 Jun and 13 Oct 2015 (Moscow Times, TASS, Defense News) · Putin, SPIEF 25 May 2018 (TASS) · SC/11990, 29 Jul 2015 · DSB 13 Oct 2015 · JIT 24 May 2018, 8 Feb 2023 · District Court of The Hague 17 Nov 2022 · ICAO 12 May 2025; Russian MFA 14 May 2025 · ECtHR GC 9 Jul 2025 (press release, Q&A; HUDOC 001-244292); Peskov 9 Jul 2025 · Bellingcat 2015–16 · EUvsDisinfo · full list on page 6
MH17, 2014 – 2025 · 7-page dossier (PDF)p.1 one-page summary · p.2 the occasion, the speakers, what others said and what was left out · p.3–4 the eight claims against the record · p.5 the record side by side · p.6 the law, lines to take and Q&A · p.7 sources and method · v1 · 21 Oct 2026
Crimea and Donbas, 2014 – 2015 · Those are local self-defence forces
Putin, Lavrov, Peskov, Churkin · Moscow, Vladivostok, New York · 2014–2021. From the first days in Crimea to the eve of the full-scale invasion, Russia's answer to every question about its soldiers in Ukraine was the same: there are none. The men in unmarked uniforms were "local militias"; the captured paratroopers had "lost their way"; the dead were "volunteers". Russia's own President, decrees and medals said otherwise, and in 2024 and 2025 the European Court of Human Rights fixed the dates: effective Russian control of Crimea from 27 February 2014 and of the "DPR/LPR" areas from 11 May 2014. Seven claims, the record, and what each concedes.
The recordThe denial was withdrawn by its author. Putin said on 4 March 2014 that the armed men in Crimea were local self-defence units in uniforms anyone could buy; on 17 April 2014 he said Russian servicemen had stood behind them; on 15 March 2015 he described ordering the operation on the night of 22–23 February 2014. The Crimea claim does not need the Hub to refute it.
Fair to sayLocal people did take part on the separatist side in 2014; the OSCE SMM reported what it saw and did not draw conclusions; and the Russian regular-army presence in Donbas between 2015 and 2021 was intermittent and partly covert. None of this is "no Russian troops".
Claim 1 · Vladimir Putin · press conference, Novo-Ogaryovo, 4 Mar 2014“[The armed men in Crimea were] local militias… [Russian-style fatigues are] available in army shops across the former Soviet Union. [RIA Novosti's English report of the press conference]”Press conference, Novo-Ogaryovo, 4 Mar 2014, as reported by RIA Novosti, "Putin denies sending Russian troops to Crimea", 4 Mar 2014 (GlobalSecurity mirror) · source ↗
Contradicted by Russia's own PresidentPutin, Direct Line, 17 Apr 2014: "our military personnel was behind the backs of Crimea's self-defence" (RIA English); Putin in "Crimea. The Way Home", Rossiya 1, 15 Mar 2015: at the end of an all-night Kremlin meeting on 22–23 Feb 2014 he told the heads of the security services, "We are obliged to start working to return Crimea to Russia". The ECtHR found that Russia exercised effective control over Crimea in the period from 27 Feb 2014, before the "referendum" (admissibility decision, 16 Dec 2020; judgment, 25 Jun 2024), and that courts applying Russian law in Crimea are not "established by law" because an occupying power may not replace local law with its own. Concedes: That armed men in Russian-pattern uniforms without insignia had taken control of Crimea's institutions — the fact Russia was explaining away.Evidence tiers: A
Claim 2 · Vladimir Putin · Direct Line, Moscow, 17 Apr 2014“Therefore, our military personnel was behind the backs of Crimea's self-defense. [They acted] very correctly, decisively, and professionally. [RIA Novosti English]”Direct Line, 17 Apr 2014, as reported by RIA Novosti English (GlobalSecurity mirror) and The Moscow Times, "Putin says Russian forces were deployed to Crimea", 17 Apr 2014 · source ↗
Self-incriminatingThe statement reverses claim 1 six weeks later and is the basis on which the ECtHR and the General Assembly's position rest: a change of territory brought about by the armed forces of another state is not an exercise of self-determination (res. 68/262; Art. 2(4) UN Charter). Putin's same answer denied any presence in the east: the article records only that Russia wanted to avoid "events like those in southeastern Ukraine" — the claim examined in claims 3–6. Concedes: Everything claim 1 denied: that Russian servicemen were deployed in Crimea, under orders, during the "referendum".Evidence tiers: A
Claim 3 · Sergey Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs · Rossiya 1, Vladivostok, 11 Apr 2014 · Dmitry Peskov, 15 Apr 2014“There are no Russian troops or agents there. … [Peskov:] This is an absurd statement. There are no Russian troops there.”Lavrov: Kyiv Post (archive) citing Rossiya 1, 11 Apr 2014 · Peskov: RIA Novosti, 15 Apr 2014 · source ↗
Already adjudicatedECtHR admissibility decision, 25 Jan 2023: the Court relied on evidence of Russian military personnel in eastern Ukraine from April 2014, the extensive provision of Russian weapons, and "the large-scale deployment of Russian troops from August 2014 at the very latest"; Russia exercised effective control over the areas held by the "DPR/LPR" from 11 May 2014 (confirmed in the judgment of 9 Jul 2025). The man who took Sloviansk on 12 Apr 2014 — one day after Lavrov's statement — was Igor Girkin, a serving FSB colonel until 2013 who had come from Crimea; he said in Zavtra (Nov 2014): "I was the one who pulled the trigger of this war… If our unit had not crossed the border, it would have all fizzled out." The Dutch court convicted Girkin for MH17 as a "functional perpetrator" and found the "DPR" took directions from Russia from mid-May 2014. Concedes: The standard Russia set for itself: that the presence of Russian "troops or agents" would be wrongful. Girkin's own account answers it.Evidence tiers: A · C
Claim 4 · Russian Ministry of Defence source to RIA Novosti · 26 Aug 2014 · Vladimir Putin, Ulan-Bator, 26 Aug 2014“[The paratroopers] were patrolling the Russian-Ukrainian border, and crossed it, probably, accidentally, at an unmarked border point. … [Putin: they may have strayed into Ukraine unintentionally; Ukrainian forces had crossed into Russia in larger numbers.]”RIA Novosti, 26 Aug 2014 (Moscow Times, "Russia claims captured soldiers crossed Ukraine border by accident"); Putin via RIA, 28 Aug 2014 (GlobalSecurity mirror); Chizhov on Rossiya 24: "nine… paratroopers who accidentally crossed into Ukraine" · source ↗
Contradicted by the ECtHR recordTen servicemen of military unit 71211 (331st Regiment, 98th Airborne Division, Kostroma) were detained near Dzerkalne, Donetsk region, on 25 Aug 2014 — about 20 km inside Ukraine. The MoD confirmed they were Russian. Within days Ukrainian forces were encircled at Ilovaisk; the ECtHR placed "the large-scale deployment of Russian troops from August 2014 at the very latest" (25 Jan 2023). On 8 Nov 2014 the OSCE SMM recorded a convoy of more than 40 unmarked military trucks — 19 towing 122 mm howitzers, crews in dark-green uniforms without insignia — moving west at Makiivka, and nine unmarked tanks in Donetsk (spot report, 8 Nov 2014). Graves of paratroopers of the 76th Division appeared near Pskov in the same week as the capture; their markings were removed (Moscow Times, 27 Aug 2014; Tier C). Concedes: That the ten men were serving Russian soldiers, armed and in Ukraine — the fact in dispute. The Chizhov figure ("nine") is itself an admission of presence.Evidence tiers: A · C
Claim 5 · Dmitry Peskov · Moscow, 18 May 2015“We along with the Defense Ministry have repeatedly said that there are no Russian soldiers in Donbass.”Sputnik, "No Russian troops in Donbass — Kremlin", 18 May 2015 (responding to the capture of Yerofeyev and Aleksandrov near Shchastia on 16 May 2015) · source ↗
Contradicted by Russia's own decreeTen days later, on 28 May 2015, Putin signed a decree adding to the list of state secrets information on losses of personnel "in peacetime during special operations"; until then only wartime losses were secret (Meduza, 28 May 2015). The two captured men, Yevgeny Yerofeyev and Aleksandr Aleksandrov, said they were serving in the 3rd GRU Spetsnaz Brigade (Tolyatti); they were convicted in Kyiv in April 2016 and exchanged for Nadiya Savchenko in May 2016. On 2 Aug 2015 an armed man guarding a heavy-weapons holding site told the SMM his unit was "the 16th airborne brigade from Orenburg, Russian Federation" (SMM daily report, 3 Aug 2015). The ECtHR's finding of effective control covers the whole period from 11 May 2014 to at least 26 Jan 2022. Concedes: That the question had been asked "repeatedly" — because Russian soldiers kept being captured, buried and photographed.Evidence tiers: A · C
Claim 6 · Vladimir Putin · annual press conference, Moscow, 17 Dec 2015“We have never said that there are no people there involved in resolving some certain issues, including those related to the military sphere. But this does not mean that there are regular Russian troops there. Feel the difference.”RFE/RL, 17 Dec 2015 (GlobalSecurity mirror) · source ↗
Concedes presence; the distinction has no legal weight"People… in the military sphere" is an admission that claims 3 and 5 were untrue. International law attributes conduct to a state that directs or controls it, whatever the formal status of the persons (ILC Articles on State Responsibility, art. 8). The ECtHR did not require proof of regular units: effective control through "military, political and economic support" to the separatist entities sufficed for Russian jurisdiction from 11 May 2014 (25 Jan 2023; 9 Jul 2025). The Dutch court applied the same logic: because the "DPR" took Russia's directions, the conflict was international from mid-May 2014; because Russia denied the "DPR" was part of its forces, its fighters could not claim combatant immunity (17 Nov 2022). Concedes: That Russians "in the military sphere" were in Donbas with the Kremlin's knowledge — twenty months after "there are no Russian troops there".Evidence tiers: A · C
Claim 7 · Vitaly Churkin · UN General Assembly, 80th plenary meeting, 27 Mar 2014“We call on everyone to respect that voluntary choice. [The draft is] confrontational in nature [and its adoption] was not necessary.”UN press release GA/11493, 27 Mar 2014 (UN Meetings Coverage summary) · source ↗
Rejected by 100 statesResolution 68/262 "Territorial integrity of Ukraine": 100 in favour, 11 against, 58 abstentions. It underscores "the invalidity of the 16 March referendum" and calls on states not to recognise any change in the status of Crimea or Sevastopol. The "voluntary choice" was made with Russian servicemen "behind the backs" of the self-defence forces, as Putin confirmed three weeks later (claim 2). Every General Assembly resolution on Crimea since (73/263, 74/17, 75/192 and others) has restated the position; the ECtHR treats Crimea as occupied territory under international humanitarian law (25 Jun 2024). Concedes: That the lawfulness of the referendum depended on its being free of foreign armed force — the condition Russia's own President later said was not met.Evidence tiers: A
What we askDate the aggression from 27 Feb 2014 (Crimea) and 11 May 2014 (Donbas) in all accountability texts, citing the ECtHR judgments of 25 Jun 2024 and 9 Jul 2025 · restate resolution 68/262 and the non-recognition of any change in Crimea's status · support execution of both inter-state judgments at the Committee of Ministers and the just-satisfaction stage · ask Russia to publish the names of its servicemen killed in Ukraine 2014–2021, as the 28 May 2015 decree prevents · use Russia's own admissions (17 Apr 2014; 15 Mar 2015; 17 Dec 2015) rather than contested figures when rebutting "no Russian troops".
SourcesPutin, 4 Mar, 17 Apr 2014, 17 Dec 2015 via RIA/RFE/RL · Lavrov, Rossiya 1, 11 Apr 2014 · Peskov 15 Apr 2014, 18 May 2015 · RIA/Moscow Times 26–28 Aug 2014 · VOA on "Crimea. The Way Home", Mar 2015 · GA/11493 · OSCE SMM 8 Nov 2014, 3 Aug 2015; Hug 25 Mar 2016 · ECtHR 25 Jan 2023, 25 Jun 2024, 9 Jul 2025 · District Court of The Hague 17 Nov 2022 · Meduza 28 May 2015 · Zavtra/Girkin Nov 2014 · EUvsDisinfo · full list on page 6
Crimea and Donbas, 2014 – 2015 · 7-page dossier (PDF)p.1 one-page summary · p.2 the occasion, the speakers, what others said and what was left out · p.3–4 the seven claims against the record · p.5 the record side by side · p.6 the law, lines to take and Q&A · p.7 sources and method · v1 · 21 Oct 2026
Narrative shift tracker
What Russia said on day one, after a week, and later. Each change of line concedes the previous one; the Bucha sequence (hoax → the dead were soldiers) is the template. Verified quotations only, with source and archived copy in the watch log below.
Event
Day one
Within a week
Later
Oleshky, May → Oct 2026
May: "the height of hypocrisy" (Saldo); Russia supplies the town "daily"
21–30 Sep: "critical" (Peskov); "Bucha 2.0", a catastrophe created by Kyiv (Zakharova)
14–16 Oct: "the tragedy in Alyoshki" (Nebenzia); "difficult humanitarian situation in the Russian city" (Kremlin) — no evacuation proposed (Oleshky: a blockade with no author, 16 Oct 2026)
Bucha, Mar 2022
"A hoax"; bodies placed after withdrawal (MoD, 3 Apr 2022); "not a single civilian suffered" (Nebenzia, UNSC, 5 Apr 2022)
"Staged provocation… like Gleiwitz"; Ukraine "killed its own"
2026: the dead "were combatants" — the deaths under occupation are no longer disputed (Grigoriev report; Zakharova 17 Sep 2026 demands "exhumation")
Pryluky, 7 Oct 2026
MoD: strike on "military-industrial facilities", a plant in Pryluky listed; no mention of the residential building
Nebenzia, 9 Oct: Ukrainian air defence "in residential areas" to blame (art. 58)
— (no further statement; residential impact never addressed)
Kramatorsk buses, 8 Oct 2026
Silence (Peskov comments only on peace talks)
Nebenzia, 9 Oct: Ukraine targets "civilian buses… time and time again" (mirror)
— (weapon identified as UMPB D-30SN; no Russian comment by name)
Energy, Oct 2022 → Oct 2026
2022: "demilitarisation of energy"; strikes on "command and control"
2024: ICC warrants → "energy infrastructure involved in military logistics" (Nebenzia, 9 Oct 2026)
14 Oct 2026: MoD names Kyiv's three CHP plants as targets; Polyanskiy (10 Oct): "nothing will be left of Ukraine's infrastructure"
17 Sep 2026 (Zakharova): the Secretary-General "played along with the anti-Russian campaign"
14 Oct 2026 (Arria): the UN "avoids documenting" Ukrainian crimes; OHCHR methodology "flawed" — the figures themselves no longer disputed
Reading the table: a line that moves from "it did not happen" to "it happened but was lawful" has conceded the fact. The remaining argument is legal, and on energy it has already been decided by the ICC.
Disinformation watch
Fact-checks start with knowing what is being said, where, and by whom. This log tracks Russian claims about crimes in Ukraine across four layers — UN organs, official Russia, propagandists, and foreign channels used as proxies — tagged by narrative and linked to our response. Verified entries only; a claim is logged with its primary source.
Date · venue
Speaker
Claim (narrative)
Status
3 Apr 2022 · Russian MoD statement
Ministry of Defence
Bucha images are "a hoax"; bodies placed after withdrawal Staged
Refuted "Heirs of Goebbels" — the 2026 Bucha denial
"Massive strike with high-precision weapons" on "military-industrial facilities"; lists a plant in Pryluky; no mention of the residential building Legit. target
"Only military facilities"; casualties due to Ukrainian air defence "in residential areas" (AP I art. 58); "provocations and staged incidents"; energy "involved in military production"; Ukraine targets "civilian buses" DenialUkraine did itStagedLegit. target
Striking "bridges, power plants, railway facilities and warehouses" is "not allowed to anyone except Zelensky"; "nothing will be left of Ukraine's infrastructure" Legit. target
Documented Zaporizhzhia, 10 Oct 2026, Pattern: Energy — stated intent
"Five energy facilities used for the needs of Ukraine's military-industrial complex" — CHP-4, CHP-5, CHP-6, Trypilska TPP, a Kyiv substation Legit. target
Refuted Kyiv, 14 Oct 2026, Pattern: Energy — conduct already qualified by the ICC
14 Oct 2026 · Arria-formula meeting convened by Russia source ↗ · archived
Amb. V. Nebenzia; R. Miroshnik; L. Johnson
The UN "is doing everything to avoid documenting the crimes of the Kiev regime"; OHCHR methodology flawed; Ukraine runs "secret prisons" Ukraine did itDenial
Refuted Nebenzia at the Council, 9 Oct, Pattern: Prisoners
"9,006 civilians incl. 305 children" killed in Russia by Ukrainian forces since 2022 Ukraine did it
In monitoring — OHCHR figure for Russia: 496 killed Jan–Sep 2026
Entry rule: primary source (UN meeting record, official transcript, broadcast with timestamp, archived post) or it is not logged. Every Russian source is snapshotted to the Wayback Machine on logging, because posts are edited and deleted; "archived" opens the snapshot list. Status: Refuted (published fact-check) · Documented (recorded, no rebuttal needed) · In monitoring (claim seen, verification pending).
Four layers
Where we listenMonitoring sources, by layer
1 · UN organs. Security Council and General Assembly meeting records and UN Web TV; Human Rights Council statements and side events; Russian letters circulated as A/ and S/ documents; Arria-formula meetings convened by Russia.
2 · Official Russia. MFA weekly briefings and statements; Ministry of Defence daily statements; Presidential Administration; Investigative Committee; Civic Chamber bodies (the "tribunal").
3 · Propagandists. State television prime-time programmes and their hosts; the heads of state media groups; the largest pro-Kremlin Telegram channels. Logged when a claim first appears there before reaching layer 2 — it signals the next official line.
4 · Proxies abroad. RT and Sputnik in Spanish, Arabic, French; affiliated outlets and "initiatives" in Africa, Latin America and South Asia; foreign commentators quoted back by Russian media; "international observers" and "tribunal" members with foreign citizenship.
Narratives
Recurring linesTagged so patterns are visible across years
Staged events are faked for Western cameras · Denial nothing happened · Reclassify the dead were soldiers · Legit. target the object was military · Ukraine did it own air defence, own shelling · Reward decorations and promotions for implicated units · Suppression prosecution of those who speak
The shift from Denial to Reclassify (Bucha, 2022→2026) is itself evidence: each new line concedes the last.
How this runs
Weekly sweep of layers 1–2 (meeting records, MFA, MoD); event-driven sweep of layers 3–4 after each major strike or UN debate. Each new claim gets a narrative tag and a decision within 48 h: log only, short rebuttal, or full fact-check. Can be partly automated as a scheduled search with a human verification step.
International record
The UN, the courts and the world on Russia's war against Ukraine. What the United Nations and the other international bodies seized of the war have said, found and decided about Ukraine — by venue, newest first, each entry linked to the official record. New York: the Secretary-General, the Security Council and the General Assembly. Geneva, Vienna, The Hague, Strasbourg, Brussels and the specialised agencies: the bodies that investigate, verify, judge and vote. Findings of courts and mandated bodies are Tier A; decisions and votes are facts of the record; statements of states and alliances are a position, kept apart; Russia's own statements are shown and answered in the fact-checks. Data as of 20 Oct 2026.
Geneva. The bodies that document the war: the Human Rights Council and its Commission of Inquiry, the Human Rights Monitoring Mission, the treaty bodies and special procedures, WHO, UNHCR and IOM. Bodies: Human Rights Council · OHCHR / HRMMU · Commission of Inquiry · Treaty bodies · Special procedures · WHO · UNHCR · IOM.
PositionDanielle Bell, Head of the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in UkrainePress release, Kyiv
Civilian casualties remain at record levels amid intensifying attacks on energy as winter approachesHRMMU said September 2026 casualties (328 killed, 2,105 injured, in 22 regions and Kyiv) were 85 per cent higher than in September 2025, and that the first two weeks of October were among the deadliest periods in years. Russia's Ministry of Defence announced on 30 August that it was preparing massive strikes on energy facilities; strikes on 13–14 October hit three main power stations in Kyiv, temporarily leaving about 600,000 people without electricity, according to Ukrainian authorities. Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces reported 82 attacks on energy infrastructure in occupied territory and Russia.“The first two weeks of October were among the deadliest periods for civilians in years.”
Also on the record. Notes that Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces reported 82 attacks on energy infrastructure in occupied territory and Russia.
Sep 2026 casualties 85% above Sep 2025; 600,000 in Kyiv without power Press release (HRMMU) ↗
15 Oct 2026
EstablishedUN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (OHCHR)Monthly Protection of Civilians update
Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict — September 2026HRMMU verified 328 civilians killed and 2,105 injured in September 2026, the highest September toll since the start of the full-scale invasion (September 2025: 249 killed, 1,068 injured). Long-range missiles and drones caused 53 per cent of casualties (165 killed, 1,119 injured) and short-range drones 23 per cent (87 killed, 475 injured). Kyiv city: 32 killed, 340 injured; Kherson: 16 killed, 202 injured. Verified in occupied territory: 18 killed and 44 injured, while Russian statements claimed at least 87 killed and 436 injured that HRMMU could not verify. January–September 2026: 2,570 killed and 15,211 injured. Russian authorities reported at least 53 killed and 462 injured in Russia in September, unverified by HRMMU.
Also on the record. Cites Russian authorities' statements of at least 53 killed and 462 injured in Russia in September 2026, which HRMMU did not verify.
PositionVolker Türk, High Commissioner for Human RightsPress release, Geneva
Comment by the High Commissioner on deadly strikes in UkraineTürk said that over four days at least 85 civilians were reportedly killed and 346 injured in Russian strikes across Ukraine, including at least 30 killed when a strike hit two public buses in Kramatorsk, according to local authorities, and that long-range strikes on substations and power plants had left many areas without power. He also expressed deep concern at reports of Ukrainian attacks killing or wounding civilians in occupied territory and in Russia.“Civilians are strictly protected under the laws of war and may never be attacked.”
Also on the record. Expresses deep concern at reports of Ukrainian attacks that killed or wounded civilians in occupied territory and in Russia.
PositionVolker Türk, High Commissioner for Human RightsOral update on Ukraine to member State delegations, Geneva, during the 63rd session of the Human Rights Council
Oral update on Ukraine: alongside peace, there must be accountabilityTürk reported roughly 15,280 civilians killed or injured verified in January–August 2026, over 400 a week and 55 per cent above the same period of 2025; glide bombs in Donetsk, Kharkiv, Sumy and Zaporizhzhia killed or injured nearly 2,500 civilians (+62 per cent). He cited over 1,000 documented sexual-violence cases (89 per cent attributed to Russian authorities, 11 per cent to Ukraine), POWs from 36 countries held by Ukraine, many deceived into joining Russian forces, sharply increased attacks on energy infrastructure and commercial property, and about 2,000 people trapped in Oleshky without water, power or gas. He called for a full exchange of POWs respecting non-refoulement and said reported civilian casualties in Russia had increased but OHCHR had no access to verify them.“Alongside peace, there must be accountability.”
Also on the record. Attributes 11 per cent of documented sexual-violence cases to Ukraine; notes reported Ukrainian strikes on warehouses, logistics centres and refineries inside Russia and Russian-reported casualties (3 killed, 41 injured in Moscow region, 19–20 Sep) that OHCHR could not verify.
PositionDanielle Bell, Head of the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in UkrainePress release, Kyiv
Russian attacks have reached a new level of intensity, UN human rights monitors sayHRMMU reported at least 200 civilians killed and 1,234 injured in Ukraine from 1 to 24 September 2026 (preliminary), including 7 killed and 12 injured in a single strike on a vegetable sorting facility in Stara Hnylytsia, Kharkiv region. Civilian casualties occurred in Kyiv on 16 of the first 24 days of September, a frequency not recorded in any other month in the capital since the full-scale invasion.“This is 48 hours in Ukraine - and it comes after months of mounting civilian casualties”
EstablishedErik Møse, Chair, and Vrinda Grover, Commissioner, Independent International Commission of Inquiry on UkraineHuman Rights Council, 63rd session, Geneva
Oral update: winter attacks on energy, militarisation of education in occupied areas, deceptive recruitment of foreignersOpening its fifth mandate, the Commission reported that Russian forces kept attacking Ukraine's energy system through the 2025–2026 winter at temperatures down to −20 °C, leaving millions without electricity and heating for weeks, with cold-related deaths recorded by Ukrainian authorities. In occupied areas, patriotic lessons are compulsory from age three and military training from age 14. Recruiters lured foreign nationals with civilian job offers and then made them sign Ministry of Defence contracts in languages they did not understand. The Commission recalled its 2025 finding that drone attacks along the Dnipro amount to crimes against humanity, cited OHCHR figures of over 17,000 civilians killed and almost 54,000 injured since February 2022, and said Russia had not responded to 41 communications since 2022.“Continued attacks on energy infrastructure are making living conditions increasingly unbearable for civilians”
Also on the record. Notes indications of increased civilian casualties from Ukrainian attacks on infrastructure in Russia and Russian-controlled areas of Ukraine, which it could not investigate for lack of access.
PositionMariana Katzarova, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Russian FederationHuman Rights Council, 63rd session, Geneva
"Nowhere is safe": Russia's transnational repression is a systematic state strategy inseparable from the war (A/HRC/63/60)Drawing on almost 400 documented cases, the Special Rapporteur found Russia's transnational repression to be a systematic, state-run strategy inseparable from its war of aggression against Ukraine: documented incidents rose roughly eightfold after 2022 (29 in the eight years before, 89 in the three years after), in absentia sentences rose from 4 in 2022 to 157 in 2025, 650,000–900,000 people have left Russia since February 2022, and 21,541 people are listed as terrorists and extremists. She called for a binding UN convention on transnational repression.“Leaving Russia does not mean leaving Russian repression behind.”
EstablishedOffice of the UN High Commissioner for Human RightsThematic report published by OHCHR / HRMMU
Sexual violence in the context of the Russian Federation's full-scale armed attack against Ukraine, 24 February 2022 – 31 July 2026OHCHR documented 1,004 cases of conflict-related sexual violence, attributing 89 per cent of verified cases to Russian authorities (armed forces, prison service, security service) and 11 per cent to Ukrainian authorities. Most victims were men in detention; women and children were affected mainly in occupied territory, where the youngest documented rape survivor was a four-year-old girl. Sexual violence was used as a method of torture against Ukrainian POWs, retained medical personnel and civilian detainees. In Ukrainian custody, violations against Russian and third-country POWs and conflict-related detainees were documented, almost half of them threats of sexual violence.“I am deeply alarmed by the prevalence of these abhorrent acts documented in our report”
Also on the record. 11 per cent of verified cases are attributed to Ukrainian authorities, against Russian and third-country POWs and conflict-related detainees; almost half of those were threats of sexual violence.
PositionDanielle Bell, Head of the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in UkrainePress release, Kyiv
Attacks against retail, food and logistics companies surge amid high civilian casualtiesHRMMU recorded 32 attacks on six retail, food and logistics companies in August 2026 (up from 11 in July), including at least 9 on Fozzy Group, 7 on Epicentr and 5 on Nova Poshta. It verified 372 civilians killed and 2,349 injured in August, 125 per cent more than in August 2025, and said more civilians were killed and injured in the first eight months of 2026 than in all of 2025.“Particularly disturbing is how many people were killed in August during their everyday lives.”
EstablishedUN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (OHCHR)Monthly Protection of Civilians update
Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict — August 2026HRMMU verified 372 civilians killed and 2,349 injured in August 2026, 125 per cent above August 2025 (260 killed, 949 injured). Long-range weapons caused 47 per cent of casualties (194 killed, 1,077 injured), mostly in cities far from the front, and short-range drones 30 per cent (91 killed, 727 injured). Most affected: Kyiv (31 killed, 106 injured), Kherson (25 killed, 334 injured), Kryvyi Rih and Zaporizhzhia. Year-to-date January–August 2026: 2,222 killed and 13,058 injured, more than in all of 2025.
PositionWHO Regional Office for Europe / WHO Ukraine (Dr Silviu Domente, WHO Representative)WHO media release
Three WHO humanitarian warehouses destroyed or damaged in Ukraine within three monthsWHO said a warehouse in Kyiv region was destroyed on 3 September 2026, following the destruction of a Dnipro warehouse about two weeks earlier (half its medical supplies, intended for 225,000 people, lost) and damage to another Kyiv-region warehouse in July. In 2026 OCHA counted at least 20 attacks on warehouses storing humanitarian supplies, 15 of them WHO-verified attacks on warehouses holding health supplies.“We are deeply concerned by the growing pattern of attacks on health in Ukraine”
PositionUN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (OHCHR)Statement, Kyiv
Explosions reportedly kill at least 37 at a warehouse outside KyivHRMMU said at least 37 people were reportedly killed and dozens injured in explosions on the evening of 28 August 2026 at a warehouse in Myla, near Kyiv, according to Ukrainian authorities, who attributed the blasts to a Russian drone attack. HRMMU noted it was still verifying the figures and that Ukrainian officials indicated ammunition might have been stored at the site, with an investigation into storage rules under way.“Statements from Ukrainian government officials indicate that ammunition might have been stored at the warehouse.”
Also on the record. Records that Ukrainian officials indicated ammunition might have been stored at the civilian warehouse, a question under Ukrainian investigation.
At least 37 reported killed, Myla warehouse, 28 Aug 2026 Statement (HRMMU) ↗
12 Aug 2026
EstablishedUN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (OHCHR)Monthly Protection of Civilians update
Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict — July 2026HRMMU verified 437 civilians killed and 2,610 injured in July 2026, a 30 per cent rise over June and 70 per cent over July 2025, with the killed figure the highest since May 2022. Long-range missiles and drones caused 38 per cent of casualties (183 killed, 967 injured), aerial bombs 105 killed and 753 injured, and short-range drones 27 per cent (111 killed, 710 injured). Child casualties (17 killed, 166 injured) were the highest since April 2022. Verified casualties in occupied territory were 25 killed and 50 injured, likely an undercount.
EstablishedClaudia Fuentes Julio, Assistant Secretary-General for Human RightsBriefing to Member States, UN Headquarters, New York (OHCHR product)
Briefing on prisoners of war, civilians and illicit recruitment of foreign fightersOHCHR reported that since February 2022 it has interviewed 2,129 people, including 910 Ukrainian POWs, 403 civilian detainees released from Russian captivity, and 816 Russian and 57 third-country POWs held by Ukraine. It has documented the execution of 129 Ukrainian POWs at the beginning of captivity and 48 deaths in custody from torture, denial of medical care or conditions; more than 95 per cent of Ukrainian POWs reported torture or ill-treatment and more than half sexual violence. More than 16,000 civilians are estimated to remain deprived of liberty; 85 per cent of those interviewed reported torture. About half of the Russian and third-country POWs held by Ukraine reported ill-treatment, mainly at capture and interrogation, while official internment conditions generally comply with IHL. Third-country nationals in Russian forces come from over 45 countries, many misled by deceptive recruitment.“These are not issues that can be left until a ceasefire or wider political settlement is reached.”
Also on the record. About half of Russian and third-country POWs interviewed in Ukrainian custody reported torture or ill-treatment, mainly during initial capture and interrogation; official internment conditions generally comply with IHL.
PositionThameen Al-Kheetan, Spokesperson for the High Commissioner for Human RightsPress briefing, Palais des Nations, Geneva
Press briefing: Ukraine conflict has deepening impact on civiliansThe spokesperson reported a weekend of strikes: at least 35 ballistic and hypersonic cruise missiles on Kyiv, the largest reported missile attack on the capital since the full-scale invasion (1 killed, 20 injured; seventh attack on Kyiv that month); 3 killed including a girl and 41 injured in Zaporizhzhia; 4 killed and 20 injured at a Nova Poshta terminal near Kharkiv; and a merchant vessel struck by cruise missiles after leaving Odesa with 10 reported dead. He also cited 8 civilians killed and 86 injured in Ukrainian drone strikes on logistics centres in Moscow and Tambov regions on 17–18 July.“Civilians and civilian infrastructure are strictly protected under international humanitarian law”
Also on the record. Cites 8 civilians killed and 86 injured in Ukrainian drone strikes on Wildberries logistics centres in Moscow and Tambov regions, 17–18 July 2026.
PositionVolker Türk, High Commissioner for Human RightsHuman Rights Council, 62nd session, Geneva (interactive dialogue under resolution 59/22)
High Commissioner Türk: human rights need to guide efforts to secure lasting peaceTürk reported that from 1 December 2025 to 31 May 2026 OHCHR verified at least 1,270 civilians killed and 6,850 injured in Ukraine, 40 per cent more than a year earlier, 96 per cent of them in government-controlled territory; that short-range drones on both sides of the frontline caused a 57 per cent rise in casualties; that since mid-November 2025 OHCHR verified the execution of at least 20 captured Ukrainian servicemen by Russian forces; and that virtually all of 129 released Ukrainian POWs interviewed described torture, while about half of POWs captured by Ukraine described ill-treatment, mostly in transit. He called Russia's systematic attacks on the energy system incompatible with IHL and noted that OHCHR had been denied access to verify Russian casualty claims (205 killed, 1,302 injured in 27 Russian regions, per Russian authorities).“The prohibition of torture is absolute.”
Also on the record. Cites Ukrainian drone strikes that hit marked humanitarian vehicles and facilities, torture and ill-treatment of Russian POWs mostly in transit facilities, and Russian-reported Ukrainian attacks on energy infrastructure in Belgorod (not fully verified).
EstablishedUNHCR Operational Data Portal (IOM figure)UNHCR Operational Data Portal, Ukraine country page
3.87 million internally displaced persons in Ukraine (as of 30 June 2026)UNHCR's Operational Data Portal lists 3,871,000 internally displaced persons in Ukraine, last updated 30 June 2026, sourced from IOM. The portal's Ukraine situation page also hosts UNHCR's Ukraine operational updates (latest 14 September 2026) and the IDP intentions survey 'Lives on hold' (1 September 2026).
EstablishedUN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (OHCHR)Published by OHCHR / HRMMU; submitted as A/HRC/62/CRP.1
Attacks against Ukraine's energy infrastructure and update on the human rights situation, 1 December 2025 – 31 May 2026Russian forces repeatedly struck generation, transmission and distribution facilities, often with hundreds of weapons in coordinated attacks, causing emergency outages for millions, nationwide rolling cuts with power for only a couple of hours a day at times, and weeks without heating or hot water for hundreds of thousands at temperatures below −20 °C. OHCHR found the attacks appear to have violated fundamental IHL principles on the conduct of hostilities. Civilian casualties in the period were higher than in any comparable period since 2022 except that year. At least 16 captured Ukrainian POWs were executed between mid-November and January; nearly all released Ukrainian POWs described torture, while around half of Russian POWs interviewed reported torture or ill-treatment at the start of captivity by Ukraine. Ukrainian forces attacked electricity and heating infrastructure in Belgorod region.“The attacks on energy infrastructure appear to have violated fundamental principles of international humanitarian law”
Also on the record. Around half of Russian POWs interviewed reported torture or ill-treatment at the start of captivity by Ukraine; Ukrainian forces attacked electricity and heating infrastructure in Belgorod region, reportedly causing regional outages.
EstablishedOffice of the UN High Commissioner for Human RightsSubmitted to the Human Rights Council, 62nd session
Forced displacement from territory of Ukraine occupied by the Russian Federation, 24 February 2022 – 31 December 2025A thematic OHCHR report on forcible transfer and deportation from occupied territory, barriers to return and the rights of internally displaced persons, covering the period from the full-scale invasion to the end of 2025. The landing page provides only the title and metadata; findings and figures must be taken from the PDF.
Thematic report on forcible transfer and deportation, Feb 2022–Dec 2025 OHCHR listing ↗
12 Mar 2026
EstablishedIndependent International Commission of Inquiry on UkraineHuman Rights Council, 61st session, Geneva
Deportation and forcible transfer of Ukrainian children, and their enforced disappearance, are crimes against humanity (A/HRC/61/61)The Commission concluded that Russian authorities committed the crimes against humanity of deportation and forcible transfer of children from Ukraine and of their enforced disappearance, pursuant to a policy conceived at the highest level with visible involvement of President Putin and Maria Lvova-Belova. It verified over 1,200 cases from five regions; about 80 per cent of the children had not been returned four years later; children were placed in 21 Russian regions, given Russian citizenship and listed on adoption databases, and the failure to return them is the war crime of unjustifiable delay in repatriation. The report also found that Russian courts systematically used evidence obtained by torture and denied fair-trial guarantees to civilians and POWs (grave breaches), documented recruitment of nationals of 17 countries, and recorded violations in Ukraine's mobilisation process and an overbroad definition of collaboration.“The deportation and forcible transfer of children is a grave violation of international law”
Also on the record. Records violations in Ukraine's mobilisation (irregular administrative detention, denial of lawyer access, force against conscientious objectors) and criticises the overbroad definition of 'collaborative activities' in Ukrainian criminal law.
EstablishedIndependent International Commission of Inquiry on UkraineHuman Rights Council, 61st session, Geneva (conference room paper)
"I am still looking for my daughter": crimes against humanity against children from Ukraine (A/HRC/61/CRP.8)The detailed paper documents 1,205 children deported or transferred from five Ukrainian oblasts, including 995 deported from 11 institutions in the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics in the weeks before the full-scale invasion; over 80 per cent have not been returned, and children were placed in 21 regions of the Russian Federation. The Commission finds the deportation and forcible transfer, and the enforced disappearance of these children, to be widespread, systematic and pursuant to a policy, hence crimes against humanity. It draws on 232 interviews and over 2,000 documents.“Russian authorities have failed to establish a system facilitating the returns.”
EstablishedWorld Health Organization (Surveillance System for Attacks on Health Care)WHO news release, Geneva/Copenhagen
Attacks on Ukraine's health care increased by 20% in 2025WHO reported that verified attacks on health care in Ukraine rose nearly 20 per cent in 2025 compared with 2024, peaking at 184 attacks in the third quarter, in which 12 people were killed and 110 injured. Over four years since 24 February 2022 WHO's Surveillance System for Attacks on Health Care had verified at least 2,881 attacks, with 233 health workers and patients killed and 930 injured.“Ultimately, the best medicine is peace.”
EstablishedUN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (OHCHR)Published by OHCHR / HRMMU; submitted as A/HRC/61/CRP.3
43rd periodic report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, 1 June – 30 November 2025Hostilities escalated sharply; civilian casualties surged in frontline and urban areas, and July 2025 had the highest monthly toll since April 2022. In October–November Russia launched eight major coordinated waves of strikes on energy facilities, causing power, water and heating outages. Since mid-November 2025 OHCHR recorded more reports of Ukrainian servicemen executed after capture. Between late May and August 2025 the largest exchanges since 2022 released more than 3,000 POWs and civilian detainees from both sides. Russia deported dozens of Ukrainians to Georgia, many stranded at the border without valid documents. Occupying authorities issued abandonment notices for at least 4,500 homes and imposed patriotic education on children from age three.“Civilian casualties surged in both frontline and urban areas”
Also on the record. POWs held by Ukraine described torture and ill-treatment in transit locations; Ukraine prosecuted people for collaboration over lawfully compellable work; undue restrictions on conscientious objection.
PositionMariana Katzarova, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Russian FederationReport to the General Assembly, 80th session
Rule of fear: silencing dissent and anti-war expression in the name of national security (A/80/382)The report finds that Russia's counter-terrorism, extremism, espionage and treason laws are abused to suppress dissent and anti-war expression, inconsistent with the principles of legality, necessity and proportionality, with escalation since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. It documents arbitrary detention, enforced disappearance, torture, deaths in custody and incommunicado detention, and the prosecution of Ukrainian prisoners of war and civilians on counter-terrorism, espionage and treason charges.“abused as a tool in its strategy for suppressing dissent and anti-war expression”
Ukrainian POWs and civilians prosecuted on terrorism and treason charges A/80/382 OHCHR document page ↗
21 Oct 2025
EstablishedIndependent International Commission of Inquiry on UkraineReport to the General Assembly, 80th session (press release 27 Oct 2025)
Drone attacks on civilians along 300 km of the Dnipro: crimes against humanity of murder and forcible transfer (A/80/497)Extending its Kherson finding, the Commission concluded that Russian short-range drone attacks across a frontline zone of over 300 km along the right bank of the Dnipro, in Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson and Mykolaiv provinces, amount to the crimes against humanity of murder and forcible transfer of population; targets included homes, medical buildings and first responders, and the Commission attributed the attacks to drone units of the "Dnepr" Group of Forces. It also found that Russian authorities committed the war crimes of deportation and forcible transfer by deporting civilians from occupied Zaporizhzhia province to Georgia in 2024–2025 and by forcing civilians in 2022–2023 to walk 10–15 km through a dangerous operational area to Ukrainian-controlled territory, with detention, torture and confiscation of documents. Russian allegations of Ukrainian drone attacks could not be concluded for lack of access and response.“Drones strike any car, any transport – nobody comes here, not the fire brigade, not the ambulance, nobody.”
Also on the record. The Commission examined Russian allegations of Ukrainian drone attacks on civilians in occupied areas but could not conclude its investigation owing to lack of access, witness-safety concerns and no response from Russian authorities.
EstablishedOffice of the UN High Commissioner for Human RightsPublished by OHCHR / HRMMU
Treatment of civilians deprived of their liberty in the context of the armed attack by the Russian Federation against UkraineOHCHR found that the Russian Federation applies its own criminal law in occupied Ukraine and has created no internment procedure for civilians as foreseen by IHL; torture and ill-treatment, including sexual violence, were applied systematically and widely in places of detention; procedural safeguards were breached, producing arbitrary detention and in many cases apparent enforced disappearance; large numbers of Ukrainian civilians remain arbitrarily detained in occupied Ukraine and Russia. Ukraine mainly detains its own citizens on national-security charges; it has strengthened safeguards, but OHCHR still documented torture and ill-treatment of conflict-related detainees by Ukrainian authorities with limited accountability.“have been applied in a systematic and widespread manner against civilians in places of detention”
Also on the record. Documents torture and ill-treatment of conflict-related detainees by Ukrainian authorities, with limited accountability, while noting steps taken to strengthen safeguards.
EstablishedUN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (OHCHR)Published by OHCHR / HRMMU
42nd periodic report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, 1 December 2024 – 31 May 2025Conflict-related violence killed 968 civilians and injured 4,807 in the period, 37 per cent more than a year earlier, mostly in government-controlled territory and linked to Russian ground offensives, explosive weapons in cities and short-range drones; Russian forces directly struck at least five hospitals. OHCHR documented credible allegations that Russian forces executed at least 35 captured Ukrainian soldiers, and released Ukrainian POWs and civilian detainees described torture, sexual violence and harsh conditions. POWs held by Ukraine described torture and ill-treatment in transit locations before official internment. In occupied territory residents were pressured to take Russian citizenship, fined for expressions of Ukrainian identity, and property expropriation accelerated.“Conflict-related violence killed 968 civilians and injured 4,807.”
Also on the record. POWs held by Ukraine described torture and ill-treatment in transit locations; Ukraine prosecuted people for collaboration over work the occupying power may lawfully compel; conscientious objection continued to be denied.
EstablishedCommittee against TortureConcluding observations on the seventh periodic report of Ukraine, Geneva (82nd session, 2025)
CAT concluding observations on Ukraine: Russian torture of Ukrainians (para. 19) and Ukraine's treatment of Russian POWs (para. 17)In paragraph 19 the Committee was seriously concerned about numerous allegations of widespread and systemic torture, including sexual violence, inflicted on Ukrainian POWs and civilian detainees by the occupying authorities of the Russian Federation, inhuman detention conditions, denial of medical care and transfers to prisons in occupied territory or Russia; about the unlawful deportation and transfer of children to Russia; and about obstacles to justice given more than 160,000 documented war crimes, 95 per cent of proceedings in absentia, and transfers of prisoners from penitentiaries in occupied territory. In paragraph 17 it was concerned by reports of torture, sexual violence, humiliation, unlawful killing and deaths in custody of Russian POWs allegedly by Ukrainian armed forces and military police, mainly in unofficial or transit places before internment (noting Ukraine's denial of such places and 20 prosecutorial investigations), torture of conflict-related detainees by the Security Service, the overbroad definition of collaboration, and inadequate investigation of abuses since 2014 including by the Tornado, Aidar and Azov units.
Also on the record. Paragraph 17 records allegations of torture, sexual violence, unlawful killing and deaths in custody of Russian POWs by Ukrainian forces in unofficial or transit places, torture of conflict-related detainees by the SBU, and inadequate investigation of abuses since 2014.
EstablishedIndependent International Commission of Inquiry on UkraineHuman Rights Council, 59th session, Geneva (conference room paper)
"They are hunting us": drone attacks on civilians in Kherson amount to crimes against humanity (A/HRC/59/CRP.2)The Commission concluded that Russian armed forces' short-range drone attacks on civilians since July 2024 along more than 100 km of the right bank of the Dnipro in Kherson Province were widespread, systematic and part of a coordinated state policy, and amount to the crime against humanity of murder, as well as the war crimes of intentionally attacking civilians and outrages upon personal dignity (posting videos of victims). Nearly 150 civilians were killed and hundreds injured in Kherson city and 16 localities, according to official sources. The finding rests on more than 300 public videos, over 600 Telegram posts and 91 interviews.“They drop explosives from drones like it is a video game.”
EstablishedIndependent International Commission of Inquiry on UkraineHuman Rights Council, 58th session, Geneva
Enforced disappearances by Russian authorities amount to crimes against humanity (A/HRC/58/67)The Commission concluded that Russian authorities carried out enforced disappearances of civilians widely and systematically, as a coordinated state policy, amounting to crimes against humanity; victims included local officials, civil servants, journalists and many prisoners of war, and standard replies to families concealed their fate. FSB officers, where present, held the highest authority in detention facilities and ordered or committed torture. Russian authorities systematically used sexual violence as torture, mostly against men, and the Commission documented rape of detained women. Russian forces killed or wounded captured or surrendering Ukrainian soldiers, a war crime; defectors said they had been ordered not to take prisoners. The Commission also found that both sides used drones to kill wounded soldiers hors de combat, and documented violations by Ukrainian authorities against persons accused of collaboration.“Prisoners are not needed, shoot them on the spot.”
Also on the record. Finds that both sides used drones to kill or wound visibly injured soldiers no longer able to defend themselves (a war crime) and documents violations by Ukrainian authorities against persons accused of collaboration.
EstablishedIndependent International Commission of Inquiry on UkraineReport to the General Assembly, 79th session (Commission based in Geneva/Vienna)
Torture by Russian authorities amounts to crimes against humanity (A/79/549)The Commission concluded that Russian authorities committed torture as a crime against humanity, in addition to its earlier finding that torture constituted war crimes. Torture was documented in all Russian-controlled areas of Ukraine and in Russian detention facilities investigated; methods were replicated across facilities; security services and armed forces acted in a coordinated division of labour, which the Chair described as a coordinated state policy of torturing Ukrainian civilians and prisoners of war. Sexual violence as torture was recurrent, mostly against male detainees, and medical care was generally denied. The report also covered repeated attacks on energy infrastructure causing blackouts affecting millions.“committed torture as a crime against humanity”
PositionMariana Katzarova, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Russian FederationReport to the General Assembly, 79th session
Torture in the Russian Federation: a tool for repression at home and aggression abroad (A/79/508)The Special Rapporteur's thematic report examines the widespread and systematic use of torture and ill-treatment in the Russian Federation, committed with impunity, identifying the absence of a specific legal framework against torture, an inadequate judicial response and systemic enforcement and accountability failures, and recommending alignment with international standards. The landing page gives no figures; details on Ukrainian POWs and civilians are in the full report.
Torture in Russia: tool of repression at home and aggression abroad A/79/508 OHCHR document page ↗
9 Oct 2024
EstablishedCommittee on Enforced DisappearancesConcluding observations on the report of Ukraine, Geneva
CED concluding observations on Ukraine: wrongful removal of children (CED/C/UKR/CO/1)The Committee was deeply concerned about allegations of deportation or forcible transfer of children to the Russian Federation or occupied territories, noting that according to Ukraine's Children of War platform 19,546 children had been illegally transferred or deported, including 1,940 disappeared children. It noted Ukraine's measures to locate the children and prosecute those responsible, but was concerned that domestic law lacks a specific offence of wrongful removal of children as required by article 25(1) of the Convention (para. 63).
Also on the record. Faults Ukraine for lacking a specific criminal provision on wrongful removal of children (art. 25(1) of the Convention).
19,546 children reported transferred/deported (Children of War, cited by CED) CED/C/UKR/CO/1 UHRI extract ↗
1 Oct 2024
EstablishedUN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (OHCHR)Published by OHCHR / HRMMU
Treatment of prisoners of war and update on the human rights situation, 1 June – 31 August 2024 (40th periodic report)The fortieth periodic report presents OHCHR's assessment of the overall scope and scale of torture and ill-treatment experienced by prisoners of war since 24 February 2022, alongside the regular update on the human rights situation for June–August 2024. The report's headline figures were not available on the landing page and must be taken from the PDF.
EstablishedIndependent International Commission of Inquiry on UkraineHuman Rights Council, 55th session, Geneva
Report of the Commission of Inquiry to the Human Rights Council (A/HRC/55/66)New evidence reinforced earlier findings that torture of civilians and prisoners of war by Russian authorities was widespread and systematic; the Commission said investigations must continue to decide whether it amounts to crimes against humanity. It documented rape and sexual violence against women amounting to torture, sexualised torture and threats of rape against male POWs, further unlawful transfers of children, and continued use of explosive weapons in populated areas. Satellite imagery of Mariupol showed destruction of whole urban areas, with at least 58 medical buildings and 11 power stations damaged or destroyed. A few violations by Ukrainian authorities against people suspected of collaboration were also described.“We are concerned at the scale, continuation, and gravity of violations and crimes that the Commission has investigated”
Also on the record. Describes a few human rights violations by Ukrainian authorities against persons suspected of collaboration with Russia.
EstablishedCommittee on the Rights of the ChildConcluding observations on the combined sixth and seventh periodic reports of the Russian Federation, Geneva
CRC concluding observations on the Russian Federation: deportation of Ukrainian children (CRC/C/RUS/CO/6-7)The Committee was deeply concerned that the armed conflict initiated by Russia on 24 February 2022 had caused severe violations of the Convention: killing and injury of hundreds of children by indiscriminate attacks with wide-area explosive weapons; reports that thousands of children were forcibly transferred or deported from Ukraine; Presidential Decree No. 11 of 4 January 2024 and earlier decrees granting Russian citizenship to transferred children; deprivation of Ukrainian nationality; sexual violence against children during occupation and in detention; arbitrary detention and torture of children in occupied territory; attacks on hospitals and schools; and enforcement of Russian curricula and military training in occupied schools (para. 45). It was also deeply concerned at the alleged responsibility of Children's Rights Commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova in the war crime of unlawful deportation and transfer of children (para. 12).
PositionSpecial Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishmentReport on visit to Ukraine, Human Rights Council, 55th session
Special Rapporteur on torture: torture is part of the war policy of the Russian Federation (A/HRC/55/52/Add.1)After her visit to Ukraine the Special Rapporteur found the allegations of torture of Ukrainian civilians and POWs by Russian forces to be reliable, concordant and of sufficient volume to exclude isolated acts; the mirroring of methods across regions indicated that torture is part of Russia's war policy, carried out in an organised and systematic manner under a higher-order policy. Interviewees held from 50 days to nine months described electric shocks to ears and genitals, mock executions, simulated drowning, humiliation ceremonies, dog attacks, sexual torture of men and women, starvation (one lost 40 kg) and deaths in custody; most were denied all visits, tantamount to enforced disappearance. Russia had not replied to her June 2023 letter and refused access to any observers. She also received allegations of mistreatment of Russian POWs by Ukrainian authorities during transfer and questioning, called such practices unlawful and urged investigation (paras 51–52).“torture is a part of the war policy of the Russian Federation”
Also on the record. Paragraphs 51–52 record allegations of intimidation and physical violence against Russian POWs by Ukrainian authorities during transfer from the front line and questioning, including in unofficial places; the Rapporteur calls these practices unlawful.
EstablishedIndependent International Commission of Inquiry on UkraineHuman Rights Council, Geneva (conference room paper)
Detailed conference room paper A/HRC/52/CRP.4 (events to 31 January 2023)The detailed paper underpinning the March 2023 report. It determines that the Russian Federation's use of armed force against Ukraine was an act of aggression, documents wilful killings, unlawful confinement, torture, rape, and unlawful transfers and deportations of protected persons as war crimes, and finds torture by Russian authorities and the attacks on energy infrastructure to be widespread and systematic, possibly amounting to crimes against humanity. It is based on 610 interviews with 595 people, eight trips to Ukraine and visits to 56 settlements. It also records two instances in which Ukrainian authorities shot, wounded and ill-treated detainees and a small number of likely indiscriminate Ukrainian attacks in Izium.“Comprehensive accountability is paramount.”
Also on the record. Two instances in which Ukrainian authorities shot, wounded and ill-treated detainees; a small number of likely indiscriminate explosive-weapon attacks by Ukrainian forces in Izium.
EstablishedIndependent International Commission of Inquiry on UkraineHuman Rights Council, 52nd session, Geneva
First report of the Commission of Inquiry to the Human Rights Council (A/HRC/52/62)The Commission found that Russian authorities committed a wide range of war crimes: attacks on civilians and energy infrastructure, wilful killings, unlawful confinement, torture, rape and sexual violence, and unlawful transfers and deportations of children. It said the pattern of torture and the wave of strikes on energy infrastructure from 10 October 2022 may amount to crimes against humanity and need further investigation. It also recorded a small number of violations by Ukrainian forces, including two incidents qualifying as war crimes against Russian prisoners of war. The Commission visited 56 localities and interviewed 348 women and 247 men.“The use of explosive weapons in populated areas has been one of the main causes of civilian casualties.”
Also on the record. Records a small number of violations by Ukrainian armed forces, including two incidents of shooting, wounding and torturing Russian prisoners of war qualified as war crimes, and likely indiscriminate attacks.
EstablishedHuman Rights CommitteeConcluding observations on the eighth periodic report of the Russian Federation, Geneva
Human Rights Committee concluding observations on the Russian Federation (CCPR/C/RUS/CO/8)The Committee expressed extreme concern about the armed conflict in Ukraine initiated by the Russian Federation, resulting in large-scale deprivation of life, and about reports of excessive use of force, killings, extrajudicial and summary executions, enforced disappearances, torture, rape and other sexual violence, arbitrary detentions, forced conscription of civilians and massive displacement attributable to Russia, including in areas under its effective control, and about the lack of investigation (para. 6). On occupied Crimea it remained gravely concerned about extrajudicial killings, abductions, enforced disappearances, politically motivated prosecutions, torture, forcible transfer of inhabitants to Russia, forced mobilisation of thousands of inhabitants, discrimination against Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians, and violations of freedom of religion (para. 38).
EstablishedCommittee on the Elimination of Discrimination against WomenConcluding observations on the ninth periodic report of Ukraine, Geneva
CEDAW concluding observations on Ukraine (CEDAW/C/UKR/CO/9)The Committee stated that the situation since 2014 and the occupation of Crimea had been exacerbated by the Russian Federation's military aggression of 24 February 2022 in violation of Article 2(4) of the Charter and by the attempted illegal annexation of Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia (para. 9). It noted with concern the increasing number of acts of sexual violence against women and girls in conflict-affected areas and in occupied Crimea since the launch of the military attack, underreporting due to stigma and fear, lack of information on reparations, and the limited number of investigations (para. 15).
Decision · voteWorld Health AssemblySeventy-fifth World Health Assembly, Geneva
WHA75.11: Health emergency in Ukraine and refugee-receiving and -hosting countries, stemming from the Russian Federation's aggressionThe Assembly condemned Russia's military aggression against Ukraine including attacks on health-care facilities, urged Russia to stop attacks on hospitals and protect medical and humanitarian personnel, decided that if Russia's actions continued to harm health in Ukraine the Assembly would consider applying relevant articles of the WHO Constitution, and requested the Director-General to lead the health response and monitor attacks on health care. The draft (A75/A/CONF./6) was approved in Committee A by 88 votes to 12 with 53 abstentions; a rival draft (A75/A/CONF./8) omitting reference to aggression was rejected 15 to 66 with 70 abstentions. The resolution was adopted at the eighth plenary meeting on 28 May 2022.
Renew the mandate of the Commission of Inquiry by vote and fund the Monitoring Mission for the next year.
Demand access for OHCHR to occupied territory and to all prisoners of war held by Russia, which Russia has refused since 2022.
Raise the deportation of Ukrainian children in the Council's dialogue with the Commission and in the review of the Russian Federation by the treaty bodies.
Cite the Commission and the Monitoring Mission by document symbol: their findings are the record the Secretariat repeats.
Vienna. Nuclear safety and the OSCE: the IAEA at the Zaporizhzhia plant, its Board and General Conference, and the OSCE's Moscow Mechanism, ODIHR monitoring, Permanent Council and Parliamentary Assembly. Bodies: IAEA · OSCE Permanent Council · Moscow Mechanism · ODIHR · OSCE Parliamentary Assembly.
EstablishedRafael Mariano Grossi, Director General, IAEAIAEA Update 371, Vienna
IAEA Update 371: The eighth localized ceasefire facilitated by the IAEA between Ukraine and the Russian Federation commenced onThe eighth localized ceasefire facilitated by the IAEA between Ukraine and the Russian Federation commenced on Thursday morning (15 Oct); the repair strengthens the connection between the ZNPP and the Ferosplavna-1 330 kV line, the plant's sole remaining external power line.“Repair work during the Agency-brokered ceasefire will improve the reliability of the off-site power connection at the ZNPP”
Eighth IAEA-brokered local ceasefire, from 15 Oct 2026 IAEA Update 371 ↗
15 Oct 2026
EstablishedRafael Mariano Grossi, Director General, IAEAIAEA Director General statement on the situation in Ukraine (Update 371), Vienna
Eighth IAEA-brokered local ceasefire takes effect for repairs near ZNPPA local ceasefire brokered by the IAEA between Ukraine and Russia took effect on the morning of 15 October 2026 to allow repairs to a damaged 330 kV substation/backup transformer near the Zaporizhzhya thermal power plant, which strengthens the link between the ZNPP and its only functioning external line, Ferosplavna-1. The Agency said this was the eighth temporary ceasefire it had brokered; efforts to restore the 750 kV Dniprovska line continued.“This is already the eighth temporary ceasefire brokered by the IAEA.”
PositionPere Joan Pons, President of the OSCE PA, and Nancy Faeser, Chair of the Parliamentary Support Team for UkraineOSCE Parliamentary Assembly, Copenhagen
OSCE PA leaders urge continued compliance with sanctions on RussiaResponding to a 9 October 2026 announcement that Russia would supply more than 300,000 metric tons of diesel to US and global markets, the OSCE PA President and the PSTU Chair warned that such a deal could undermine coordinated efforts to restrict the financial, commercial and logistical channels supporting Russia's war, and called for strict sanctions compliance in line with The Hague Declaration.“In line with The Hague Declaration, we stress the need for strict sanctions compliance.”
EstablishedRafael Mariano Grossi, Director General, IAEAIAEA Update 370, Vienna
IAEA Update 370: Drone incidents at the ZNPP earlier in the week: on 5 October the IAEA team was informed of a reported drone aDrone incidents at the ZNPP earlier in the week: on 5 October the IAEA team was informed of a reported drone attack on a laboratory and utility building and a radioactive waste processing building inside the protected area; no casualties or radiation leaks reported.“It is essential that IAEA staff are provided with prompt, unfettered access to the sites of reported attacks in order to enable independent assessment of the nature and impact of any incident.”
Drone attack inside the ZNPP protected area, 5 Oct 2026 IAEA Update 370 ↗
3 Oct 2026
EstablishedIAEA (Director General statement on the situation in Ukraine)IAEA statement, Vienna (published on the Agency's official account 3 Oct 2026)
Series of drone attacks at ZNPP in September 2026 reported to the IAEAThe IAEA said it had been informed of a series of drone attacks in recent weeks that further threatened nuclear safety and security at the Zaporizhzhya NPP, including reported strikes on 19, 20 and 27 September 2026. The statement was published on the Agency's official account on 3 October 2026; the corresponding numbered Update (likely Update 370) is on iaea.org but could not be opened for this record.“a series of drone attacks in recent weeks that further threatened nuclear safety and security”
EstablishedRafael Mariano Grossi, Director General, IAEAIAEA Update 369, Vienna
IAEA Update 369: The ZNPP is considering a further reduction in the number of emergency diesel generators kept in automatic staThe ZNPP is considering a further reduction in the number of emergency diesel generators kept in automatic standby as diesel fuel supplies at the site continue to be a concern.
PositionPere Joan Pons, President of the OSCE Parliamentary AssemblyOSCE Permanent Council, Vienna
OSCE PA President addresses the Permanent Council on Ukraine and OSCE reformAddressing the Permanent Council, the OSCE PA President reaffirmed support for Ukraine's independence and territorial integrity, demanded the immediate release of three detained OSCE officials, called for a just and lasting peace in which Ukraine's sovereignty is respected, and urged reform and adequate funding of the OSCE. He regretted that the United States and Russia had declined to invite OSCE observers to their elections.“in which Ukraine has a voice, its sovereignty is respected and international law is upheld”
PositionPere Joan Pons, President of the OSCE PA; Nancy Faeser, Chair of the Parliamentary Support Team for Ukraine; Roberto Montella, Secretary GeneralOSCE Parliamentary Assembly, Copenhagen
OSCE PA leadership condemns Russia's organisation of voting in occupied territories of UkraineThe leadership condemned Russia's organisation of voting in Crimea, Sevastopol and parts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions as a violation of international law and Ukraine's sovereignty, recalled earlier OSCE PA declarations that do not recognise the annexation of Crimea or attempts to legitimise occupation through elections, and called for accountability.“The organization of voting in occupied territories contradicts core OSCE principles and commitments”
PositionEuropean Union70th IAEA General Conference, 14–18 September 2026, agenda item 21, Vienna
EU statement at the 70th General Conference on UkraineThe EU described the 20 August 2026 event as the latest complete loss of off-site power at the ZNPP (it counted it as the 27th; the Board statement a week earlier and IAEA updates give 26), welcomed the seventh local ceasefire negotiated by the Director General, praised the Agency's presence at the demining works, expressed deep concern at continued detention of Ukrainian ZNPP personnel by Russia, and called on all delegations to vote in favour of the draft resolution on Ukraine.
PositionOSCE PA leadership (President Pere Joan Pons and Parliamentary Support Team for Ukraine)OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, Copenhagen
OSCE PA leadership condemns Russia's intensified attacks on UkraineThe Assembly's leadership condemned Russia's intensified attacks in its war of aggression against Ukraine and warned of further escalation.
PositionEuropean UnionIAEA Board of Governors, 7–11 September 2026, agenda item 7, Vienna
EU statement to the IAEA Board on nuclear safety, security and safeguards in UkraineThe EU noted ten total losses of off-site power at the ZNPP during the Director General's reporting period, out of 26 since the start of Russia's invasion, and that the plant ran on emergency diesel generators from 20 August to 7 September 2026. It welcomed the seventh local ceasefire negotiated by the Director General, noted that the 750 kV Dniprovska line still could not be re-energised, and stated that some of the Seven Pillars were compromised at all five Ukrainian NPPs.
EstablishedRafael Mariano Grossi, Director General, IAEAIAEA Director General statements on the situation in Ukraine (Updates 365–366), Vienna
Seventh IAEA-brokered local ceasefire restores off-site power to ZNPPThe IAEA announced on 5 September 2026 that it had brokered a limited local ceasefire so that Ukrainian crews could repair the 330 kV Ferosplavna-1 line after demining. Repairs took three days and the plant was reconnected on 7 September, ending an outage of almost three weeks on diesel generators. The Agency described it as the seventh localised ceasefire it had negotiated since the start of the conflict; IAEA experts were present at the demining and repair works.“This is a much-needed step at a critical time for nuclear safety and security.”
EstablishedRafael Mariano Grossi, Director General, IAEA (Updates 363–366)IAEA Director General statements on the situation in Ukraine, Vienna
ZNPP loses its last off-site power line — 26th complete loss of off-site powerAt 00:44 on 20 August 2026 the Zaporizhzhya NPP lost its sole remaining external line (330 kV Ferosplavna-1) to military activity and switched to emergency diesel generators (Update 363, 25 Aug 2026). The IAEA counted the brief 8 August outage as the 25th complete loss of off-site power since the invasion (Update 362), making the 20 August event the 26th. The outage lasted almost three weeks: the line was reconnected on the evening of 7 September 2026 after three days of repairs under an IAEA-brokered local ceasefire (Update 366, 11 Sep 2026). The 750 kV Dniprovska line remained out of service; all six units are in cold shutdown.
PositionEuropean UnionOSCE Permanent Council No. 1574, Vienna
EU statement on Russia's ongoing aggression against UkraineThe EU recorded that on 19 July 2026 Russia fired more than forty ballistic missiles at Kyiv in a single attack, the most since the full-scale invasion began; that at least 293 civilians were killed and 1,990 injured in June 2026, the highest monthly toll since April 2022; and that civilian casualties in the first half of 2026 were 37% above the same period of 2025 (HRMMU). It cited ODIHR's ninth interim report on arbitrary detention and enforced disappearance in occupied territory and demanded the release of the three detained OSCE staff.“Russia continues to show no interest in a negotiated end to its war of aggression against Ukraine.”
EstablishedOSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR)ODIHR Ukraine monitoring, Warsaw/Vienna
ODIHR Ninth Interim Report on violations of IHL and human rights law in UkraineCovering 1 December 2025 – 31 May 2026 and based on 104 interviews with 107 survivors and witnesses, ODIHR finds that the frequency and severity of civilian harm suggest repeated Russian failure to comply with proportionality and precautions, and that the pattern of strikes on energy facilities suggests intent to disrupt the national energy system as a whole. It records 1,090+ attacks on more than 550 energy facilities, a 45% rise in verified civilian casualties in government-controlled Ukraine against the same period of 2025 (OHCHR data), widespread torture of detained civilians and POWs, and allegations of execution of 345+ surrendered Ukrainian servicemen.
EstablishedOSCE Moscow Mechanism mission of expertsOSCE Permanent Council, Vienna
Moscow Mechanism: Report on Violations and Abuses of International Humanitarian, Human Rights and Criminal Law related to Militarization and Indoctrination of Ukrainian Children by the Russian FederationReport of the mission of experts appointed under the OSCE Moscow Mechanism. Presented to the OSCE Permanent Council and published by ODIHR.
Decision · voteOSCE Parliamentary Assembly33rd Annual Session, The Hague, 4–8 July 2026
The Hague Declaration: resolutions on Russia's crimes, POWs and deported childrenThe Assembly adopted The Hague Declaration including a resolution on crimes against humanity and war crimes committed by the Russian Federation and the release of POWs and civilian detainees and return of Ukrainian children (principal sponsor Mykyta Poturaiev, Ukraine), a resolution on Ukraine as an indispensable security provider (Roger Wicker, US; adopted by an overwhelming majority in committee) and one on war crimes against media workers (Pascal Allizard, France). The Declaration condemns the war as a gross violation of the Helsinki Final Act and demands withdrawal of all Russian forces and release of the three detained OSCE officials. It cites OHCHR data that over 92% of 216 released civilian detainees interviewed since June 2023 reported torture or ill-treatment.“turning the cold into a weapon”
Decision · voteOSCE Parliamentary AssemblyPrincipal sponsor Mykyta Poturaiev (Ukraine); adopted with one amendment. Also a
Resolution on Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Committed by the Russian Federation: release of POWs and civilian detainees and return of Ukrainian children (The Hague Declaration, 33rd Annual Session)Principal sponsor Mykyta Poturaiev (Ukraine); adopted with one amendment. Also adopted: Ukraine as an Indispensable Security Provider (Roger Wicker, US; 'overwhelming majority' in the First Committee) and War Crimes Against Media Workers during Russia's war of aggression (Pascal Allizard, France). Session 4–8 Jul 2026. No tally published. Adopted as part of the session declaration; the OSCE PA does not publish tallies for declarations.
EstablishedRafael Mariano Grossi, Director General, IAEAIAEA statement, Vienna
Local ceasefire announced for repair of the 330 kV backup line at ZNPPOn 27 February 2026 the IAEA announced that a locally agreed ceasefire was in effect so that the 330 kV backup line to the Zaporizhzhya NPP could be repaired; demining was under way to secure access for repair teams. The Agency had already described a January 2026 truce for the same line (damaged on 2 January) as the fourth it had negotiated.“Demining activities are ongoing to ensure safe access for the repair teams”
PositionRafael Mariano Grossi, Director General, IAEAExtraordinary meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors, Vienna
Extraordinary Board meeting on attacks on Ukraine's substations serving nuclear plantsThirteen Member States requested an extraordinary Board meeting on 30 January 2026 after Russian attacks on Ukraine's electricity infrastructure, including substations critical to nuclear power plants. The Director General linked the attacks to nuclear safety and called for respect of the Seven Indispensable Pillars and the Five Principles for the ZNPP. No resolution is recorded on the source consulted.
EstablishedOSCE Moscow Mechanism mission of expertsOSCE Permanent Council, Vienna
Moscow Mechanism: Report on Possible Violations and Abuses of International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, Related to the Treatment of Ukrainian POWs by the Russian FederationReport of the mission of experts appointed under the OSCE Moscow Mechanism (Hervé Ascensio, Veronika Bílková, Mark Klamberg). Invoked by 41 participating States, 24 Jul 2025. Presented to the OSCE Permanent Council and published by ODIHR.
EstablishedDirector General, IAEA (report to the Board)IAEA Board of Governors, September 2025 session, Vienna
Director General's report GOV/2025/54 on nuclear safety, security and safeguards in UkraineCovering 31 May – 29 August 2025, the report assesses the ZNPP situation as precarious with six of the Seven Pillars fully or partially compromised. The 4 July 2025 event was the ninth total loss of off-site power at that time; the plant relied on one of its ten pre-war lines (750 kV Dniprovska) with the 330 kV backup disconnected throughout. The cooling pond stood at 13.43 m. The Agency had carried out 217 missions by 176 staff (474 person-months) across the five Ukrainian sites.
Decision · voteOSCE Parliamentary AssemblySession 29 Jun – 3 Jul 2025. The resolution condemns Russia's war of aggression,
Porto Declaration: resolution on the 50th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act — Russia's use of force against Ukraine is a crime of aggression (32nd Annual Session)Session 29 Jun – 3 Jul 2025. The resolution condemns Russia's war of aggression, states that the use of armed force against Ukraine is a crime of aggression, calls for withdrawal of unauthorised personnel from and demilitarisation of the ZNPP and for an international mechanism to remedy environmental damage. No tally published. Adopted as part of the session declaration; the OSCE PA does not publish tallies for declarations.
Position47 IAEA Member States (joint statement)IAEA Board of Governors, March 2025 session, Vienna
Joint statement of 47 Member States on the third anniversary of the occupation of ZNPPForty-seven Member States condemned Russia's seizure of the ZNPP and attacks on Ukraine's nuclear infrastructure, called on Russia to stop military actions threatening nuclear safety, and said Russia's presence had led to the plant's ongoing technical degradation. They referred to the Seven Pillars and Five Principles, noted the February 2025 drone strike on the Chornobyl New Safe Confinement, and raised concern about an IAEA expert rotation that left ZNPP by a route not agreed with Ukraine.
Decision · voteOSCE Parliamentary AssemblySession 29 Jun – 3 Jul 2024. Resolutions: Security and Geopolitical Challenges i
Bucharest Declaration: resolutions on ten years of Russian armed aggression against Ukraine and on strengthening support to Ukraine (31st Annual Session)Session 29 Jun – 3 Jul 2024. Resolutions: Security and Geopolitical Challenges in the OSCE Region: Ten Years of Armed Aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine; Strengthening Support to Ukraine (Didier Paris, France); Building a Comprehensive European Security Architecture against Aggression. Cites environmental damage above EUR 56 bn and 45 States' invocation of the Moscow Mechanism. No tally published. Adopted as part of the session declaration; the OSCE PA does not publish tallies for declarations.
EstablishedOSCE Moscow Mechanism mission of expertsOSCE Permanent Council, Vienna
Moscow Mechanism: Report on Violations and Abuses of International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, related to the Arbitrary Deprivation of Liberty of Ukrainian Civilians by the Russian FederationReport of the mission of experts appointed under the OSCE Moscow Mechanism (Veronika Bílková, Cecilie Hellestveit, Elīna Šteinerte). Invoked by 45 participating States, 29 Feb 2024 (verify). Presented to the OSCE Permanent Council and published by ODIHR.
Decision · voteOSCE Parliamentary AssemblyAdopted in plenary on 4 Jul 2023 with more than 225 parliamentarians from 50 cou
Vancouver Declaration with calls for ending the war in Ukraine in full compliance with international law (30th Annual Session)Adopted in plenary on 4 Jul 2023 with more than 225 parliamentarians from 50 countries; no tally published. Adopted as part of the session declaration; the OSCE PA does not publish tallies for declarations.
EstablishedOSCE Moscow Mechanism mission of expertsOSCE Permanent Council, Vienna
Moscow Mechanism: Report on Violations and Abuses of International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, related to the Forcible Transfer and/or Deportation of Ukrainian Children to the Russian FederationReport of the mission of experts appointed under the OSCE Moscow Mechanism (Veronika Bílková, Cecilie Hellestveit, Elīna Šteinerte). Invoked by 45 participating States, 30 Mar 2023 (odihr 540828). Presented to the OSCE Permanent Council and published by ODIHR.
EstablishedOSCE Moscow Mechanism mission of expertsOSCE Permanent Council, Vienna
Moscow Mechanism: Report on Russia's Legal and Administrative Practice in Light of its OSCE Human Dimension CommitmentsReport of the mission of experts appointed under the OSCE Moscow Mechanism (Angelika Nussberger, Elīna Šteinerte, Martin Scheinin (verify)). Invoked by 38 participating States, 28 Jul 2022 (odihr 523512). Presented to the OSCE Permanent Council and published by ODIHR.
EstablishedOSCE Moscow Mechanism mission of expertsOSCE Permanent Council, Vienna
Moscow Mechanism: Report on Violations of International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity Committed in Ukraine (1 April – 25 June 2022)Report of the mission of experts appointed under the OSCE Moscow Mechanism (Veronika Bílková, Marco Sassòli, Elīna Šteinerte). Invoked by 45 participating States, 2 Jun 2022. Presented to the OSCE Permanent Council and published by ODIHR.
Resolution on the Russian Federation's War of Aggression Against Ukraine and its People, and its Threat to Security across the OSCE Region (Birmingham Declaration, 29th Annual Session)Sponsors Vilija Aleknaite Abramikiene (Lithuania), Mykyta Poturaiev (Ukraine), Roger Wicker (US); adopted with amendments; a second resolution on the human dimension in the context of the Russian aggression (Grzegorz Bierecki, Poland) was also adopted. Session 2–6 Jul 2022. Vote tallies are not published in OSCE PA records. Adopted as part of the session declaration; the OSCE PA does not publish tallies for declarations.
EstablishedOSCE Moscow Mechanism mission of expertsOSCE Permanent Council, Vienna
Moscow Mechanism: Report on Violations of International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity Committed in Ukraine since 24 February 2022Report of the mission of experts appointed under the OSCE Moscow Mechanism (Wolfgang Benedek, Veronika Bílková, Marco Sassòli). Invoked by 45 participating States, 3 Mar 2022. Presented to the OSCE Permanent Council and published by ODIHR.
Support the IAEA presence at the Zaporizhzhia plant and the Board's resolutions on Ukraine; fund the Agency's assistance programme.
Invoke the Moscow Mechanism where a new pattern appears, and cite its reports as expert findings.
Do not let consensus be used to shut OSCE field work: keep the Support Programme for Ukraine and ODIHR monitoring funded outside the unified budget.
Raise each attack on a nuclear site and each loss of off-site power at the plant in the Board and the Permanent Council.
The Hague. The courts and the claims mechanisms: the International Criminal Court, the International Court of Justice, the OPCW, the Register of Damage, the Claims Commission, the Special Tribunal and Eurojust. Bodies: ICC · ICJ · OPCW · Register of Damage · Claims Commission · Special Tribunal · Eurojust / ICPA.
Decision · voteMarkiyan Kliuchkovskyi, Executive Director, Register of Damage for UkraineRegister of Damage for Ukraine, The Hague
Register of Damage opens all 43 claim categories; 195,000 claims receivedThe Register announced that all 43 categories of claims (21 for individuals, 11 for legal entities, 11 for the State of Ukraine) are now open for submission, completing the claim architecture begun on 2 April 2024. It has received 195,000 claims, of which more than 65,000 have been recorded by the Board; the rest are under review. Claims are submitted digitally through Ukraine's Diia platform.“The Register has created the full claim submission architecture.”
Decision · voteCouncil of Europe (Treaty Office)Strasbourg; Convention establishing an International Claims Commission for Ukraine
Netherlands ratifies the Claims Commission convention; 40 signatories, 10 ratificationsWith the Netherlands' ratification, the host-state candidate joined nine other parties (eight States and the EU) that have ratified the Convention; it has 40 signatories. Entry into force requires 25 ratifications by States or regional integration organisations and sufficient financial commitments for the Commission's initial work.
Decision · voteCommittee of Ministers, 135th SessionChişinău, Moldova (ministerial session); Tribunal seat The Hague
Enlarged Partial Agreement on the Special Tribunal's Management Committee adopted; 36 States and the EU to joinAt its 135th Session the Committee of Ministers adopted by resolution an Enlarged Partial Agreement establishing the Management Committee of the Special Tribunal, which will decide the Tribunal's budget, structure and internal rules; 36 countries and the European Union declared their intention to join. Ministers also welcomed support for the Claims Commission convention and noted that 44 States and the EU had joined the Register of Damage. An EU-funded advance team has been preparing the Tribunal since January 2026; the Netherlands reaffirmed on 3 July 2026 its willingness to host the Tribunal's operational phase. Judges have not yet been appointed.“The Special Tribunal represents justice and hope.”
PositionNikolaus Korczynski, Deputy Permanent Representative of Germany to the OPCWExecutive Council, 111th session, The Hague
Germany: over 12,500 cases of toxic chemical use by Russian forces; calls on the Secretariat to identify perpetratorsGermany told the Executive Council that three OPCW Technical Assistance Visit reports confirmed CS in grenades on the Ukrainian front line, and that German and Dutch intelligence agencies determined in June 2025 that Russia used chloropicrin, a Schedule 3 chemical, against Ukrainian troops. It puts the number of cases of riot-control agents and other toxic chemicals used by the Russian military against Ukrainian forces at over 12,500 and asks the Technical Secretariat to officially identify those responsible.
PositionMame Mandiaye Niang, Deputy Prosecutor, International Criminal CourtOffice of the Prosecutor, visit to Kyiv
ICC Deputy Prosecutor concludes his first visit to KyivThe Deputy Prosecutor visited Kyiv on 3–6 March 2026 and met high-level Ukrainian officials and civil society, as part of the Office's ongoing activities in the Ukraine situation and its cooperation with Ukraine and other partners.
Decision · voteRegister of Damage for UkraineRegister of Damage for Ukraine, The Hague
Register of Damage passes 100,000 claims from individualsThe Register reported that individuals had submitted 100,000 claims for loss of life, personal injury, torture and sexual violence, displacement, destroyed homes and other harm. At that date the Claims Commission convention had 35 State signatories plus the EU. Executive Director Kliuchkovskyi said the milestone represents only a fraction of the damage inflicted.“this milestone represents only a fraction of the damage inflicted”
Decision · voteDiplomatic conference convened by the Council of EuropeDiplomatic conference, The Hague
Convention establishing an International Claims Commission for Ukraine opened for signatureThe Convention, approved by the Committee of Ministers on 22 October 2025, was adopted and opened for signature in The Hague; 34 States and the EU signed on the day and Greece on 19 December, for 35 States plus the EU. The Commission will decide compensation claims arising from Russia's aggression since 24 February 2022 and take over the Register of Damage's claims; it enters into force after 25 ratifications and sufficient financial commitments. The Netherlands offered to host it. Canada became the first non-member State to sign on 11 May 2026; Estonia was the first to ratify on 30 April 2026.“I call for quick ratifications so we can get the commission rapidly up and running for the people of Ukraine”
Decision · voteInternational Court of JusticePeace Palace, The Hague; Allegations of Genocide (Ukraine v. Russian Federation), case 182
Russia's counter-claims declared admissible; Reply due December 2026, Rejoinder December 2027By 11 votes to 4 (Judges Abraham, Gómez Robledo, Cleveland and Judge ad hoc Daudet against) the Court found admissible as such the eight counter-claims Russia filed with its Counter-Memorial on 18 November 2024, which ask the Court to declare that Ukraine committed, attempted, incited and failed to prevent or punish genocide in Donbas. Unanimously, it fixed 7 December 2026 for Ukraine's Reply and 7 December 2027 for Russia's Rejoinder. No merits hearing has been scheduled; a judgment on the merits is not expected before 2028.
Also on the record. The admitted counter-claims put Ukraine's own conduct in Donbas since 2014 before the Court; Russia alleges genocide by Ukraine, which Ukraine denies.
PositionDelegation of Ukraine to the OPCWExecutive Council, 110th session, The Hague
Ukraine reports almost 11,000 chemical-munition incidents to the Executive CouncilUkraine's statement under agenda item 6(f) cites 10,978 documented instances of Russian use of munitions containing hazardous chemicals, including chloropicrin, between February 2023 and September 2025, and 2,862 servicemen who sought medical care for symptoms of chemical exposure. It recalls that three OPCW TAV reports (18 Nov 2024, 14 Feb 2025, 20 Jun 2025) confirmed CS in seven RG-Vo grenades and in soil and grass samples, and calls on States Parties not to elect Russia to the Executive Council for 2026–2028. Chloropicrin findings cited are from Ukrainian laboratories in 2024, not OPCW.
Decision · voteCouncil of Europe and UkraineStrasbourg (agreement signed); Tribunal to be seated in The Hague
Agreement establishing the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine signedFollowing Ukraine's request of 14 May 2025 and the Committee of Ministers' authorisation of 24 June 2025, the Council of Europe and Ukraine signed the bilateral agreement establishing the Special Tribunal, with its Statute annexed, on 25 June 2025 in Strasbourg. The Verkhovna Rada ratified it on 15 July 2025. The Tribunal is to try those primarily responsible for the crime of aggression, which the ICC cannot prosecute in this situation. The Netherlands formalised its offer to host the seat on 17 October 2025.
EstablishedTechnical Secretariat, OPCWOPCW, The Hague; Technical Assistance Visits TAV/02/25 and TAV/03/25
Third OPCW report: CS confirmed in grenades dropped by FPV drone on a border guard postThe third report concerns an incident of 28 February 2025 at a State Border Guard Service observation post near Mariivka, Nikopol district, Dnipropetrovsk region; samples were collected on 1 March 2025. Two OPCW-designated laboratories found CS in both grenades, in nearby vegetation and soil, and at very low levels on a wipe from the remnants of an FPV drone; TNT and RDX were found in soil by one grenade. The TAV team found Ukraine's sampling and evidence handling generally in line with OPCW standards and the chain of custody maintained. Three OPCW reports have now confirmed CS; none has confirmed chloropicrin.
EstablishedICAO CouncilICAO Council, Montreal (case brought by the Netherlands and Australia)
ICAO Council: Russia breached the Chicago Convention by downing MH17In the first dispute ever decided on the merits under ICAO's dispute-settlement mechanism, the Council found that the Russian Federation failed to uphold its obligations under Article 3 bis of the Chicago Convention, which requires States to refrain from using weapons against civil aircraft in flight, and that the claims of Australia and the Netherlands were well founded in fact and in law. On 30 June 2025 the Council ordered the parties to begin good-faith negotiations on reparations immediately. The ECtHR separately found Russia responsible for the downing on 9 July 2025 (Strasbourg record).“well founded in fact and in law”
EstablishedTechnical Secretariat, OPCWOPCW, The Hague; Technical Assistance Visits TAV/05/24 and TAV/01/25
Second OPCW report confirms CS in grenades from three further front-line incidentsThe second Technical Assistance Visit report covered three alleged incidents in Dnipropetrovsk region: 2 October 2024 near Mariivka and 12 and 14 October 2024 near Illinka. Nine samples (four grenade shells, three soil and two vegetation samples) were analysed; OPCW-designated laboratories found CS, CS-related compounds and/or their degradation products in grenades taken from dugouts and in soil and vegetation where the grenades were found. Director-General Arias described it as the second confirmed instance of riot-control agent grenades on the confrontation lines.“This report marks the second confirmed instance of riot-control agent grenades being found”
Decision · voteInternational Criminal CourtInternational Criminal Court, The Hague
Rome Statute enters into force for UkraineThe Rome Statute entered into force for Ukraine on 1 January 2025, making Ukraine the 125th State Party to the ICC and the 20th from the Eastern European region. Until then, the Court's jurisdiction over Ukraine's territory rested on Ukraine's Article 12(3) declarations of 2014 and 2015.
EstablishedTechnical Secretariat, OPCWOPCW, The Hague; Technical Assistance Visit TAV/04/24
First OPCW Technical Assistance Visit confirms CS riot-control agent in grenade and soil from the front lineAt Ukraine's request under Article VIII(38)(e) of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the OPCW analysed one grenade shell and two soil samples from a trench near Illinka, Dnipropetrovsk region, linked to an incident of 20 September 2024. Two OPCW-designated laboratories independently found the riot-control agent CS (2-chlorobenzylidenemalononitrile); the chain of custody was maintained. The report does not attribute responsibility. Use of riot-control agents as a method of warfare is prohibited by the Convention.“Under the CWC, the use of riot control agents as a method of warfare is prohibited.”
Also on the record. The OPCW notes that both Russia and Ukraine have made allegations of chemical weapons use against each other since February 2022.
EstablishedPre-Trial Chamber II, International Criminal CourtInternational Criminal Court, The Hague
Mongolia failed to comply with the Court's request to arrest and surrender Vladimir PutinPre-Trial Chamber II found that, by failing to arrest Mr Putin while he was on its territory (3 September 2024) and surrender him to the Court, Mongolia failed to comply with the Court's request to cooperate, contrary to the Rome Statute, thereby preventing the Court from exercising its functions and powers under article 87(7). The Chamber referred the matter to the Assembly of States Parties.
EstablishedPre-Trial Chamber II, International Criminal CourtInternational Criminal Court, The Hague
Chamber finds Mongolia failed to cooperate in the arrest of PutinPre-Trial Chamber II found that Mongolia, a State Party, failed to comply with the Court's request to arrest and surrender Vladimir Putin during his visit to Mongolia in September 2024, and referred the matter to the Assembly of States Parties. Mongolia's requests for reconsideration were rejected on 10 and 18 March 2025. The Assembly took note of the finding in its 2024 omnibus resolution.“the Chamber considers it appropriate to refer the matter of Mongolia's non-compliance to the Assembly of States Parties”
EstablishedPre-Trial Chamber II, International Criminal CourtInternational Criminal Court, The Hague
Arrest warrants for Sergei Shoigu and Valery GerasimovWarrants were issued for Sergei Shoigu, then Minister of Defence, and Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff and First Deputy Minister of Defence, for the same charges as Kobylash and Sokolov: attacks on civilian objects, excessive incidental harm to civilians, and the crime against humanity of inhumane acts. The alleged conduct covers at least 10 October 2022 to at least 9 March 2023, the period of the campaign against Ukraine's electricity grid.
EstablishedPre-Trial Chamber II, International Criminal CourtInternational Criminal Court, The Hague
Arrest warrants for Sergei Kobylash and Viktor SokolovWarrants were issued for Lieutenant General Sergei Kobylash, Commander of Long-Range Aviation, and Admiral Viktor Sokolov, Commander of the Black Sea Fleet. The charges are the war crimes of directing attacks at civilian objects (Art. 8(2)(b)(ii)) and causing excessive incidental harm to civilians or civilian objects (Art. 8(2)(b)(iv)), and the crime against humanity of inhumane acts (Art. 7(1)(k)), in connection with strikes on Ukraine's electricity infrastructure.
Decision · voteInternational Court of JusticePeace Palace, The Hague; Allegations of Genocide (Ukraine v. Russian Federation), case 182
Judgment on preliminary objections: case proceeds on Ukraine's request for a declaration that it did not commit genocideThe Court rejected five of Russia's six preliminary objections and found, by 15 votes to 1, that it has jurisdiction under Article IX of the Genocide Convention over Ukraine's submission (b), a declaration that there is no credible evidence Ukraine is responsible for genocide in the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, and by 13 to 3 that this submission is admissible. By 12 votes to 4 it upheld Russia's objection to jurisdiction over submissions (c) and (d), which concerned Russia's use of force and recognition of the so-called DPR and LPR; those claims and the related reparation claims do not go to the merits. 32 States were admitted as interveners at the preliminary objections stage.
EstablishedInternational Court of JusticePeace Palace, The Hague; Application of the ICSFT and CERD (Ukraine v. Russian Federation), case 166
Judgment: Russia violated CERD in Crimea and the terrorism-financing convention's duty to investigateIn the case Ukraine filed in January 2017, the Court found by 13 votes to 2 that Russia breached Article 9(1) of the Terrorism Financing Convention by failing to investigate persons named by Ukraine as alleged offenders, and by 13 to 2 that Russia's implementation of school education in the Ukrainian language in Crimea after 2014 breached Articles 2(1)(a) and 5(e)(v) of CERD. It also found that Russia breached the 2017 provisional measures order by maintaining its ban on the Mejlis (11–4) and by aggravating the dispute (10–5). All other Ukrainian submissions under both conventions were rejected (10–5), including the claim that Russia financed terrorism through the supply of weapons to armed groups in Donbas.
Decision · voteEurojust, International Centre for the Prosecution of the Crime of Aggression against UkraineEurojust, The Hague
International Centre for the Prosecution of the Crime of Aggression (ICPA) starts workThe ICPA began operations at Eurojust as a judicial hub where prosecutors from Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland and Romania, the ICC Office of the Prosecutor and a US Special Prosecutor for the Crime of Aggression work together to secure evidence and build cases on the crime of aggression, irrespective of the forum in which they will be tried. It was funded by the European Commission with an initial EUR 8.3 million and received a further EUR 5 million in December 2025. The first charges and notifications of suspicion have been presented, according to Eurojust in February 2026.
EstablishedPre-Trial Chamber II, International Criminal CourtInternational Criminal Court, The Hague
Arrest warrants for Vladimir Putin and Maria Lvova-BelovaPre-Trial Chamber II issued arrest warrants for the President of the Russian Federation and for the Commissioner for Children's Rights in the Office of the President. Both are charged with the war crimes of unlawful deportation of population (children) and unlawful transfer of population (children) from occupied areas of Ukraine to the Russian Federation, under Articles 8(2)(a)(vii) and 8(2)(b)(viii) of the Rome Statute.
Core International Crimes Evidence Database (CICED) starts operationsEurojust launched CICED, a database to preserve, store and analyse evidence of core international crimes, under the mandate extension that entered into force on 1 June 2022. By February 2026 it held roughly 10,000 evidence files from 17 countries. The database also underpins the International Centre for the Prosecution of the Crime of Aggression.
EstablishedDistrict Court of The Hague (MH17 trial)Schiphol Judicial Complex, Badhoevedorp
MH17: Girkin, Dubinskiy and Kharchenko convicted of murder of 298 people, sentenced to lifeThe court found Igor Girkin, Sergey Dubinskiy and Leonid Kharchenko guilty of causing the crash of flight MH17 near Pervomaiskyi, Donetsk oblast, on 17 July 2014 with a Buk missile and of the murder of the 298 people on board, and sentenced each to life imprisonment in absentia; Oleg Pulatov was acquitted. The court found that from mid-May 2014 the so-called DPR in fact took directions from the Russian Federation, making the conflict international, and that the DPR fighters could not claim combatant immunity. It granted 306 compensation claims totalling more than EUR 16 million.“the DPR in fact took directions from the Russian Federation”
Joint Investigation Team on core international crimes in Ukraine set upLithuania, Poland and Ukraine signed a JIT agreement with Eurojust support to investigate alleged core international crimes in Ukraine. The ICC Office of the Prosecutor joined on 25 April 2022, Estonia, Latvia and Slovakia on 30 May 2022 and Romania on 13 October 2022, making seven national authorities plus the ICC, with Eurojust and Europol participating. By 2025 the JIT had conducted 4,000 witness interviews and focused mainly on crimes at detention sites.
EstablishedInternational Court of JusticePeace Palace, The Hague; Allegations of Genocide (Ukraine v. Russian Federation), case 182
ICJ orders Russia to immediately suspend military operations in UkraineThree weeks after Ukraine filed its application under the Genocide Convention, the Court indicated provisional measures. By 13 votes to 2 (Vice-President Gevorgian and Judge Xue against) it ordered the Russian Federation to immediately suspend the military operations commenced on 24 February 2022 and to ensure that armed units it directs or supports take no further steps in those operations. Unanimously, both parties were ordered to refrain from aggravating the dispute.“The Russian Federation shall immediately suspend the military operations that it commenced on 24 February 2022 in the territory of Ukraine”
Decision · voteOffice of the Prosecutor, International Criminal CourtInternational Criminal Court, The Hague
ICC Prosecutor opens investigation into the situation in UkraineAfter Lithuania's referral on 1 March 2022 and a joint referral by 38 States Parties on 2 March 2022, the Prosecutor opened an investigation covering alleged war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide on Ukrainian territory from 21 November 2013 onward. Japan, North Macedonia, Montenegro and Chile joined later, bringing the referring States to 43. Jurisdiction rests on Ukraine's two Article 12(3) declarations (2014 and 2015) and, since 1 January 2025, on Ukraine's status as a State Party.
Execute the ICC arrest warrants without exception; say so publicly before any visit by a person named in them.
Join or support the interventions in Ukraine v. Russia at the International Court of Justice and insist on compliance with the Order of 16 March 2022.
Sign and ratify the Convention on the International Claims Commission and fund the Register of Damage.
Ratify the agreement on the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression and support its judges' election.
Support the OPCW's technical assistance visits and raise the confirmed use of riot-control agents as a method of warfare.
Strasbourg. The Council of Europe: the Committee of Ministers, the Parliamentary Assembly and the European Court of Human Rights — the first organisation to expel Russia and the court that has ruled on the war. Bodies: Committee of Ministers · PACE · European Court of Human Rights · Commissioner for Human Rights · Venice Commission.
Decision · voteSecretary General Alain Berset / Register of Damage (Enlarged Partial Agreement)Strasbourg / The Hague
Register of Damage fully open: all 43 claim categories accepting claimsThe Register opened its final claim categories (environmental damage and state property claims), bringing the total to 43. About 195,000 claims had been received, of which about 65,000 were recorded in the Register, with the rest under review. Claims are submitted by individuals, legal entities and the State of Ukraine through the Diia portal. The Register, seated in The Hague, is the first component of the compensation mechanism; the Claims Commission will take over its work once established.“The Register of Damage for Ukraine represents the legal memory of this unjust war.”
EstablishedAlain Berset, Secretary General of the Council of Europe1568th meeting of the Ministers' Deputies, Strasbourg
Secretary General's report on human rights in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine (SG/Inf(2026)23)The report, covering April 2025 to March 2026, finds that Russia's new laws and policies further entrenched the occupation in breach of its obligations as an occupying power, covering forced citizenship, education, freedom of expression and movement, property, conscription and forcibly transferred children. Ukrainian authorities estimate about 3.5 million people remain in the occupied territories. Independent monitoring is blocked because international organisations have no physical access and the occupying authorities refuse cooperation. The report calls the planned Russian State Duma voting in occupied areas on 20 September 2026 incompatible with international law.“The occupation has further entrenched patterns of grave, systemic and far-reaching human-rights abuses”
Decision · voteCommittee of Ministers of the Council of Europe (46 member states)Special meeting of the Ministers' Deputies, Strasbourg
Committee of Ministers decision on the fourth anniversary of Russia's war of aggressionThe Committee of Ministers restated that Russia bears full responsibility for the war and its consequences, welcomed the 2025 progress on the Special Tribunal and the start of the advance team's work, welcomed the opening for signature of the Claims Commission convention, condemned the systematic targeting of civilian infrastructure in winter and the deportation and forcible transfer of Ukrainian children, and recalled that Russia remains bound to implement European Court judgments despite ceasing to be a party to the Convention on 16 September 2022.“Russian Federation bears full responsibility for its war of aggression against Ukraine”
Decision · voteDiplomatic Conference co-hosted by the Council of Europe and the NetherlandsThe Hague, 15–16 December 2025
Convention establishing an International Claims Commission for Ukraine opened for signatureThe Convention (CETS No. 229) creates the second component of the compensation mechanism, to review and decide claims recorded in the Register of Damage. It was signed on the first day by 34 states and the European Union; Greece signed on 19 December 2025. It enters into force after 25 ratifications and once initial funding is secured. The Committee of Ministers launched a preparatory committee on 27 February 2026 to draft rules of procedure and a first budget. By 30 September 2026 the Convention had 39 state signatories plus the EU and nine state ratifications plus the EU.
Decision · voteCommittee of Ministers (Human Rights meeting), supervising execution under Article 46Ministers' Deputies, Strasbourg
First examination of the execution of the inter-State judgment Ukraine and the Netherlands v. RussiaThe Committee of Ministers held its first examination of the Grand Chamber judgment of 9 July 2025 on Russia's aggression against Ukraine, including the downing of flight MH17. Since March 2022 the Committee has adopted 63 decisions in 73 leading cases or groups against Russia (as of December 2025), confirming that Russia remains bound to execute judgments despite ceasing to be a party to the Convention on 16 September 2022.
EstablishedGrand Chamber of the European Court of Human RightsStrasbourg
Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia: Grand Chamber judgment on the meritsThe judgment (adopted 4 June 2025, delivered 9 July 2025) in applications nos. 8019/16, 43800/14, 28525/20 and 11055/22 covers eastern Ukraine from 2014 and the full-scale invasion from 24 February 2022 up to 16 September 2022, the limit of the Court's temporal jurisdiction. According to the PACE President's statement on the day, the Court attributed to Russia responsibility for the deaths of the 298 people aboard MH17 and found systematic violations in Ukraine since 2014, including extrajudicial killings, torture, sexual violence, forced labour, arbitrary detention, abductions and the forced transfer and adoption of Ukrainian children; it is the first judgment of an international court on Russia's responsibility for the full-scale invasion.
Decision · votePresident Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Secretary General Alain BersetCouncil of Europe, Strasbourg
Agreement establishing the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine signedUkraine requested the tribunal on 13 May 2025; the Committee of Ministers authorised the Secretary General to sign on 24 June 2025. The Agreement and annexed Statute give the Tribunal jurisdiction over those most responsible for the crime of aggression against Ukraine, based on Ukraine's territorial jurisdiction, exclude functional immunity, allow trials in absentia under conditions, and provide for a Management Committee set up through an Enlarged Partial Agreement open to non-member states and the EU. On 24 January 2026 the Council of Europe and the EU agreed to fund an advance team (EU contribution EUR 10 million, up to 24 months) to prepare the Tribunal's rules, court management and the election of judges and prosecutor.“Functional immunity shall not apply before the Special Tribunal.”
EstablishedGrand Chamber of the European Court of Human RightsStrasbourg
Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea): Grand Chamber judgment on the meritsThe Grand Chamber delivered its merits judgment in the inter-State case concerning Crimea (nos. 20958/14 and 38334/18) on 25 June 2024, following the admissibility decision of 14 January 2021 which had found Russia in effective control of Crimea from 27 February 2014. The case covers administrative practices of the Russian authorities in Crimea from 2014.
Decision · voteHeads of State and Government of the 46 Council of Europe member states4th Summit of the Council of Europe, Reykjavik, 16–17 May 2023
Reykjavik Declaration and creation of the Register of Damage for UkraineLeaders established the Enlarged Partial Agreement on the Register of Damage Caused by the Aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine (Resolution CM/Res(2023)3), the first component of an international compensation mechanism to be followed by a claims commission and compensation fund. The Declaration affirmed that no statute of limitations applies to genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, supported the principles of Ukraine's Peace Formula and welcomed progress towards a special tribunal for the crime of aggression.“Without accountability, there can be no lasting peace.”
EstablishedGrand Chamber of the European Court of Human RightsStrasbourg
Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia: admissibility decision (jurisdiction over eastern Ukraine from 11 May 2014)In its decision of 30 November 2022 (made public 25 January 2023), the Grand Chamber found that the areas of eastern Ukraine held by separatists were under Russian jurisdiction from 11 May 2014 until at least 26 January 2022, declared most of Ukraine's complaints admissible and declared admissible the Netherlands' complaints on the downing of flight MH17 on 17 July 2014, which killed 298 people including 196 Dutch nationals.
Decision · voteCommittee of Ministers of the Council of EuropeExtraordinary meeting of the Ministers' Deputies, Strasbourg
Russia excluded from the Council of Europe (CM/Res(2022)2)On 25 February 2022 the Committee of Ministers suspended Russia's rights of representation and opened the Article 8 procedure. On 15 March PACE adopted Opinion 300 (2022) concluding Russia could no longer be a member. On 16 March 2022 the Committee of Ministers adopted Resolution CM/Res(2022)2 ending Russia's membership with immediate effect; Resolution CM/Res(2022)3 (23 March 2022) set the legal and financial consequences.“the Russian Federation ceases to be a member of the Council of Europe as from today”
EstablishedEuropean Court of Human RightsStrasbourg
Interim measures indicated to Russia under Rule 39 (Ukraine v. Russia (X), no. 11055/22)On 1 March 2022, at Ukraine's request, the Court indicated interim measures calling on Russia to refrain from military attacks against civilians and civilian objects and to ensure the safety of medical establishments and personnel; further measures followed on 4 March and 1 April 2022 and the 2014 measure was reaffirmed. Ukraine's completed inter-State application no. 11055/22 was received on 23 June 2022 and later joined to Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia.
Keep the execution of the Court's judgments against Russia on the Committee of Ministers' agenda and record Russia's non-compliance.
Support PACE's resolutions on the war with a recorded vote and cite their numbers.
Contribute to the Register of Damage and the Claims Commission; back the Special Tribunal.
Brussels. The European Union and NATO, and the G7: Parliament's resolutions with recorded votes, the European Council's conclusions, the Council's legal acts on immobilised assets, NATO's summit language and North Atlantic Council statements on Russian incidents, and G7 leaders' statements. Bodies: European Parliament · European Council · Council of the EU · NATO · G7.
PositionEuropean CouncilBrussels, 15–16 October 2026
European Council conclusions on Ukraine, 15–16 October 2026Leaders reaffirmed full support for Ukraine, urged Russia to accept an immediate unconditional ceasefire and continue prisoner exchanges and the return of deported children, called for faster air-defence and energy support before winter, welcomed the release of EUR 6.6 billion under the European Peace Facility and the Integrated Anti-Ballistic Missile Coalition, welcomed the 21st sanctions package and the opening of accession clusters 2 and 3 on 13 October 2026, condemned Russia's so-called elections in occupied territories and the DPRK, Iran and Belarus support to Russia, backed the Claims Commission and the Special Tribunal, and noted the extension of temporary protection until March 2028.“The path to peace in Ukraine cannot be decided without Ukraine.”
Decision · voteCouncil of the European Union (topic page 'Russia's war against Ukraine')Brussels
EU support to Ukraine: EUR 228.7 billion, including Ukraine Facility and proceeds of immobilised Russian assetsThe Council's topic page puts total EU and member-state support to Ukraine since February 2022 at EUR 228.7 billion, of which EUR 114.4 billion from or guaranteed by the EU budget and EUR 3.8 billion in proceeds from immobilised Russian assets. The Ukraine Facility provides up to EUR 50 billion in loans and grants; the EUR 90 billion Ukraine Support Loan covers 2026–2027. Figures as published on the Council site in October 2026.
PositionNATO Allies, following a meeting of the North Atlantic CouncilNATO Headquarters, Brussels
NATO Allies condemn Russian airspace violations and drone incidents (Poland, Romania)After a North Atlantic Council meeting, Allies condemned recent Russian airspace violations affecting Poland and Romania and related drone incidents, expressed full solidarity with the affected Allies and restated NATO's readiness to deter and defend against any aggression.“NATO stands ready to deter and defend against any aggression.”
North Atlantic Council statement condemning Russia's malicious cyber activitiesThe NAC condemned Russia's ongoing cyber operations against Allies and partners targeting critical infrastructure and government bodies, expressed solidarity with affected Allies, noted related UK and EU sanctions, called on Russia to halt the activity, and stated readiness to use the full range of capabilities to deter and counter cyber threats.“These activities constitute a threat to Allied security.”
PositionNATO Heads of State and GovernmentAnkara Summit, 8 July 2026
Ankara Summit Declaration: EUR 70 billion for Ukraine in 2026Allies pledged EUR 70 billion in military equipment, assistance and training for Ukraine in 2026 and at least an equivalent level in 2027, noted that European Allies and Canada now provide most of the security assistance, welcomed the EU's Ukraine Support Loan, and reaffirmed collective defence against the long-term threat posed by Russia. The NATO-Ukraine Council had held its first meeting in Ukraine, in Kyiv, on 3 June 2026.“Allies stand united in our unwavering support for Ukraine in defending its freedom, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.”
European Council conclusions on Ukraine, 18–19 June 2026Leaders stated that borders must not be changed by force and the aggressor cannot be rewarded; noted the opening of the fundamentals cluster of Ukraine's accession talks on 15 June 2026; committed to contribute to security guarantees with the Coalition of the Willing and the United States, including EUMAM/EUAM and Satellite Centre support for ceasefire monitoring; expected the first disbursement of the EUR 90 billion loan before end-June 2026; welcomed the 20th sanctions package; and recorded the EU's ratification of the Claims Commission convention.“Borders must not be changed by force, the aggressor cannot be rewarded.”
Decision · voteEuropean CouncilBrussels, 18 December 2025
EUR 90 billion Ukraine Support Loan for 2026–2027 agreedThe European Council agreed a EUR 90 billion loan to Ukraine for 2026–2027, financed by EU borrowing on the capital markets backed by the EU budget headroom, on the basis of Article 212 TFEU and enhanced cooperation under Article 20 TEU; the budget guarantee does not affect the financial obligations of Czechia, Hungary and Slovakia. The text on Ukraine (EUCO 26/25) was firmly supported by 25 Heads of State or Government. Ukraine is to repay the loan once it receives reparations from Russia (as recorded by PACE Doc. 16311 Add.). The first disbursement was expected before end-June 2026 and the October 2026 conclusions call for timely disbursement of 2026 commitments.“The text set out in document EUCO 26/25 was firmly supported by 25 Heads of State or Government.”
PositionNATO Heads of State and GovernmentThe Hague Summit, 24–25 June 2025
The Hague Summit Declaration: 5% of GDP by 2035; Ukraine contributions countAllies committed to invest 5% of GDP annually in defence by 2035 (at least 3.5% core defence and up to 1.5% defence-related), with a review of the trajectory in 2029. They reaffirmed sovereign commitments to support Ukraine, whose security contributes to their own, and agreed that direct contributions to Ukraine's defence and defence industry count towards Allies' defence spending. The Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List (PURL) was launched in July 2025 with over USD 6 billion committed.“Allies agree that this 5% commitment will comprise two essential categories of defence investment.”
PositionNATO Heads of State and GovernmentWashington Summit, 10 July 2024
Washington Summit Declaration: Ukraine's 'irreversible path' to membership; NSATU; EUR 40 billion baselineAllies committed to support Ukraine on its irreversible path to full Euro-Atlantic integration including NATO membership, established NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU, headquartered in Wiesbaden, operational December 2024) and pledged a minimum baseline of EUR 40 billion of security assistance within the next year; actual 2024 contributions exceeded EUR 50 billion.“NSATU, which will operate in Allied states, will support Ukraine's self-defence in line with the UN Charter.”
Decision · voteEuropean CouncilBrussels, 14–15 December 2023
European Council decides to open accession negotiations with UkraineLeaders decided to open accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova; the Council was to adopt the negotiating frameworks once the steps in the Commission's 8 November 2023 recommendations were completed. The first intergovernmental conference with Ukraine followed in June 2024, the fundamentals cluster was opened on 15 June 2026 and clusters 2 and 3 on 13 October 2026.“EU leaders decided to open accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova.”
PositionNATO Heads of State and GovernmentVilnius Summit, 11–12 July 2023
Vilnius Communiqué: NATO-Ukraine Council created; 'Ukraine's future is in NATO'Allies reaffirmed the 2008 Bucharest commitment, stated that Ukraine no longer needs a Membership Action Plan and that an invitation will follow when Allies agree and conditions are met, created the NATO-Ukraine Council as a joint body with equal membership (inaugural meeting 12 July 2023 with President Zelenskyy), and turned the Comprehensive Assistance Package into a multi-year programme.“Ukraine's future is in NATO.”
G7 Leaders' statement on Ukraine, HiroshimaLeaders condemned the war as a clear breach of the UN Charter, pledged financial, humanitarian, military and diplomatic support for as long as it takes, announced further sanctions and noted that the oil price cap had reduced Russia's revenues while stabilising global energy prices.“Our support for Ukraine will not waver.”
PositionNATO Heads of State and GovernmentMadrid Summit, 29 June 2022
Madrid Summit Declaration: NATO condemns Russia's war of aggressionAllies condemned Russia's war against Ukraine as a violation of international law, called on Russia to stop the war and withdraw and on Belarus to end its complicity, affirmed Ukraine's right to self-defence and to choose its own security arrangements, and agreed a strengthened package of support including non-lethal equipment and cyber defence.“We condemn Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine in the strongest possible terms.”
Decision · voteEuropean CouncilBrussels, 23–24 June 2022
European Council grants Ukraine EU candidate statusThe European Council granted candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova and asked the Commission to report on fulfilment of the conditions set out in its opinion, with further steps to be decided once these are fully met.“EU leaders granted candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova.”
PositionHeads of State or Government of the EUInformal meeting, Versailles, 10–11 March 2022
Versailles Declaration: EU acknowledges Ukraine's European aspirationsLeaders acknowledged the European aspirations and European choice of Ukraine as stated in the Association Agreement, invited the Commission to give its opinion on Ukraine's membership application submitted on 28 February 2022, and committed to deepen the partnership pending that opinion.
Joint statement of the members of the European Council on Russia's invasionThe 27 leaders condemned Russia's military aggression and Belarus's involvement, demanded the withdrawal of Russian forces from all of Ukraine, agreed to meet the same day on further restrictive measures coordinated with transatlantic partners, and pledged political, financial and humanitarian support.“Such use of force and coercion has no place in the 21st century.”
G7 Leaders' statement on the invasion of UkraineG7 leaders condemned Russia's large-scale aggression as a serious violation of international law, rejected the recognition of the self-declared Donetsk and Luhansk entities, reaffirmed Ukraine's sovereignty including Crimea, and announced severe coordinated sanctions and humanitarian support.“We call on the Russian Federation to stop the bloodshed, to immediately de-escalate and to withdraw its forces from Ukraine.”
NATO-Russia relations: practical cooperation suspended since April 2014, political dialogue suspended in 2022All practical civilian and military cooperation with Russia was suspended in April 2014 after the annexation of Crimea; the last NATO-Russia Council meeting took place on 12 January 2022. After the full-scale invasion political dialogue was fully suspended and NATO states it can no longer regard Russia as a partner. Allies also suspended the operation of the CFE Treaty after Russia's withdrawal on 7 November 2023.“All practical civilian and military cooperation with Russia was suspended in April 2014.”
Keep Russian sovereign assets immobilised until Russia pays for the damage; use them for Ukraine's defence and reconstruction.
Attribute each Russian incursion and sabotage jointly, in the North Atlantic Council and the European Council.
Adopt Parliament's resolutions by recorded vote and cite the tallies.
Agencies. The specialised agencies: UNESCO's verified damage to culture and killed journalists, the IMO on the Black Sea, ICAO on airspace and navigation, FAO and WFP on grain, UNICEF on children, the ILO and the ITU. Bodies: UNESCO · IMO · ICAO · FAO / WFP · UNICEF · ILO · ITU.
EstablishedUNESCO (Culture Sector, with UNITAR/UNOSAT satellite verification)UNESCO, Paris — 'Damaged cultural sites in Ukraine verified by UNESCO'
UNESCO verifies damage to 563 cultural sites in UkraineUNESCO's running verification lists 563 cultural sites in Ukraine confirmed as damaged as of 29 September 2026 (page updated 7 October 2026): 165 religious sites, 285 buildings of historical and/or artistic interest, 43 museums, 33 monuments, 24 libraries, 8 archaeological sites and 5 archives. By region the largest counts are Donetsk (149), Kharkiv (87), Odesa (66), Kyiv (58), Luhansk (48), Kherson (36) and Zaporizhzhia (32). UNESCO states the figures are preliminary, regularly updated and do not commit the Organization; its 25 June 2025 update (501 sites) explicitly counts damage since 24 February 2022.“As of 29 September 2026, 563 cultural sites have been confirmed as damaged”
UNESCO count: 26 journalists and media workers killed; 4,650 educational institutions damaged or destroyedUNESCO's Ukraine war page, as of 29 September 2026, records 26 journalists and media workers killed in Ukraine (UNESCO counts only deaths linked to their work and condemns each through a Director-General statement) and 4,650 educational institutions damaged (4,227) or destroyed (423), the latter figure sourced from Ukraine's Ministry of Education and Science. UNESCO says it has mobilised about US$80 million for Ukraine. On 6 October 2025 UNESCO put the journalist toll at 'at least 23' since February 2022; its count includes Russian media workers killed in Ukraine (e.g. RIA Novosti correspondent Ivan Zuev, statement of 23 Oct 2025).
Also on the record. UNESCO's journalist count and condemnations cover all media workers killed in Ukraine regardless of nationality, including Russian state-media staff (Ivan Zuev, RIA Novosti, 16 Oct 2025).
EstablishedAnne-Claire Dufay, UNICEF Representative to UkraineUNICEF press release, Kyiv/New York
Monthly child casualties in Ukraine reach a four-year high; 3,946 children killed or injured since Feb 2022UNICEF reported that in July 2026 the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission verified 17 children killed and 166 injured, a 49% increase on June and the highest monthly total since April 2022, and that the UN has verified 3,946 children killed or injured since February 2022. It cited the 21 August attack on a shopping centre in Kryvyi Rih, in which at least 23 children were among more than 140 injured, and a strike on Mykolaiv the same day that reportedly killed three children. UNICEF called for an end to attacks that kill and injure children and for full compliance with international humanitarian law.“UNICEF is calling for an end to attacks that kill and injure all children in this war.”
3,946 children killed or injured since Feb 2022 (UN-verified, Aug 2026) UNICEF press release ↗
4 Aug 2026
PositionUNICEF (statement issued from New York/Geneva)UNICEF press statement
UNICEF statement on children reportedly killed and injured in attacks in the Russian Federation and UkraineUNICEF said that in the preceding seven days at least 6 children were reportedly killed and 19 injured in Ukraine, and that in the Russian Federation a 13-year-old girl was reportedly killed and two girls injured in a drone strike in Belgorod region and three children were among seven people killed in an attack in Krasnodar region. It called on all parties to uphold international humanitarian law, including the protection of children and civilian infrastructure.“UNICEF again calls on all parties to uphold their obligations under international humanitarian law - including the protection of children and civilian infrastructure.”
Also on the record. The statement also records reported child deaths and injuries in Russia's Belgorod and Krasnodar regions in the same week.
6 children killed, 19 injured in Ukraine in one week (late Jul–early Aug 2026) UNICEF press statement ↗
Jul 2026
Decision · voteWorld Heritage Committee48th session of the World Heritage Committee, BEXCO, Busan, 19–29 Jul 2026
Decisions 48 COM 7A.30–7A.32: all three Ukrainian properties retained on the List in Danger; damage from 2026 strikes on Kyiv and L'viv recordedIn three decisions the Committee deplored the Russian Federation's full-scale invasion, reiterated its call on Russia to avoid damaging the properties and Ukraine's wider heritage, and retained Kyiv (Saint Sophia and Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra), L'viv and Odesa on the List of World Heritage in Danger. It expressed grave concern at significant damage to the Dormition Cathedral and Lavra fortifications in the large-scale attack on Kyiv of 15 June 2026, at damage to historic buildings of the Bernardine Monastery Complex in the attack on L'viv of 24 March 2026, and at over 60 cultural sites damaged within the Odesa property since the start of the full-scale invasion. Updated reports are due by 1 February 2027.“over 60 cultural sites within the property have been damaged since the beginning of the full-scale invasion”
EstablishedAnne-Claire Dufay, UNICEF Representative to UkraineUNICEF press release, Kyiv
Child casualties in Ukraine up 65% in March 2026; at least 3,452 children killed or injured since Feb 2022Citing UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission verification, UNICEF reported 89 child casualties in March 2026 (9 killed, 80 injured), a 65% rise on February, and a 49% increase in child casualties in the first quarter of 2026 compared with the same period of 2025. UNICEF put the verified total since February 2022 at least 3,452 children killed or injured and said the true number is likely considerably higher.“No child is safe in the country”
PositionAudrey Azoulay, Director-General of UNESCOUNESCO, Paris — press release
Director-General condemns the drone killing of photojournalist Antoni LallicanUNESCO's Director-General condemned the killing of French photojournalist Antoni Lallican, reportedly struck by a drone on 3 October 2025 near Druzhkivka, Donetsk region, while wearing a press vest on assignment for the Hans Lucas agency, and called for a thorough and transparent investigation. The release states that UNESCO has recorded at least 23 journalists and media workers killed in Ukraine in the line of work since February 2022.“I condemn the killing of Antoni Lallican and call for a thorough and transparent investigation.”
Resolution A42-2: Assembly condemns Russia for GNSS interference as an infraction of the Chicago ConventionThe Assembly endorsed the Council's determination that recurring GNSS radio-frequency interference originating from Russian territory and affecting the Baltic, Eastern and Northern European regions constitutes an infraction of the Chicago Convention, condemned the Russian Federation, urgently called on it to comply with its obligations and stop the interference, and asked the Council to remain seized. A parallel resolution condemned the DPRK for similar interference. ICAO's release of 3 October 2025 records the adoption; no vote tally is published on the page.“constitute infractions of the 1944 Convention on International Civil Aviation.”
Decision · voteWorld Heritage Committee47th session of the World Heritage Committee, UNESCO HQ, Paris, 2025
Decision 47 COM 7A.26: Odesa retained on the List in Danger after 'several large-scale attacks'The Committee deplored the Russian Federation's full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the loss of life, expressed serious concern at damage from several large-scale attacks on the property, called on Russia to avoid damaging the property and Ukraine's wider heritage (Article 6 of the Convention), welcomed provisional enhanced protection under the 1954 Hague Convention Second Protocol for a fourth building, requested a report by 1 February 2026 and retained Odesa on the List of World Heritage in Danger.
Odesa retained on the List in Danger (47 COM 7A.26, 2025) 47 COM 7A.26 Decision 47 COM 7A.26 ↗
C-DEC 235/7: Council urges Russia to stop GNSS interference affecting Baltic and Nordic airspaceOn a joint paper by Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Sweden (C-WP/15745), the Council addressed recurring GNSS radio-frequency interference originating from Russian territory and affecting the Warsaw, Vilnius, Riga, Tallinn, Helsinki and Sweden flight information regions. It strongly urged the Russian Federation to comply with the Chicago Convention and its Annexes, called on it to prevent recurrence, had the Council President request a report within 30 days, tasked the EUR/NAT office to engage Russia, and remained seized of the matter in cooperation with ITU. The Council subsequently determined the conduct to be an infraction of the Convention under Article 54(k) and reported it to the Assembly (A42-WP/553).“strongly urged the Russian Federation to strictly comply with its obligations under the Chicago Convention and its Annexes”
ICAO Council finds Russia responsible under international air law for the downing of flight MH17In the first ruling on the merits of a State-to-State dispute under ICAO's dispute settlement mechanism, the Council voted that the Russian Federation failed to uphold its obligations under international air law in the 2014 downing of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17, which killed 298 people. It found the claims brought by Australia and the Netherlands under Article 3 bis of the Chicago Convention (refraining from the use of weapons against civil aircraft in flight) well founded in fact and in law; the formal decision document was to be issued at a later meeting.“voted that the Russian Federation failed to uphold its obligations under international air law”
Decision · voteWorld Heritage Committee46th session of the World Heritage Committee, New Delhi, 2024
Decision 46 COM 7A.6: Odesa retained on the List in Danger; Committee deplores Russia's full-scale invasionThe Committee deplored the Russian Federation's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, called on Russia to refrain from any action that would damage the Historic Centre of Odesa, its buffer zone and Ukraine's cultural heritage in line with Article 6 of the World Heritage Convention, requested a Desired State of Conservation for Removal (DSOCR) and a report by 1 February 2025, and retained the property on the List of World Heritage in Danger.
Odesa retained on the List in Danger (46 COM 7A.6, 2024) 46 COM 7A.6 Decision 46 COM 7A.6 ↗
Resolution A.1183(33): The impact of the Russian armed invasion of Ukraine on international shippingThe Assembly strongly condemned the Russian Federation's armed aggression against Ukraine as a violation of its territorial integrity and sovereignty extending to its territorial waters, demanded that Russia immediately cease its military action, stressed the paramount importance of the safety and welfare of seafarers caught in the conflict, commended Ukraine's special maritime corridor in the Black Sea that enabled the release of stranded commercial vessels, and decided to prioritise a needs assessment to support Ukraine's implementation of IMO instruments.“DEMANDS that the Russian Federation immediately cease its military action”
Decision · voteWorld Heritage CommitteeExtended 45th session of the World Heritage Committee, Riyadh, 10–25 Sep 2023
Kyiv's Saint Sophia Cathedral and Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra and the historic centre of L'viv inscribed on the List of World Heritage in DangerThe Committee placed two Ukrainian World Heritage properties on the List of World Heritage in Danger because of the threat of destruction posed by the Russian offensive, noting the risk from shockwaves of bombing in both cities and permanent threat since 24 February 2022. The decision opens access to enhanced international technical and financial assistance.“optimal conditions are no longer met to fully guarantee the protection of the Outstanding Universal Value of the property”
Decision · voteWorld Heritage Committee18th extraordinary session of the World Heritage Committee, UNESCO HQ, Paris, 24–25 Jan 2023
Historic Centre of Odesa inscribed on the World Heritage List and simultaneously on the List of World Heritage in DangerUnder an emergency procedure, the Committee inscribed the Historic Centre of Odesa on the World Heritage List and, in the same decision (18 EXT.COM 5.2), on the List of World Heritage in Danger, giving Ukraine access to reinforced technical and financial assistance. The nomination was prepared with UNESCO support in summer 2022 and submitted by President Zelenskyy in October 2022. UNESCO has funded repairs at the Odesa Museum of Fine Arts and Museum of Modern Art and digitisation of nearly 1,000 artworks and documents.“While the war continues, this inscription embodies our collective determination”
Resolution A41-2: Infractions of the Chicago Convention by the Russian FederationThe Assembly endorsed the Council's determination that Russia's violation of Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty, including its airspace, and its dual registration of foreign-leased aircraft flying without valid airworthiness certificates are infractions of Articles 1, 18, 19, 29 and 31 of the Chicago Convention. It condemned the Russian Federation, urgently called on it to cease these actions and to resolve the status of re-registered leased aircraft, and asked the Council to remain seized of the matter. The resolution text does not record the vote.“Condemns the Russian Federation for the violation of the sovereignty of the airspace of Ukraine”
Decision · voteIMO Secretariat (circulating UN OCHA / Joint Coordination Centre procedures)IMO, London — Circular Letters No.4611 and No.4611/Add.1
IMO circulates the Black Sea Grain Initiative procedures for merchant vesselsIMO's Black Sea hot-topic page lists the Organization's actions since 2022: circular letters on the security situation in the Black Sea and Sea of Azov (14 Mar 2022), a stranded-ship reporting form (28 Mar 2022), free-floating mines (24 May 2022), the interim (9 Aug 2022) and final (30 Aug 2022) procedures for merchant vessels under the Black Sea Grain Initiative run by the Joint Coordination Centre in Istanbul, and Ukraine's notified maritime routes in the north-western Black Sea (19 Jul and 24 Aug 2023). The Initiative, signed in Istanbul in July 2022, expired on 17 July 2023 and was not renewed.
Resolution MSC.495(105) on the urgent evacuation of seafarers from the Black Sea and Sea of Azov war zoneResponding to the request of the Council's extraordinary session of March 2022 (C/ES.35), the Committee adopted resolution MSC.495(105), 'Actions to facilitate the urgent evacuation of seafarers from the war zone area in and around the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov as a result of the Russian Federation aggression against Ukraine', and urged the Secretary-General to continue work as a priority on safe maritime corridors and evacuation of seafarers. It also invited the Council to consider reports of armed interference with shipping by States.
FAO Council special session on the impact of the war in Ukraine on global food securityAn unscheduled session of the FAO Council convened at the request of Members to consider the Secretariat paper CL 169/3 on the impact of the Ukraine–Russia conflict on global food security and a proposal for decision co-sponsored by 80 FAO Members (CL 169/4 Add.1), alongside counter-proposals from the Russian Federation (CL 169/5, 169/6). The FAO paper notes that Russia and Ukraine supplied about 30% of global wheat exports in 2021 and that nearly 50 countries depended on them for at least 30% of their wheat imports. The adopted decision text and any vote could not be read from the session report page (see unverified).
Governing Body resolution on the Russian Federation's aggression against Ukraine: technical cooperation suspended, regional office to leave RussiaThe Governing Body declared Russia's continuing aggression against Ukraine, aided by Belarus, grossly incompatible with the aims of the ILO and the principles governing membership; called on Russia to cease the aggression and withdraw its troops; temporarily suspended ILO technical cooperation and assistance to Russia (except humanitarian) until a ceasefire and peaceful settlement; suspended invitations to Russia to discretionary meetings; and asked the Director-General to examine relocating the Decent Work Technical Support Team and Country Office for Eastern Europe and Central Asia outside the Russian Federation. The resolution text does not record the vote.
Support UNESCO's verification of damaged heritage and its condemnation of each killed journalist.
Raise attacks on ships and ports in the IMO Council and the Maritime Safety Committee.
Raise GNSS interference and airspace violations in the ICAO Council.
Keep Russia out of the governing councils it lost in 2022–2023.
Capitals. Acts of individual states with legal effect: parliamentary resolutions adopted by recorded vote, court judgments and indictments, and executive acts beyond sanctions — including the acts that go against Ukraine's case. Bodies: Parliaments · Courts and prosecutors · Governments.
Decision · voteRiigikogu of the Republic of EstoniaRiigikogu, Tallinn
Riigikogu statement 'On ensuring victory for Ukraine and security for Europe'The Riigikogu stated that a lasting peace must preserve Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity with security guarantees, rejected the Russian Duma 'elections' held in occupied Ukrainian territory, called on all countries to complete the special tribunal for the crime of aggression and compensation mechanisms, and committed to at least 0.25% of GDP annually for Ukraine's defence. The published statement does not record a vote tally.“a lasting peace in Europe cannot be born out of rewarding the aggression or restoring the spheres of influence”
EstablishedHelsinki Court of Appeal (Helsingin hovioikeus)Helsinki, Finland
Helsinki Court of Appeal upholds Torden's war-crimes conviction on three counts, reduces sentence to 12.5 yearsOn appeal the Helsinki Court of Appeal upheld Voislav Torden's conviction on three war-crimes counts (participation in the ambush involving improper use of the Ukrainian flag, desecration of a killed serviceman's body, and statements that no prisoners would be taken), acquitted him of personally executing wounded servicemen and of the cheek-carving count for lack of evidence, and replaced the life sentence with 12 years 6 months. Compensation to wounded servicemen and relatives was extended. Reported by Yle; no court press release retrieved.
Decision · voteGovernment of HungaryDepositary notification C.N.180.2026.TREATIES-XVIII.10, New York
Hungary withdraws its notification of withdrawal and remains a State PartyFour days before its withdrawal would have taken effect, Hungary withdrew its notification of withdrawal from the Rome Statute, effected on 29 May 2026 and circulated by the UN Secretary-General as depositary. Hungary therefore remains a State Party. The ICC welcomed the decision on 1 June 2026.
Decision · voteGovernment of HungaryDepositary notification C.N.225.2025.TREATIES-XVIII.10, New York
Hungary notifies withdrawal from the Rome StatuteHungary announced on 3 April 2025 that it would leave the ICC and deposited its notification of withdrawal on 2 June 2025. Under Article 127(1) the withdrawal was to take effect one year later, on 2 June 2026. The President of the Assembly of States Parties expressed regret on 5 June 2025. Hungary later reversed course (see entry of 29 May 2026).“I truly hope that Hungary's withdrawal from the Rome Statute is not permanent, but just a brief pause to its commitment to international justice.”
Decision · voteOrszággyűlés (National Assembly of Hungary)National Assembly, Budapest
Hungarian National Assembly votes to withdraw Hungary from the Rome Statute of the ICCThe National Assembly approved the government bill (T/11449) on Hungary's withdrawal from the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Telex reported the vote as 134 in favour, 37 against, 7 abstentions. Under Article 127 of the Rome Statute withdrawal takes effect one year after the UN Secretary-General receives the notification. This is a reverse act: the ICC is the only international court with an arrest warrant against Vladimir Putin for the deportation of Ukrainian children.
EstablishedHelsinki District Court (Helsingin käräjäoikeus)Helsinki, Finland
Helsinki District Court convicts Rusich commander Voislav Torden (Yan Petrovsky) of war crimes in Luhansk region, life sentenceThe Helsinki District Court found Voislav Torden, former commander of the Rusich unit, guilty of war crimes committed in September 2014 near Shchastia, Luhansk region, including the ambush and killing of Ukrainian servicemen, and sentenced him to life imprisonment. This was the first conviction in a Nordic country for war crimes committed in Ukraine, tried under universal jurisdiction. No Finnish court press release could be retrieved; the public broadcaster Yle and multiple outlets reported the verdict.
Decision · voteUnited States Congress; signed by President BidenWashington DC
REPO for Ukrainians Act enacted as Division F of Public Law 118-50 (H.R. 815)The Rebuilding Economic Prosperity and Opportunity for Ukrainians Act was enacted as Division F of Public Law 118-50, the emergency supplemental appropriations act signed on 24 April 2024. Its sections prohibit the release of blocked Russian sovereign assets (Sec. 103), provide authority to ensure compensation to Ukraine using seized Russian sovereign assets (Sec. 104) and call for an international mechanism for Ukraine's reconstruction (Sec. 105). The REPO text originated in H.R. 8038, which the House passed 360–58 on 20 April 2024; the Senate concurred in the combined House amendment to H.R. 815 by 79–18 on 23 April 2024.
Decision · voteRiigikogu of the Republic of EstoniaRiigikogu, Tallinn
Riigikogu statement on returning to Ukraine the children deported by RussiaThe Riigikogu characterised the systematic deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia and Belarus as a war crime and genocide under international law, demanded their release and safe return, condemned Russia's simplified citizenship procedure for them, and supported the ICC arrest warrants against Putin and Lvova-Belova. The published statement does not record a vote tally.“is a war crime and genocide under international law”
Decision · voteSaeima of the Republic of LatviaSaeima, Riga
Saeima statement on the return of Ukrainian children unlawfully transferred to Russia and BelarusThe Saeima condemned the forcible transfer of Ukrainian children to Russia and Belarus, characterising it as a war crime and genocide aimed at destroying Ukrainian national identity, supported the ICC investigation and the March 2023 arrest warrants, and backed an international centre for the children's return. Public broadcaster LSM reported 88 votes in favour, none against, no abstentions.“constitutes a crime of war and genocide with the aim of destroying Ukrainian national identity”
Decision · voteUS Department of Justice, Attorney General Merrick B. GarlandUS District Court, Eastern District of Virginia
First US war-crimes charges: four Russia-affiliated soldiers indicted for torturing a US national in Kherson regionThe Justice Department unsealed an indictment in the Eastern District of Virginia charging Suren Mkrtchyan, Dmitry Budnik and two men known as Valerii and Nazar with three war crimes (unlawful confinement, torture, inhuman treatment) and conspiracy to commit war crimes against a US national abducted from his home in Mylove, Kherson oblast, in April 2022. It was the first prosecution under the US war crimes statute (18 U.S.C. 2441). Each count carries up to life imprisonment.“will work for as long as it takes to pursue accountability and justice”
First-ever US war-crimes indictment; 4 defendants, up to life DOJ press release ↗
15 Sep 2023
Decision · voteUK Home OfficeLondon
United Kingdom proscribes the Wagner Group as a terrorist organisationThe Wagner Group was proscribed as a terrorist organisation in the UK with immediate effect on 15 September 2023, after the draft order was laid before Parliament on 6 September. Membership of or support for the group in the UK became a criminal offence carrying up to 14 years' imprisonment. The Home Office's list of proscribed organisations describes Wagner as a Russian private military company acting as a malign proxy force on behalf of the Russian state.“Wagner Group is a Russian private military company which has acted as a malign proxy military force”
Decision · voteRiigikogu of the Republic of EstoniaRiigikogu, Tallinn
Riigikogu statement on accountability for the crime of aggression against Ukraine (special tribunal)The Riigikogu declared the establishment of a special international tribunal for the crime of aggression against Ukraine, under the auspices of the UN General Assembly, a priority of Estonian foreign policy and called on allied governments and parliaments to support it. Submitted by 94 members; 85 voted in favour according to the Riigikogu press release.“A special international tribunal will have to be established under the auspices of the UN General Assembly”
Decision · voteGlobal Affairs Canada; Minister of Foreign Affairs Mélanie JolyOttawa
Canada starts first process to seize and forfeit assets of a sanctioned Russian oligarch (US$26 million, Granite Capital Holdings)Canada announced the first use of its new authority under the Special Economic Measures Act to seize and pursue forfeiture of US$26 million held by Granite Capital Holdings Ltd., owned by Roman Abramovich, sanctioned under the Special Economic Measures (Russia) Regulations. If forfeited, proceeds may be used for Ukraine's reconstruction and compensation of victims.“Canada will not be a haven for their ill-gotten gains”
Decision · voteSejm of the Republic of PolandSejm, Warsaw
Sejm resolution recognising the Russian Federation as a state supporting terrorismThe Sejm recognised the Russian Federation as a state supporting terrorism and using means of terror, stating that Russia's terror against Ukrainian citizens constitutes crimes against humanity and genocide, and listing forced deportations, separation of children and mass executions. The text also attributes the 2010 Smolensk crash and MH17 to Russia, a clause over which most opposition MPs did not take part. Notes from Poland reported 231 for, 2 against, 1 abstention with 226 not voting.“Sejm Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej uznaje Federację Rosyjską za państwo wspierające terroryzm i stosujące środki terroru”
Decision · voteDeutscher BundestagBundestag, Berlin
Bundestag motion 'Holodomor in Ukraine: remember, commemorate, warn'The Bundestag adopted motion 20/4681, tabled jointly by SPD, Greens, FDP and CDU/CSU, stating that a historical-political classification of the 1932–33 Holodomor as genocide is appropriate from today's perspective and placing it in the context of Russia's current war of aggression. The Bundestag record states it passed with the votes of the sponsoring groups, with AfD and Die Linke abstaining; no numerical tally is given.“Opfer des völkerrechtswidrigen Angriffskriegs Russlands und der imperialistischen Politik Wladimir Putins”
Decision · voteChamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech RepublicChamber of Deputies, Prague
Chamber of Deputies resolution on escalating Russian aggression, designating the current Russian regime as terroristThe Chamber adopted a resolution on the escalating aggression of the Russian Federation which, citing PACE Resolution 2463, labels the current Russian regime as terrorist. The official voting record (45th session, vote 24) shows 129 in favour, 0 against, 30 abstaining of 159 present; the Chamber's press release notes the 14 SPD deputies opposed the terrorist designation.“současný ruský režim za teroristický”
Decision · voteRiigikogu of the Republic of EstoniaRiigikogu, Tallinn
Riigikogu statement condemning the annexation of Ukrainian territory and declaring the Russian regime a terrorist regimeThe Riigikogu condemned Russia's annexation of Ukrainian regions after sham referendums, declared the Russian regime a terrorist regime and Russia a state supporting terrorism, and called on other countries to adopt similar declarations. It backed stripping Russia of its UN Security Council permanent seat, ICC and ICJ investigations and a special tribunal for aggression. Public broadcaster ERR reported 88 votes in favour in the 101-seat chamber.“Violation of law can never create law”
Decision · voteSaeima of the Republic of LatviaSaeima, Riga
Saeima statement declaring Russia a state sponsor of terrorismThe Saeima adopted a statement recognising Russia's violence against civilians in Ukraine as terrorism and Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism, and called on other states to do likewise. The Saeima press release does not publish a numerical tally.“recognising Russia's violence against civilians as terrorism and Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism”
Decision · voteUnited States SenateUS Senate, Washington DC
S.Res.623 calling on the Secretary of State to designate Russia a state sponsor of terrorismThe Senate agreed to S.Res.623, with an amended preamble, calling on the Secretary of State to designate the Russian Federation as a state sponsor of terrorism. The preamble cites Russia's attacks on civilian centres in Chechnya, Georgia, Syria and Ukraine, the Wagner Group and mass graves in Ukraine. The enrolled text records the resolution as considered, amended and agreed to; no roll-call tally is recorded in it. The Executive has not made the designation.“calls on the Secretary of State to designate the Russian Federation as a state sponsor of terrorism”
Decision · voteSeimas of the Republic of LithuaniaSeimas, Vilnius
Seimas resolution recognising forced transfer of Ukrainians to Russia as deportation and genocideThe Seimas adopted a resolution recognising the forced relocation of Ukrainians, including about 200,000 children, to Russia or Russian-controlled territory as deportation of the Ukrainian people aimed at destroying Ukrainian identity, and as genocide. It called for legal measures to stop the deportations and for other states to prosecute those organising them. LRT reported 50 votes in favour; the resolution was tabled by 23 MPs.
Decision · voteSeimas of the Republic of LithuaniaSeimas, Vilnius
Seimas resolution recognising Russia's war in Ukraine as genocide and Russia as a state that supports and perpetrates terrorismThe Seimas adopted a resolution recognising the full-scale war against Ukraine as genocide against the Ukrainian people and declaring the Russian Federation a state that supports and perpetrates terrorism, citing mass war crimes in Bucha, Irpin, Mariupol, Borodyanka and Hostomel. It called for a special international criminal tribunal with power to issue arrest warrants not limited by official immunity. Public broadcaster LRT reported 128 votes in favour, none against, no abstentions; the Seimas's own English press page for the vote could not be retrieved.
Decision · voteHouse of Commons of CanadaHouse of Commons, Ottawa
House of Commons motion recognising that Russia is committing acts of genocide against the Ukrainian peopleBy unanimous consent the House of Commons resolved that it recognises that the Russian Federation is committing acts of genocide against the Ukrainian people. The preamble cites systematic war crimes and crimes against humanity directed by President Putin, including killings of civilians, forcible transfer of Ukrainian children, torture and rape. Journals of the House, Sitting No. 59.“the House recognize that the Russian Federation is committing acts of genocide against the Ukrainian people”
Decision · voteSaeima of the Republic of LatviaSaeima, Riga
Saeima statement recognising Russia's aggression and war crimes in Ukraine as genocide against the Ukrainian peopleThe Saeima adopted a statement 'On the Aggression of the Russian Federation and War Crimes in Ukraine' declaring that the Russian Federation is currently committing genocide against the Ukrainian people. The Saeima press release describes the vote as unanimous; no numerical tally is published on the page. The statement also urged the EU to suspend Russian oil and gas imports.“the Russian Federation is currently committing genocide against the people of Ukraine”
Decision · voteRiigikogu of the Republic of EstoniaRiigikogu, Tallinn
Riigikogu statement on war crimes and genocide committed by the Russian Federation in UkraineThe Riigikogu adopted a statement recognising the actions of Russia's armed forces and political and military leadership in the invasion begun on 24 February 2022 as genocide against the Ukrainian people, citing Bucha, Borodyanka, Hostomel, Irpin and Mariupol. It called on other parliaments and international organisations to do the same and for an international court to prosecute the crimes. The sitting review records 86 votes in favour; the statement was presented by 84 members.“systematic and massive war crimes have been committed against the people of Ukraine”
Decision · voteSejm of the Republic of PolandSejm, Warsaw
Sejm resolution condemning Russian war crimes, crimes against humanity and acts of genocide in UkraineThe Sejm adopted a resolution condemning war crimes, crimes against humanity and acts of genocide committed by Russian armed forces and their allies in Ukraine. It states that publicly available evidence already justifies recognising Vladimir Putin as a war criminal and calls on states to support proceedings at the ICJ and ICC. Press reports describe adoption by acclamation; the gazette text records no tally.“w sprawie popełniania zbrodni wojennych i zbrodni przeciw ludzkości oraz łamania praw człowieka przez Rosję w Ukrainie”
Adopt parliamentary acts by recorded vote: the tally is what makes them citable.
Use universal jurisdiction: investigate and try war crimes committed in Ukraine in national courts.
Execute the ICC warrants and legislate for the use of immobilised Russian assets.
Regions. Statements and decisions of regional organisations outside Europe — the OAS, the African Union, ASEAN, the Pacific Islands Forum, CARICOM and others — not of individual states. Bodies: OAS · African Union · ASEAN · Pacific Islands Forum · CARICOM · Commonwealth.
Decision · votePermanent Council of the Organization of American StatesSpecial meeting of the Permanent Council, Washington, D.C.
OAS Permanent Council suspends the Russian Federation as a Permanent ObserverThe Permanent Council met in special session on 21 April 2022 to consider the draft resolution 'Suspension of the Status of the Russian Federation as a Permanent Observer of the Organization of American States' and adopted it (CP/RES. 1195 (2374/22)).
ASEAN Foreign Ministers' statement on the situation in UkraineASEAN foreign ministers expressed deep concern over the armed hostilities in Ukraine and urged all relevant parties to exercise maximum restraint, de-escalate and pursue dialogue consistent with international law and the UN Charter. The statement does not name Russia.“exercise maximum restraint and make utmost efforts to pursue dialogues through all channels”
Does not name Russia; calls for restraint and dialogue ASEAN statement ↗
24 Feb 2022
PositionCaribbean Community (CARICOM)CARICOM Secretariat, Georgetown
CARICOM statement condemning Russia's military attacks and invasion of UkraineCARICOM strongly condemned the military attacks and invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation, treated Russia's recognition of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions as a breach of Ukraine's territorial integrity, called for withdrawal of Russian forces and urged diplomatic talks for de-escalation.“strongly condemns the military attacks and invasion of Ukraine by The Russian Federation”
Invite the Commission of Inquiry and the Monitoring Mission to brief regional bodies.
Adopt organisation-level statements on the deportation of children and attacks on grain exports.
Vote on the record in the General Assembly.
Every body with a mandate on the war: what created it, what it has established, its latest document, what comes next and whether Russia gives it access. Next dates feed the Calendar.
Body
Mandate
Established
Latest
Next
Access for Russia
Eleventh emergency special session of the General Assembly (ES-11) New York
Convened by Security Council resolution 2623 (2022), 27 Feb 2022 (11-1-3), under GA resolution 377 A (V) 'Uniting for Peace'; session adjourned temporarily and resumed on request of Member States
Ten resolutions ES-11/1 to ES-11/10 adopted 2022–2026; aggression deplored (ES-11/1, 141-5-35)
Annexation of four regions declared invalid (ES-11/4, 143-5-35, 12 Oct 2022)
Russia must bear legal consequences and make reparation (ES-11/5, 94-14-73, 14 Nov 2022)
Russia suspended from the Human Rights Council (ES-11/3, 93-24-58, 7 Apr 2022)
Return of deported Ukrainian children demanded (ES-11/9, 91-12-57, 3 Dec 2025)
— Debate convened after any future veto on Ukraine
Not applicable
Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine Geneva
HRC resolution 49/1 (4 Mar 2022, 32–2–13); special mandate on Kyiv, Chernihiv, Kharkiv and Sumy regions by S-34/1 (12 May 2022, 33–2–12); renewed by 52/32 (4 Apr 2023, 28–2–17), 55/23 (4 Apr 2024, 27–3–17), 58/24 (4 Apr 2025, 25–4–18) and 61/29 (31 Mar 2026, 25–4–18). Commissioners: Erik Møse (Norway, Chair), Pablo de Greiff (Colombia), Vrinda Grover (India); former: Jasminka Džumhur. Reports: A/77/533 (18 Oct 2022), A/HRC/52/62 (16 Mar 2023), A/HRC/52/CRP.4 (23 Aug 2023), A/78/540 (20 Oct 2023), A/HRC/55/66 (15 Mar 2024), A/79/549 (29 Oct 2024), A/HRC/58/67 (19 Mar 2025), A/HRC/59/CRP.2 (28 May 2025), A/80/497 (21 Oct 2025), A/HRC/61/61 and A/HRC/61/CRP.8 (12 Mar 2026).
Torture by Russian authorities is a crime against humanity, pursuant to a coordinated state policy (A/79/549, 29 Oct 2024)
Enforced disappearances of civilians by Russian authorities are crimes against humanity (A/HRC/58/67, 19 Mar 2025)
Short-range drone attacks on civilians along the Dnipro are crimes against humanity of murder and forcible transfer (A/HRC/59/CRP.2, 28 May 2025; A/80/497, Oct 2025)
Deportation and forcible transfer of Ukrainian children, and their enforced disappearance, are crimes against humanity; 1,205 cases documented, over 80% not returned (A/HRC/61/61, 12 Mar 2026)
War crimes: wilful killings, attacks on civilians and energy infrastructure, unlawful confinement, rape, unlawful transfers of children (A/HRC/52/62, 16 Mar 2023)
Russian forces killed or wounded captured or surrendering Ukrainian soldiers, a war crime; defectors reported orders to take no prisoners (A/HRC/58/67, 19 Mar 2025)
Oct 2026 — Report to the General Assembly, 81st session (Third Committee), followed by a comprehensive report to HRC 64 in March 2027
The Russian Federation has not responded to 41 Commission communications since 2022 (Chair's statement, 21 Sep 2026); no access to occupied territory or the Russian Federation. The Commission also records violations by Ukrainian forces and authorities where found (POW ill-treatment incidents, collaboration prosecutions, mobilisation abuses).
OHCHR / UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU) Geneva
OHCHR monitoring mission present in Ukraine since 2014; reporting to the Human Rights Council under the 'cooperation with and assistance to Ukraine' resolutions (53/30 of 14 Jul 2023, 28–3–16; 59/22 of 8 Jul 2025, 28–2–17), which request oral updates by the High Commissioner on each OHCHR report followed by interactive dialogues. Products: periodic reports (42nd: Dec 2024–May 2025; 43rd: Jun–Nov 2025, A/HRC/61/CRP.3; 44th: Dec 2025–May 2026 with energy focus, A/HRC/62/CRP.1), thematic reports (POWs, Oct 2024; civilians deprived of liberty, Sep 2025; forced displacement, Mar 2026; sexual violence, Sep 2026) and monthly Protection of Civilians updates. Head of Mission: Danielle Bell.
Over 17,000 civilians killed and almost 54,000 injured since Feb 2022, per OHCHR figures cited by the CoI (21 Sep 2026)
Jan–Sep 2026: 2,570 civilians killed, 15,211 injured; September 2026 the deadliest September of the war (PoC update, 15 Oct 2026)
129 Ukrainian POWs executed at the start of captivity and 48 deaths in custody documented; over 95% of released Ukrainian POWs report torture (ASG briefing, 10 Aug 2026)
1,004 cases of conflict-related sexual violence documented, 89% attributed to Russian authorities and 11% to Ukrainian authorities (report, 18 Sep 2026)
Torture of civilian detainees by Russian authorities applied in a systematic and widespread manner; more than 16,000 civilians estimated still deprived of liberty (23 Sep 2025; 10 Aug 2026)
Attacks on Ukraine's energy infrastructure in winter 2025–26 appear to have violated fundamental IHL principles (A/HRC/62/CRP.1, 29 Jun 2026)
Nov 2026 — Protection of Civilians update for October 2026 (mid-November); 45th periodic report covering Jun–Nov 2026 (December 2026)
No access to territory occupied by the Russian Federation or to the Russian Federation; Russian casualty claims (e.g. 205 killed and 1,302 injured in 27 regions, Dec 2025–May 2026) are reported as unverified. OHCHR interviews POWs on both sides and documents violations by Ukrainian authorities (ill-treatment of Russian POWs mainly in transit, 11% of CRSV cases, collaboration prosecutions).
Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Russian Federation (Mariana Katzarova) Geneva
Country mandate created by HRC resolution 51/25 (7 Oct 2022, 17–6–24) and renewed by 54/23 (12 Oct 2023, 18–7–22), 57/20 (10 Oct 2024, 20–8–19), 60/21 (7 Oct 2025, 20–8–18) and 63/22 (6 Oct 2026, 21–5–21). Reports: A/HRC/54/54, A/HRC/57/59, A/79/508 (torture, 28 Oct 2024), A/HRC/60/59, A/80/382 (anti-war expression, 27 Oct 2025), A/HRC/63/60 (transnational repression, Sep 2026).
Counter-terrorism, extremism and treason laws abused to suppress anti-war expression; Ukrainian POWs and civilians prosecuted on such charges (A/80/382, 27 Oct 2025)
Transnational repression is a systematic state strategy inseparable from the war against Ukraine; in absentia sentences rose from 4 (2022) to 157 (2025) (A/HRC/63/60, 21 Sep 2026)
Oct 2026 — Report to the General Assembly, 81st session
The Russian Federation does not cooperate with the mandate (UPR recommendations in A/HRC/55/14 urged it to start cooperation); note that the OHCHR mandate page describing the resolution that created the mandate could not be read, so the link between 51/25 and the mandate is listed under unverified
WHO Surveillance System for Attacks on Health Care (SSA) Geneva
WHO's global system for collecting and verifying reports of attacks on health care; resolution WHA75.11 (28 May 2022) requested the Director-General to monitor attacks on health care in Ukraine and report to the Assembly. Ukraine data published on the SSA dashboard and in WHO news releases.
At least 2,881 verified attacks on health care in Ukraine since 24 Feb 2022; 233 killed, 930 injured (WHO, 23 Feb 2026)
Attacks rose nearly 20% in 2025 over 2024, peaking at 184 in Q3 2025 (WHO, 23 Feb 2026)
15 WHO-verified attacks on warehouses holding health supplies in 2026 (WHO/Europe, 4 Sep 2026)
Feb 2027 — Annual WHO tally of attacks on health care in Ukraine for 2026
Verification depends on WHO country-office reporting; the SSA dashboard itself did not return Ukraine totals when fetched, so the latest cumulative figure after 23 Feb 2026 is unverified
IAEA Support and Assistance Mission to Zaporizhzhya (ISAMZ) and the Seven Indispensable Pillars Vienna
Continuous IAEA expert presence at the ZNPP since the Director General's mission of September 2022, endorsed by Board resolutions GOV/2022/58 (15 Sep 2022, 26–2–7), GOV/2022/71 (17 Nov 2022), GOV/2024/18 (7 Mar 2024) and GOV/2024/73 (12 Dec 2024) and by General Conference resolutions GC(67)/RES/16 (69–6–33), GC(68)/RES/15 (65–8–43), GC(69)/RES/16 (62–7–46) and the GC(70) resolution of Sep 2026 (63 in favour); IAEA experts are also present at Chornobyl, Rivne, Khmelnytskyy and South Ukraine. The Director General's Seven Indispensable Pillars for nuclear safety and security in armed conflict and the Five Principles for the ZNPP (presented to the Board in 2023) are the yardstick used in each report.
Six of the Seven Pillars fully or partially compromised at ZNPP; situation 'precarious' (GOV/2025/54, 1 Sep 2025)
26 complete losses of off-site power at ZNPP since the invasion; 10 in the 2026 reporting period (EU at Board citing DG report, 10 Sep 2026; Updates 362–366)
Plant down from 10 pre-war lines to one working line (330 kV Ferosplavna-1); 750 kV Dniprovska line out since March 2026 (Update 366; EU, 18 Sep 2026)
217 IAEA missions by 176 staff, 474 person-months at the five sites as of 29 Aug 2025 (GOV/2025/54)
Eight local ceasefires brokered by the IAEA for repairs, the 7th on 5–7 Sep 2026 and the 8th from 15 Oct 2026 (Updates 365–366, 371)
ISAMZ denied access to parts of the site and unable to confirm reported drone attacks (GOV/2025/26, 2 Jun 2025)
Nov 2026 — Director General's report to the November 2026 Board session; item kept on the General Conference agenda for 2027
ISAMZ remains on site but Russia denies full access to and information about the plant (EU and Denmark statements to the Board, 10 Sep 2026); rotations across the front line are repeatedly delayed by military activity.
OSCE Moscow Mechanism Vienna
Human dimension mechanism of 1991 (Moscow Document); invoked on Russia's war against Ukraine by 45 participating States on 3 Mar 2022, 2 Jun 2022, 30 Mar 2023 and in 2024, by 38 States on Russia's domestic practice (28 Jul 2022) and by 41 States on POWs (24 Jul 2025)
Apr 2022 and Jul 2022: violations of IHL and human rights, war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Ukraine since 24 Feb 2022 (two reports)
May 2023: forcible transfer and deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia
Apr 2024: arbitrary deprivation of liberty of Ukrainian civilians by Russia
Sep 2025: treatment of Ukrainian prisoners of war by Russia
Jul 2026: militarization and indoctrination of Ukrainian children by Russia
— Invoked ad hoc by participating States; no fixed cycle
Russia did not cooperate with the missions of experts; reports are based on open sources, interviews and submissions
OSCE Moscow Mechanism (missions of experts on Ukraine / Russia) Vienna
Human-dimension mechanism of 1991 allowing a group of participating States to dispatch a mission of experts without consensus. Invoked on Ukraine by 45 participating States with Ukraine's support on 3 March 2022 (first mission; report April 2022), again in 2022 and 2023, and by 45 States in 2024 on the arbitrary deprivation of liberty of Ukrainian civilians (recorded in the OSCE PA Birmingham 2022 and Bucharest 2024 Declarations). The individual reports (dates, titles, osce.org URLs) could not be opened from osce.org in this run — see 'unverified'.
45 participating States invoked the Mechanism on Ukraine on 3 Mar 2022 (US Mission to the OSCE; Birmingham Declaration, Jul 2022)
45 participating States invoked the Mechanism on the arbitrary deprivation of liberty of Ukrainian civilians (Bucharest Declaration, Jul 2024)
Dec 2026 — 33rd Ministerial Council, Lugano, 3–4 Dec 2026 (per the hub calendar) — statements expected to cite the reports
Russia has not cooperated with the missions and has blocked consensus on related OSCE decisions; reports rely on remote interviews and open sources.
OSCE ODIHR Ukraine monitoring (interim reports on violations of IHL and IHRL) Vienna
ODIHR monitoring of reported violations of international humanitarian and human rights law in Ukraine since 2022, financed outside the unified budget; nine interim reports to date, the ninth covering 1 Dec 2025 – 31 May 2026.
Pattern of strikes on energy facilities suggests intent to disrupt the national energy system as a whole (9th report, 15 Jul 2026)
1,090+ attacks on more than 550 energy facilities recorded by Ukrainian authorities (9th report, para 33)
Verified civilian casualties in government-controlled Ukraine up 45% on the same period of 2025 (9th report, para 28, OHCHR data)
Widespread, systematic torture of detained Ukrainian civilians; torture of POWs reported at almost every detention facility; detained civilians used as bargaining chips, amounting to hostage-taking (9th report)
Allegations of execution of 345+ surrendered Ukrainian servicemen, about which ODIHR 'remains seriously concerned' (9th report, para 49)
Jan 2027 — Tenth interim report expected (semi-annual cycle; not confirmed)
No access to occupied territory or to Russian-held detainees; interviews with released persons and witnesses in government-controlled Ukraine and abroad.
Eurojust — JIT Ukraine, CICED and ICPA The Hague
JIT agreement 25 Mar 2022 (Lithuania, Poland, Ukraine; ICC OTP 25 Apr 2022; Estonia, Latvia, Slovakia 30 May 2022; Romania 13 Oct 2022); Eurojust mandate on core international crimes evidence in force 1 Jun 2022; CICED operational 23 Feb 2023; ICPA operational 3 Jul 2023, EU-funded (EUR 8.3m + EUR 5m Dec 2025).
CICED holds about 10,000 evidence files from 17 countries (Eurojust, 24 Feb 2026)
JIT reached 4,000 witness interviews; focus on crimes at detention sites (annual report 2025)
Lithuania issued in-absentia notices of suspicion against six suspects; one suspect extradited from Ukraine (2025)
ICPA: first charges and notifications of suspicion for aggression presented (Eurojust, 24 Feb 2026)
— ICPA case files to be transferred to the Special Tribunal once operational
Evidence collection in Ukrainian-controlled territory and from refugees in EU States; no access to Russia or occupied territory.
International Claims Commission for Ukraine (Convention of 16 December 2025) The Hague
Convention approved by the Committee of Ministers 22 Oct 2025 and opened for signature in The Hague 16 Dec 2025; second pillar of the Reykjavik compensation mechanism (Register – Commission – compensation fund). Enters into force after 25 ratifications and sufficient financial commitments; open to non-member States and the EU.
35 States + EU signed at opening; Greece 19 Dec 2025 (16 Dec 2025)
Canada first non-member State to sign (11 May 2026); Estonia first ratification (30 Apr 2026)
40 signatories; 9 States + EU ratified after the Netherlands (15 Sep 2026)
— entry into force on 25th ratification plus financial commitments; seat expected in The Hague (Netherlands offer)
Russia is not a party; the compensation fund that would pay awards is still under discussion.
International Court of Justice — Allegations of Genocide (Ukraine v. Russian Federation), case 182 The Hague
Application filed 26 Feb 2022 under Article IX of the Genocide Convention; 32 States admitted as interveners (5 Jun 2023); jurisdiction upheld over Ukraine's request for a declaration that it did not commit genocide (2 Feb 2024).
Provisional measures: Russia must immediately suspend military operations, 13–2 (Order, 16 Mar 2022)
Jurisdiction over submission (b) 15–1; use-of-force and recognition claims excluded 12–4 (Judgment, 2 Feb 2024)
Russia's eight counter-claims alleging genocide by Ukraine admissible as such, 11–4 (Order, 5 Dec 2025)
7 Dec 2026 — Ukraine's Reply due; Russia's Rejoinder due 7 Dec 2027; merits hearing not yet scheduled
Russia participates in the written phase (Counter-Memorial 18 Nov 2024 with counter-claims) but has not complied with the 2022 provisional measures order.
International Court of Justice — Application of the ICSFT and CERD (Ukraine v. Russian Federation), case 166 The Hague
Application filed 16 Jan 2017; provisional measures 19 Apr 2017; Judgment on the merits 31 Jan 2024 (case closed).
Russia breached ICSFT art. 9(1) by failing to investigate alleged terrorism-financing offenders, 13–2 (31 Jan 2024)
Russia breached CERD arts. 2(1)(a), 5(e)(v) on Ukrainian-language school education in Crimea, 13–2 (31 Jan 2024)
Russia breached the 2017 order by maintaining the Mejlis ban (11–4) and aggravating the dispute (10–5)
Other claims rejected 10–5, including financing of terrorism via arms supply to Donbas groups
International Criminal Court — Situation in Ukraine The Hague
Ukraine's Article 12(3) declarations (2014: crimes 21 Nov 2013–22 Feb 2014; 2015: open-ended from 20 Feb 2014); investigation opened 2 Mar 2022 on referral by 39 States Parties (Lithuania 1 Mar, 38 jointly 2 Mar), later 43 with Japan, North Macedonia, Montenegro and Chile; Ukraine a State Party since 1 Jan 2025 (125th).
Arrest warrants for Putin and Lvova-Belova: deportation and transfer of Ukrainian children (17 Mar 2023)
Arrest warrants for Kobylash and Sokolov: attacks on civilian objects, energy grid (5 Mar 2024)
Arrest warrants for Shoigu and Gerasimov: same charges, Oct 2022–Mar 2023 strikes (24 Jun 2024)
Mongolia failed to cooperate in arresting Putin; referred to ASP (24 Oct 2024; ICC-ASP/24/33)
Dec 2026 — 25th session of the Assembly of States Parties (annual); no trial possible until a suspect is in custody
Russia is not a State Party, does not recognise the Court and does not cooperate; none of the six persons under warrant has been surrendered. No ICC access to occupied territory.
Technical assistance at the request of Ukraine under Article VIII, subparagraph 38(e) of the Chemical Weapons Convention: sampling, chain-of-custody verification and analysis by OPCW-designated laboratories; the mechanism does not attribute responsibility.
CS riot-control agent in grenade and trench soil, Illinka, incident 20 Sep 2024 (S/2338/2024, 18 Nov 2024)
CS in four grenades, soil and vegetation from three incidents near Mariivka and Illinka, Oct 2024 (S/2370/2025, 14 Feb 2025)
CS in two grenades and on FPV-drone remnants, Mariivka border post, 28 Feb 2025 (S/2415/2025, 20 Jun 2025)
Use of riot-control agents as a method of warfare is prohibited under the CWC
Nov 2026 — 31st Conference of the States Parties; Executive Council agenda item 6(f) on RCA/Russia/Ukraine recurs each session
Visits take place in Ukrainian-controlled territory on Ukraine's request; Russia rejects the findings. No TAV has confirmed chloropicrin; chloropicrin claims rest on Ukrainian and German/Dutch intelligence assessments.
Register of Damage Caused by the Aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine (RD4U) The Hague
Established by Resolution CM/Res(2023)3 of the Council of Europe at the Reykjavik Summit (May 2023) as an Enlarged Partial Agreement; seat The Hague; opened for claims on 2 April 2024 via Ukraine's Diia platform; 44 States and the EU participate (May 2026). Records eligible claims for damage on or after 24 Feb 2022; does not assess value or order payment.
195,000 claims received, 65,000+ recorded by the Board (30 Sep 2026)
All 43 categories open: 21 individuals, 11 legal entities, 11 State of Ukraine (30 Sep 2026)
100,000 individual claims reached (19 Jan 2026); 45,000 recorded at 11th Board meeting (30 Apr 2026)
Claims to be transferred to the International Claims Commission once it is established
Dec 2026 — next Board eligibility decisions; handover to the Claims Commission after 25 ratifications of the Convention
Claims accepted only digitally; the Register notes that claimants in areas with limited power, connectivity or security may file later. No access to occupied territory.
Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine The Hague
Bilateral agreement Council of Europe–Ukraine with annexed Statute, signed Strasbourg 25 Jun 2025 (CM authorisation 24 Jun 2025); ratified by Ukraine 15 Jul 2025; Enlarged Partial Agreement on the Management Committee adopted by the Committee of Ministers in Chişinău 15 May 2026 with 36 States + EU; open to States that voted for UNGA resolution ES-11/1.
Jurisdiction over those primarily responsible for the crime of aggression against Ukraine (Statute, 25 Jun 2025)
Netherlands offered to host the seat, formalised 17 Oct 2025, reaffirmed for the operational phase 3 Jul 2026
EU-funded advance team at work since Jan 2026 (financing agreement 23 Jan 2026)
Management Committee EPA: 36 States + EU (15 May 2026); judges not yet appointed
— Management Committee to adopt budget and rules; election of judges; investigations to begin thereafter
Russia rejects the Tribunal; trials in absentia and immunity questions depend on the Statute's provisions.
ECtHR inter-State cases Ukraine v. Russia / Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia Strasbourg
Inter-State applications under Article 33 ECHR: re Crimea (nos. 20958/14, 38334/18, lodged 2014/2018); Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (nos. 8019/16, 43800/14, 28525/20, 11055/22); Ukraine v. Russia (VIII) no. 55855/18 (lodged 29 Nov 2018); Ukraine v. Russia (IX) no. 10691/21 (lodged 19 Feb 2021). Russia ceased to be a party on 16 Sep 2022; the Court retains jurisdiction over facts up to that date.
Russia exercised effective control over Crimea from 27 Feb 2014 (decision, 14 Jan 2021)
Separatist-held eastern Ukraine under Russian jurisdiction from 11 May 2014 (decision, 30 Nov 2022)
pending — Just satisfaction (Article 41) in the inter-State judgments; Ukraine v. Russia (VIII) and (IX) pending; Committee of Ministers supervision of execution (first examination 8 Dec 2025)
Russia stopped participating in Council of Europe proceedings after exclusion; over 8,500 individual applications concerning Crimea, eastern Ukraine, the Sea of Azov and the 2022 invasion were pending (Jan 2023 factsheet)
Register of Damage for Ukraine (Enlarged Partial Agreement) and International Claims Commission Strasbourg
Register established by Resolution CM/Res(2023)3 at the Reykjavik Summit (16–17 May 2023); 44 states and the EU participate. Claims Commission created by the Convention CETS No. 229 opened for signature in The Hague on 16 Dec 2025 (enters into force after 25 ratifications).
c. 195,000 claims received, c. 65,000 recorded; 43 claim categories open (30 Sep 2026)
Claims opened to Ukrainian refugees abroad (23 Feb 2026)
Convention CETS 229 signed by 39 states + EU, ratified by 9 + EU (30 Sep 2026)
Preparatory committee for the Claims Commission launched 27 Feb 2026
pending — Entry into force of the Claims Commission convention after 25 ratifications and secured funding; Commission to take over the Register's work
Russia is not a participant and has not responded
UNESCO verification of damaged cultural sites in Ukraine (with UNITAR/UNOSAT satellite imagery) Agencies
Running preliminary damage assessment by UNESCO's Culture Sector since 24 February 2022, cross-checking reported incidents against satellite imagery and multiple credible sources; published on unesco.org and updated regularly (not a Committee-mandated investigative body).
563 cultural sites confirmed damaged as of 29 Sep 2026 (unesco.org, updated 7 Oct 2026)
1 Feb 2027 — Ukraine's state of conservation reports on Kyiv, L'viv and Odesa due to the World Heritage Centre for the 49th Committee session
Remote/satellite verification; UNESCO states the figures are preliminary and do not commit the Organization
Every recorded vote on Ukraine, with the full tally and the list of those against; every election since 2022 in which the Russian Federation or a Russian candidate stood, won or lost; the memberships Russia has lost; and the decisions Russia has blocked. Facts of the record only — no comment on how any state voted.
Recorded votes
Newest first
6 Oct 2026
VoteHuman Rights CouncilGeneva
63/22 Situation of human rights in the Russian Federation
21 in favour · 5 against · 21 abstained
Adopted at the 42nd meeting of the 63rd session, 6 October 2026; no Ukraine resolution was tabled at HRC 63 (the cooperation resolution is biennial: 53/30 in 2023, 59/22 in 2025)
61/29 Situation of human rights in Ukraine stemming from the Russian aggression (CoI mandate extended one year)
25 in favour · 4 against · 18 abstained
Adopted at the 54th meeting of the 61st session, 31 March 2026 (draft A/HRC/61/L.17); calls for swift and verifiable withdrawal of Russian troops; requests a CoI oral update at HRC 63, a comprehensive report at HRC 64 and a report to the 81st General Assembly; country lists not confirmed from an official source
Adopted at the 23rd/24th plenary meetings of ES-11 (draft A/ES-11/L.17) on the fourth anniversary; calls for an immediate ceasefire and release of detained persons. A US amendment to delete the sovereignty/territorial-integrity language was rejected 11-69-62 (tally from secondary reporting; verify in A/ES-11/PV.23-24). The United States, China and Brazil abstained. The 'no' list is from press reporting (reform.news, Euromaidan Press) pending the UN voting record.
80/223 Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine, including the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol
79 in favour · 16 against · 73 abstained · 25 not voting
Abstained: Algeria, Angola, Armenia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Central African Republic, China, Colombia, Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Gambia, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mongolia, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uzbekistan, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zimbabwe
Adopted at the 22nd plenary meeting of ES-11 (draft A/ES-11/L.16/Rev.1); demands the unconditional return of all Ukrainian children forcibly transferred or deported by Russia. Brazil, China and the GCC states abstained.
Nuclear safety, security and safeguards in Ukraine (69th regular session)
62 in favour · 7 against · 46 abstained
Adopted 19 Sep 2025 at the eleventh plenary meeting (iaea.org GC archive listing); recognises ZNPP as a Ukrainian facility that must operate exclusively under Ukrainian control and demands withdrawal of Russian military and other unauthorised personnel. Tally per Ukraine's MFA; the resolution PDF on iaea.org could not be opened to confirm.
59/22 Cooperation with and assistance to Ukraine in the field of human rights
28 in favour · 2 against · 17 abstained
Adopted at the 33rd meeting of the 59th session (Item 10); welcomes Ukraine's cooperation with OHCHR and HRMMU and keeps the OHCHR interactive dialogues on Ukraine on the agenda; country lists not confirmed from an official source
58/24 Situation of human rights in Ukraine stemming from the Russian aggression (CoI mandate extended one year)
25 in favour · 4 against · 18 abstained
Adopted at the 58th meeting of the 58th session (draft A/HRC/58/L.22); demands a halt to forcible transfer and deportation of civilians, particularly children, and to executions of POWs; country lists not confirmed from an official source
ES-11/7 Advancing a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine
93 in favour · 18 against · 65 abstained · 17 not voting
Against: Belarus, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, DPRK, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Haiti, Hungary, Israel, Mali, Marshall Islands, Nicaragua, Niger, Palau, Russian Federation, Sudan, United States
Abstained: Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Chad, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Honduras, India, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libya, Malawi, Mauritania, Micronesia, Mongolia, Mozambique, Namibia, North Macedonia, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Syria, Tajikistan, Togo, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uzbekistan, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe
Ukraine/EU text (draft A/ES-11/L.10), adopted at the 20th plenary meeting of ES-11 on the third anniversary of the invasion. The United States voted against for the first time; Hungary and Israel also voted no.
Abstained: Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahrain, Botswana, Brazil, Burundi, Central African Republic, China, Colombia, Cuba, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Haiti, Hungary, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Lesotho, Libya, Mauritania, Micronesia, Mozambique, Namibia, North Macedonia, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Qatar, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Syria, Tajikistan, Togo, Tonga, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Uzbekistan, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe
US draft A/ES-11/L.11 adopted at the 20th plenary meeting of ES-11 after three European amendments (L.13 60-18-81; L.14 79-16-67; L.15 83-16-61) restored references to the aggression, sovereignty and territorial integrity; Russian amendment L.12 rejected 31-71-59. The United States and Ukraine abstained on the amended text.
Resolution 2774 (2025) — US text imploring a swift end to the conflict and a lasting peace between Ukraine and the Russian Federation
10 in favour · 0 against · 5 abstained
Abstained: Denmark, France, Greece, Slovenia, United Kingdom
ADOPTED (not blocked) at the 9866th meeting. First Council resolution on the war since 2022; it does not name the aggression or affirm Ukraine's territorial integrity. Five amendments (UK on behalf of the European members; Russia) were not adopted — some for lack of votes, some because Russia cast its veto (S/2025/115, S/2025/116 recorded as vetoed drafts); France's motion to postpone the vote failed. Russia voted in favour.
79/184 Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine, including the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol
81 in favour · 14 against · 80 abstained · 18 not voting
Attacks on energy infrastructure critical to the safety of Ukraine's nuclear power plants (extraordinary meeting)
22 in favour · 2 against · 10 abstained
Against: China, Russian Federation
Fifth Board resolution, initiated by Ukraine at an extraordinary meeting; condemns attacks on substations supplying external power to NPPs without naming Russia; calls on Member States to support Ukraine's energy security. Symbol and date confirmed in GOV/2025/26; 22 in favour per Ukraine's Ministry of Energy, full tally per Ukrainska Pravda.
Resolution 2573 (2024) — Missing persons, prisoners of war and civilians in captivity as a result of the war of aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine
74 in favour · 0 against · 0 abstained
Roll-call vote recorded by the Assembly (PACE voting results, vote 40018).
Nuclear safety, security and safeguards in Ukraine (68th regular session)
65 in favour · 8 against · 43 abstained
Adopted at the tenth plenary meeting; reaffirms that Ukrainian NPPs including ZNPP must operate under full sovereign control of Ukraine; calls on Russia to give ISAMZ unrestricted access until control is returned. Tally printed on the resolution.
Adopted at the 99th plenary meeting of the 78th session (draft A/78/L.90); demands that Russia urgently withdraw its military and other personnel from the ZNPP and return it to Ukrainian control.
Nuclear safety, security and safeguards in Ukraine — return ZNPP to Ukrainian control
20 in favour · 2 against · 12 abstained
Against: China, Russian Federation
Fourth Board resolution, drafted by Ukraine; demands urgent withdrawal of all unauthorised personnel from the ZNPP and its immediate return to Ukrainian control; notes anti-personnel mines in the plant's buffer zone. Board of Governors records are restricted: the tally is as announced after the vote, not from a published record.
78/221 Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine, including the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol
78 in favour · 15 against · 79 abstained · 21 not voting
Nuclear safety, security and safeguards in Ukraine (67th regular session)
69 in favour · 6 against · 33 abstained
Adopted at the tenth plenary meeting; demands urgent withdrawal of unauthorised military and other personnel from the ZNPP and its return to full Ukrainian control; backs ISAMZ and IAEA presence at the other four sites. Tally printed on the resolution.
53/30 Cooperation with and assistance to Ukraine in the field of human rights
28 in favour · 3 against · 16 abstained
Against: China, Cuba, Eritrea
Abstained: Algeria, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Cameroon, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan, South Africa, Sudan, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Viet Nam
Item 10 (technical assistance); requests OHCHR oral updates on each report on Ukraine at every session until the 59th session, each followed by an interactive dialogue (draft A/HRC/53/L.1)
Resolution 2495 (2023) — Deportations and forcible transfers of Ukrainian children and other civilians to the Russian Federation or to temporarily occupied Ukrainian territories
87 in favour · 1 against · 1 abstained
Roll-call vote recorded by the Assembly (PACE voting results, vote 39334).
Adopted at the 69th plenary meeting of the 77th session; the preamble refers to 'the aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine' and to the end of Russia's membership of the Council of Europe. Russia forced a recorded vote.
Adopted at the 19th plenary meeting of ES-11 (draft A/ES-11/L.7) on the eve of the first anniversary. Two Belarusian amendments rejected: L.8 (11-94-56) and L.9 (15-91-52).
Resolution on the establishment of a tribunal on the crime of aggression against Ukraine
472 in favour · 19 against · 33 abstained
Urges a special international tribunal for the crime of aggression, preferably through the UN; supports the ICC investigation; urges Ukraine to ratify the Rome Statute.
Nuclear safety, security and safeguards in Ukraine — withdrawal of Russian personnel from ZNPP
24 in favour · 2 against · 7 abstained · 2 not voting
Against: China, Russian Federation
Abstained: India, Kenya, Namibia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Viet Nam
Third Board resolution; calls on Russia to cease all actions at Ukrainian nuclear facilities and withdraw military and other personnel from the ZNPP. Board of Governors records are restricted: the tally is as announced after the vote, not from a published record.
Adopted at the 15th plenary meeting of ES-11 (draft A/ES-11/L.6). Recognises that Russia must bear the legal consequences of its wrongful acts, including reparation, and recommends an international register of damage (later established in the Council of Europe, May 2023).
Adopted at ES-11 after the September 2022 'referendums' and attempted annexation of Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia regions; declares them invalid and calls on States not to recognise them.
Nuclear safety, security and safeguards in Ukraine — Zaporizhzhya NPP
26 in favour · 2 against · 7 abstained
Against: China, Russian Federation
Proposed by Poland and Canada; calls on Russia to immediately cease all actions against the ZNPP and other Ukrainian nuclear facilities so that Ukraine regains full control. Tally per the Polish National Atomic Energy Agency.
Draft A75/A/CONF./6 — Health emergency in Ukraine and refugee-receiving and -hosting countries, stemming from the Russian Federation's aggression (became WHA75.11)
88 in favour · 12 against · 53 abstained · 30 not voting
Approved at the eighth meeting of Committee A as recorded in WHA75 Journal No. 6 (27 May 2022); adopted in plenary 28 May 2022; the exact day of the Committee vote is not stated in the Journal
Draft A75/A/CONF./8 — Health emergency in and around Ukraine and refugee receiving and hosting countries (rival text without reference to aggression) — REJECTED
15 in favour · 66 against · 70 abstained · 32 not voting
Rejected at the eighth meeting of Committee A (WHA75 Journal No. 6, 27 May 2022); the Journal does not name the sponsors
Adopted at the 34th special session; tasks the Commission of Inquiry with events in Kyiv, Chernihiv, Kharkiv and Sumy regions (Feb–Mar 2022) and requests an oral update on Mariupol
Adopted at the 10th plenary meeting of ES-11 (draft A/ES-11/L.4); two-thirds of those present and voting required. Russia announced its withdrawal from the Council the same day.
Adopted at the 9th plenary meeting of ES-11 (draft A/ES-11/L.2). A competing South African draft (L.3) was not taken up: motion to act on it rejected 50-67-36.
Nuclear safety, security and safeguards in Ukraine (emergency Board meeting)
26 in favour · 2 against · 5 abstained · 2 not voting
Against: China, Russian Federation
First Board resolution after the invasion; deplores Russia's actions including seizure of nuclear facilities and calls on Russia to cease all actions at Chornobyl and other Ukrainian facilities. Tally per the Polish National Atomic Energy Agency; 'not_voting' derived from 35 Board members and may be inaccurate.
Adopted at the 11th emergency special session (draft A/ES-11/L.1), convened under 'Uniting for Peace' after Security Council resolution 2623 (2022) of 27 Feb 2022 (11-1-3). Deplores the aggression and demands that Russia withdraw all forces.
Resolution 2623 (2022) — convening the 11th emergency special session of the General Assembly
11 in favour · 1 against · 3 abstained
Against: Russian Federation
Abstained: China, India, United Arab Emirates
Procedural vote (no veto applies) under 'Uniting for Peace' (resolution 377 A (V)); first emergency special session convened by the Council since 1982.
76/70 Problem of the militarization of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, Ukraine, as well as parts of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov
62 in favour · 22 against · 55 abstained · 54 not voting
75/29 Problem of the militarization of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, Ukraine, as well as parts of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov
63 in favour · 17 against · 62 abstained · 51 not voting
74/17 Problem of the militarization of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, Ukraine, as well as parts of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov
63 in favour · 19 against · 66 abstained · 45 not voting
73/194 Problem of the militarization of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, Ukraine, as well as parts of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov
66 in favour · 19 against · 72 abstained · 36 not voting
Plenary resolution adopted by recorded vote (meeting A/73/PV.56). First adopted three weeks after the Kerch Strait incident of 25 Nov 2018 (draft A/73/L.47); an Iran/Syria amendment failed 25-64-60.
Adopted at the 80th plenary meeting of the 68th session (draft A/68/L.39) after the March 2014 'referendum' in Crimea; calls on States not to recognise any alteration of the status of Crimea and Sevastopol.
All elections where the Russian Federation or a Russian candidate stood. Listing wins as well as losses is what makes the losses citable.
Date
Body
Seat
Candidate
Result
Elected instead · note
Record
28 Nov 2025
IMO Assembly, 34th session
IMO Council, Category (a), 2026–2027 biennium
Russian Federation
Not elected Not published by IMO (secret ballot); 48 candidates for 40 seats
Category (a): China, Greece, Italy, Japan, Liberia, Norway, Panama, Republic of Korea, United Kingdom, United States Second consecutive defeat. IMO's pre-session briefing set the election for Friday 28 Nov 2025 (in-person secret ballot); the Danish Maritime Authority reported the result as 'today' on 27 Nov 2025 — ballot date to be confirmed.
UNESCO General Conference, 43rd session (Samarkand)
UNESCO Executive Board, Electoral Group II (Eastern European States), 2025–2029 (3 seats)
Russian Federation
Not elected Russia does not appear on UNESCO's results page; elected: Ukraine 137, Romania 135, Republic of Moldova 133
Ukraine, Romania, Republic of Moldova Ukraine's MFA reported that Russia received 93 votes, the fewest of four candidates (not shown on unesco.org, which lists only the three elected). Ukraine now sits on the Board 2025–2029; Russia has no seat.
OPCW Conference of the States Parties, 30th session (24–28 Nov 2025)
Executive Council, Eastern European Group, 2026–2028 (3 seats, term from 12 May 2026)
Russian Federation
Not elected secret ballot under Rules 79 and 81; tallies not published in the Conference report
Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine Third consecutive failure; five candidates (Armenia, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine) for three seats. Ukraine returns to the Council.
Part I: Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, United States. Part II: Argentina, Colombia, Denmark, Egypt, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland Russia was the only non-incumbent on the formal Part I candidate list (11 candidates for 10 seats) and, per the Council's later paper A43-WP/2 Appendix A, also stood in Part II; it was not elected in either part, nor in Part III on 30 Sep 2025. The Council was enlarged from 36 to 40 seats when the 2016 Protocol to Article 50(a) entered into force on 12 Jun 2026; four additional seats are to be filled at the 43rd (extraordinary) Assembly session in Nov 2026.
Category (a): China, Greece, Italy, Japan, Liberia, Norway, Panama, Republic of Korea, United Kingdom, United States First time Russia was absent from the IMO Council; the category in which it stood in 2023 is not stated on imo.org. The 2024–2025 Council list on imo.org contains no Russian Federation.
UNESCO Executive Board, Electoral Group II (Eastern European States), 2023–2027 (4 seats)
Russian Federation (outgoing member, term 2019–2023)
Not elected Russia does not appear on UNESCO's results page; elected: Serbia 137, Albania 134, Slovakia 117, Czechia 99
Serbia, Albania, Slovakia, Czechia Russia's Board term expired and it was not returned; UNESCO's official results list only the four elected candidates for four Group II seats, so whether Russia formally stood is not confirmed on unesco.org. Russia is absent from the Board composition 2023–2027 and 2025–2029.
Judge of the International Court of Justice, 2024–2033 (5 seats)
Kirill Gevorgian (Russian Federation), sitting judge and former Vice-President
Not elected General Assembly: 77 (absolute majority 97); Security Council rounds 1–5: 6, 5, 6, 6, 5 (majority 8). Elected: Gómez Robledo (Mexico) 143, Cleveland (USA) 135, Aurescu (Romania) 117, Charlesworth (Australia) 117, Tladi (South Africa) 113.
Bogdan-Lucian Aurescu (Romania) took the Eastern European seat; also Hilary Charlesworth, Sarah Cleveland, Juan Manuel Gómez Robledo, Dire Tladi First time that the USSR/Russia is not represented on the Court since its creation.
Human Rights Council, Eastern European States, 2024–2026 (2 seats)
Russian Federation
Not elected Vote counts not confirmed from an official page in this session (see unverified); Albania and Bulgaria elected
Albania, Bulgaria Russia's first attempt to return after its suspension (ES-11/3, 7 Apr 2022). Czechia had been elected on 10 May 2022 to fill the remainder of Russia's term (to 31 Dec 2023).
ICAO Council 2022–2025, Part I (States of chief importance in air transport)
Russian Federation
Not elected Not confirmed from an official page in this session (see unverified)
Part I 2022–2025: Russia absent from the elected list Russia had sat in Part I since 1970s; in the 42nd Assembly (27 Sep 2025) Russia again was not among Part I or Part II States elected.
ITU Council, Region C (Eastern Europe and Northern Asia), 2023–2026 (5 seats)
Russian Federation
Not elected Not confirmed from itu.int
Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Poland, Romania Russia is not listed on the ITU Council for 2023–2026 (ITU Council membership page); ballot figures not published on the page.
Suspensions, exclusions and memberships ended since February 2022.
10 Oct 2023
General Assembly — Russia failed to regain a seat on the Human Rights Council for 2024–2026 (Eastern European Group: Albania and Bulgaria elected). secret ballot; counts see unverified GA 78 elections page: HRC ↗
24 Feb 2023
FATF (Financial Action Task Force) — Suspended the membership of the Russian Federation; Russia remains bound by FATF Standards and the suspension is reviewed at each plenary. FATF statement on the Russian Federation ↗
16 Sep 2022
European Court of Human Rights — Russia ceased to be a High Contracting Party to the European Convention on Human Rights on 16 September 2022 (Court plenary resolution of 22 March 2022). The Court keeps jurisdiction over acts and omissions that occurred up to that date; the Committee of Ministers continues to supervise execution of judgments against Russia under Article 46. ECtHR plenary resolution, 22 Mar 2022 ↗ Execution of judgments – Russian Federation ↗
21 Apr 2022
Organization of American States, Permanent Council — Suspended the Russian Federation's status as Permanent Observer to the OAS. 25–0–8 OAS press release E-022/22 ↗
7 Apr 2022
General Assembly — Suspended the rights of membership of the Russian Federation in the Human Rights Council (resolution ES-11/3); Russia then announced its withdrawal from the Council. Czechia was elected on 10 May 2022 to the vacated seat for the remainder of the term. 93–24–58 Resolution ↗ Press release GA/12414 ↗
16 Mar 2022
Committee of Ministers (Council of Europe) — Resolution CM/Res(2022)2: the Russian Federation ceased to be a member of the Council of Europe as from 16 March 2022, under Article 8 of the Statute, after 26 years of membership. Resolution CM/Res(2022)3 of 23 March 2022 settled the legal and financial consequences. CoE press release ↗ Cessation of membership (CM/Res(2022)2 and (2022)3) ↗ Resolution CM/Res(2022)2 (PDF) ↗
Mar 2022
ILO Governing Body — Temporarily suspended ILO technical cooperation and assistance to the Russian Federation (except humanitarian), suspended Russia's invitations to discretionary ILO meetings, and asked the Director-General to examine relocating the ILO Decent Work Team and Country Office for Eastern Europe and Central Asia out of Russia (GB.344 resolution). not recorded in the resolution text GB.344 resolution (PDF) ↗
25 Feb 2022
Committee of Ministers (Council of Europe) — Suspended the Russian Federation's rights of representation in the Committee of Ministers and the Parliamentary Assembly and launched the Article 8 procedure of the Statute, the day after the full-scale invasion. CoE press release (16 Mar 2022, refers to 25 Feb decision) ↗
Where Russia blocked
Vetoes, blocked consensus and refused access, with the vote where there was one.
24 Feb 2025
Security Council — Russia vetoed amendments (recorded as S/2025/115 and S/2025/116) proposed by the United Kingdom on behalf of Denmark, France, Greece, Slovenia and the UK to the US draft that became resolution 2774 (2025); the amendments would have referred to the full-scale invasion and to Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity (9866th meeting, S/PV.9866). Other amendments failed for lack of votes. Press release SC/16005 ↗ Meeting record S/PV.9866 ↗ UN veto list (Dag Hammarskjöld Library) ↗
24 Oct 2024
ICC — Execution of the ICC arrest warrant against Putin was blocked when Mongolia, a State Party, hosted him in September 2024 without arresting him; Pre-Trial Chamber II found Mongolia in non-compliance and referred the matter to the Assembly of States Parties. Russia itself does not recognise the Court and does not cooperate with it. unanimous Chamber finding ICC press release, 24 Oct 2024 ↗ ASP Bureau report ICC-ASP/24/33 (PDF) ↗
30 Sep 2022
Security Council — Russia vetoed draft resolution S/2022/720 (Albania, United States) declaring the 23–27 September 'referendums' in Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia regions invalid and calling on States not to recognise any change of status (9143rd meeting, S/PV.9143). The General Assembly then adopted ES-11/4 (143-5-35) on 12 Oct 2022. 10–1–4 (against: Russian Federation; abstaining: Brazil, China, Gabon, India) Press release SC/15046 ↗ Draft S/2022/720 ↗ Meeting record S/PV.9143 ↗
General Assembly — The Assembly declined to act on the Russia-backed South African humanitarian draft A/ES-11/L.3 at the 9th plenary meeting of ES-11: the motion to take a decision on it was rejected 50–67–36, and ES-11/2 was adopted instead (140-5-38). 50–67–36 (motion rejected) Press release GA/12411 ↗
16 Mar 2022
ICJ — Russia has not implemented the ICJ's binding Order of 16 March 2022 requiring it to immediately suspend the military operations commenced on 24 February 2022; the operations continue as of October 2026. In the separate ICSFT/CERD case the Court found on 31 January 2024 that Russia had also breached its 2017 provisional measures order (Mejlis ban 11–4; aggravation of the dispute 10–5). 13–2 (order); 11–4 and 10–5 (2024 findings of breach of 2017 order) Order of 16 March 2022 (PDF) ↗ ICJ press release, 31 Jan 2024 ↗
25 Feb 2022
Security Council — Russia vetoed draft resolution S/2022/155 (Albania, United States) deploring the aggression against Ukraine as a violation of Article 2(4) of the Charter and demanding immediate withdrawal of Russian forces (8979th meeting, S/PV.8979). 11–1–3 (against: Russian Federation; abstaining: China, India, United Arab Emirates) Press release SC/14808 ↗ Draft S/2022/155 ↗ Meeting record S/PV.8979 ↗
A short note for the hour before a meeting: the latest findings of the bodies in that city, the latest votes, what Russia said there and what to ask for. Rebuilt with every update; each one is a one-page PDF.
What to cite
Before a meeting in GenevaHuman Rights Council · OHCHR / HRMMU · Commission of Inquiry · Treaty bodies · Special procedures · WHO · UNHCR · IOM
Renew the mandate of the Commission of Inquiry by vote and fund the Monitoring Mission for the next year.
Demand access for OHCHR to occupied territory and to all prisoners of war held by Russia, which Russia has refused since 2022.
Raise the deportation of Ukrainian children in the Council's dialogue with the Commission and in the review of the Russian Federation by the treaty bodies.
Cite the Commission and the Monitoring Mission by document symbol: their findings are the record the Secretariat repeats.
Ukraine in the latest noon briefingsTaken from the source by the site itself · not yet reviewed by an editor ·
· Egypt, Jordan, Ukraine & other topics - Daily Press Briefing — UN Transcriptstranscript ↗
Our guest on Monday is, will be Bjorg Sangjer, Assistant Secretary General for Policy in the Department of Economic and Social Affairs; and Sarah Hendrix, the Director of Policy Program and Intergovernmental Divisions at UN Women. They'll be here to brief you on the Secretary-General's annual report on women, peace, and security. 00 p.m., there will be a briefing by the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine. Erik Moos, the Chairman, will be virtually from Oslo, and Pablo de Greiff from Colombia will be here in the room. The Secretary-General is leaving for Egypt in a few hours.
The Secretary-General also calls for all those responsible to be found and to be held to account. Let me start with Ukraine, where we, along with our humanitarian partners, continue to reach frontline communities despite continued attacks. Our colleagues The Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs tell us that today, two interagency convoys delivered food. They delivered clothes, hygiene, winter kits, and other essential supplies to frontline communities in the regions of Kherson and Dnipro.
Meanwhile, authorities report that civilians were killed and injured, including children. That took place between yesterday and this morning in attacks across Ukraine. Energy infrastructure also came under attack, leaving half a million without electricity. across several regions. A power plant suspended operations after sustaining significant damage.
A power plant suspended operations after sustaining significant damage. Our humanitarian colleagues also tell us that an attack yesterday on Kharkiv damaged vehicles and a generator belonging to an NGO. Nearly two-thirds of more than 250 humanitarian access incidents recorded between January and August involved violence against aid workers, their assets, and their facilities. Turning to Yemen, humanitarian colleagues tell us that more than 256,000 people have now been forced from their homes since the start of the fighting in August in that country, and the fighting is continuing.
22 Oct 2026 · Daily Press Briefing by the Spokespersons of the Secretary-General w/ Jorge Moreira da Silva (UNOPS) briefing on his rectranscript ↗
At the same time, he said, we cannot let intolerable violence obscure the very legitimate and very real grievances of many of the peaceful demonstrators. He added that from the Middle East to Ukraine to Sudan, we're seeing civilians and civilian infrastructure deliberately thrust into the line of fire. Nothing seems to be off limits, he said, warning that war exposes the fundamental unfairness of an economic system that forces those with the least to absorb the greatest shocks. Everywhere, he said, fighting must stop.
Again, we continue to urge all to respect the freedom of movement for peacekeepers and to avoid any acts that could lead to further escalation. And moving to Ukraine, where humanitarian colleagues tell us that repeated attacks continue to claim civilian lives, disrupt essential services, and hinder humanitarian evacuations. In regions of Kyiv and Kharkiv. Those were the most impacted, while attacks on the capital damaged homes, medical facility, ambulances, and some transport infrastructure.
Relentless attacks were also impacting humanitarian operations. Yesterday, a drone strike severely damaged a clearly marked humanitarian vehicle in the Donetsk region, forcing the humanitarian group to suspend its operations to try to evacuate people from Kramatorsk, and Sloviansk in the region. Aid workers, thankfully, were unharmed. Our humanitarian partners, including with support from UN agencies, are providing emergency repair material, hot meals, cash assistance, and psychosocial support.
Our humanitarian partners, including with support from UN agencies, are providing emergency repair material, hot meals, cash assistance, and psychosocial support. Yesterday, an interagency convoy delivered medicines, hygiene kits, and winter supplies to a frontline community in the region of Zaporizhzhia, where access remains severely restricted, as you well know. And lastly, a note from Afghanistan, where our friends at the World Food Programme warned that the situation in the country is deteriorating fast, and hunger and malnutrition are no longer seasonal setbacks. The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification projection released earlier this month confirms more than 19.2 million human beings are acutely food insecure in Afghanistan, of which 5 million will be facing emergency levels of hunger, while 4 million children and 1.3 million mothers are projected to be malnourished.
21 Oct 2026 · Emissions Gap Report, El Niño, Extreme heat & other topics - Daily Press Briefing — UN Transcriptstranscript ↗
UN Spokesperson 17:48 We are not at this point able to make a formal determination. Speaker 4 17:53 And secondly, does the Secretary-General have any comment on the announcement of talks between the United States, Russia, and Ukraine next month on ending the war in Ukraine. UN Spokesperson 18:16 We always welcome new avenues of dialogue to bring an end to this war. We are always ready to support any efforts to bring an end to the war in Ukraine based on international law, based on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, and for a settlement to be just, to be fair and sustainable, and also based on all relevant UN resolutions.
A follow-up on Edie's question about these multilateral meetings. On the Ukraine-U UN Spokesperson 19:43 I mean, this story literally broke, I think, in the last 10 minutes, so let us look into it. Speaker 10 19:48 All right. Number two is on the story that broke a few days ago, which is trilateral U.S., Russia, China.
Speaker 30 29:03 Thank you very much. President Trump said recently that president of Ukraine shouldn't be at the moment anymore in the discussion for peace. He thinks that somebody else should represent Ukraine. Now, But does the Secretary General think that this is something that could help or not the peace process?
Paragraphs that mention Ukraine, copied verbatim from the UN transcript. An editor turns them into entries of the record above, with the speaker named.
OHCHR monthly update detected automatically: September 2026ukraine.ohchr.org ↗ · checked 23 Oct 2026
How to use
Quote the UN, not usThe rule for every entry
Cite the speaker and the date, never "the UN says". The Secretary-General's words carry the Charter; the Spokesperson's noon briefing is on the record and transcribed the same day; an OCHA or OHCHR figure is the one the Secretariat will repeat.
Figures first, assessments second. "More than 100 civilians killed in one week (OHCHR, 9 Oct)" is Tier A. "Could amount to war crimes" (High Commissioner, 8 Oct) is a UN position — strong, but not a finding. We keep the two apart on this page and in every PDF.
Quote all of it. On 7 Oct the Secretary-General condemned the attacks on Ukrainian cities and, in the same statement, voiced concern at civilian casualties in Russia. Leaving out the second sentence invites the reply "selective quotation" and loses the first.
Official record over transcript. Links go to press.un.org and the verbatim records (S/PV.). The automatic transcripts at transcripts.un.org are used only on the day, until the official text is posted; quotes on this page are checked against the official text when it appears.
Where it feeds
On this siteEach entry is reused, not copied
Case files. "UN said" is a fixed line on each card and one-pager: Pryluky — ASG Khiari, 9 Oct; Kramatorsk — High Commissioner, 8 Oct; Kyiv energy — Spokesperson, 14 Oct.
Fact-checks. Each Russian claim is set against what UN officials said the same week; the Secretary-General's 7 Oct statement answers "only military facilities" (Nebenzia at the Council, 9 Oct).
Brief and pulse. The newest UN entry opens the weekly brief; the monthly pulse quotes the OHCHR update it is built on.
Subscribe. "UN statements" is a category of its own: same-day alert with the quote, the link and the figure.
Watch list
Where the statements come fromChecked daily · New York 12:00 noon briefing
Statements attributable to the Spokesperson (SG/SM), High Commissioner comments, UNICEF, UNHCR, IAEA, WHO, UNESCO, Commission of Inquiry
What the UN has not said
No Secretary-General statement in October uses the words "war crime"; the High Commissioner says "could amount to". The UN names "Russian forces" as the attacker in the 7 Oct statement and "Russian long-range drone attacks" in the 2 Oct update, and in both also records casualties in Russia. This page shows the wording as given, so that no one who quotes it is corrected from the Russian side.
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Photo & video
Every photograph and video on this site in one place — from the State Emergency Service, city and regional administrations and the case files — each with its source, date, licence and a link to the original post. Free to reuse with the credit line: Copy credit gives the line; 1:1 and 16:9 give a ready image for social media with the credit printed on it. Data as of 23 Oct 2026.
Newest first
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Rules
What we show and what we never showThe same rules on the site, in every PDF and in every download
Only official sources with an open licence. The State Emergency Service, the Kyiv city administration, the National Police, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Cabinet of Ministers and the Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk regional administrations publish under CC BY 4.0. Agency photographs and images without a licence are linked, never copied.
No bodies, ever. Images that may distress — blood, covered remains, a child's belongings — are blurred until you click, are printed blurred in the PDFs and are left out of the share kit.
No identifiable children or prisoners of war. The Third Geneva Convention protects prisoners of war from public curiosity; we apply the same rule to children.
Nothing that helps the attacker. Only what an official source has already published — at once if the source published it, otherwise not earlier than 24 hours after the strike; never air defence, never a precise point of impact.
Reuse
How to creditDiplomats, journalists and researchers are welcome to reuse
Use the line given by Copy credit, for example: Photo: State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · CC BY 4.0 · via Ukraine Evidence Hub. Link to the original post where you can.
Every case file also has a ZIP of its photographs; sensitive images in it are marked sensitive-.
Have photographs or video of a crime yourself? See Have evidence? — we do not collect material, we tell you where it counts.
For every recent case file: what images we hold, how they are dated, who named the place and the weapon, whether the UN has recorded the attack, and what Russia said. The verdict is mechanical: corroborated when the UN record mentions the attack and at least two Ukrainian authorities name it; consistent when two or more independent official sources agree; preliminary otherwise. Built from the case-file data at every update.
How we verified
Kyiv: an operating theatre in daylightKyiv and Kyiv region · 20–21 October 2026
Consistent across 10 official Ukrainian sources
Images on file9 photos, 0 videos — State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS)
Dated 20 Oct 2026 – 21 Oct 2026 — the day of the attack or the rescue work that followed
Place Kyiv and Kyiv region — named by the State Emergency Service and the regional authorities; shown at town level only
UN record this attack is not yet mentioned by a UN body; UN reports on the pattern are cited in the case file
Ukrainian authorities10 official sources
Media that reported it3 outlets (Tier C)
Russia's account3 Russian statements recorded and answered in the case file
Not independently geolocated by the Hub. We check dates, places and the agreement of independent official sources; geolocation is left to courts and specialised investigators.
Nova Vodolaha: a drone on a town parkNova Vodolaha, Kharkiv region · 19 October 2026
Consistent across 9 official Ukrainian sources
Images on file4 photos, 0 videos — State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS)
Dated 19 Oct 2026 — the day of the attack or the rescue work that followed
Place Nova Vodolaha, Kharkiv region — named by the State Emergency Service and the regional authorities; shown at town level only
Weapon Geran-3 — Kharkiv regional prosecutor's office, 19 Oct 2026
UN record this attack is not yet mentioned by a UN body; UN reports on the pattern are cited in the case file
Ukrainian authorities9 official sources
Media that reported it3 outlets (Tier C)
Russia's account2 Russian statements recorded and answered in the case file
Not independently geolocated by the Hub. We check dates, places and the agreement of independent official sources; geolocation is left to courts and specialised investigators.
Vinnytsia, 17 October 2026: a city without powerVinnytsia · Lutsk · Rivne · Zhytomyr · night of 16–17 October 2026
Consistent across 8 official Ukrainian sources
Images on file5 photos, 0 videos — State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS)
Dated 16 Oct 2026 — the day of the attack or the rescue work that followed
Place Vinnytsia — named by the State Emergency Service and the regional authorities; shown at town level only
UN record this attack is not yet mentioned by a UN body; UN reports on the pattern are cited in the case file
Ukrainian authorities8 official sources
Media that reported it8 outlets (Tier C)
Russia's account3 Russian statements recorded and answered in the case file
Not independently geolocated by the Hub. We check dates, places and the agreement of independent official sources; geolocation is left to courts and specialised investigators.
Dnipro: a jet drone into the working dayDnipro · 28 September 2026 · midday · with the 22 September ballistic strike on Interpipe
Consistent across 7 official Ukrainian sources
Images on file1 photos, 0 videos — State Emergency Service, Dnipropetrovsk region
Dated no dated image
Place Dnipro — named by the State Emergency Service and the regional authorities; shown at town level only
UN record this attack is not yet mentioned by a UN body; UN reports on the pattern are cited in the case file
Ukrainian authorities7 official sources
Media that reported it15 outlets (Tier C)
Russia's account2 Russian statements recorded and answered in the case file
Not independently geolocated by the Hub. We check dates, places and the agreement of independent official sources; geolocation is left to courts and specialised investigators.
850 drones in 33 hoursLutsk · Kropyvnytskyi · six regions · 14–15 October 2026 · 33 hours
Consistent across 8 official Ukrainian sources
Images on file9 photos, 2 videos — State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS)
Dated 14 Oct 2026 – 15 Oct 2026 — the day of the attack or the rescue work that followed
Place Lutsk — named by the State Emergency Service and the regional authorities; shown at town level only
UN record this attack is not yet mentioned by a UN body; UN reports on the pattern are cited in the case file
Ukrainian authorities8 official sources
Media that reported it9 outlets (Tier C)
Russia's account2 Russian statements recorded and answered in the case file
Not independently geolocated by the Hub. We check dates, places and the agreement of independent official sources; geolocation is left to courts and specialised investigators.
Kharkiv: five strikes in eleven daysKharkiv and Pisochyn · 2–12 October 2026 · five strikes
Corroborated: on the UN record and named by several Ukrainian authorities
Images on file9 photos, 2 videos — State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · State Emergency Service, Kharkiv region
Dated 12 Oct 2026 – 21 Oct 2026 — some images are dated later than the rescue work: check before use
Place Kharkiv and Pisochyn — named by the State Emergency Service and the regional authorities; shown at town level only
UN record this attack is mentioned in the UN record (Kharkiv) — see International record
Ukrainian authorities5 official sources
Media that reported it14 outlets (Tier C)
Russia's account3 Russian statements recorded and answered in the case file
Not independently geolocated by the Hub. We check dates, places and the agreement of independent official sources; geolocation is left to courts and specialised investigators.
Kyiv, 14 October 2026: the lightsKyiv · night of 13–14 October 2026
Corroborated: on the UN record and named by several Ukrainian authorities
Images on file1 photos, 0 videos — State Emergency Service, Kyiv
Dated no dated image
Place Kyiv — named by the State Emergency Service and the regional authorities; shown at town level only
UN record this attack is mentioned in the UN record (Kyiv) — see International record
Ukrainian authorities7 official sources
Media that reported it15 outlets (Tier C)
Russia's account4 Russian statements recorded and answered in the case file
Not independently geolocated by the Hub. We check dates, places and the agreement of independent official sources; geolocation is left to courts and specialised investigators.
Zaporizhzhia: five bombs on sleeping homesZaporizhzhia · 10 October 2026 · before dawn
Corroborated: on the UN record and named by several Ukrainian authorities
Images on file6 photos, 1 videos — State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · State Emergency Service, Zaporizhzhia region
Dated 10 Oct 2026 — the day of the attack or the rescue work that followed
Place Zaporizhzhia — named by the State Emergency Service and the regional authorities; shown at town level only
UN record this attack is mentioned in the UN record (Zaporizhzhia) — see International record
Ukrainian authorities8 official sources
Media that reported it9 outlets (Tier C)
Russia's account4 Russian statements recorded and answered in the case file
Not independently geolocated by the Hub. We check dates, places and the agreement of independent official sources; geolocation is left to courts and specialised investigators.
Kramatorsk: two city buses on a morning streetKramatorsk, Donetsk region · 8 October 2026 · ~10:00
Corroborated: on the UN record and named by several Ukrainian authorities
Images on file10 photos, 1 videos — State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · State Emergency Service, Donetsk region
Dated 8 Oct 2026 – 20 Oct 2026 — some images are dated later than the rescue work: check before use
Place Kramatorsk, Donetsk region — named by the State Emergency Service and the regional authorities; shown at town level only
Weapon 1 — Donetsk regional prosecutor; National Police, 8 Oct 2026
UN record this attack is mentioned in the UN record (Kramatorsk) — see International record
Ukrainian authorities6 official sources
Media that reported it13 outlets (Tier C)
Russia's account2 Russian statements recorded and answered in the case file
Not independently geolocated by the Hub. We check dates, places and the agreement of independent official sources; geolocation is left to courts and specialised investigators.
Pryluky: a sleeping apartment block, 150 km from the frontPryluky, Chernihiv region · 7 October 2026
Corroborated: on the UN record and named by several Ukrainian authorities
Images on file10 photos, 4 videos — State Emergency Service of Ukraine (DSNS) · State Emergency Service, Chernihiv region
Dated 7 Oct 2026 – 9 Oct 2026 — the day of the attack or the rescue work that followed
Place Pryluky, Chernihiv region — named by the State Emergency Service and the regional authorities; shown at town level only
UN record this attack is mentioned in the UN record (Pryluky) — see International record
Ukrainian authorities6 official sources
Media that reported it12 outlets (Tier C)
Russia's account3 Russian statements recorded and answered in the case file
Not independently geolocated by the Hub. We check dates, places and the agreement of independent official sources; geolocation is left to courts and specialised investigators.
What survivors, relatives and witnesses told the bodies that investigate — in their words, as published. A UN Commission of Inquiry, OHCHR and the OSCE Moscow Mechanism · B Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Truth Hounds, ZMINA. We do not interview anyone ourselves; names appear only where the source gives them. Accounts about the conduct of Ukrainian forces are shown too, as in the sources.
45accounts · newest report first
“It's impossible to do anything around the house. My body is just freezing.”
— a Kyiv resident (energy outages, winter 2025–2026), Kyiv
A OHCHR / UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU) · Attacks against Ukraine's energy infrastructure and update on the human rights situation in Ukraine, 1 Dec 2025 – 31 May 2026 (44th periodic report) · para 33 · 29 Jun 2026 · Source ↗
“My whole body froze while standing near the well.”
— a 77-year-old woman in Kyiv, Kyiv
A OHCHR / UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU) · Attacks against Ukraine's energy infrastructure and update on the human rights situation in Ukraine, 1 Dec 2025 – 31 May 2026 (44th periodic report) · para 36 · 29 Jun 2026 · Source ↗
“This was a theatre of farce, where we were mere observers. It was a one-sided game.”
— a person tried and convicted by a Russian court, recalling her trial, Russian Federation (court)
A Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine · A/HRC/61/61 · para 22 · 12 Mar 2026 · Source ↗
“They tortured me and left me to die. It's a miracle I'm still alive. Those weeks changed my life and my family's forever.”
— a 26-year-old man, a former contract soldier of the Ukrainian armed forces, village in Kherson Oblast
A Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine · A/HRC/61/61 · para 46 · 12 Mar 2026 · Source ↗
“I was sad, I was scared. I worried that I would have to live in the Russian Federation.”
— one child who managed to return to Ukraine, Russian Federation
A Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine · A/HRC/61/61 · Summary · 12 Mar 2026 · Source ↗
“I am still looking for my daughter, and I am terribly afraid of what she might think of me…”
— a mother who has not managed to find her daughter, placed in an unidentified institution in the Russian Federation, Russian Federation (unidentified institution)
A Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine · A/HRC/61/CRP.8 · para 13 · 12 Mar 2026 · Source ↗
“Your day starts with explosions. The explosions wake you up instead of an alarm.”
— an evacuee in a transit centre, on life in a frontline settlement in Dnipropetrovsk region, Dnipropetrovsk region (frontline settlement)
A OHCHR / UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU) · Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, 1 June – 30 November 2025 (43rd periodic report) · epigraph before para 35 · 9 Dec 2025 · Source ↗
“The atmosphere in our town is very tense. People are afraid of the occupation authorities and Russian soldiers.”
— a woman from occupied Kherson region, occupied Kherson region
A OHCHR / UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU) · Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, 1 June – 30 November 2025 (43rd periodic report) · epigraph before para 96 · 9 Dec 2025 · Source ↗
“The most hideous thing was the hunger. Constant hunger. Bodily injuries are nothing in comparison to the hunger.”
— a Ukrainian POW on conditions of internment in a pre-trial detention facility in the Russian Federation, pre-trial detention facility, Russian Federation
A OHCHR / UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU) · Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, 1 June – 30 November 2025 (43rd periodic report) · epigraph before para 58 · 9 Dec 2025 · Source ↗
“During my whole time in the facility, we were beaten almost every day.”
— a Ukrainian POW on treatment in 2025 in a pre-trial detention facility in the Russian Federation, pre-trial detention facility, Russian Federation
A OHCHR / UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU) · Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, 1 June – 30 November 2025 (43rd periodic report) · epigraph after para 59 · 9 Dec 2025 · Source ↗
“I knew nothing, but they kept torturing me even more.”
— a Russian POW on torture during interrogation in a transit place, transit place (Ukrainian custody)
Also on the record: this account concerns the conduct of Ukrainian forces.
A OHCHR / UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU) · Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, 1 June – 30 November 2025 (43rd periodic report) · epigraph before para 65 · 9 Dec 2025 · Source ↗
“We are hit every day, drones fly at any time – morning, evening, day or night, constantly.”
— one man from the targeted localities, Kherson, Dnipropetrovsk and Mykolaiv regions (drone-targeted localities)
A Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine · A/80/497 · Summary · 21 Oct 2025 · Source ↗
“We don’t have a day without injuries in Kherson.”
— one resident (July 2025), Kherson
A Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine · A/80/497 · para 14 · 21 Oct 2025 · Source ↗
“Drones do not allow us to put out fires – they keep watch and they will drop an explosive on people…”
— a woman from Dobra Nadiia village, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, Dobra Nadiia, Dnipropetrovsk region
A Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine · A/80/497 · para 22 · 21 Oct 2025 · Source ↗
“I saw the house burn down in front of my eyes and there was nothing I could do.”
— a 47-year-old woman from Dniprovske village, Mykolaiv Oblast, Dniprovske, Mykolaiv region
A Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine · A/80/497 · para 23 · 21 Oct 2025 · Source ↗
“We hid the generators. If you left it in the middle of the yard, it would definitely be hit by a drone.”
— a woman from Kherson Oblast, Kherson region
A Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine · A/80/497 · para 37 · 21 Oct 2025 · Source ↗
“I feared that if the Russians found out that someone was searching for him, they might retaliate.”
— the wife of a man who disappeared in an area marked by hostilities, area marked by hostilities (not specified)
A Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine · A/HRC/58/67 · para 17 · 19 Mar 2025 · Source ↗
“The despair is killing me. I don't know what to do or how to help my husband.”
— the wife of a man missing for over two years, not specified
A Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine · A/HRC/58/67 · para 30 · 19 Mar 2025 · Source ↗
“It was just pain. I couldn't even breathe.”
— a 26-year-old female prisoner of war, detention facility, Russian Federation
A Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine · A/HRC/58/67 · para 49 · 19 Mar 2025 · Source ↗
“The explosion was so strong that I immediately found myself on the floor.”
— a surgeon at Okhmatdyt children's hospital who was operating on a child at the moment of the strike, Kyiv, Okhmatdyt children's hospital
B Amnesty International · Ukraine: Russian strikes exact increasingly heavy toll on Ukraine's children (EUR 50/8743/2024) · p. 3 · 18 Nov 2024 · Source ↗
“During the evacuation, it was complete chaos.”
— the godmother of a child patient undergoing treatment at the hospital that morning, Kyiv, Okhmatdyt children's hospital
B Amnesty International · Ukraine: Russian strikes exact increasingly heavy toll on Ukraine's children (EUR 50/8743/2024) · p. 4 · 18 Nov 2024 · Source ↗
“It was hell. Explosions. Destroyed buildings. Houses on fire. Wounded people crying.”
— a woman who evacuated an injured man (siege of Mariupol), Mariupol
A Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine · A/HRC/55/66 · para 15 · 15 Mar 2024 · Source ↗
“No creature alive deserves to be treated like Russians treat Ukrainians in their detention facilities.”
— a former detainee, Russian detention facilities
A Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine · A/HRC/55/66 · para 69 · 15 Mar 2024 · Source ↗
“Every time I answered that I didn't know or didn't remember something, they gave me electric shocks”
— a victim who had been subjected to electric shocks, occupied territory (Kherson/Zaporizhzhia regions covered by report)
A Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine · A/78/540 · para 51 · 19 Oct 2023 · Source ↗
“It was so painful … I thought I would die there. It was lasting for two hours.”
— a victim, occupied territory (Kherson/Zaporizhzhia regions covered by report)
A Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine · A/78/540 · para 62 · 19 Oct 2023 · Source ↗
“I am still waiting for my wife, I cannot believe they are all gone, I cannot sleep, I cannot eat…”
— a man who lost his wife, son and daughter-in-law in the attack (first name given by OHCHR), Hroza
A OHCHR / UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU) · Attack on Funeral Reception in Hroza, 5 October 2023 · p. 5 · 2023-10 · Source ↗
“Those injured helped others with everything they had at hand”
— a survivor released during a prisoner exchange in September (first name given by HRW), Olenivka
B Human Rights Watch · One Year Since Death of Ukrainian POWs in Explosion · article body · 28 Jul 2023 · Source ↗
“Doctors among the captives were allowed to help, but it was not enough.”
— a survivor released during a prisoner exchange in September (first name given by HRW), Olenivka
B Human Rights Watch · One Year Since Death of Ukrainian POWs in Explosion · article body · 28 Jul 2023 · Source ↗
“As soon as I tried to say something, I started shaking. I was afraid I would be beaten if I said something wrong.”
— a resident of occupied Kakhovka, Kherson region, detained at the Armiansk checkpoint in January 2023, Simferopol pre-trial detention centre No. 2 (detained at Armiansk checkpoint)
B Human Rights Centre ZMINA · A story of a man spent two months in captivity in the Russian pre-trial detention center with other civilians and volunteers · article body · 3 Jul 2023 · Source ↗
“They did not just beat us, they broke us.”
— a man POW describing 'admission' in a pre-trial detention facility in the Russian Federation, pre-trial detention facility, Russian Federation
A OHCHR / UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU) · Report on the treatment of prisoners of war and persons hors de combat, 24 Feb 2022 – 23 Feb 2023 · boxed quote before para 58 · 24 Mar 2023 · Source ↗
“I was hungry all the time. You eat but you don't feel like you have eaten. I weighed 106 kg, and now my weight is 75 kg.”
— a man POW about conditions in a pre-trial detention facility in the Russian Federation, pre-trial detention facility, Russian Federation
A OHCHR / UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU) · Report on the treatment of prisoners of war and persons hors de combat, 24 Feb 2022 – 23 Feb 2023 · boxed quote before para 44 · 24 Mar 2023 · Source ↗
“It was the most terrifying episode. They told us nothing. I thought we were brought out to be executed.”
— a man POW about treatment during a transfer for an exchange of POWs, transfer for exchange
A OHCHR / UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU) · Report on the treatment of prisoners of war and persons hors de combat, 24 Feb 2022 – 23 Feb 2023 · boxed quote before para 86 · 24 Mar 2023 · Source ↗
“The questioning lasted for about an hour and they used electricity six times, whenever they thought I was lying…”
— a Russian POW on torture and psychological pressure during interrogations by Ukrainian armed forces, place of interrogation (Ukrainian custody)
Also on the record: this account concerns the conduct of Ukrainian forces.
A OHCHR / UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU) · Report on the treatment of prisoners of war and persons hors de combat, 24 Feb 2022 – 23 Feb 2023 · boxed quote before para 95 · 24 Mar 2023 · Source ↗
“The prosecutor says the only way to be exchanged is to admit guilt…”
— a Russian POW, Ukrainian custody
Also on the record: this account concerns the conduct of Ukrainian forces.
A OHCHR / UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU) · Report on the treatment of prisoners of war and persons hors de combat, 24 Feb 2022 – 23 Feb 2023 · boxed quote before para 120 · 24 Mar 2023 · Source ↗
“They punished innocent people; now those who are guilty, if they are still alive, need to be punished to the fullest extent.”
— a man whose father was executed by Russian armed forces in a village in Kharkiv Province, village in Kharkiv Province
A Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine · A/HRC/52/62 · para 111 · 15 Mar 2023 · Source ↗
“There was no choice for the boys who were under 18 years old.”
— a 16-year-old boy from Mariupol, on being stopped in Manhush, Manhush (Mariupol area), filtration
B Amnesty International · “Like a prison convoy”: Russia's unlawful transfer and abuse of civilians in Ukraine during 'filtration' (EUR 50/6136/2022) · p. 10 · 10 Nov 2022 · Source ↗
“They told me I was going to be taken away from my mom…”
— an 11-year-old boy separated from his mother during filtration, Mariupol area, filtration
B Amnesty International · “Like a prison convoy”: Russia's unlawful transfer and abuse of civilians in Ukraine during 'filtration' (EUR 50/6136/2022) · p. 11 · 10 Nov 2022 · Source ↗
“By the time they came to get me the next day, I just wanted them to kill me, to put an end to it”
— a 52-year-old agronomist detained in early September 2022, Izium
B Human Rights Watch · Ukraine: Russian Forces Tortured Izium Detainees · article body · 19 Oct 2022 · Source ↗
“At some point I told them, just give me a list of names of whoever you want, and I will sign it”
— a 48-year-old electrician who was arrested five times, Izium
B Human Rights Watch · Ukraine: Russian Forces Tortured Izium Detainees · article body · 19 Oct 2022 · Source ↗
“They even put a gun to my head and threatened to shoot me unless I gave names.”
— a 31-year-old builder, Izium
B Human Rights Watch · Ukraine: Russian Forces Tortured Izium Detainees · article body · 19 Oct 2022 · Source ↗
“I used to want to find those who were responsible and kill them, but now I want the guilty to be put on trial…”
— a stepfather whose son was killed in Bucha, Bucha
A Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine · A/77/533 · para 111 · 18 Oct 2022 · Source ↗
“The room had no light. We could only sit on small children’s chairs or narrow benches.”
— a woman from Yahidne held in the school basement, Yahidne
B Human Rights Watch · Ukraine: Executions, Torture During Russian Occupation · Yahidne section · 18 May 2022 · Source ↗
“We tried not to drink much because there was not enough water”
— a woman from Yahidne held in the school basement, Yahidne
B Human Rights Watch · Ukraine: Executions, Torture During Russian Occupation · Yahidne section · 18 May 2022 · Source ↗
“Almost all the children had high fevers, spasms from coughing, and would throw up.”
— a woman from Yahidne held in the school basement, Yahidne
B Human Rights Watch · Ukraine: Executions, Torture During Russian Occupation · Yahidne section · 18 May 2022 · Source ↗
“They concluded that we were guilty and should be punished.”
— a 48-year-old Bucha resident (first name given by HRW), Bucha
B Human Rights Watch · Ukraine: Russian Forces' Trail of Death in Bucha · article body · 21 Apr 2022 · Source ↗
The weapons that hit the places in our case files are built with foreign electronics. Ukraine's Defence Intelligence (HUR) has catalogued 6,181 foreign components found in Russian weapons (updated 19 Oct 2026). Below: the weapons in our case files, by the country where each component's maker is headquartered. B Tier B — an official Ukrainian source.
Counts are components with a known manufacturer's headquarters country, read from the portal filters on 21 Oct 2026 (via a browser; the portal is closed to automated requests). A component found in a weapon is not evidence that its maker supplied Russia: most reach it through intermediaries in third countries. Whether the Russian makers of these weapons are sanctioned is shown under Sanctions → From strike to sanction.
What satellites recorded. We make our own before-and-after views from free Copernicus Sentinel-2 imagery and link the damage maps of the UN Satellite Centre (UNOSAT). Sentinel-2 crops are made by the Hub from free Copernicus data (Earth Search STAC on AWS, no account) — 10 m per pixel: enough for a reservoir, a flood, a burn scar or a power-plant fire, not for a single building. Each pair shows the latest cloud-free scene before the event and the first usable scene after it. The false-colour view (shortwave infrared) shows water as black, healthy vegetation as green and burnt or bare ground as pink or brown.
From space
The Kakhovka dam, before and after it was destroyedNova Kakhovka, Kherson region (occupied) · 6 Jun 2023
5 Jun 202318 Jun 2023
Before — 5 June 2023, the day before: the dam holds the Kakhovka reservoir (top, black water); the hydroelectric plant spans the river.
After — 18 June 2023: the central section of the dam is gone; the water level behind it has dropped and pale, exposed bed appears at right.
A UNOSAT (7 Jun 2023, imagery of 6 Jun 08:07 UTC): damaged dam wall; within an 80 km² area around the dam, 346 structures damaged or potentially affected and 7 harbours damaged — preliminary, not validated in the field. UNOSAT map ↗
Oleshky and the left-bank floodplainOleshky, Kherson region (occupied) · 6 Jun 2023
3 Jun 202318 Jun 2023
Before — 3 June 2023: green floodplain forests and wetlands between the Dnipro and Oleshky (centre).
After — 18 June 2023, twelve days after the dam was destroyed: most water has receded and the floodplain around the town has turned from green to brown. Cloud-free images from 6–10 June are not available.
A UNOSAT (9 Jun 2023): about 620 km² flooded in Kherson region between 6 and 9 June; about 110,000 people living close to flooded areas — preliminary. UNOSAT map ↗
Kyiv power plants after 13–14 OctoberChecked automatically in every run
Kyiv CHP-5 (case file, 14 Oct 2026) — No cloud-free Sentinel-2 image of Kyiv since the strike of 13–14 October; the latest clear image is from 5 October. Checked again in every run.
Darnytsia CHP, Kyiv (case file, 14 Oct 2026) — Same: the image of 15 October is fully clouded.
Trypilska thermal power plant (case file, 14 Oct 2026) — Same: no cloud-free image since 14 October.
UN Satellite Centre
UNOSAT maps of damage in UkraineA analyses by a UN body — cite these, not our crops
Fires seen from orbit near recent strikesVIIRS detections within 5 km and one day of the strikes on our map, last 7 days
Kryvyi Rih · 19 Oct: detection on 20 Oct 2026, 23:37 UTC, 3.33 km from the town point, confidence nominal — not linked to the strike: too far or at the wrong time.
VIIRS sees fires of roughly 0.1 ha and larger through clear sky at the moment of the satellite pass; most strikes on homes leave no detection. A detection is supporting context, never proof. Data: NASA FIRMS, open.
Sub-metre imagery
Vantor (formerly Maxar) open dataLicence CC BY-NC 4.0
Checked 21 Oct 2026: the Vantor (formerly Maxar) Open Data Program has no event folder for Ukraine (latest: Bordeaux wildfire, Colombia and Indonesia earthquakes, DRC Ebola). Its sub-metre images (CC BY-NC 4.0, allowed on this site since 21 Oct 2026) will be added if an activation covers Ukraine.
The ask
Close the supply routes. Every Russian missile and drone on this page flies on foreign electronics. List the goods for high-risk due diligence, ban their re-export to Russia, Belarus and the DPRK, and sanction the intermediaries.
Show the record, not only the numbers. Use these images in statements, briefings and reports, with the credit line.
Protect the people in them. Do not crop out the blur, and do not repost images of children or prisoners of war.
Have evidence?
If you have photographs, video, documents or testimony of a crime committed by Russia in Ukraine, send it where it can be used in court. This site does not collect evidence and cannot protect witnesses or keep the chain of custody — the bodies below can.
Ukraine
Office of the Prosecutor GeneralThe state hub for evidence of war crimes
Online form, photos and video, a mobile app. Material is used in Ukrainian courts and shared with the International Criminal Court; personal details are kept confidential.
Commission of Inquiry on UkraineIndependent International Commission, Human Rights Council
Takes first-hand accounts from survivors, relatives and witnesses — on both parties to the conflict. Questions and other ways to submit: [email protected].
Register of Damage for UkraineCouncil of Europe, The Hague
Claims for damage, loss or injury caused by Russia's aggression are filed in digital form through the Diia portal; the Register records them for a future compensation mechanism.
Keep it usable in courtSimple steps that protect the evidence
Keep the original file. Do not edit, crop, filter or re-save it; messengers strip the date and place — send the file itself, not a screenshot.
Write down what you know. Date, time, place, what you saw, who else was there.
Do not post it first. Publishing can endanger witnesses and help the attacker; send it to the bodies above.
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This site
What we can doCorrections and published material only
We publish only what official bodies and recognised organisations have already published. If you see an error on this site, or a published source we have missed, write to [email protected]. Please do not send us original evidence.
The ask
Point people to these channels. Diplomats, journalists and organisations who receive material from witnesses can forward this page.
Map & data
One map for the whole war: where the front runs and how it moved since 24 February 2022, where Russian strikes land, what Russia claims and what the UN has found. The front line is a background layer from independent open-source maps, shown with a delay of at least 48 hours; this page never shows Ukrainian positions, units or movements.
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OccupiedSeized since previous stepLiberated since previous stepLine of 24 Feb 2022
Russia kept attacking along the whole line — 165 to 270 clashes a day — and its Chief of General Staff claimed 1,800 km² and 92 settlements. Independent analysts confirmed little of it: from 17 to 22 October ISW reported three Russian advances, north of Kostiantynivka, south of Orikhiv and south of Dobropillia, and called several of the claims false. What did not stop were the strikes on towns behind the line.
C22 October. The General Staff reported 165 combat clashes over the day. ISW confirmed no Russian advance on any direction that day and did not confirm Russia's claim to Myrivka: the village lies about 16 km beyond the furthest Russian advance it has assessed. ISW counts a net Russian loss of 241 km² since 1 September. ISW/CTP, 22 Oct 2026 ↗ · General Staff via DSnews, 23 Oct 2026 ↗
C21 October. ISW reported that Russian forces had recently advanced south of Dobropillia, but judged significant gains there unlikely despite infiltration attempts in fog and rain. It called the Ministry of Defence claims to Chervonyi Yar and Yulivka (Zaporizhzhia region) "blatantly false" — both lie about 17 km beyond the front line it assessed — and saw no Russian advance in the Sumy region, east of Lyman or near Velykyi Burluk. ISW/CTP, 21 Oct 2026 ↗
CTwo Russian advances in six days. ISW recorded no confirmed Russian gains on 15, 16, 18 and 19 October; on 17 October it reported that Russian forces had recently advanced north of Kostiantynivka, and on 20 October that they had advanced south of Orikhiv. ISW counts a net Russian loss of about 122 km² since 1 September. ISW/CTP, 17 Oct 2026 ↗ · ISW/CTP, 19 Oct 2026 ↗ · ISW/CTP, 20 Oct 2026 (via Kyiv Post) ↗
CThe map agrees. On the DeepState map the occupied area changed by +26 km² in seven days and +9 km² in 30 days (derived by the Hub). Over the past year Russia gained about 1,937 km² — 1.7% of what it already held. DeepStateMap.live polygons, derived by the Hub ↗
Russia saysWhat Russia said. On 16 October General Gerasimov claimed 1,800 km² and 92 settlements, Russian troops 5 km from Zaporizhzhia city and the capture of Kostiantynivka. ISW called the claims to Kovalivka and Palamarivka (Kupiansk) false, found no evidence that Russian forces had consolidated in Dobropillia, and measured at least 20.95 km to Zaporizhzhia city. On 19 and 20 October the Ministry of Defence claimed Omelnyk and Tymoshivka (Zaporizhzhia region); ISW assessed the flag-raising in Omelnyk as an infiltration mission likely meant to support the claim. ISW/CTP, 17 Oct 2026 ↗ · ISW/CTP, 19 Oct 2026 ↗ · Russian Ministry of Defence via Channel One, 20 Oct 2026 ↗
Among the most attacked directions every day. A Russian flag-raising in Dobropillia was an infiltration; ISW has not observed evidence that Russian forces consolidated positions in the town.
The only confirmed Russian advance of the week, north of the city (ISW, 17 Oct). Gerasimov claimed the city on 16 October; ISW and Ukrainian sources say it is not fully seized. No confirmed advance on 18–19 October.
ISW reported a Russian advance south of Orikhiv on 20 October. Russian claims to Omelnyk (19 Oct) and Tymoshivka (20 Oct) not confirmed; ISW measured Russian forces at least 20.95 km from Zaporizhzhia city, against the 5 km claimed by Gerasimov.
No ground activity reported on 17–19 October. Shelling and drone attacks on civilians on the right bank continue — a pattern the UN Commission found to be a crime against humanity.
Settlements Russia's Ministry of Defence said it captured, checked against the independent map and Ukrainian military statements. Of 19 claims since 1 October 2026, 0 are confirmed by the independent map at the time of review. A claim is marked contradicted only when an independent source or the Ukrainian military places the settlement outside Russian control.
Russia's Ministry of Defence said its "Vostok" group had taken the village. ISW did not confirm the claim: the village lies about 16 km beyond the furthest Russian advance it has assessed (ISW, 22 Oct). ISW/CTP, 22 Oct 2026 ↗
Russia's Ministry of Defence said its "Dnepr" group had taken the village, north-west of Orikhiv. ISW called the claim "blatantly false": the village lies about 17 km beyond the front line it assessed (ISW, 21 Oct). ISW/CTP, 21 Oct 2026 ↗
Russia's Ministry of Defence said its "Vostok" group had taken the village, west of Huliaipole. ISW called the claim "blatantly false": the village lies about 17 km beyond the front line it assessed (ISW, 21 Oct). ISW/CTP, 21 Oct 2026 ↗
Russia's Ministry of Defence said units of its "Vostok" group had taken control of the village. ISW (19 Oct) assessed a Russian flag-raising in eastern Omelnyk as an infiltration mission, likely meant to support the claim, and did not confirm Russian control. ISW/CTP, 19 Oct 2026 ↗
ISW: no evidence; about 13.5 km beyond the furthest Russian advance. A Russian milblogger later conceded Ukrainian control (ISW, 15 Oct). ISW/CTP, 12 Oct 2026 ↗ · ISW/CTP, 15 Oct 2026 ↗
Encirclement claimed from 7 October, capture on 16 October. ISW observed only limited infiltration; the General Staff denied the capture. ISW/CTP, 16 Oct 2026 ↗
Every strike in the current log is measured from the nearest ground Russia holds — the front line, occupied Crimea or the Russian border. Russia says it strikes military targets; the record shows where its missiles and drones land. Distances are derived by the Hub from the coordinates and rounded to 5 km.
Overnight: 176 drones, 92 of them jet-powered; 140 shot down or suppressed, hits at 19 locations (Air Force). Sumy: a massed drone attack hit civilian infrastructure in three parts of the city — 2 injured, preliminary (Sumy regional military administration). Nikopol district and Shakhtarske community (Dnipropetrovsk region): drones — 2 injured. Rivne region: drones hit energy facilities, power cut in parts of Sarny and Dubno districts. Zhytomyr community, evening of 22 Oct: a Shahed drone hit a private house — 9 injured, incl. 2 children (Zhytomyr regional military administration). During the day: strikes on Dnipro destroyed a private house — 1 killed, 8 injured; 3 injured in Pidhorodne community (Dnipropetrovsk regional military administration, as of 18:30); an FPV drone in Zaporizhzhia and a strike on a house in Vilniansk — 4 injured (Zaporizhzhia regional military administration). Kramatorsk, during the day: three FAB-250 aerial bombs on a residential area — 1 killed, 6 injured, incl. 3 children (Donetsk regional prosecutor's office).
22 Oct
Overnight: 210 drones and Iskander-M, S-400, Zircon and Onyx missiles, main direction Kyiv; hits at 32 locations (Air Force). Several waves of ballistic missiles on Kyiv from the evening of 21 Oct hit six districts and split the green metro line in two — 1 killed, 24 injured, 16 of them in hospital (Kyiv city prosecutor's office, Kyiv city military administration). Lymanivka (Kharkiv region): a woman killed, 4 injured incl. two boys. Drones hit Kharkiv, an energy facility in Kremenchuk district, warehouses in Kropyvnytskyi district and a food enterprise in Odesa region; a fire at an infrastructure facility in Zaporizhzhia. Lozova (Kharkiv region), day: a strike on the market — 2 killed, 38 injured. Izium district: 5 injured, incl. a boy aged 13. Zaporizhzhia, day: a strike on a private house — 2 killed.
21 Oct
Overnight wave of 186 drones, 88 of them jet-powered, and Iskander-K cruise missiles; hits at 27 locations (Air Force). Kyiv: a drone hit a 24-storey residential building in Sviatoshynskyi district — 2 killed, 2 injured. Korotych (Kharkiv region): 2 killed, an 81-year-old woman and an 83-year-old man, 13 houses damaged. Kremenchuk (Poltava region), late on 20 Oct: a drone hit a university building — 2 injured, incl. a 16-year-old girl. Uman (Cherkasy region) and Zhovkva (Lviv region), overnight: drones hit a hypermarket and an enterprise — 3 injured. Komyshuvakha (Zaporizhzhia region), day: a drone hit a civilian car — 2 killed. Sloviansk (Donetsk region), day: guided aerial bombs and a drone — 8 injured, incl. two boys. Chernihiv, day: a drone and a second strike on an enterprise — 1 killed, 1 injured. Druzhkivka and Kramatorsk (Donetsk region): 1 killed in each city. Sumy region: drone attacks on 26 settlements — 1 killed, 4 injured. Kyiv, about 22:10: ballistic missiles on Dniprovskyi and Darnytskyi districts — 6 injured.
20 Oct
Overnight wave of 165 drones, 105 of them jet-powered, hits at 30 locations; the attack was still under way in the morning. Obukhiv district (Kyiv region): the toll at the enterprise hit on the evening of 19 Oct rises to 3 killed, 6 injured. Izium (Kharkiv region): drones on the residential sector, 5 injured. Chabany (Kyiv region), morning: a drone near the Kyiv–Odesa highway — 3 killed, 4 injured, among the dead the driver of the memorial-cemetery shuttle bus. Dnipro suburb: warehouses hit — 2 killed. Kramatorsk (Donetsk region), day: three strikes on the city — 4 killed, among them three heat-supply workers preparing the network for winter, 6 injured.
19 Oct
Overnight wave of 269 drones with Iskander-M ballistic and Iskander-K cruise missiles, hits at 25 locations. Irpin (Kyiv region): a woman killed, 17 injured incl. 8 children, 84 buildings and vehicles damaged; Kyiv toll rises to 1 killed, 8 injured (see 18 Oct). Kryvyi Rih, morning: a Banderol missile strike on an industrial enterprise — 2 killed, 7 injured incl. a boy (15). Nova Vodolaha (Kharkiv region), afternoon: an attack drone on the town park — 6 killed, two of them children, 15 injured incl. 7 children (Nova Vodolaha, Kharkiv region, 19 Oct 2026). Kushuhum (Zaporizhzhia region), morning: four guided aerial bombs — a man (57) killed. Evening: Khmelnytskyi — a strike on residential buildings, two women (born 1926 and 1954) killed, 3 injured; Obukhiv district (Kyiv region) — a drone attack on an enterprise, 3 killed, 6 injured (see 20 Oct).
18 Oct
Zaporizhzhia, overnight: two strikes on residential buildings — a woman (27) killed, 2 injured incl. a girl (6); overnight wave of 180 drones and an Iskander-M ballistic missile, hits at 20 locations. Kyiv, evening and night: two missile strikes — a medical centre and a metro station hit, 1 killed, 8 injured. Donetsk region: Kramatorsk and Druzhkivka shelled — 1 killed in each. Borova (Kharkiv region): a woman (65) killed, 2 men injured.
17 Oct
Kherson: repeat aerial-bomb strike on the same address — an ambulance driver killed, 37 injured incl. a one-month-old baby; Sumy: guided bombs and a drone — 2 killed; Sloviansk: glide-bomb and FPV drone strikes on housing — 9 killed, 12 injured; Poltava, evening: drone strike on houses — 1 killed, 4 injured; daytime wave of 157 drones and 6 Banderol missiles.
16–17 Oct
332 drones and ballistic, cruise and Kalibr missiles; more than 15 power facilities attacked; Vinnytsia left without electricity (Vinnytsia, Lutsk, Rivne, Zhytomyr, 16–17 Oct 2026).
Air Force of Ukraine preliminary morning counts, 16 Sep – 21 Oct 2026. Missile counts have not been published consistently since August; where a package included ballistic or cruise missiles this is noted. 30 such nights or days since 16 September; September alone saw 3,177 jet-powered drones (Air Force, 29 Sep).
Night / day
Launched
Intercepted or suppressed
Hits (locations)
Note
23 Oct (day)
Strikes on Dnipro and Pidhorodne community; an FPV drone on Zaporizhzhia; a strike on a private house in Vilniansk; three FAB-250 aerial bombs on Kramatorsk
n/a
n/a
Kramatorsk, Donetsk region, 23 Oct: three FAB-250 aerial bombs hit a residential area during the day, 27 residential buildings damaged — 1 killed, 6 injured, incl. 3 children, girls aged 7 and 10 and a boy aged 1 (Donetsk regional prosecutor's office); Dnipro, 23 Oct: strikes during the day destroyed a private house and damaged critical infrastructure, an enterprise, private houses and cars; a body was recovered from the rubble of the destroyed house — 1 killed, 8 injured, all in hospital, as of 18:30 (Dnipropetrovsk regional military administration); Pidhorodne community, Dnipro district, 23 Oct: 3 injured, as of 18:30 (Dnipropetrovsk regional military administration); Zaporizhzhia, 23 Oct: an FPV drone strike — 2 injured, a woman and a man aged 55 (Zaporizhzhia regional military administration); Vilniansk, Zaporizhzhia region, 23 Oct: a strike partly destroyed a private house and damaged neighbouring buildings — 2 injured, women aged 44 and 63 (Zaporizhzhia regional military administration)
22–23 Oct
176 drones (92 jet-powered), from 18:00 on 22 Oct
140 drones (68 jet-powered)
19
Debris at 13 locations; 10 drones still in the airspace at 08:00 (Air Force). Sumy, overnight: a massed drone attack, drones hit civilian infrastructure in three parts of the city and damaged residential buildings in Kovpakivskyi district — 2 injured, preliminary (Sumy regional military administration); Nikopol district, Dnipropetrovsk region, overnight: drones hit the district centre and the Marhanets, Chervonohryhorivka and Pokrov communities — 1 injured (Dnipropetrovsk regional military administration); Shakhtarske community, Dnipropetrovsk region, overnight: a drone attack — 1 injured (Dnipropetrovsk regional military administration); Rivne region, overnight and morning: drones hit energy facilities in the north of the region, power cut in parts of Sarny and Dubno districts — no casualties (Rivne regional military administration)
22 Oct (day)
Strike on the market in Lozova; strike on a private house in Zaporizhzhia; a drone on a private house in Zhytomyr community; attacks on Izium district
n/a
n/a
Lozova, Kharkiv region, 22 Oct: a strike on the town market, a shop caught fire, an apartment building, private houses and cars damaged — 2 killed, women aged 50 and 60, 38 injured (Kharkiv regional military administration, State Emergency Service); Zaporizhzhia, 22 Oct: a strike hit a private house — 2 killed (Zaporizhzhia regional military administration); Zhytomyr community, Zhytomyr region, 22 Oct: a Shahed drone hit a private house — 9 injured, incl. 2 children (Zhytomyr regional military administration); Izium and Izium district, Kharkiv region, 22 Oct: Russian attacks, incl. on the Izium–Sloviansk highway — 5 injured, incl. a boy aged 13 (Kharkiv regional military administration)
21–22 Oct
210 drones (110 jet-powered) + Iskander-M, S-400, Zircon and Onyx missiles (number not given), from 18:00 on 21 Oct
181 drones (87 jet-powered)
32
Debris at 8 locations; 10 drones still in the airspace at 09:00; main direction — Kyiv (Air Force). Kyiv, Dniprovskyi and Darnytskyi districts, about 22:10: on the evening of 21 Oct ballistic missiles hit a car-service building, private houses and a transport infrastructure facility, a gas station damaged — 6 injured, 4 of them in hospital (Kyiv mayor Vitali Klitschko); Kyiv, overnight: several waves of ballistic missiles from about 00:05 hit six districts: residential buildings and cars in Dniprovskyi, transport infrastructure in Darnytskyi, an ambulance station, ambulances and a monastery in Pecherskyi, non-residential buildings in Obolonskyi and Holosiivskyi, a restaurant complex in Sviatoshynskyi; part of the metro infrastructure on the Pivdennyi bridge hit — 1 killed, a man (48), in Dniprovskyi district, 24 injured, 16 of them in hospital, as of the afternoon of 22 Oct (the morning count of 22 injured included 4 children); the count covers the strikes since the evening of 21 Oct (Kyiv city prosecutor's office, Kyiv city military administration); Lymanivka, Kharkiv region, 06:04: a Russian attack on the village — 1 killed, a woman (42), 4 injured, incl. boys aged 13 and 10 (Kharkiv regional military administration); Kharkiv, Slobidskyi and Osnovianskyi districts, overnight: a jet-powered drone hit private houses and an outbuilding caught fire; a shop, four cars and windows of an apartment building damaged — no casualties reported (Kharkiv mayor Ihor Terekhov; Kharkiv regional military administration); Kharkiv, Kholodnohirskyi district, about 06:47: a drone hit a truck parking lot, four trucks, a trailer and a car burned — no casualties reported (Kharkiv regional military administration); Kremenchuk, Poltava region, 02:27: a drone hit the building of a private TV and radio company, fire; at 06:16 an energy facility in Kremenchuk district hit — no casualties reported (Poltava regional military administration); Kropyvnytskyi district, Kirovohrad region, evening of 21 Oct: jet-powered drones hit warehouses, a large fire — no casualties, preliminary (Kirovohrad regional military administration); Odesa region, overnight: drones hit a food-industry enterprise, its administrative building burned down — no casualties (Odesa regional military administration); Zaporizhzhia, evening of 21 Oct and overnight: a strike on an infrastructure facility caused a fire; guided aerial bombs on the city overnight — 1 injured, preliminary (Zaporizhzhia regional military administration)
21 Oct (day)
Drone strike on a civilian car near Komyshuvakha; guided aerial bombs and a drone on Sloviansk; a drone and a second strike on an enterprise in Chernihiv; aircraft, drones and artillery on Kherson region; strikes on Druzhkivka and Kramatorsk; drones on Sumy region
n/a
n/a
Komyshuvakha area, Zaporizhzhia region, 21 Oct: a drone hit a civilian car — 2 killed, a man (73) and a woman (71) (Zaporizhzhia regional military administration); Sloviansk, Donetsk region, during the day: guided aerial bombs and an FPV drone hit the city, six apartment buildings and a hotel damaged — 8 injured, incl. two boys aged 7 and 13 (Donetsk regional military administration); Chernihiv, morning and a few hours later: a jet-powered drone hit an enterprise, then a second strike — 1 killed, a man (61), and 1 injured, a man (54) (Chernihiv regional police); Kherson region, 21 Oct: aircraft, drones and artillery hit 38 settlements and the city of Kherson — 2 killed, incl. a man (63) in Biliivka who died of drone injuries, 4 injured (Kherson regional military administration); Druzhkivka and Kramatorsk, Donetsk region, 21 Oct: Russian attacks — 2 killed, one in each city (Donetsk regional military administration); Sumy region, 21 Oct: drone attacks on 26 settlements — 1 killed, 4 injured (Sumy regional military administration)
Debris at 13 locations; 10 drones still in the airspace at 08:30 (Air Force). Kyiv, Sviatoshynskyi district, early morning: a drone hit a 24-storey residential building, fire on the 20th floor — 2 killed, 2 injured (Kyiv city military administration); Korotych, Kharkiv region, overnight: a drone attack on the residential sector — 2 killed, an 81-year-old woman and an 83-year-old man; 13 houses and a car damaged, 11 people treated for acute stress incl. a 2-month-old baby (Kharkiv regional military administration); Kremenchuk, Poltava region, late evening of 20 Oct: a drone hit a university building — 2 injured, incl. a 16-year-old girl (Poltava regional military administration); Kyiv, Solomianskyi district, overnight: a fire at a transport facility after a drone attack — no casualties reported (Kyiv mayor Vitali Klitschko); Uman, Cherkasy region, overnight: drones hit a hypermarket and a private house, fires — 1 injured (Cherkasy regional military administration); Zhovkva community, Lviv region, overnight: a drone hit an enterprise, fire — 2 injured, both workers (Lviv regional military administration); Volyn region (Kovel, Lutsk, Kolky), evening of 20 Oct and overnight: drones hit enterprises, critical and energy infrastructure, more than 5,000 subscribers in Lutsk district without power — no casualties (Volyn regional military administration); Odesa region, overnight: drones damaged energy facilities and a food-industry enterprise — no casualties reported (Odesa regional military administration)
20 Oct (day)
Strikes on Kramatorsk; missile strike on Kharkiv; drones on Kyiv; shelling of Kherson; strikes in Zaporizhzhia region
n/a
n/a
Kramatorsk, Donetsk region, during the day: three strikes — 4 killed, three of them heat-supply workers, 6 injured (Donetsk regional military administration); Kharkiv, Novobavarskyi district, daytime: a missile strike on a private residential area — 9 injured, homes and an enterprise damaged (Kharkiv mayor Ihor Terekhov); Kyiv, Holosiivskyi district, daytime: drone debris hit the upper floors of a medical facility — 3 injured (Kyiv city military administration); Kyiv, Solomianskyi district, daytime: a drone hit the top floor of a medical facility — no casualties (Kyiv mayor Vitali Klitschko); Kherson, Korabelnyi district, afternoon: a house shelled — 4 injured, a woman and three children (Kherson city military administration); Zaporizhzhia, daytime: a strike hit a warehouse building — 3 injured (Zaporizhzhia regional military administration); Zaporizhzhia, evening: an FPV drone hit the roof of a municipal bus — 1 injured (Zaporizhzhia regional police); Balabyne, Zaporizhzhia region: a strike damaged a private house — 1 killed, a man (47) (Zaporizhzhia regional police)
19–20 Oct
165 drones (105 jet-powered)
115 drones (73 jet-powered)
30
Debris at 13 locations; 20 drones still in the airspace at 08:15 (Air Force). Obukhiv district, Kyiv region: an enterprise hit on the evening of 19 Oct, 3 killed, 6 injured (State Emergency Service, Kyiv regional military administration); Izium: 5 injured (State Emergency Service); Chabany, Kyiv region, morning: 3 killed, 4 injured (State Emergency Service); Dnipro suburb: warehouses hit, 2 killed (regional administration)
19 Oct (day)
Geran-3 attack drone on Nova Vodolaha; Banderol missile on Kryvyi Rih
n/a
n/a
Nova Vodolaha (Kharkiv region), about 16:30: a drone on the central park — 6 killed, two of them children, girls aged 1 and 11; 15 injured, seven of them children (Kharkiv regional military administration, updated 20 Oct) → Nova Vodolaha, Kharkiv region, 19 Oct 2026. Kryvyi Rih, morning: 2 killed, 7 injured incl. a boy (15) (Dnipropetrovsk regional military administration)
Debris at 8 locations; attack still under way at 09:00 (Air Force). Kyiv: 1 killed, 8 injured (city military administration); Irpin: a woman killed, 17 injured incl. 8 children (Kyiv regional military administration, as of 11:00; Irpin city council); Dnipro: 1 injured (regional administration)
Debris at 4 locations; about 10 drones still in the airspace at 08:00 (Air Force). Zaporizhzhia: 1 killed, 2 injured incl. a girl (6); Dnipropetrovsk region: 3 injured (regional administrations)
Daytime wave, 07:30–19:30; about 30 more drones in the airspace at 22:00 (Air Force); Sloviansk, Donetsk region, 03:40 and about 09:20: FAB-250 glide bombs hit apartment blocks and private houses — 9 killed, 12 injured, all bodies recovered after a five-day search (Sloviansk city military administration, 21 Oct)
289 drones + 4 Kalibr; no ballistic missile reported intercepted
22
More than 15 power facilities attacked (President); Vinnytsia left without electricity, main water station without power; outages in Lutsk, Rivne, Zhytomyr → Vinnytsia, Lutsk, Rivne, Zhytomyr, 16–17 Oct 2026. Over the day 7 killed, about 90 injured in eight regions (regional administrations)
15–16 Oct
149 drones (108 jet-powered)
114 drones (77 jet-powered)
24
Volyn region: 370,000 without electricity; an enterprise in Manevychi hit, 1 killed, 8 injured. Over the day at least 4 killed (Kherson region 2, Kramatorsk 1, Manevychi 1) and at least 52 injured in 11 regions (regional administrations)
14–15 Oct
580 drones + 2 Kh-59
536 drones
31
Part of 850+ drones in 33 hours (President). Over 14–15 Oct at least 17 killed in six regions, incl. Lutsk 6 (14 Oct, daytime) and Kropyvnytskyi 3; 67 injured → Lutsk, Kropyvnytskyi and beyond, 14–15 Oct 2026
Kyiv water supply cut on the left bank; 20 injured
Sources: Air Force of Ukraine daily summaries as relayed by Ukrinform, Kyiv Independent, Censor.net, RBC-Ukraine, UNN, Hromadske, ISW (16 Sep – 16 Oct 2026). Preliminary figures; not a Tier A series.
Open data, feeds and widgets
Everything on this site is also available as files that update with every publication (CC BY 4.0 — attribute "Ukraine Evidence Hub" and the original source named in each record).
type = strikes · kpis · cases · cost · calendar; add &lang=fr for another language
Live preview — this is what the frame looks like on another site:
Occupation, 2014 → now
Feb–Mar 2014Crimea occupiedRussia seizes Crimea and stages a "referendum". On 27 March the General Assembly affirms Ukraine's territorial integrity and calls on states not to recognise any change of status — 100 in favour, 11 against, 58 abstentions (resolution 68/262).AGA/11493 ↗
Apr 2014Parts of Donetsk and Luhansk seizedRussian-controlled forces take parts of the two regions; the occupation line holds with fighting until 2022.Context
24 Feb 2022Full-scale invasionOn 2 March the General Assembly deplores Russia's aggression "in the strongest terms" and demands full withdrawal — 141 in favour, 5 against, 35 abstentions (ES-11/1).AGA/12407 ↗
30 Sep 2022Four regions "annexed"On 12 October the General Assembly condemns the "attempted illegal annexation" of Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia regions — 143 in favour, 5 against, 35 abstentions (ES-11/4).AGA/12458 ↗
23 Feb 2023Withdraw "immediately, completely and unconditionally"General Assembly resolution ES-11/6 — 141 in favour, 7 against, 32 abstentions.AGA/12492 ↗
Jul 2024 → Oct 2026From 109,361 to 117,112 km²Over 27 months Russia added about 7,751 km² — 1.3% of Ukraine — at the cost of continuous assaults (derived from DeepState snapshots).CDeepStateMap.live polygons, derived by the Hub ↗
1 Sep 2026"Realities on the ground"At the General Assembly Ambassador Nebenzia says the status of the annexed regions is "not subject to discussion" and demands recognition of the situation on the ground. The General Assembly's position (ES-11/4) is unchanged.Russia saysRussian Mission to the UN, 1 Sep 2026 ↗
Legal qualification
Established — by bodies with a mandate
Aggression and annexation. The General Assembly deplored Russia's aggression and demanded its withdrawal (ES-11/1), and condemned the "attempted illegal annexation" of four regions (ES-11/4). GA/12458 ↗
Killing of prisoners. The Commission of Inquiry found a Russian policy of killing surrendering soldiers — a war crime (A/HRC/58/67). A/HRC/58/67 ↗
Crimes against humanity. Torture and enforced disappearance in occupied territory (A/HRC/58/67); murder and forcible transfer by drone attacks on civilians in Kherson, Dnipropetrovsk and Mykolaiv regions (A/80/497); deportation and forcible transfer of children (A/HRC/61/61). A/80/497 ↗ · A/HRC/61/61 ↗
Pattern — what the record shows repeatedly
Strikes far from the front. Many of the deadliest strikes in the 2026 log hit cities far behind the line, where no Russian ground force is in contact (see "Distance from the front", derived).
Claims ahead of diplomacy. Russia announces captures that independent maps do not show — 0 of 16 confirmed since 1 October; the Dobropillia "encirclement" was first announced during UN General Assembly high-level week (22 Sep). ISW/CTP daily assessments ↗
Occupation as a system. Passportization, conscription of protected persons, property seizure and the ban on the Ukrainian curriculum recur in every UN report on the occupied territories since 2022. A/HRC/62/59 ↗
Position — Ukraine's qualification
Ukraine qualifies the occupation as a continuing act of aggression and the forcible transfer of Ukrainian children as genocide under Article II(e) of the Genocide Convention. These are Ukraine's legal positions, not findings of a UN body.
What we do not know
The front line is an independent estimate. The DeepState polygons show territory assessed as occupied; contested "grey zones" are not shown, and a settlement outside the polygon is not necessarily under Ukrainian control.
The 2014–2022 line in Donetsk and Luhansk regions and the March 2022 maximum extent of the occupation are not drawn: we have no open, attributable dataset for them yet.
Distance is measured to the nearest Russian-held ground. Missiles and drones are often launched from much farther away — from Russian territory, Crimea or the Black Sea.
Strike coordinates are approximate (city or district level). Casualty figures are preliminary Ukrainian figures (Tier B) until OHCHR verifies them.
A claim marked "not confirmed" may be confirmed later; statuses are reviewed weekly. OCHA's October figures and the IAEA's October updates on Zaporizhzhia were not yet available at review.
What we ask
Do not recognise "realities on the ground". Reaffirm General Assembly resolution ES-11/4 in national statements; no change of status by force, no matter how much territory is held.
Do not repeat claims that the record does not support. Russian announcements of captured towns are not facts until an independent source confirms them. Use this table before citing them.
Open the occupied territories to the UN. Press for unimpeded access for HRMMU, the Commission of Inquiry and the ICRC to occupied areas and to prisoners of war — and for an ICRC-mediated evacuation of Oleshky.
Protect the cities behind the line. Air defence and sanctions on the supply chains of glide bombs, drones and missiles: the deadliest strikes land far from the front.
Rules for this page: front-line data only after an independent source has published it and at least 48 hours have passed; no Ukrainian positions, units or movements; Russian claims always labelled as claims; every figure with source, date and tier (A — UN-mandated bodies, B — Ukrainian authorities, C — independent researchers). Report an error: Corrections.
Accountability
What exists already: six ICC arrest warrants, unit designations by the US, UK and EU, convictions in absentia in Ukrainian courts. Click a node in the chain for the evidentiary link and the status.
Select a node. Each node: office, holder, link to the strike, warrants or sanctions.
ICC warrant
Date
Conduct
Vladimir Putin
17 Mar 2023
Unlawful deportation and transfer of children
Maria Lvova-Belova
17 Mar 2023
Same
Lt Gen Sergei Kobylash
5 Mar 2024
Attacks on civilian objects, CAH — strikes on electricity infrastructure, Oct 2022 – Mar 2023
Adm Viktor Sokolov
5 Mar 2024
Same (Black Sea Fleet)
Sergei Shoigu
24 Jun 2024
Same (Minister of Defence at the time)
Gen Valery Gerasimov
24 Jun 2024
Same (Chief of the General Staff)
Bucha units
Designation / status
234th Guards Air Assault Regiment (Pskov); 76th Division
US State Dept, 28 Jun 2022; commander identified (NYT, Dec 2022)
64th Separate Motor Rifle Brigade (Khabarovsk)
US, 28 Jun 2022; UK sanctions on commander; "Guards" title from Putin, 18 Apr 2022
Nine servicemen, Bucha
Convicted in absentia, Irpin City Court, Aug 2023 (11–12 years)
Maxim Grigoriev (author of the Bucha denial)
EU sanctions 2026; Canada SEMA Aug 2024 — state propaganda
What we ask
No amnesty for war crimes in any settlement · cooperation with the ICC and the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression · renewal of the Commission of Inquiry mandate and funding for HRMMU · support for the Register of Damage and the International Claims Commission.
What happened next
The question asked most often: "and then what?" One row per major incident — the UN finding, the national proceeding, the international step. Empty cells are honest: they show where accountability has not yet reached.
Incident
UN finding A
Ukrainian proceedings B
International step
Bucha, Mar 2022
OHCHR: 73 civilians killed, documented by name (7 Dec 2022); COI: war crimes (A/77/533)
9 servicemen convicted in absentia (Irpin, Aug 2023); 72 murders solved (National Police)
US designation of 234th Regt and 64th Bde (28 Jun 2022); GA res. ES-11/3
Proceedings under art. 438 CCU; Tochka-U unit identified
Cited in COI report A/77/533
Olenivka, 29 Jul 2022
UN fact-finding mission established, denied access, disbanded Jan 2023; OHCHR: Russia's account not credible
Investigation open; survivors interviewed after exchanges
— (no on-site investigation to date)
Energy campaign, Oct 2022 – Mar 2023
COI: war crimes and possible CAH (A/HRC/52/62)
Evidence shared with ICC OTP via JIT
ICC warrants: Kobylash, Sokolov (5 Mar 2024); Shoigu, Gerasimov (24 Jun 2024)
Children, since 2022
COI: unlawful transfer, war crime (A/HRC/52/62)
Ombudsman register: 20,651 cases; 2,665 returned
ICC warrants: Putin, Lvova-Belova (17 Mar 2023); International Coalition for the Return of Ukrainian Children
Hroza, 5 Oct 2023
HRMMU on site within 24 h: 59 killed, no military objective found
Two local informants charged with treason; Iskander unit identified
Raised at UNSC, Oct 2023
Okhmatdyt, 8 Jul 2024
OHCHR: high likelihood of a direct hit by a Kh-101
Proceedings open; missile fragments documented
UNSC emergency meeting 9 Jul 2024
Pryluky, 7 Oct 2026
UN ASG Khiari, UNSC 9 Oct: "the deadliest attack… at least 19 people, including five children"; OHCHR verification pending
Proceedings opened under art. 438 CCU; evidence shared with ICC OTP
Security Council meeting 9 Oct 2026 (10237th)
Kramatorsk buses, 8 Oct 2026
High Commissioner Türk, 8 Oct: direct attacks on civilians "could amount to war crimes"; ASG Khiari: "at least 33"
Proceedings under art. 438 CCU; weapon identified (UMPB D-30SN)
Security Council meeting 9 Oct 2026; Russia silent by name
Kyiv energy, 13–14 Oct 2026
ICC warrants of 2024 cover the same conduct; COI statement 21 Sep 2026; ASG Khiari 9 Oct: "all attacks on energy infrastructure… must cease"
Proceedings; MoD target list preserved as evidence
— (no Council meeting yet)
The named
Who has been named, by whom, and at what level of the ladder: an ICC warrant, a conviction (in absentia in Ukraine, or by a foreign court), a notice of suspicion, or sanctions only. Each row links to the document that names the person. Interpol issues no red notices for Russian servicemen (art. 3 of its Constitution), so the Ukrainian wanted database and the ICC are the only live lists. No photographs are reproduced here; the linked pages carry them.
ICC — the six warrants with the Chamber's decisions: icc-cpi.int ↗A
Wanted database of the Ministry of Internal Affairs — cards with photo, date of birth, article of the Criminal Code; Russian servicemen under arts. 437–438 among them: wanted.mvs.gov.ua ↗B
War & Sanctions (Defence Intelligence) — dossiers: child abductors, "war managers", "engineers of aggression", propagandists: war-sanctions.gur.gov.ua ↗B
State sanctions register (NSDC) — every sanctioned person with decree number and term: drs.nsdc.gov.ua ↗B
Prosecutor General — aggregate figures and case releases; no public register of suspects by name: war.gp.gov.ua ↗B
In: a person named in an ICC decision, a court judgment, a notice of suspicion published by the Prosecutor General or the SBU, a sanctions decree, or an official intelligence dossier. Each row carries the level and the link.
Out: Myrotvorets and similar anonymous lists (not a state resource; contains known errors), personal data of relatives, photographs — the linked official pages carry those under their own responsibility.
Interpol: no red notices for Russian servicemen since 2014 (art. 3 of the Interpol Constitution). Why ↗
Next: the 22 commanders convicted in absentia (Prosecutor General, Feb 2026) are not published as one list — requested; the annex to decree 303/2026 will be added as a searchable table.
Method
Source tiers
AUN-mandated bodies. OHCHR / Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, the Independent International Commission of Inquiry, UNESCO, IAEA, WHO, UNHCR; ICC decisions. These are the figures the Secretariat cites and the only ones that cannot be dismissed as "Ukrainian numbers".
BUkrainian authorities. Prosecutor General, National Police, Ombudsman, Air Force, State Emergency Service, regional administrations. Fuller and faster; always labelled as national data.
CIndependent investigations. Maxar, NYT and AP visual investigations, Bellingcat, CIR, Yale HRL; sanctions listings.
Tiers are never merged in one figure. When a Tier A figure exists, it replaces Tier B on this site.
Legal qualification, three layers
Established found by a UN mechanism or court · Pattern the argument Ukraine makes from the documented pattern · Position Ukraine's qualification, pending international findings. Never presented as one.
Rules
Every figure carries a source and a date; derived figures are marked "derived".
No graphic images of the dead. Maps, numbers, satellite imagery, memorials, portraits with family consent.
One idea per page, one figure per headline.
Our own imprecisions are corrected publicly, in one sentence.
Every item ends with an ask: what a Member State can do.
When a UN body publishes a figure lower than ours, both are shown the same day, with their dates. No delay, no footnote.
Every external source is linked and snapshotted to the Wayback Machine when first cited; the Sources page lists every link with its access date.
Update cycle
Mass strike
Air Force summary at T+10 h → case card at T+24 h → FR/ES at T+48 h → OHCHR figures replace national ones when published
Monthly pulse
OHCHR Protection of Civilians update, 10th–16th of each month
Indicators
Weekly check; dated on the tile
Fact-checks
Per Russian document; 1–2 days; circulated to the SG when warranted
Map outline schematic.
Photo and video
Where images come from
Official Ukrainian sources, linked to the eventEvery image on a case file is tied to one incident, one date, one source post
State Emergency Service (DSNS) and its regional directorates publish photo galleries and video from every major strike site within hours, under dsns.gov.ua ↗ and 24 regional sites (cn., dn., zp., kh., kyiv.dsns.gov.ua …). Their content is released under Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 — reusable with credit. Each case file carries one DSNS photo with the credit, the date and a link to the original post, and an "Official media" line to the full gallery and video.
Other official sources used for links (not yet for embedded images): National Police (weapon fragments, scene documentation), Air Force (launch and interception summaries), regional military administrations (casualty lists, damage surveys), Prosecutor General (proceedings), Office of the President. Satellite imagery is requested from Maxar News Bureau and shown only with its licence line.
What is never shown. No images of the dead or of identifiable injured people, no close-ups of body bags, no children's faces without consent; galleries that contain such images are linked, not embedded, and the link says so. Images are not cropped to alter meaning; the DSNS watermark stays.
Chain of custody. The file name encodes source, region, date and subject (photo-zaporizhzhia_2026-10-11_rubble.jpg); the original URL and a Wayback copy are in the sources register; the image is listed with its hash under Files and integrity.
DSNS as a data source
Figures, not only picturesTier B · primary · fastest final count
The DSNS post that closes a search-and-rescue operation is the first final figure for a strike — killed, children, injured, rescued, responders, tonnes of debris. It arrives 24–48 h after the strike and precedes the regional administration summary and OHCHR verification. This site takes the DSNS closing figure as its Tier B number (Zaporizhzhia: 23 killed incl. 4 children, 11 Oct; Pryluky: 22 incl. 5 children, 8 Oct) and shows the earlier interim figure in the corrections log.
Reading a DSNS post. The interim count carries a time stamp ("as of 18:45"); the closing post says "search and rescue completed". Only the closing figure is used in headlines; interim figures are shown with their hour.
Video. DSNS posts embed video (YouTube/Facebook); it is linked from the "Official media" line, never re-hosted. A still is taken only when no photo is published.
What we do not know
Occupied territory. OHCHR has no access; the Commission of Inquiry works from released detainees and open sources. Civilian deaths in Mariupol (2022), in the occupied parts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions, and in filtration are counted only where a name and two sources exist. The true figures are higher by an unknown margin; this site does not estimate them.
Prisoners and detainees. The number of civilians held by Russia is a minimum (16,000+ recorded); Russia publishes no lists and admits no ICRC access. Deaths in custody are known mainly from exchanges.
Children. 20,651 is the number of recorded cases with identifying data, not the number of children taken; estimates run far higher and are not used here.
Strike packages. Air Force launch and interception counts are preliminary morning figures; missile counts have not been published consistently since August 2026. The strike log is a lower bound.
Attribution below unit level. Which regiment, which crew: known in some cases (Bucha, Hroza), not in most. The chain of command on the Accountability page stops where the evidence stops.
Casualties in Russia. OHCHR records them (496 killed Jan–Sep 2026); this site cites that figure when Russia raises the subject and does not verify it independently.
Rule
Where we do not know, we say so on the page itself — not in a footnote. A reader who is told the limits of a figure will trust the figure.
Why the UN figure is lower
OHCHR counts only what it has verified: each civilian casualty is corroborated from at least two independent sources, or by the Monitoring Mission's own field visit. Casualties in occupied territory and in places under intense fighting — Mariupol in 2022, Bakhmut, Avdiivka — are largely absent from its tables. OHCHR says so in every update: the real figures are "considerably higher".
Ukrainian bodies count what they have recorded: the Prosecutor General registers every proceeding; the Ombudsman registers every reported child. These figures are fuller and faster, and they are the national record. They are not lower-quality — they measure something different.
So when a reader sees 16,431 (OHCHR) beside a larger Ukrainian number, both are right. This site shows the UN figure first because it is the one international bodies and most governments will repeat; the national figure is shown beside it, labelled, never merged.
Corrections log
Every change to a published figure or wording, with date and reason. Nothing is silently edited.
Date
Was
Now
Why
23 Oct 2026
Oleshky: "Russia has not confirmed it will go ahead" with the evacuation
Russia did not confirm it for five months; on 23 Oct the Kremlin confirmed a US-brokered local ceasefire from 29 Oct
White House announcement and Kremlin confirmation, 23 Oct; case file, both fact-checks, their PDFs and the Home card updated
23 Oct 2026
Lozova, 22 Oct: 2 killed, 34 injured
2 killed, 38 injured
Kharkiv regional military administration (O. Syniehubov), morning summary of 23 Oct; strike log and its PDF, map, timeline and Home status updated
23 Oct 2026
Dnipro district, 23 Oct (morning): 2 injured at an enterprise
Dnipropetrovsk regional military administration, evening summary as of 18:30 on 23 Oct (1 killed and 11 injured in the region); strike log and its PDF, map, timeline and Home status updated
22 Oct 2026
Kyiv, 21–22 Oct: 1 killed, 22 injured, incl. 4 children (State Emergency Service, morning of 22 Oct)
1 killed, a man (48), 24 injured, 16 of them in hospital
Kyiv city prosecutor's office and Kyiv city military administration, afternoon of 22 Oct; strike log and its PDF, map, timeline and Home status updated
22 Oct 2026
Kyiv, night of 21–22 Oct: 15 injured, incl. two 15-year-olds (Kyiv mayor, 06:05)
1 killed, 22 injured, incl. 4 children
State Emergency Service summary, morning of 22 Oct, covering the strikes since the evening of 21 Oct; strike log, map, timeline and Home status updated
21 Oct 2026
Sloviansk, 17 Oct: 6 killed, 15 injured
9 killed, 12 injured
Final toll from the Sloviansk city military administration (V. Liakh, 21 Oct, via Interfax-Ukraine): all bodies recovered after a five-day search; 12 injured in the air strike (earlier 15); map, timeline and strike log updated
21 Oct 2026
Only military targets (Nebenzia at the Security Council, 9 Oct 2026): quotations taken from the interpreted transcript — e.g. "Various provocations and staged incidents are used to this end", "A predictable response followed…"
Quotations from the English text published by the Russian Mission — "They're resorting to various provocations and hoaxes"; "…the Russian Armed Forces naturally responded by targeting Ukrainian defense and industrial facilities, as well as energy infrastructure used for military production and logistics"
The published text governs; the two checks of the same statement were merged into one and re-verified against primary sources (editorial decision, 21 Oct 2026)
21 Oct 2026
Only military targets: civilians killed in Ukraine in 2026 given as 2,222 (Jan–Aug); Pryluky "five children died", 22 killed; claim on the Arria-formula meeting of 14 Oct
2,570 killed in Jan–Sep 2026 (HRMMU, 15 Oct 2026); Pryluky at least 19 killed incl. 5 children as reported to the Council on 9 Oct (UN), 22 according to Ukrainian authorities (B); the Arria claim is answered in "Blind spots that are not there"
Newer UN figure; UN and Ukrainian tolls shown side by side, never merged; no duplicate claims across fact-checks
20 Oct 2026
Executions of Ukrainian prisoners of war and persons hors de combat: 128 on Pattern: Prisoners and Blind spots that are not there, 14 Oct 2026 (after the change of 15:41, row below) and “at least 128” on Map & data
129 everywhere
Restored to the OHCHR / HRMMU figure of 10 Aug 2026 (129 executions); Map & data (Occupation & law, KPI) aligned to the same figure; editorial decision, 20 Oct 2026, superseding the row below. Card, PDFs of Pattern: Prisoners and Blind spots that are not there, 14 Oct 2026 (six languages) updated
20 Oct 2026
Pattern: Prisoners and Blind spots that are not there, 14 Oct 2026: 129 Ukrainian prisoners of war executed after capture (OHCHR)
128
Aligned with the OHCHR figure used on Map & data (at least 128 executions of Ukrainian POWs and persons hors de combat since February 2022); editorial decision, 20 Oct 2026. The figure “124 of 129 released POWs” is the interview sample and is unchanged. Card, PDF of Pattern: Prisoners and Blind spots that are not there, 14 Oct 2026 (six languages) updated
20 Oct 2026
Nova Vodolaha, Kharkiv region, 19 Oct 2026, Nova Vodolaha (19 Oct): 6 killed, three of them children
6 killed, two of them children (girls aged 1 and 11)
Kharkiv regional military administration (O. Syniehubov), updated toll, 20 Oct; the first report at 18:20 on 19 Oct named three children; card, Home, map, timeline, strike log and the one-pager PDF (v2) updated
State Emergency Service and Kyiv regional military administration (T. Tkachenko), morning of 20 Oct: updated toll; map, timeline and strike log updated
21 Oct 2026
Kyiv, Sviatoshynskyi district, early morning of 21 Oct: 2 killed, 1 injured
2 killed, 2 injured
Updated toll from the Kyiv city military administration and Kyiv mayor Vitali Klitschko (two people hospitalised); strike log, map, timeline and strike log PDF updated
21 Oct 2026
Strike log: 29 nights or days with 100+ drones and missiles, 16 Sep – 20 Oct
30, 16 Sep – 21 Oct
The night of 20–21 Oct (186 drones and Iskander-K missiles, Air Force) added to the count and to the strike log PDF
21 Oct 2026
Kremenchuk, Poltava region, late evening of 20 Oct: 1 injured
2 injured, incl. a 16-year-old girl
Updated toll from the Poltava regional military administration
20 Oct 2026
Strike log: 28 nights or days with 100+ drones and missiles, 16 Sep – 19 Oct
29, 16 Sep – 20 Oct
The night of 19–20 Oct (165 drones, Air Force) added to the count and to the strike log PDF
19 Oct 2026
Case files: 124 civilians killed in the incidents on the ten cards, 22 Sep – 17 Oct
128, 22 Sep – 19 Oct
Nova Vodolaha, Kharkiv region, 19 Oct 2026 (Nova Vodolaha, 6 killed) added; Sumy, 26 Sep 2026 (Sumy, 2 killed) moved to the Archive
19 Oct 2026
Strike log: 27 nights or days with 100+ drones and missiles, 16 Sep – 18 Oct
28, 16 Sep – 19 Oct
The night of 18–19 Oct (269 drones with ballistic and cruise missiles, Air Force) added to the count and to the strike log PDF
19 Oct 2026
Irpin, night of 18–19 Oct: 1 killed, 6 injured incl. 3 children, 3 missing
1 killed, 17 injured incl. 8 children
Kyiv regional military administration (T. Tkachenko), as of 11:00 on 19 Oct: updated count; 84 objects damaged; no update on the missing; map, strike log and timeline updated
19 Oct 2026
Kyiv, evening and night of 18–19 Oct: 1 killed, 3 injured
1 killed, 8 injured
Kyiv city military administration, morning of 19 Oct: updated toll after the overnight missile and drone attack; map, timeline and strike log updated
19 Oct 2026
Kyiv, evening of 18 Oct: 1 killed, 2 injured
1 killed (a woman, 21), 3 injured
Kyiv mayor V. Klitschko, night of 18–19 Oct: a second missile strike damaged a metro station and a residential building in the Solomianskyi district; map and timeline updated
18 Oct 2026
St Petersburg and Leningrad region, night of 18 Oct (cost of the war): casualties in Leningrad region not recorded
Leningrad region: 10 injured, including 5 children; 7 in hospital
Leningrad region health committee via TASS (Vedomosti, 18 Oct); regional governor A. Drozdenko: a woman and three children poisoned by smoke from a fire caused by drone debris in Vsevolozhsk district
18 Oct 2026
Sumy, 17 Oct: 1 killed, 2 injured
2 killed, 3 injured
Toll for the day from the Sumy regional police (morning of 18 Oct): a man (30) killed by a drone and a man (42) by guided bombs in the Sumy community; map and timeline updated
18 Oct 2026
St Petersburg, night of 18 Oct (cost of the war): 'no casualties reported by the city governor'
1 killed, 5 injured; fires also at the Ruchyi oil depot and Kolpino warehouses; 12 apartment buildings and 2 houses damaged
Later statement by St Petersburg governor A. Beglov (Interfax, 09:30 Moscow time, 18 Oct); Leningrad region governor: 145 drones downed (earlier 126–127)
18 Oct 2026
Sloviansk, 17 Oct: 3 killed, 16 injured
6 killed, 15 injured
Toll for the day of 17 Oct from the Sloviansk city military administration (V. Liakh), morning of 18 Oct: some victims were killed by FPV drones; bodies remain under the rubble; map and timeline updated
18 Oct 2026
Zaporizhzhia, 18 Oct: 1 killed, 1 injured
1 killed, 2 injured incl. a girl (6)
Updated count from the Zaporizhzhia regional military administration (M. Semikin): two overnight strikes; map and timeline updated
18 Oct 2026
Nights or days with 100+ drones and missiles, 16 Sep – 17 Oct: 26
27 (16 Sep – 18 Oct)
Overnight wave of 17–18 Oct (180 drones and an Iskander-M ballistic missile, Air Force) added to the strike log; strike log PDF re-issued (v5)
18 Oct 2026
Poltava, 17 Oct: 1 killed, 2 injured
1 killed, 4 injured
Updated count from the Poltava regional military administration (V. Diakivnych); map and timeline updated
18 Oct 2026
Nights or days with 100+ drones and missiles, 16 Sep – 17 Oct: 25
26
Daytime wave of 17 Oct (157 drones and 6 Banderol missiles, Air Force) added to the strike log; strike log PDF re-issued (v4)
17 Oct 2026
Calendar: "36th meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (NATO HQ), 15 Oct 2026"
Entry removed
The source announced the meeting of 15 Oct 2025, not 2026; no UDCG meeting on 15 Oct 2026 has been announced or reported (2026 meetings: 12 Jan, 15 Apr, 18 Jun, September online)
17 Oct 2026
Sloviansk, 17 Oct: 1 killed, 10 injured
3 killed, 16 injured
Injured in the 03:40 strike rose to 13 (as of 13:06); a second strike around 09:20 killed 2 and injured 3 (Sloviansk city military administration); map and timeline updated
17 Oct 2026
Kherson, 17 Oct: 1 killed, 22 injured
1 killed, 37 injured in the city (Kherson region over the day: 1 killed, 40 injured incl. 3 children)
Kherson regional prosecutor's office, as of 17:30: 35 injured in the 04:00 aerial-bomb strike, an ambulance driver killed in a repeat strike on the same address, 2 injured by a drone; map and timeline updated
16 Oct 2026
Strike log, 15–16 Oct: "Over the day 3 killed (Kherson region 2, Kramatorsk 1)"
At least 4 killed (Kherson region 2, Kramatorsk 1, Manevychi 1)
Volyn regional administration reported 1 killed and 8 injured at an enterprise in Manevychi in the same overnight attack (16 Oct); site and strike log PDF updated
16 Oct 2026
Nights or days with 100+ drones and missiles, 16 Sep – 16 Oct: "at least 21" (site); strike log PDF: 22 to 14 Oct
24 (every row of the strike log, 16 Sep – 16 Oct, incl. two daytime waves)
Recounted row by row from the strike log table; the earlier site figure under-counted rows, and the PDF had not been re-issued since 14 Oct (now v2)
16 Oct 2026
17,257 civilians killed incl. 835 children, 53,693 injured (OHCHR, as of 31 Aug 2026); "+55% Jan–Aug 2026 vs 2025"
17,605 killed, 55,846 injured (as of 30 Sep 2026); "+59% Jan–Sep 2026 vs 2025" (2,570 killed, 15,211 injured)
OHCHR September 2026 update (16 Oct) replaced the August figures on the home indicators and the pulse; the child total is not repeated until OHCHR states it in text
15 Oct 2026
Map: "Volyn region · 15 Oct", 6 killed (night of 14–15 Oct); "Lutsk · 14 Oct", 3 killed
"Lutsk · 14 Oct", 6 killed, 12 injured; the separate Volyn entry removed
The six deaths in Volyn were the 14 Oct daytime strike on a Lutsk market (Lutsk City Council; Volyn regional administration), already on the map with an early toll of 3
14 Oct 2026
"509 civilians" (Bucha Wall of Remembrance, used in some speeches)
"residents of the Bucha community killed during the occupation"
The wall includes local defence volunteers, as its plaques state; the legal record (OHCHR: 73 by name) never relied on the memorial
14 Oct 2026
July 2026: 286 killed (preliminary)
448 killed
OHCHR revision in the September update after verification of July incidents
14 Oct 2026
16,431 civilians killed incl. 803 children (OHCHR, as of 30 Jun 2026); "+37% H1 2026 vs H1 2025"
17,257 incl. 835 children (as of 31 Aug 2026); "+55% Jan–Aug 2026 vs 2025"
OHCHR August 2026 update (16 Sep) and USG DiCarlo's Security Council briefing of 23 Sep replaced the mid-year figures
23 killed incl. 4 children, 32 injured incl. 3 children; entrance section of a three-storey block
SES Zaporizhzhia region final report of 11 Oct (search and rescue completed) replaces the 10 Oct interim count; map, card, brief and the derived weekly total (99 → 98) updated; PDF re-issued as v2
14 Oct 2026
Pryluky: "19 killed" (UN briefing, 9 Oct)
22 killed (SES final)
Both figures shown with their dates; the UN figure was given before rescue work ended
14 Oct 2026
Map period "Oct 2026", 7 entries
16 Sep – 14 Oct 2026, 28 entries
Full sweep of the four-week window; earlier version under-counted strikes
225,000+ war crimes of 256,000+ crimes linked to the aggression; 1,191 suspects, 856 indicted, 254 convicted
Figure replaced with the latest published OPG total (7 May 2026; ZMINA, UNN). Earlier figure was out of date
14 Oct 2026
Map period limited to Oct 2026
2022–2026 by year
Site update v0.4
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Files and integrity
SHA-256 of every PDF published on this site. A file whose hash does not match was not published here — relevant for a resource that fact-checks forgeries.
All figures on this site, with source, date and tier, as one JSON file — licence CC BY 4.0, attribution "Ukraine Evidence Hub". Partners may embed and republish; the live file is at /data/hub.json and is refreshed with every release.
Update log
Every change to the site, newest first. Corrections to figures are listed separately in the corrections log above.
v1.8.12 · 23 Oct
Case file — Oleshky: the White House announced a local ceasefire in the town from 29 Oct, brokered by the United States, for aid and a civilian evacuation; the Kremlin confirmed it. Russia had not confirmed the evacuation for five months
v1.8.12 · 23 Oct
Follow us: YouTube and Threads icons added to the header, the Follow panel and the footer
v1.8.11 · 23 Oct
Negotiations: the White House announced a US-brokered local ceasefire in occupied Oleshky from 29 Oct, for aid deliveries and a civilian evacuation through a designated safe passage; the Kremlin confirmed it on 23 Oct (White House via Euronews; TASS)
v1.8.11 · 23 Oct
Strike log: three Russian FAB-250 aerial bombs on a residential area of Kramatorsk on 23 Oct killed one person and injured six, among them three children (Donetsk regional prosecutor's office)
v1.8.10 · 23 Oct
Strike log: Russian strikes on Dnipro on 23 Oct destroyed a private house and killed one person; 8 were injured in the city and 3 in Pidhorodne community (Dnipropetrovsk regional military administration, as of 18:30)
v1.8.10 · 23 Oct
Strike log: the toll of the 22 Oct strike on the market in Lozova, Kharkiv region, rises to 2 killed and 38 injured; Russian attacks on Izium district the same day injured 5, including a 13-year-old boy (Kharkiv regional military administration)
v1.8.9 · 23 Oct
Strike log: on 23 Oct a Russian strike caused a fire at an enterprise in Dnipro district, injuring 2 (Dnipropetrovsk regional military administration); an FPV drone in Zaporizhzhia and a strike on a house in Vilniansk injured 4 (Zaporizhzhia regional military administration)
v1.8.9 · 23 Oct
Russia claims: ISW (22 Oct) did not confirm Russia's claim to have taken Myrivka in Zaporizhzhia region — the village lies about 16 km beyond the furthest Russian advance it has assessed. None of 19 Russian capture claims since 1 October has been confirmed
v1.8.9 · 23 Oct
Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said the talks planned for the first half of November in Abu Dhabi will be trilateral — Russia, the United States and Ukraine — and that European participation cannot be ruled out in advance
v1.8.9 · 23 Oct
Cost of the war: Ukraine's General Staff says it hit a Russian unit's command post near Hromove in occupied Crimea and ammunition, drone and supply depots in occupied Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia regions (claim, Tier B)
v1.8.9 · 23 Oct
Map & data: the week on the front now includes ISW's assessment of 22 October
v1.8.8 · 23 Oct
Strike log: Russia launched 176 drones overnight into 23 Oct; 140 were shot down or suppressed, hits at 19 locations (Air Force). Drones injured 2 people in Sumy and 2 in Dnipropetrovsk region and cut power in parts of Rivne region
v1.8.8 · 23 Oct
Map & data: the week on the front now covers the last 7 days, 17–23 Oct
v1.8.7 · 23 Oct
Strike log: a Russian Shahed drone hit a private house in Zhytomyr community on 22 Oct, injuring 9 people, incl. 2 children (Zhytomyr regional military administration); an overnight drone attack on Sumy injured at least 2 (Sumy regional military administration)
v1.8.6 · 22 Oct
Russia claims: independent analysts (ISW, 21 Oct) called Russia's claims to have taken Chervonyi Yar and Yulivka in Zaporizhzhia region "blatantly false" — both villages lie about 17 km beyond the front line. None of 19 Russian capture claims since 1 October has been confirmed
v1.8.6 · 22 Oct
Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said trilateral talks with Ukraine and the US could be held in Abu Dhabi; asked whether Russia would prepare documents for signing, he said: "You're getting ahead of yourself. Don't do that."
v1.8.6 · 22 Oct
Cost of the war: Ukraine's General Staff says it hit a Russian electronic warfare station near Hulevka in Russia's Bryansk region, and a command post, a drone control point and a supply depot in occupied Zaporizhzhia and Luhansk regions (claim, Tier B)
v1.8.6 · 22 Oct
Map & data: the week on the front now includes ISW's assessment of 21 October
v1.8.5 · 22 Oct
Strike log: a Russian strike on the market in Lozova, Kharkiv region, on 22 Oct killed two women, aged 50 and 60, and injured 34 (Kharkiv regional military administration); a strike on a private house in Zaporizhzhia killed two (Zaporizhzhia regional military administration)
v1.8.5 · 22 Oct
Beyond Ukraine: German federal prosecutors arrested a man in Brandenburg suspected of gathering information on armoured vehicles, ammunition and sites securing NATO's eastern flank for a Russian intelligence service
v1.8.5 · 22 Oct
Russia claims: Russia's Ministry of Defence says its troops took Myrivka, north of Orikhiv in Zaporizhzhia region; independent assessments have not confirmed the claim
v1.8.4 · 22 Oct
Strike log: the toll of Russia's ballistic missile strikes on Kyiv since the evening of 21 Oct rises to 1 killed and 24 injured, 16 of them in hospital (Kyiv city prosecutor's office, Kyiv city military administration)
v1.8.4 · 22 Oct
Strike log: Russian attacks on 21 Oct killed one person each in Druzhkivka and Kramatorsk (Donetsk regional military administration) and one in Sumy region, where 4 were injured (Sumy regional military administration)
v1.8.3 · 22 Oct
Strike log: overnight Russia launched 210 drones and Iskander-M, S-400, Zircon and Onyx missiles, mainly at Kyiv (Air Force); in Kyiv ballistic strikes since the evening of 21 Oct killed 1 and injured 22, incl. 4 children (State Emergency Service)
v1.8.3 · 22 Oct
Russia claims: Russia's Ministry of Defence says its troops took Chervonyi Yar and Yulivka in Zaporizhzhia region; independent assessments have not confirmed either claim
v1.8.3 · 22 Oct
Case file — Oleshky: Ukraine's Ombudsman says people in the occupied town "are effectively dying" and that evacuation talks with Russia are "practically on the final stretch"
v1.8.3 · 22 Oct
Beyond Ukraine: Human Rights Watch reports that Malian soldiers and Russia's Africa Corps tortured detainees held in a shipping container at the Sévaré army base in May–August 2026
v1.8.3 · 22 Oct
Map & data: the week on the front now covers the last 7 days, 16–22 Oct
v1.8.2 · 22 Oct
Strike log: overnight ballistic missile waves on Kyiv injured 15, incl. two 15-year-olds, and hit an ambulance station and metro infrastructure (Kyiv mayor Vitali Klitschko); a woman killed and 4 injured, incl. two boys, in Lymanivka, Kharkiv region (regional military administration)
v1.8.1 · 21 Oct
Strike log: ballistic missiles hit Kyiv's Dniprovskyi and Darnytskyi districts at about 22:10 on 21 Oct — 6 injured, 4 in hospital (Kyiv mayor Vitali Klitschko); in Chernihiv two strikes on an enterprise killed a man of 61 (regional police)
v1.8.1 · 21 Oct
Sloviansk, 17 Oct: the final toll of the glide-bomb strikes is 9 killed and 12 injured after a five-day search of the rubble (Sloviansk city military administration, 21 Oct); map, timeline and strike log updated
v1.8.1 · 21 Oct
Denmark: two Ukrainian nationals charged with espionage for photographing the counter-drone maker MyDefence, which supplies Ukraine's forces; prosecutors told the court they believe a Russian intelligence service was involved
v1.8.1 · 21 Oct
Kremlin: after a three-hour meeting with US envoy Steve Witkoff in St Petersburg on 21 Oct, Putin agreed "in principle" to resume trilateral talks with Ukraine and the US after 10 November (Yuri Ushakov)
v1.8.1 · 21 Oct
Sanctions, lifted and eased: OFAC issued Russia-related General License 131K on 21 Oct — a further revision of the licence for contingent contracts for the sale of Lukoil International GmbH
v1.8.0 · 21 Oct
Site: new in six languages — Negotiations track (2014–2026: timeline, Russia in its own words, ceasefires on the record, demands over time, talks vs. casualties), The world's response (assistance and the role of the UN system and international organisations), Research desk (query all the data, saved queries, requests), and From space (satellite before and after)
v1.8.0 · 21 Oct
Case files — Historical, 2014 to 2026: fifteen new dossiers, from MH17 and the Mariupol theatre to Kyiv on 2 July and 20 August 2026, each with photographs, sources and a PDF in six languages
v1.8.0 · 21 Oct
Fact-checks — Recent and Historical: twelve new fact-checks of Russian statements at the UN and the OSCE and of the versions Moscow gave for MH17, Mariupol, Olenivka, Zaporizhzhia and other cases; Nebenzia's 9 October speech now in one fact-check
v1.7.5 · 21 Oct
Strike log: Russian guided aerial bombs and an FPV drone hit Sloviansk, Donetsk region, on 21 Oct, injuring 8 people, including two boys aged 7 and 13 (Donetsk regional military administration)
v1.7.5 · 21 Oct
Russia claims: ISW assesses Russia's claim to have captured Tymoshivka, Zaporizhzhia region, as exaggerated — the village lies at least 12 km beyond the furthest Russian advance
v1.7.5 · 21 Oct
Strike log, 20 Oct: Zaporizhzhia region added — a man (47) killed in Balabyne; 4 injured in Zaporizhzhia city when strikes hit a warehouse and a municipal bus (regional police and military administration)
v1.7.4 · 21 Oct
Strike log: a Russian drone hit a civilian car near Komyshuvakha, Zaporizhzhia region, on 21 Oct, killing a 73-year-old man and a 71-year-old woman (Zaporizhzhia regional military administration)
v1.7.4 · 21 Oct
Strike log, night of 21 Oct: Uman (Cherkasy region) and Zhovkva (Lviv region) added — drones hit a hypermarket and an enterprise, 3 injured (regional military administrations)
v1.7.4 · 21 Oct
Oleshky: the head of the town's military administration says more than 10 people have died trying to leave on foot along the 25 km road to Radensk, and their bodies remain by the roadside
v1.7.4 · 21 Oct
Cost of the war: the General Staff of Ukraine reports strikes on Russian command posts near Luhansk and Kurakhove and on supply depots near Yany-Kapu in occupied Crimea and Chystiakove on 20–21 Oct
v1.7.4 · 21 Oct
Case file — Kyiv: an operating theatre in daylight. Russian drones hit the operating theatre of the Strazhesko Institute of Cardiology on 20 October, wounding a patient — the second strike on the institute — and a second medical facility; six killed in Kyiv and its outskirts on 20–21 October (preliminary). Six-page dossier. Kramatorsk and Kharkiv case files updated with the strikes of 20–21 October.
v1.7.3 · 21 Oct
Correction: Kyiv, Sviatoshynskyi district, 21 Oct — toll updated to 2 killed and 2 injured (Kyiv city military administration); strike log, map, timeline and strike log PDF updated
v1.7.2 · 21 Oct
Strike log: overnight on 21 Oct Russia launched 186 drones, 88 of them jet-powered, and Iskander-K missiles, with hits at 27 locations (Air Force). In Kyiv a drone hit a 24-storey building, killing 2 and injuring 1 (city military administration)
v1.7.2 · 21 Oct
Week on the front, 15–21 Oct: ISW reported Russian advances only north of Kostiantynivka and south of Orikhiv; the General Staff counted 269 combat clashes on 20 October
v1.7.2 · 21 Oct
Oleshky: European Parliament Vice-President Pina Picierno has begun a hunger strike demanding a humanitarian ceasefire, food, medicine and safe evacuation for the town's remaining residents
v1.7.1 · 21 Oct
Strike log: an overnight Russian drone attack on Korotych near Kharkiv killed an 81-year-old woman and an 83-year-old man and damaged 13 houses (Kharkiv regional military administration)
v1.7.0 · 21 Oct
Site: new in six languages — International record (Geneva, Vienna, The Hague, Strasbourg, Brussels, agencies, capitals, regions, votes and elections, What to cite), Historical case files with photo and video packs, photos and video on the latest strikes, and a weekly strikes PDF
v1.6.5 · 20 Oct
Strike log: a Russian missile strike on Kharkiv's Novobavarskyi district on 20 Oct injured 9 people (Kharkiv mayor); in Kyiv, drone debris hit a medical facility and injured 3 (Kyiv city military administration)
v1.6.5 · 20 Oct
Sanctions — lifted and eased: two US Treasury (OFAC) removals from the Russia-related list in September 2026 added: Dulac Capital (Switzerland); Hans Peter Bomatter and Modulsan Makina (Türkiye)
v1.6.4 · 20 Oct
Site: the four heaviest pages (Beyond Ukraine, Cost of the war, Sanctions, Calendar) now load when first opened, so the first page is half the size and opens faster on a phone; the dates on the Home page (Status, Updated) are set automatically
v1.6.3 · 20 Oct
Map & data — the front, last 7 days (14–20 Oct): ISW confirmed one Russian advance, north of Kostiantynivka, while Moscow claimed 1,800 km² and 92 settlements; the claims to Omelnyk and Tymoshivka are not confirmed
v1.6.3 · 20 Oct
Strike log: Russian shelling of a house in Kherson's Korabelnyi district on 20 Oct injured a woman and three children (Kherson city military administration); Kramatorsk strikes of the same day added to the log
v1.6.3 · 20 Oct
Beyond Ukraine: NATO is sending maritime patrol aircraft, radars, explosive-exploitation teams and drones to the Black Sea after drone attacks on ships off Romania and Bulgaria; no Ally has formally named Russia
v1.6.3 · 20 Oct
Cost of the war: satellite images show damage to two primary crude units at the Salavat refinery in Bashkortostan after the 8 Oct drone strike; the entry is upgraded to Tier C
v1.6.2 · 20 Oct
Executions of Ukrainian prisoners of war: 129 restored on Pattern: Prisoners and Blind spots that are not there, 14 Oct 2026, and Map & data brought to the same figure (corrections log); PDFs rebuilt in six languages
v1.6.1 · 20 Oct
Pattern: Prisoners (Prisoners) and Blind spots that are not there, 14 Oct 2026: executions of Ukrainian prisoners of war corrected 129 → 128, in line with the figure on Map & data (corrections log); PDFs rebuilt in six languages
v1.6.0 · 20 Oct
New site layout: tabs instead of buttons across the site, a menu grouped by topic, Subscribe and Contact in one section, a shorter subscription form, fact-checks that open claim by claim, every strike as its own entry on Home, Show more adds 20 at a time, Add to brief on every item, and every page updated every four hours
v1.5.13 · 20 Oct
Map: three Russian strikes on Kramatorsk on 20 Oct killed 4 people, three of them heat-supply workers preparing the city's network for winter, and injured 6 (Donetsk regional military administration)
v1.5.13 · 20 Oct
Nova Vodolaha: toll corrected to 6 killed, two of them children, girls aged 1 and 11 (Kharkiv regional military administration, 20 Oct); first reports named three children. Map: Borova, 18 Oct — a woman killed, 2 injured
v1.5.12 · 20 Oct
Beyond Ukraine: 28 new entries — Russian drones over Romania and Moldova, attacks on ships off Romania and Bulgaria, Starlink sabotage in Poland, Bulgaria and Lithuania, Signal account hijacking, UK and US charges against Russian intelligence networks, and a new tab on migrants and border provocations by Russia and Belarus (2021–2026)
v1.5.11 · 20 Oct
Map: a Russian drone near the Kyiv–Odesa highway in Chabany, Kyiv region, killed 3 and injured 4 on the morning of 20 Oct, among them the driver of the military memorial cemetery shuttle bus (SES). In a Dnipro suburb, a strike on warehouses killed 2
v1.5.11 · 20 Oct
UN record: the Secretary-General strongly condemns the escalating daily Russian attacks on Kyiv, Odesa, Kharkiv, Dnipro and other cities, reportedly causing a record number of civilian casualties (statement read by Spokesperson Stéphane Dujarric, 19 Oct)
v1.5.11 · 20 Oct
Cost of the war: Ukraine's General Staff says it hit a Russian command post near Fedorivka in occupied Zaporizhzhia region and a repair unit near Kalmiuske in occupied Donetsk region on 19–20 Oct (Tier B, claim of one side)
v1.5.11 · 20 Oct
Russia claims Tymoshivka, Zaporizhzhia region (Ministry of Defence, 20 Oct) — not confirmed by the independent map; 0 of 16 Russian capture claims since 1 Oct confirmed
v1.5.11 · 20 Oct
Oleshky: the ICRC says it is ready to facilitate a voluntary and dignified movement of civilians with the consent of both parties; no evacuation agreement has been announced
v1.5.10 · 20 Oct
Cost of the war: overnight on 20 Oct a fire broke out at an industrial facility in Michurinsk district, Tambov region, after a drone attack, its governor said; media identified it as the Nikolskoye oil pumping station on the Druzhba pipeline
v1.5.10 · 20 Oct
Strike log: overnight on 20 Oct Russia launched 165 drones, 105 of them jet-powered, with hits at 30 locations (Air Force). Obukhiv district, Kyiv region: the toll at an enterprise hit on 19 Oct rose to 3 killed, 6 injured (SES)
v1.5.9 · 19 Oct
Map: Russian attacks on the evening of 19 Oct killed two women, born in 1926 and 1954, in Khmelnytskyi, and a man at an enterprise in Obukhiv district, Kyiv region, where six were injured (regional authorities, Tier B)
v1.5.9 · 19 Oct
Russia's Arria-formula meeting of 14 Oct: the UN records violations by both sides; Russia lets it see only one. Eight claims checked against the UN record
v1.5.8 · 19 Oct
New section Research & analysis: independent reports we cite, with our summaries, key figures and archived copies; publication rules; forms to submit analysis or ask for author access
v1.5.8 · 19 Oct
Contact: a new block for governments and international organisations on how to use the record in statements, reports and briefing notes
v1.5.7 · 19 Oct
Map: Russia dropped four guided aerial bombs on Kushuhum, Zaporizhzhia region, on the morning of 19 Oct, killing a man of 57 and damaging private houses (regional authorities, Tier B)
v1.5.7 · 19 Oct
Nova Vodolaha: a Russian attack drone hit a town park in Kharkiv region, killing 6, three of them children, incl. an infant, and injuring 15, seven of them children (regional authorities, preliminary)
v1.5.7 · 19 Oct
Oleshky: Ukraine's Ombudsman says talks with Russia on a ceasefire and evacuation directly to Ukrainian-controlled territory have reached "the final details"; no agreement yet
v1.5.7 · 19 Oct
Map: Russian shelling killed one resident each in Kramatorsk and Druzhkivka on 18 Oct (Donetsk regional authorities). Strike log: 28 mass air attacks since 16 Sep, PDF updated
v1.5.7 · 19 Oct
Cost of the war: a radar station near Trubchevsk (Bryansk region) and ammunition depots in occupied Donetsk region hit, says Ukraine's General Staff (Tier B)
v1.5.6 · 19 Oct
Every figure, row and card on the site can now be added to My brief and printed. Source titles on Beyond Ukraine and Sanctions are translated into all six languages
v1.5.5 · 19 Oct
Kryvyi Rih: a Russian missile strike on an industrial enterprise killed 2 and injured 7, incl. a boy of 15 (regional authorities). Irpin after the night attack: 1 killed, 17 injured incl. 8 children (Kyiv region). Russia claims Omelnyk — unconfirmed
v1.5.4 · 19 Oct
Strike log, map and timeline: night of 18–19 Oct — 269 drones plus ballistic and cruise missiles, hits at 25 locations (Air Force). Irpin: a woman killed, 6 injured incl. 3 children, 3 missing; Kyiv toll now 1 killed, 8 injured (regional authorities)
v1.5.3 · 19 Oct
Map and timeline: Kyiv, night of 18–19 Oct — a second Russian missile strike damaged a metro station on the left bank and hit a 25-storey residential building in the Solomianskyi district; toll now 1 killed (a woman, 21) and 3 injured (Kyiv mayor V. Klitschko; corrections log)
v1.5.2 · 18 Oct
Map and timeline: Kyiv, evening of 18 Oct — a Russian missile strike hit a medical centre building in the Desnianskyi district and a non-residential building in the Dniprovskyi district; one person killed, two injured (Kyiv city military administration, preliminary)
v1.5.1 · 18 Oct
New: a Contact section for media and researchers — how to cite the record (CC BY 4.0, no permission needed), the reliability tiers A/B/C, ready-to-use case files, fact-checks, open data and card images, and one address for questions, data extracts and background briefings. Corrections and requests are in the same place.
v1.4.0 · 17 Oct
New section: Calendar — where Ukraine is on the agenda in the coming months (UN bodies in New York, Geneva, Vienna, The Hague, London and Montreal; OSCE, NATO, EU, Council of Europe, G20 and coalition formats), with what to bring to each meeting, tiers A/B, an ICS feed and a weekly "Week ahead" subscription; My brief — mark case files, UN statements and figures as you read and print them as one document; reading layer: mobile menu, page contents, show-more lists, period filters, "new since your last visit", search over the sanctions registers, charts, print styles; Subscribe: topics for the strike log, Beyond Ukraine, Sanctions, Cost of the war and Week ahead, rhythm explained; Open data, RSS feeds, calendar and widgets on the Data page; automatic daily intake of General Staff losses, OFAC actions, UN noon briefings, OHCHR updates and schedule pages; weekly link check with archived copies; faster pages (translations loaded on demand)
v1.5.0 · 18 Oct
Oleshky. Moscow now calls the town's situation "critical" and "a tragedy" and blames Kyiv for blockading a town Russia has held since 2022. None of eight Russian statements proposes the evacuation the UN, the ICRC and the Pope asked for
v1.5.0 · 18 Oct
Oleshky: about 1,700 people, 47 of them children, trapped in a town Russia has held since 2022. No food by road since 26 May (UN monitoring mission); Ukraine drops food by drone. Six-page dossier with testimonies of those who got out
v1.5.0 · 18 Oct
Map & data: one map for the whole war — the front line since 24 Feb 2022 with a time slider, Russian strikes and their distance from the front, and Russia's capture claims checked against the record (0 of 14 confirmed since 1 Oct)
v1.5.0 · 18 Oct
Cost of the war: Daily tally of Russia's losses (General Staff of Ukraine, with independent floors from Oryx and Mediazona/BBC) and a register of struck objects in Russia and occupied territory — refineries, ports, data centres — each as PDF and image
v1.4.14 · 18 Oct
The cost of the war for Russia: St Petersburg and Leningrad region, night of 18 Oct — the regional health committee now reports 10 injured in Leningrad region, including 5 children (corrections log)
v1.4.13 · 18 Oct
Map and timeline: Sumy, 17 Oct — toll revised to 2 killed and 3 injured in the Sumy community: a man killed by guided bombs and another by a drone (Sumy regional police; corrections log)
v1.4.12 · 18 Oct
The cost of the war for Russia: St Petersburg, night of 18 Oct — the city governor now reports 1 killed and 5 injured and fires at the oil terminal, the Ruchyi oil depot and Kolpino warehouses (corrections log); General Staff: a Russian attack-drone launch site near Donetsk and a vehicle repair base near Sukhodilsk hit
v1.4.11 · 18 Oct
The cost of the war for Russia: St Petersburg oil terminal, night of 18 Oct — fire after a drone attack, confirmed by the city governor; about 20,000 people without power in Leningrad region (regional governor)
v1.4.11 · 18 Oct
Map and timeline: Sloviansk, 17 Oct — toll revised to 6 killed, 15 injured (Sloviansk city military administration); Zaporizhzhia, 18 Oct — two overnight strikes, 2 injured incl. a girl (6)
v1.4.11 · 18 Oct
Strike log: night of 17–18 Oct — 180 drones and an Iskander-M ballistic missile, 152 drones downed, hits at 20 locations (Air Force); 27 mass attacks since 16 Sep; strike log PDF re-issued (v5, six languages)
v1.4.10 · 18 Oct
Map and timeline: Zaporizhzhia, night of 18 Oct — a strike on a multi-storey residential building killed a 27-year-old woman and injured another woman (Zaporizhzhia regional military administration, preliminary); Poltava, 17 Oct: injured revised from 2 to 4
v1.4.10 · 18 Oct
Strike log: daytime wave of 17 Oct — 157 drones and 6 Banderol missiles, 140 drones and all missiles downed (Air Force); 26 mass attacks since 16 Sep; strike log PDF re-issued (v4, six languages)
v1.4.9 · 17 Oct
Map and timeline: Poltava, evening of 17 Oct — a drone strike on a private residential area killed one person and injured two; four houses damaged (Poltava regional military administration, preliminary)
v1.4.8 · 17 Oct
Vinnytsia, Lutsk, Rivne, Zhytomyr, 16–17 Oct 2026 (Vinnytsia) updated to v2: 6 injured in the region, 1 in intensive care; 24 drones downed over the region; by the evening power was back at the water station; Russia's MoD statement of 17 Oct names Kryvyi Rih, Zaporizhzhia and Zhytomyr but not Vinnytsia. One-pager in six languages
v1.4.8 · 17 Oct
Open data: every figure on the site — indicators, strike log, incidents, UN record — as one file at /data/hub.json, refreshed with every release
v1.4.7 · 17 Oct
Calendar: the European Council of 15–16 Oct now links to its adopted conclusions, which include Ukraine
v1.4.7 · 17 Oct
Map and timeline: Kherson, 17 Oct — a repeat aerial-bomb strike on the same address killed an ambulance driver, 37 injured incl. a one-month-old baby; Sloviansk, 17 Oct — a second glide-bomb strike, toll now 3 killed, 16 injured
v1.4.6 · 17 Oct
Strike log PDF re-issued (v3, 16 Sep – 17 Oct, six languages) with the 16–17 Oct row: 25 mass attacks in one month
v1.4.6 · 17 Oct
Vinnytsia, Lutsk, Rivne, Zhytomyr, 16–17 Oct 2026: Vinnytsia left without electricity and water pumping after the night of 16–17 Oct — 332 drones, Iskander-M/KN-23, Kh-22/32 and 4 Kalibr missiles; no ballistic missile reported intercepted; 15+ power facilities attacked (Air Force, President of Ukraine, Vinnytsia authorities · tier B). One-pager PDF in six languages
v1.4.5 · 17 Oct
Vinnytsia, Lutsk, Rivne, Zhytomyr, 16–17 Oct 2026: Vinnytsia left without power after the night strike of 16–17 Oct — 332 drones and ballistic, cruise and Kalibr missiles, more than 15 power facilities attacked; one-pager in six languages; Nikopol district, 16 Sep 2026 moved to the Archive
v1.4.5 · 17 Oct
Strike log and map: 16–17 Oct — 332 drones and missiles, hits at 22 locations; Kherson, Sumy and Sloviansk, 17 Oct — 1 killed in each
v1.4.5 · 17 Oct
UN on the record: IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi, 16 Oct — diesel at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant running low before winter
v1.4.5 · 17 Oct
Sanctions — easing: US Executive Order of 16 Oct waives the tariffs and secondary sanctions of the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026; existing Russia sanctions unaffected
v1.4.5 · 17 Oct
The cost of the war for Russia: railway bridge over the Unecha (Bryansk region), 16–17 Oct; drone maker near Lenina (Rostov region), 16 Oct; supply depots in occupied Donetsk region; missile-brigade supply depot near Latyshi (Bryansk region), 12 Oct
v1.4.4 · 17 Oct
Social media: a daily plan of about ten posts (Russian losses, strike log, case files, UN on the record, sanctions, calendar, cost of the war, Beyond Ukraine, verified figures, economy) with cards; X account @UkraineEvidence
v1.4.1 · 17 Oct
Telegram channel: new update-log rows and the Monday "Week ahead" are posted as cards; link previews of the site now carry a card image (og:image); social cards available at /cards/
v1.3.4 · 16 Oct
The cost of the war for Russia: two communications towers, Olenivka area (Crimea), 15–16 Oct; Ryazan refinery: primary unit shut down after the 15 Oct attack (Reuters)
v1.3.4 · 16 Oct
Sanctions: EU listings of 77 persons over the Duma elections held in occupied Ukrainian territory (12 Oct)
v1.3.3 · 16 Oct
Sanctions: EU listings of 1,569 individuals and companies (12 Oct) and of 3 individuals and 9 entities for circumvention (15 Oct); UK package of 38 designations (8 Oct)
v1.3.3 · 16 Oct
The cost of the war for Russia: Nebo-U radar near Magri (Krasnodar region) and two radars and an EW station in Bryansk region, 15–16 Oct
v1.3.3 · 16 Oct
Map and timeline: Dnipro, 16 Oct — 1 killed, 4 injured; Nikopol district, 16 Oct — 1 killed, 2 injured
v1.3.2 · 16 Oct
Case files 09–11: official photographs of the State Emergency Service added to the cards and one-page PDFs; The cost of the war for Russia: 5 military assets and 6 damaged facilities, 9–16 Oct 2026
v1.3.1 · 16 Oct
Case files 09–12: Kyiv, 25 Sep; Dnipro, 22 and 28 Sep; Nikopol district, 16 Sep; Sumy, 26 Sep — cards and one-page PDFs in six languages; the Case files page now shows the ten latest files and the Home page ten latest items; The cost of the war for Russia: latest additions and new military assets and damaged facilities (to 9 Oct)
v1.3.0 · 16 Oct
New sections: Sanctions — the legal acts, registers of sanctioned companies, individuals and vessels from nine official lists (updated daily), gaps between the lists, the makers of the weapons in our case files, and what has been lifted or eased; The cost of the war for Russia — people, equipment, military assets, damaged facilities, violence by returning soldiers and the economy
v1.2.2 · 16 Oct
Strike log and map: Manevychi (Volyn region), 15–16 Oct — 1 killed, 8 injured; toll for the night raised to 4 killed; Kharkiv, 16 Oct — 2 killed, 12 injured; UN record: IOM, 16 Oct; timeline to 16 Oct
v1.2.1 · 16 Oct
Permanent pages for every case file, fact-check and UN record entry, in six languages, so that each can be found by search engines and linked directly
v1.2.0 · 16 Oct
New home page: latest Russian strikes and what is new on the site at the top, key figures in a column on the right; the brief is now assembled automatically from the newest items; timeline, archive documents and data tables listed newest first
v1.1.6 · 16 Oct
Strike log PDF re-issued (v2, 16 Sep – 16 Oct, six languages) with the 14–15 and 15–16 Oct rows; count of mass-attack nights or days corrected to 24
v1.1.5 · 16 Oct
OHCHR September update: monthly pulse (chart, table, PDF in six languages) and home indicators updated; UN record: HRMMU, 16 Oct; strike log: 15–16 Oct; timeline to 16 Oct
v1.1.4 · 15 Oct
Case files: six files; killed-on-these-cards figure updated to 115 (2–15 Oct) to include Lutsk, Kropyvnytskyi and beyond, 14–15 Oct 2026
v1.1.3 · 15 Oct
UN record: briefers named (Stéphane Dujarric, Farhan Haq); OCHA, 13 Oct (Kyiv and Kharkiv) added
v1.1.2 · 15 Oct
850+ attack drones in 33 hours, 14–15 Oct (Lutsk, Kropyvnytskyi): card, one-pager PDF in six languages; strike log and map updated
v0.4.2 · 14 Oct
Full Spanish version of every page; Prosecutor General figures updated to 7 May 2026
v1.1 · 15 Oct
New section "Beyond Ukraine": Russia's attacks and operations in other countries since 2004 — killings, sabotage, airspace violations, cyber operations, election interference, Wagner and Africa Corps — each with its degree of proof, sources and a one-page PDF in six languages
v1.0 · 15 Oct
The site is live at ukraine-evidence.org; e-mail subscriptions by topic, language and frequency, confirmed by e-mail in six languages; privacy note on subscriber data
v0.10 · 15 Oct
Links inside each language open the material in that language; PDF buttons download the file; two new pattern files — sexual violence (Pattern: Sexual violence) and nuclear safety (Pattern: Nuclear safety) — in six languages; private usage statistics without cookies or personal data; release gate: nothing is published until every language is complete
v0.9 · 15 Oct
Full versions in French, Spanish, Russian, Arabic and Chinese: every page, every figure label and every PDF (case files, pattern files, fact-check dossiers, brief, pulse, strike log) in its own language; PDF buttons open the version in the reader’s language; typography adjusted for Cyrillic, Arabic and Chinese
v0.8 · 15 Oct
Emblem in the header and favicon; slogan "The record Russia cannot deny"; language selector as a dropdown in the header; audience wording removed; "The named" on Accountability — ICC warrants, convictions in absentia and abroad, notices of suspicion, sanctions and dossiers, with links to the official registers; indicator on Home
v0.7 · 14 Oct
"UN on the record" page: Secretary-General, Spokesperson, Council briefers, OHCHR and OCHA statements, 23 Sep – 14 Oct, with filters, Cite/Link and official-record links; UN entries reused on Home, the Brief and Nebenzia at the Council, 9 Oct; DSNS photographs (CC BY 4.0) and "Official media" links on all five case files; photo-and-video policy and DSNS-as-data-source on the Method page; Zaporizhzhia corrected to the SES closing figure (23 killed incl. 4 children); Nebenzia at the Council, 9 Oct expanded to a six-page dossier; "UN statements" subscription category
v0.6 · 14 Oct
Permalinks and "Link" on every figure; "Report an error" on every card and claim; Requests & corrections page; narrative shift tracker; source and archived-copy links on every watch-log entry; sources register (all external links); "What we do not know"; file hashes; open-data JSON; PDFs for Nebenzia at the Council, 9 Oct, the Brief and the monthly pulse; UN calendar; evidence-chain line on each case file; offline support scaffold
v0.5 · 14 Oct
Five new case files with one-pager PDFs (Pryluky, Kramatorsk, Zaporizhzhia, Kyiv energy, Kharkiv); three pattern files as PDFs; Nebenzia at the Council, 9 Oct (Nebenzia, 9 Oct) and 15 new disinformation-watch entries; incident map extended to 28 entries for 16 Sep – 14 Oct; strike log of 22 mass attacks; OHCHR figures updated to 31 Aug 2026; report links on every indicator tile; institutional references removed
v0.4 · 14 Oct
Brief page; pattern files (energy, children, prisoners); Cite buttons; site search; map by year; "what happened next"; UN-vs-national explainer; corrections log; Subscribe by category; six-language pages (scaffold)
v0.3 · 14 Oct
Sources directory with Ukrainian State bodies; archive with UN document table; distribution lists
First version: home, case files, fact-checks, data, accountability, method
Sources · who verifies what
The directory behind every figure on this site. Tier A bodies carry a UN or court mandate; Tier B are Ukrainian State bodies with a statutory recording function; Tier C are independent investigations and academic trackers. Each row: what the body records, how often it publishes, and where it feeds on this site.
What the State bodies record now B
National registers, shown as such. Where a Tier A body measures the same thing (UNESCO, WHO), the UN figure leads on the thematic page and the national figure stands beside it.
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Body
What it records
Cadence
On this site
OHCHR / Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine
Registered crimes linked to the aggression (256,000+, of which 225,000+ war crimes, 7 May 2026); suspects (1,191), indictments (856), verdicts (254); evidence intake
Generated from the page itself: every external link, where it is used, and an archived copy. Access date for this version: 14 Oct 2026. If a link dies, the archive holds the page as it was when cited.
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Archive · since 24 February 2022
Two layers of memory. Left: the documented record — key incidents, UN findings and accountability steps, year by year, so a newcomer sees the pattern in five minutes. Right: every official document Ukraine has circulated at the United Nations, searchable by year, type and subject, with the UN symbol that makes it citable.
Curated; figures as verified at the time of the entry. Each incident will link to its case file as the series is built.
Official documents circulated by Ukraine
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Date
Subject
Seeded from the UN Digital Library (letters from the Permanent Representative or Chargé d'affaires a.i. of Ukraine addressed to the Secretary-General, 2025–2026 sample). The full series since 2022 — several hundred letters, mostly under the Eleventh Emergency Special Session (A/ES-11/…) — is added by import from the Library; each row then links to the six-language PDF. Mission statements, Arria-formula concept notes and side-event materials form a second table once their files are supplied.
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What this is. A public, verified record of Russia's crimes in Ukraine and of Russian hostile acts abroad. Every figure carries its source, date and reliability tier: A — UN-mandated bodies, B — Ukrainian authorities, C — independent researchers. Legal language is kept in three layers: what is established, what is a pattern, what is a position.
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OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) · report
Ninth Interim Report on reported violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law in Ukraine2026-07-15 · intergovernmental monitoring (OSCE) C
The report, covering 1 December 2025 to 31 May 2026, finds that the frequency and severity of civilian harm suggest the Russian Federation repeatedly failed to comply with the IHL principles of proportionality and precautions, and that the scale and pattern of strikes on energy facilities suggest an intent to disrupt the national energy system as a whole. It describes widespread and systematic torture of detained Ukrainian civilians, reports of torture of POWs at almost every detention facility, and the use of detained civilians as bargaining chips, which it says amounts to hostage-taking.
+45% Increase in verified civilian casualties in government-controlled Ukraine vs. same period of 2025 (OHCHR data) (p. 14, para. 28)
1,090+ Attacks on more than 550 energy facilities recorded by Ukrainian authorities (p. 18, para. 33)
345+ Ukrainian military personnel who surrendered reportedly executed (allegations ODIHR 'remains seriously concerned' about) (p. 27, para. 49)
Method, as the authors describe it: ODIHR conducted 104 interviews with 107 survivors and witnesses during three monitoring deployments in the first half of 2026, complemented by open-source investigation and information from NGOs, Ukrainian and Russian institutions and intergovernmental organizations.
Note: Casualty data partly from OHCHR, which says its figures may rise as reports are confirmed. The executions figure is reported as allegations.
Physicians for Human Rights (with Insecurity Insight, eyeWitness to Atrocities, Media Initiative for Human Rights, Truth Hounds, Ukrainian Healthcare Center) · dataset
Attacks on Health in Ukraine Continue to Escalate Four Years into Russia's Full-Scale Invasion2026-02-12 · independent research C
The organisations find that 2,591 attacks on health care were documented in Ukraine between February 2022 and the end of 2025, with incidents rising from 445 in 2024 to 663 in 2025. The release finds that armed-drone incidents affecting health care grew from 25 in 2023 to over 300 in 2025, and argues the attacks are systematic and part of a broader campaign against civilian infrastructure including energy. It also reports that in occupied territories health care is controlled and weaponised, including through forced passportisation and detention of health workers.
2,591 Attacks on health care documented since February 2022 (press release, key figures (PHR); opening paragraph (Insecurity Insight release))
359 Health workers killed (379 injured) (press release, key figures)
300+ Armed-drone incidents affecting health care in 2025 (25 in 2023, 87 in 2024) (press release, key figures)
Method, as the authors describe it: Incident data on attacks on health care are monitored and compiled by Insecurity Insight together with five partner organisations and published as an interactive map (attacksonhealthukraine.org); no further verification method is described on the page.
Note: Release accompanying a dataset and map, not a long-form report; the verification method is not described. Figures differ slightly between the organisations' releases.
Seizing Power: Rosatom's Complicity in Occupation, Torture, and Nuclear Safety Breaches at the Zaporizhzhia NPP2025-09-24 · independent research C
The report finds that after capturing Enerhodar and the Zaporizhzhia NPP in March 2022, Russian forces unlawfully detained at least 226 residents and plant employees across at least seven detention sites, where detainees describe beatings, electrocution, sexual violence and mock executions. It finds that Rosatom played a central role in consolidating control over the plant and the occupied city, and that coercion of licensed staff undermined the plant's safety culture and heightened accident risk. The authors characterise these acts as war crimes and crimes against humanity.
226+ Enerhodar residents and ZNPP employees unlawfully detained (Executive Summary)
7+ Detention sites established by Russian forces in and around Enerhodar (Executive Summary)
~50,000 → ~10,000 Enerhodar population before occupation vs. by March 2025 (Executive Summary)
Method, as the authors describe it: 39 in-depth anonymised interviews with survivors and witnesses (including 20 ZNPP staff), 17 further testimonies from former Enerhodar residents provided by the Association of Relatives of Political Prisoners of the Kremlin, open-source monitoring and analysis of Rosatom sources, a nuclear-safety assessment with Greenpeace Ukraine, and legal review against IHL and ICL.
Note: The legal characterisation (war crimes, crimes against humanity) is the authors' position.
Yale School of Public Health Humanitarian Research Lab (Yale HRL) · investigation
Ukraine's Stolen Children: Inside Russia's Network of Re-education and Militarization2025-09-16 · independent research C
The report finds at least 210 facilities inside Russia and temporarily occupied Ukraine where children from Ukraine have been taken, forming what it calls a potentially unprecedented system of large-scale re-education, military training and dormitory facilities. It finds re-education activities at at least 130 sites and military training at at least 39, and that at least 106 of the 210 locations are managed by Russian federal or local government bodies. The study does not estimate how many children are currently in Russian custody.
210+ Facilities in Russia and occupied Ukraine where children from Ukraine were taken (p. 1, Executive Summary 1A)
130 (61.9%) Sites with re-education activities involving children from Ukraine (p. 2, Key Finding 3)
106 Locations managed by Russian federal or local government bodies (p. 3, Key Finding 6)
Method, as the authors describe it: Open-source investigation using publicly available data and commercially available very-high-resolution satellite imagery, applying Berkeley Protocol multi-source corroboration and requiring at least five independent sources to confirm the presence of children from Ukraine at a facility; no witness interviews.
Note: Figures as given in the report PDF; the news page rounds some shares differently. The study does not estimate how many children are in Russian custody.
Hunted From Above: Russia's Use of Drones to Attack Civilians in Kherson, Ukraine2025-06-03 · independent research C
The report finds that Russian forces used commercially available quadcopter drones to deliberately or recklessly attack civilians and civilian objects in Kherson, documenting at least 45 such attacks in Antonivka and Dniprovskyi between June and December 2024. It finds the attacks spread terror and drove depopulation, and concludes they constitute war crimes and appear to be crimes against humanity as part of a widespread attack on Kherson's civilian population.
45+ Drone attacks apparently deliberately targeting civilians and civilian objects in Antonivka and Dniprovskyi (June–Dec 2024) (Summary)
30 killed / 483 injured Civilian casualties from drone attacks in Kherson, 1 May–16 Dec 2024 (Kherson City Council data) (Summary)
4,570 → 2,300 Antonivka population, May–Dec 2024 (Summary; Attacks on Health Care, Other Essential Goods and Services)
Method, as the authors describe it: Interviews with 59 people (including 36 survivors and witnesses, rescue and medical workers and officials), mostly in person in Kherson, plus analysis of 83 videos from Russian military-affiliated Telegram channels and further witness and social-media imagery graded as reviewed, analyzed or verified.
Note: Casualty figures are from the Kherson City Council; HRW cites the UN monitoring mission (drones caused 70% of civilian casualties in Kherson in January 2025), consistent with UN reporting.
Ukraine: A Deafening Silence: Ukrainians Held Incommunicado, Forcibly Disappeared and Tortured in Russian Captivity2025-03-04 · independent research C
The report finds that Russia holds most Ukrainian POWs incommunicado, denies international organisations access to them and fails to acknowledge some detentions, which Amnesty says amounts to enforced disappearance. Former detainees described torture and denial of medical care, and Amnesty concludes that the treatment of Ukrainians in Russian captivity amounts to war crimes and crimes against humanity.
104 People interviewed (Jan–Nov 2024) (Methodology (per Amnesty press release))
38 POWs whose family members were interviewed (Methodology (per Amnesty press release))
Tens of thousands Ukrainians considered 'missing in special circumstances' by Ukrainian authorities (Press release / Summary)
Method, as the authors describe it: Interviews with 104 people in Ukraine between January and November 2024, including former Ukrainian POWs, relatives of POWs and of people missing in special circumstances, formerly detained civilians and their families, and Russian POWs held in Ukraine.
Note: The legal characterisation (war crimes, crimes against humanity) is the authors' position.
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